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A  Abstract  
 
This thesis argues for the reform of the regulatory framework of the Reserve Bank 
of Australia (RBA) for its financial stability responsibility. The mandate of the RBA 
for financial stability is an uneasy mandate, being both informal, but also 
decentralized and shared. It therefore creates challenges for the governance and 
accountability of the RBA as the regulator with the ultimate overall responsibility 
for financial stability in Australia. The current regulatory framework lacks clarity 
about the RBA’s responsibility for financial stability. These difficulties are 
compounded by the elusive nature of the concept of financial stability and the fact 
that the RBA is a central bank, with a unique character and potentially competing 
mandates.  
A preponderance of soft law regulatory measures control and influence the 
execution of the RBA’s financial stability mandate. The thesis suggests that the 
emphasis on soft law regulation results in the regulatory framework being 
inadequate, with both the RBA and the Australian Government risking the 
legitimacy and credibility of the RBA in its pursuit of financial stability. As the 
current measures to ‘regulate the regulator’ are not optimal, this thesis proposes 
necessary reforms to the regulatory framework. These suggested reforms have 
a legal focus and reflect emerging international best practice in the regulation of 
financial stability.  
The original contribution to knowledge that this thesis makes is firstly in the 
detailed critical analysis of the regulatory framework of the RBA’s financial 
stability obligations and the governance and accountability mechanisms that 
regulate the RBA as regulator. Secondly, it highlights both the potential problems 
for the RBA as a central bank with an informally formulated financial stability 
responsibility and the risks arising from the legal framework for governance and 
accountability, affecting the RBA's legitimacy and credibility. Finally, the thesis 
makes a contribution to academic discourse through proposals for improvements 
to the RBA’s regulatory framework in regard to financial stability and provides the 
rationales for such improvements. 
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‘Does the goal of financial stability need to be better defined than it 
is at the moment? If so, by whom? Should the central bank have 
complete independence to pursue its goal of financial stability with 
whatever instruments it so chooses, including when the 
distributional implications of some of those instruments are much 
starker? The questions do not have a straightforward answer. I 
would hope they would be a hot topic for students today in the 
way that central bank independence was when Adam Posen and I 
were PhD students’.1 
 
Dr Guy Debelle 
Deputy-Governor, Reserve Bank of Australia 
 
 
1 Guy Debelle, ‘Central Bank Independence in Retrospect’ (Speech, Bank of England 












Financial stability is a longstanding responsibility of the Reserve 
Bank and its Board …1 
 
… this responsibility derives from its broad charter which extends to the 
‘economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia’.2 
 
I The Reserve Bank of Australia’s Regulatory Framework for 
Financial Stability: Background 
 
This thesis analyses the regulatory framework of the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) for financial stability and considers how the RBA as a regulator is regulated 
in respect of its financial stability responsibility.  
 
The two quotations at the start of this chapter provide an oversimplified and 
inaccurate account of the regulatory framework of the RBA’s financial stability 
obligation, which this thesis exposes and critiques. It has become accepted that 
financial stability is a longstanding responsibility of the RBA, as noted in the first 
quotation. However, whether that obligation derives from its charter as suggested 
by the second quotation, what that obligation entails, and how it is ensured that 
the RBA indeed pursues and achieves that obligation, are more nuanced 
considerations. They are at the heart of this thesis: what the RBA is required to 
 
1 The Treasurer and the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Statement on the Conduct of Monetary 
Policy (Statement, 30 September 2010) <http://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-
policy/framework/stmt-conduct-mp-5-30092010.html>.  
 
2 Graeme Thompson, ‘Regulatory Policy Issues in Australia’ in Malcolm Edey (ed), The Future 
of the Financial System (Alken Press, 1996) 252, 259. 
 
 2 
achieve, and how the Australian government ensures that the RBA achieves its 
objectives. 
 
These questions are to be considered in light of the fact that the RBA does not 
have an express, legislated financial stability mandate. The RBA further also 
shares financial stability responsibilities with other regulators, most importantly 
the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). Since the creation of 
APRA in 1998, the regulatory framework for financial stability in Australia has 
effectively remained unchanged. Even in the aftermath of the GFC, when there 
was a significant emphasis on financial stability responsibilities, no changes were 
effected to the regulatory framework or mandate of the RBA for financial stability. 
The far-reaching Financial System Inquiry (2014) (Australia) (Murray Inquiry)3 
concluded in November 2014 that no major change was required in the Australian 
financial regulatory system and made no recommendations in respect of the 
RBA’s financial stability mandate. What the Murray Inquiry did however 
recommend was that the government needed to develop a process to assess the 
performance of regulators.4 The latter recommendation was not adopted by the 
Australian government, 5  and no changes have been made to the financial 
stability mandate of the RBA or the governance of the financial regulators in 
Australia since 2014. This situation is of concern and is addressed in this thesis. 
 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is important background to this thesis and its 
conclusions in respect of the Australian regulatory framework. Financial stability, 
 
3 See Commonwealth, Financial System Inquiry (Final Report, November 2014) 
<http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final_Report_Consolidated20141210.pdf> (Murray Inquiry 
Final Report). 
 
4 ‘Australia’s regulatory architecture does not need major change; however, the Inquiry has 
made recommendations to improve the current arrangements. Government currently lacks a 
regular process that allows it to assess the overall performance of financial regulators’: Ibid xxi. 
  
5 The government stated: ‘The Government agrees with the Inquiry’s objective of strengthening 
the regulator accountability framework but does not support the creation of a new Financial 
Regulator Assessment Board’: Commonwealth, Improving Australia’s Financial System: 
Government Response to the Financial System Inquiry (Response, 20 October 2015) 23 
<https://treasury.gov.au/publication/government-response-to-the-financial-system-inquiry/>. The 
reasons cited included the adequacy of the requirements in the Public Governance, 
Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) (PGPA Act), as well as the intended 
reconstitution of the Financial Sector Advisory Council’. 
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and how regulation can achieve financial stability, were important issues in the 
GFC. The GFC made securing financial stability a priority internationally. Central 
banks were pushed into the spotlight as the most natural and appropriate 
guardians of financial stability. There were both calls for central banks to be 
responsible for financial stability, and reassurances by governments, such as the 
Australian government, that the central bank was already responsible for financial 
stability.6  
 
Some important questions arose as a consequence. How do central banks 
ensure or promote financial stability? How does a financial stability mandate 
relate to and affect a central bank’s other key mandate, that of monetary policy? 
How would a government be able to mandate the central bank in an effective way 
with a financial stability objective as well as hold the central bank accountable for 
a financial stability mandate? Given the impact of financial instability – as was 
demonstrated by the apocalyptic events of the GFC – it is important to consider 
what the Australian government can and should do to establish an effective 
regulatory framework for financial stability.  
 
The regulatory framework for financial stability represents a government’s 
‘architectural choices for a public policy regime’. 7  The regulatory design 
implemented by the Australian government in mandating and equipping the RBA 
for its financial stability task has not received much attention academically or 
politically after the GFC. The mandate and actions of the RBA in respect of 
financial stability have not been in the spotlight before or after the Murray Inquiry 
and the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and 
Financial Services Industry (Hayne Commission). That does not mean that it 
could not become an important political or legal issue in future, as has been the 
case in other countries. For example, in response to perceived failures in financial 
responsibility obligations during the GFC, some countries such as the United 
 
6 See The Treasurer and the Governor of the Reserve Bank (n 1). 
 
7 Paul Tucker, Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the 
Regulatory State (Princeton University Press, 2018) 72 (emphasis added). 
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Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (US), reviewed the roles of their 
central banks and financial stability regulators. Action was even taken against the 
Bank of England (BOE) on the basis of the tort of misfeasance.8 The RBA could 
also be subjected to increased scrutiny resulting in potential reputational damage 
if any discrepancy is revealed between what the RBA was expected to deliver 
and what it actually delivered. This could be problematic, because, as will be 
argued in this thesis, it is not clear as to what the RBA is required to do in relation 
to financial stability, how it should go about its task, and which steps have been 
taken to ensure that the RBA does in fact accomplish the objectives of the 
Australian government.  
 
The hypothesis of this thesis (as described below) was formed against this 
backdrop. Even though there have not been any recent financial stability crises 
in Australia, and there has not been any indication that the RBA has not 
adequately performed its tasks in relation to financial stability, the questions 
about the adequacy of the regulatory framework for the RBA’s financial stability 
mandate are still important and relevant. The manner in which regulators are 
regulated can have significant long-term implications for the government, the 
electorate, and for the regulators themselves as well as those that they regulate 
(the regulatees). The issues raised in this thesis pose questions in relation to the 
legitimacy of the regulator and how democratic and rule of law principles are 
affected by the existing regulatory framework.  
 
II Research Question and Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the regulatory framework of the RBA’s 
responsibility for financial stability is based on an ‘uneasy’ mandate that does not 
support the governance and accountability of the RBA as Australia’s financial 
stability regulator. 
 
8 See Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 2) 
[1996] 2 All ER 363; Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and Company of the Bank of 




This thesis argues that the regulatory framework of the RBA’s responsibility for 
financial stability provides it with an informal, shared and decentralised mandate, 
which does not appropriately support the governance and accountability of the 
RBA. The thesis argues that a strong regulatory framework will promote the 
governance and accountability of the RBA as an independent regulatory agency, 
as well as support democratic principles and the rule of law. The current 
regulatory framework is not reflective of best practice in the regulation of financial 
stability regulators internationally and falls short because of an imbalance 
between the use of ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’ controls and influences in the 
governance of the RBA. How the Australian government has chosen to regulate 
the RBA in its responsibilities for financial stability is therefore not optimal. The 
Australian government has chosen to adopt tools of regulation that are for the 
most part vague and non-specific, thereby creating difficulties in, for example, 
holding the RBA clearly accountable for its activities.  
 
The examination of the regulatory framework of the RBA for financial stability in 
this thesis therefore addresses a variation of the question ‘who regulates the 
regulator’, or ‘who watches the watcher’, by asking ‘how is the Australian financial 
stability regulator regulated?’. 
 
The thesis concludes that the regulatory framework of the RBA’s financial stability 
responsibility should be improved. The regulatory framework does not provide 
the Australian government with the necessary regulatory tools for the governance 
and accountability of the RBA when measured against best practice in the 
regulation and governance of regulators, and appropriate regulatory design 
precepts.9  Although the regulatory framework has some strengths, it fails to 
address important challenges and does not capitalise on certain opportunities. In 
particular, the way in which the financial stability responsibility has been assigned 
to the RBA does not effectively use hard law regulatory tools such as a statutory 
mandate. The practical and theoretical consequences are undesirable, and the 
 
9 The five design precepts proposed by Paul Tucker for delegating to trustee-like independent 
agencies such as central banks are used. Tucker (n 7) 110. 
 6 
effectiveness of many of the tools of regulation used by the Australian 
government are assessed as low. The thesis proposes three key 
recommendations for legislative change at the end. 
 
III Focus and Scope of the Thesis 
 
A The ‘Level of Regulation’ Investigated by this Thesis 
 
This thesis will focus on how the Australian government regulates the financial 
stability regulator in Australia. This thesis therefore considers the tools of 
regulation used by the Australian government to create and regulate the RBA as 
a regulatory agency responsible for financial stability. The regulatory ‘level’ is 
accordingly the regulatory mechanisms that are used by the state for the creation, 
operation and governance of the financial stability regulator, ie the regulatory 
mechanisms between the state (represented by the Australian government) and 
the RBA (the institution created by government to act in certain ways in the 
Australian markets and economy). See Figure 1.1 below. 
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This figure sets out the different levels or tiers of regulation as identified for the conceptual 
framework of this thesis. The focus of this thesis is on the regulation of the RBA as financial 
stability regulator (the regulation of the regulator) 
 
B Specific Exclusions/Limitations to the Scope of this Thesis 
 
The scope of this thesis is limited to the regulatory ‘level’ identified above as 
between the Australian government (represented by Parliament) and the RBA. It 
does not focus on the regulation of the markets and financial institutions in the 
financial markets themselves and does not consider regulation by the RBA and/or 
APRA of banks and financial institutions (regulatees). 
 
This thesis also focusses on the RBA as the regulatory agency responsible for 
financial stability and does not consider the role of APRA (or any other regulatory 
agency or stakeholder) in financial stability except to the extent that those 















has overall responsibility for financial stability, only APRA as prudential 
supervisor can utlilise some key financial stability tools. Although the interaction 
with both APRA and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC) is a relevant factor in how the RBA gives effect to its obligations, APRA 
and ASIC are only discussed to the extent relevant for the analysis of the RBA’s 
financial stability responsibility. 
 
This thesis focusses on the regulatory framework and does not address problems 
of actually procuring financial stability. The law and legal framework however play 
important roles in that regard. The regulatory architecture of how regulators are 
created, empowered and governed, have a direct influence on financial stability 
per se, but that is not the focus of this thesis. This thesis focusses on how the 
Australian government regulates the RBA in relation to its financial stability 
responsibility. 
 
C Terminological Clarification  
 




This thesis is about the ‘architectural choices for a public policy regime’,10 as 
noted above. The phrase ‘regulatory framework’ is accordingly used in this thesis 
to encompass the entirety of the regulatory design of the RBA as financial stability 
regulator. It includes the ‘regulatory architecture’ of the RBA and the other 
relevant regulators as well as the ‘regulatory tools’ of government in the form of 
governance and accountability mechanisms. The phrase ‘regulatory architecture’ 
refers to the manner in which the Australian government has structured the RBA 
as the financial stability regulator, including its institutional character, structure, 
 
10 Tucker (n 7) 72. 
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objectives, functions, powers, and tools. It also involves the relationship(s) 
created between the RBA, other regulators and the Australian government itself.  
 
The phrase ‘regulatory framework’ includes the formal legislation promulgated by 
the Australian government to both empower and control the RBA and therefore 
includes ‘formal’ elements of law, ie hard law. The framework also encompasses 
all other regulatory elements that may originate in soft law. The regulatory 
framework also includes the hard law and soft law regulation of the interaction 
between the RBA and other regulators and the complementarity, overlap and 
gaps between their roles. For example, memoranda of understanding, official 
statements, and operational practices, as well as governance, transparency and 
accountability mechanisms that have an effect on the conduct of the RBA, are 
also considered as part of the ‘regulatory framework’.  
 
In Australia, the Australian government is the main architect of the regulatory 
framework for financial stability, although other parties also play important roles 
in constructing, implementing and influencing the regulatory framework, as well 
as in providing controls for and influences on the financial stability role of the 
RBA. The Australian government’s role in the creation of the regulatory 
framework is not always active, and the government does not prescribe all 




In this thesis the word ‘regulation’ is accordingly also used broadly. The thesis 
adopts the view that ‘government regulation is only one element of power or 
social control in a society’ 11  and only one tool of control of a regulator. It 
acknowledges that ‘power structures are complex, dynamic and fragmented’.12 
 
11 Ibid 5; See also Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal 
of Legal Philosophy 1; See also Barak Orbach, ‘Regulation: Why and How the State Regulates’ 
(Foundation Press, 2013): ‘Regulation is state intervention in the private domain, which is a 
byproduct of our imperfect reality and human limitations’: at 2 
 
12 Arie Freiberg, The Tools of Regulation (Federation Press, 1st ed, 2010) (‘Tools’) 5. 
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The dominant focus in this thesis is government regulation, ie government 
measures or interventions that are ‘intentional and systematic’,13 and are taken 
with a specific goal in mind (in this case, the regulation of the responsibility for 
financial stability). This thesis also recognises and identifies other forms of 
regulation of conduct, such as non-statutory ways of altering behaviour, 14 
historically developed roles, and the role of personal power as well as the strive 
for excellence and prestige. In particular, where the behaviour of institutions and 
the persons acting for the institutions are not regulated by hard law, regulatory 
power may lie in other forces, and behavioural factors may be the most 
fundamental influences on conduct.  
 
Regulation is accordingly seen to be ‘a specific set of commands’15 and also a 
‘deliberate state influence’16 and ‘all forms of social or economic influence’.17 It 
includes both enabling and facilitating commands and influences, but also all 
restrictive and preventative commands and influences. 18  References to 
‘regulation’ in this thesis therefore includes (but are not limited to) legislation, 
memoranda of understanding, principles adopted by international organisations 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), and self-regulatory measures adopted by institutions. This thesis analyses 
the extent to which the regulation of the financial stability regulator is achieved 
 
13 Ibid 4. 
 
14 Regulation can include ‘all mechanisms of social control or influence affecting behaviour, from 
whatever source, whether intentional or not’: Robert Baldwin, Colin D Scott and Christopher 
Hood (eds), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1998) 4. In this thesis the 
behavioural factors of personality and the search for prestige will be analysed. See also Arie 
Freiberg, Regulation in Australia (Federation Press, 2017) 205. 
 









through traditional legal regulatory mechanisms (hard law)19 as opposed to other 




In this thesis, the word ‘regulator’ and the phrase ‘regulatory agency’ are used 
interchangeably. They are both used to designate an institution that has been 
created by government as a formal regulator, ie an institution with the statutory 
powers to issue regulations (delegated/subordinate legislation). In Australia, the 
RBA, APRA and ASIC are generally referred to as the ‘government financial 
regulators’.22 All three ‘financial regulators’ are created by statute and have the 
statutory authority to issue regulations. The RBA however only issues regulations 
in relation to the payments system, and monetary policy is implemented without 
traditional ‘regulation’ but through banking mechanisms (the raising of interest 
rates).23 It is therefore acknowledged that the term ‘regulator’ may not be an 




19 Hard law consists of regulatory mechanisms with binding legal force. 
 
20 Quasi legal mechanisms that do not have binding legal force can operate as soft law. See 
Rolf H Weber, ‘Overcoming the Hard Law/Soft Law Dichotomy in Times of Financial Crises’ 
(2012) 1(1) Journal of Governance and Regulation 8; See also Deborah E Rupp and Cynthia A 
Williams, ‘The Efficacy of Regulation as a Function of Psychological Fit: Reexamining the Hard 
Law/Soft Law Continuum’ (2011) 12(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 581. 
 
21 This phrase is frequently used in the European Union (EU): See Baldwin et al (n 15) 396-9. 
 
22 Sheelagh McCracken, John Stumbles, Greg Tolhurst and Olivia Dixon, Everett and 
McCracken’s Banking and Financial Institutions Law (Lawbook, 9th ed, 2017) 20.  
 
23 A central bank is not a ‘regulator’ in the strict sense of the word in respect of monetary policy 
because it does not compel regulated entities to act in a certain way through the use of 
regulation. Rather, it acts like a bank, and the increase in interest rates changes behavior. It 
may act as a regulator in respect of payment systems, for example. 
 
24 The RBA nevertheless employs a spectrum of regulatory mechanisms. It uses economic, 
transactional, and informational regulation, as well as authorization, and enforcement and 
sanctions, although not all the regulatory mechanisms are relevant in the context of financial 
stability. See Freiberg (n 14) for a discussion of these different forms of regulation. 
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IV Significance and Importance of the Research 
 
This research is significant because of the importance of financial stability to 
Australia and the importance of the regulatory framework of the financial stability 
regulator. 
 
By making the RBA responsible for financial stability, the Australian government 
delegates an important public function to an institution that is not part of 
government and is not subject to the control of, for example, a minister that is 
part of a democratically elected parliament. The institutional and legal design of 
the regulated entity – the RBA – is therefore important. How this public function 
has been delegated to the RBA is the key issue in this thesis. 
 
A The Importance of the Regulatory Framework for Promoting Financial 
Stability in Australia 
 
The regulatory framework for promoting financial stability in Australia is important 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, financial stability is critical to Australia’s welfare. 
Financial stability is in Australia’s national interest, and financial stability is a 
public good. 25  It is therefore an important consideration for the Australian 
government. Secondly, the role of the RBA as the responsible regulator needs to 
be constructed in such a manner that the government’s public policy objectives 
will be met. The legitimacy and credibility of the RBA as the relevant regulator is 
affected by its underlying legal framework. 
 




1 Financial Stability is in Australia’s National Interest and a Public Good  
 
The Australian government is (and should be) concerned with financial stability 
as a matter of national interest. As financial stability has an impact on welfare and 
has objectives related to public policy, financial stability is in Australia’s national 
interest.26 The Australian government has for example taken Australia’s financial 
stability into account when assessing foreign investment applications. When 
announcing that permission for the foreign acquisition of the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) had been denied, the then Treasurer linked Australia’s financial 
stability directly with Australia’s national interest. He stated that ‘it's in Australia's 
national interest to ensure the ongoing strength and stability of our financial 
system so that it remains well placed to support our economy into the future’.27 
This and similar actions in which the Australian government and its 
representatives act for the benefit of the Australian population and Australia as a 
nation, support the designation of financial stability as a national interest.28 
 
Financial stability is both a national and international public good.29 Financial 
stability as well as monetary stability are preconditions for sustained economic 
growth and prosperity. Accordingly, achieving and preserving financial stability is 
now considered to be a ‘key policy objective in our societies’.30 At the height of 
 
26 See Louise Parsons, ‘Regulating Australia's Financial Stability in the National Interest’, in 
John H Farrar, Mary Hiscock and Vai Io Lo (eds), Australia's Trade, Investment and Security in 
the Asian Century (World Scientific, 2015) 251. 
 
27 Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment Decision’ (Media Release No 030, The Treasury, 8 April 
2011) 
<http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2011/030.htm&pageID=
003&min=wms&Year=&> (emphasis added). 
 
28 See Parsons, (n 26). The concept of ‘national interest’ is nevertheless somewhat vague: See 
Joseph Frankel, National Interest (Palgrave Macmillan, 1970).  
 
29 See C B Blankart and E R Fasten, ‘Financial Crisis Resolution – The State as a Lender of 
Last Resort?’ 2009 29(3) Economic Affairs 47. 
 
30 Peter Praet, ‘The (Changing) Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability Policies’ (Speech, 
Annual Internal Banking Conference, 10 November 2011). 
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the GFC, the IMF and the G20, both key international institutions involved with 
finding solutions to the GFC, noted that one of the key lessons of the GFC was 
that there should be a much more pronounced focus on financial stability, with a 
broader responsibility for, and oversight of, financial stability both in domestic 
economies and internationally.31 The importance of financial stability as a policy 
objective increased during and after the GFC.  
 
In light of the events and consequences of the GFC, and the strong response 
from international organisations and domestic governments and regulators, it 
would therefore be reasonable to expect that the regulatory framework and 
architecture in domestic jurisdictions would post-GFC reflect the importance of 
financial stability. After all, the institutional underpinnings – that is, the structure, 
role and administration of the government-mandated regulators – are critically 
important,32 revealing the extent to which financial stability is a key consideration 
for the government. 
 
Subsequent Australian governments have always recognised the importance of 
financial stability.33 Nevertheless financial stability did not expressly form part of 
the three separate commissions of inquiry launched into the Australian financial 
 
31 G20, G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration 2010 (Seoul, 12 November 2010)  
<https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/documents/statement/wcms_146479.pdf>; See also International Monetary Fund, 
‘Lessons of the Financial Crisis for Future Regulation of Financial Institutions and Markets and 




32 See Erland W Nier, Jacek Osiński, Luis I Jácome and Pamela Madrid, ‘Institutional Models for 
Macroprudential Policy’ (Staff Discussion Note No 11/18, International Monetary Fund, 1 
November 2011) <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1118.pdf>. 
 
33 For example, the Wallis Inquiry recognised the role of the RBA in financial stability (see 
Commonwealth, Financial System Inquiry (Final Report, March 1997) 
<https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2018/07/01-fsi-fr-Prelim.pdf> (Wallis Inquiry Final 
Report). The Australian Government at that time included an express responsibility for financial 
system stability in the suite of legislation following the Wallis Inquiry (Reserve Bank Act 1959 
(Cth) s 10B). Australia’s financial stability has also been recognized internationally and Australia 
has been rated as one of the world’s best performing financial centres, in part because of its 
‘strength in financial intermediation and our financial stability’: See Commonwealth, Backing 




system over the past + 35 years, nor was the Hayne Commission34 tasked with 
financial stability issues. Nevertheless, considerations of financial stability 
impliedly formed part of the establishment of each.35  
 
The Murray Inquiry is of particular importance for this thesis, because its objective 
was to undertake a review of the Australian financial system and its regulators 
after the GFC. The Australian government, when initiating the inquiry, did so 
informed by the events and lessons from the GFC. The government’s terms of 
reference for the Murray Inquiry however did not expressly focus on financial 
stability, but emphasised matters and problems indirectly related to financial 
stability, including ‘how the financial system could be positioned to best meet 
Australia’s evolving needs and support Australia’s economic growth’. 36  The 
Murray Inquiry was further tasked with making recommendations to ‘foster an 
efficient, competitive and flexible financial system, consistent with financial 
 
34 See Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial 
Services Industry, Terms of Reference (14 December 2017) 
<https://financialservices.royalcommission.gov.au/Pages/Terms-of-reference.aspx>. The Hayne 
Commission addressed issues of potential systemic importance and the role, function and 
governance of regulators, and its findings may result in legislative reform, in the same manner 
as the Campbell Inquiry, the Wallis Inquiry and the Murray Inquiry. Then Prime Minister Malcolm 
Turnbull, when announcing the Hayne Commission, emphasised: ‘We need to maintain the 
stability of our banking and financial system, all Australians, consumers, small businesses, 
farmers, shareholders, must have confidence and trust in the financial system’: See Claire 
Bickers, ‘Australia’s Major Banks Call for ‘Properly Constituted’ Inquiry into the Financial 
Services Sector’, News Corp Australia Network (online, 30 November 2017) 
<https://www.news.com.au/finance/business/banking/australias-major-banks-call-for-properly-
constituted-inquiry-into-the-financial-services-sector/news-
story/ebac85c6474c092e629744a31d22aa5a> (emphasis added). 
 
35 Each of these Inquiries required at least some consideration of financial stability. The 
Campbell Inquiry of 1981 was aimed at investigating the financial system as a whole, and 
stability of the financial system was therefore a specific consideration: See Commonwealth, 
Australian Financial System: Committee of Inquiry (Final Report, 1 September 1981) 
<https://treasury.gov.au/publication/p1981-afs/> (‘Campbell Inquiry Final Report’). The Wallis 
Inquiry of 1996 also recognised the importance of financial stability: See Commonwealth, 
Financial System Inquiry (Final Report, March 1997) 
<https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2018/07/01-fsi-fr-Prelim.pdf> (Wallis Inquiry Final 
Report). Similarly, the scope of the Murray Inquiry was broad: See Financial System Inquiry 
(Final Report, November 2014) (Murray Inquiry Final Report) (n 3).  
 
36 Announcing the final terms of reference: Joe Hockey, ‘Financial System Inquiry’ (Media 




stability, prudence, public confidence and capacity to meet the needs of users’.37 
The Murray Inquiry considered financial stability to some extent, and the first 
chapter in its report deals with ‘Resilience’, effectively a synonym for financial 
stability.38 The opening paragraph of this chapter highlights the cost of financial 
crises, and therefore the economic rationale for financial stability. It notes that the 
‘average total cost of a crisis is around 63 per cent of annual gross domestic 
product (GDP), and the cost of a severe crisis is around 158 per cent of annual 
GDP ($950 billion to $2.4 trillion in 2013 terms)’.39 There is accordingly no doubt 
about the current relevance of the regulation of financial stability. 
 
National policy and views on financial stability are of course political in nature40 
and these may change along with changes in the governing political party. 
Subsequent Australian governments may have different stances on and 
approaches to economic policy,41 and policy shifts can sometimes be subtle. For 
example, the recent inclusion of the phrase ‘including financial stability’ into the 
most recent Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy jointly issued by the 
Australian government and the RBA,42 may reflect a subtle shift in focus. A strong 
 
37 Ibid (emphasis added). 
 
38 Financial System Inquiry, Murray Inquiry Final Report, (n 3) 33. 
 
39 Ibid 10.  
 
40 See Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Texts and 
Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
 
41 For example, the Australian Treasury’s Corporate Plan demonstrates an important change 
from the policies of the previous Labor government in departing markedly from the previous so-
called “wellbeing” framework: Commonwealth, Corporate Plan 2016–17 (Corporate Plan, 31 
August 2016) <https://treasury.gov.au/publication/corporate-plan-2016-17/>; See also David 
Uren, ‘Reserve Bank, Treasury Plans Sharpen Economic Policy Focus, The Australian (online, 
22 September 2016).  
 
42 The Seventh Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy (2016) highlighted the importance 
of financial stability as a policy objective for the Australian Government by a small change made 
to the previous (Sixth) Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy. In the sentence dealing 
with the objectives of monetary policy, the phrase ‘including financial stability’ has been 
inserted: See The Treasurer and the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Statement on the Conduct 




regulatory framework however provides stability and durability in the role of the 
financial stability regulator. 
 
2 Financial Stability as a Central Bank Priority 
 
Financial stability is important for the RBA, and the RBA is said to have always 
had financial stability as a core function. 43  The RBA’s obligation under the 
Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) (RBA Act) to consider employment and welfare in 
Australia,44 can be interpreted to support a mandate for financial stability. The 
RBA has therefore interpreted the RBA Act ‘to imply a mandate to pursue 
financial stability’.45 The Australian government has also made the ‘implicit goal’ 
of financial stability ‘express’ on ‘a number of occasions’.46 These points are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
3 Regulatory Legitimacy and Credibility 
 
As a regulator, the RBA’s conduct and behaviour are important considerations – 
as they are for all financial regulators. The Hayne Commission for example 
recently delivered a damning criticism of the Australian financial regulators 
(particularly of ASIC but also of APRA) for the manner in which they failed to 
adequately fulfil their mandates. The regulators were heavily criticised for not 
 
43 See the first speech by the new Assistant Governor (Financial System) of the RBA: Michele 
Bullock, ‘Has the Way We Look at Financial Stability Changed Since the Global Financial 
Crisis?’ (Speech, Bloomberg Breakfast, 14 March 2017).  
 
44 The reason is the ‘serious damage to employment and economic prosperity that can occur in 
times of financial instability’: Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority, Macroprudential Analysis and Policy in the Australian Financial Stability Framework 








acting against instances of misconduct in the banking, superannuation and 
financial services sectors.47  
 
When the behaviour of a regulator is scrutinised the starting point is the regulatory 
framework, ie its founding legislative framework, including how the regulator can 
be held accountable under that regulatory framework. The Hayne Commission 
for example adopted that approach in considering the role of ASIC as market 
conduct regulator. On a fundamental level, the actions of a regulatory agency are 
only seen to be legitimate if the actions amount to the proper fulfilment of a task 
appropriately assigned.48 The question of regulator legitimacy is therefore also 
closely associated with the credibility of the regulator, which has important 
practical consequences for the regulatees. These are important issues for the 
RBA as the financial stability regulator. 
 
The legal fundamentals of the regulatory framework are important because they 
determine the legitimacy of the regulator and its actions. As the RBA can be 
categorised as an ‘unelected power’, 49  the formal legislative framework is 
important to support democratic principles and the rule of law.50 The Australian 
government and society have a long history of democracy, and also of respecting 
the rule of law.51  The regulatory (ie legal) framework of financial stability in 
Australia should therefore not be based on anything other than the principles of 
the rule of law. A preponderance of soft law instruments in the RBA’s regulatory 
 
47 See Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial 
Services Industry (Interim Report, 28 September 2018) 
<https://financialservices.royalcommission.gov.au/Pages/reports.aspx#interim> (‘Hayne 
Commission Interim Report’) and Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, 
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry (Final Report Volume 1, 1 February 2019) 
<https://financialservices.royalcommission.gov.au/Pages/reports.aspx#final> (‘Hayne 
Commission Final Report’). 
 
48 Regulators need legitimacy. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Principles for the Governance of Regulators (Public Consultation Draft, 21 June 2013). 
 
49 See Tucker (n 7).  
 
50 ‘The rule of law underpins the way Australian society is governed. Everyone – including 
citizens and the government – is bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws’: ‘Rule of Law’, 




framework for financial stability may undermine the operation of the rule of law 
principle.52  
B Threats to Financial Stability and Financial Stability Regulators 
 
During and in the immediate aftermath of the GFC, the concept of financial 
stability assumed a very high priority world-wide and attracted much attention 
politically, academically and practically. Even though media, political and 
regulatory interest may have waned somewhat, academic and financial interest 
remains.53 In view of potential threats to financial stability in future, complacency 
about financial stability now would be misplaced. Threats to financial stability are 
discussed in Chapter 8.  
 
A particularly important consideration that constitutes a threat to financial stability 
regulators per se and that also underpins this thesis, is the increase in the public 
scrutiny of regulators.54  If the outcome of an investigation into a regulator’s 
actions is unfavourable, the reputational harm that can follow can have significant 
consequences and may damage its credibility. If the regulator is the central bank, 
the reputational consequences can be even more damaging because of the 
importance of trust and esteem for central banks in all of their functions. 55 
Therefore, setting the regulator up appropriately with solid policy, legal and 
governance frameworks to avoid reputational harm is important.56  
 
52 See Chapters 4 – 9 in this regard. 
 
53 For an interesting analysis of how the post-GFC research conducted by the RBA reflects 
concerns about financial stability, see John Simon, ‘Ten Years of Research – What Have We 
Learnt Since the Financial Crisis?’ (Speech, Economic Society of Australia (QLD) and Griffith 
University Symposium, 7 March 2019) <https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2019/sp-so-2019-03-
07.html>. 
 
54 See Chapter 7. See also Annelise Riles, Financial Citizenship: Experts, Publics, and the 
Politics of Central Banking (Cornell University Press, 2018) 39: ‘So today, the central bank is on 
the public’s radar. Populist attacks are framed explicitly as attacks on the expertise of central 
bankers’. 
 
55 See Chapter 3. 
 
56 See R C Lodha, ‘Reputational Risk - A Risk Which is Often Ignored’, Banking Frontiers (Web 
Page, 11 July 2016) <https://bankingfrontiers.com/reputational-risk-a-risk-which-is-often-
ignored/>. 
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C Overall Significance and Importance of the Research 
 
1 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
The need for and significance of research into the role of central banks in financial 
stability has recently been highlighted by Dr Guy Debelle, Deputy Governor of 
the RBA.57 He noted that this area of research is as significant now as the 
research into the independence of central banks was in the late 20th century.58 
This thesis therefore makes an important contribution to the body of knowledge 
about the regulatory framework of central bank financial stability responsibility, 
and the conclusions drawn in relation to the Australian framework are also 
relevant and informative for other jurisdictions.  
 
No systematic analysis of the regulatory framework of the RBA as financial 
stability regulator and the legal effects of that regulatory framework, including 
governance and accountability mechanisms, has been published. This thesis 
therefore fills a gap in the existing research in that it specifically examines the 
legal consequences of the current regulatory framework in relation to the 
accountability of the RBA. This research complements recent work by Australian 
academics, including Drs Andrew Godwin, Sheelagh McCracken, Ian Ramsay 
and A Schmulow, who in their work on the Australian financial system regulatory 
framework and the Twin Peaks system consider important ancillary aspects of 
the RBA’s financial stability mandate.59 It also complements the very recent work 
 
 
57 Guy Debelle, ‘Central Bank Independence in Retrospect’ (Speech, Bank of England 





59 See for example Andrew Godwin, ‘Surveying the Twin Peaks of Australia’s Financial System’ 
in Sheelagh McCracken and Shelley Griffiths (eds), Making Banking and Finance Law: A 
Snapshot (Ross Parsons Centre of Commercial, Corporate and Taxation, 2015) 11; Andrew 
Godwin and Ian Ramsay, ‘Twin Peaks: The Legal and Regulatory Anatomy of Australia’s 
System of Financial Regulation’ (Working Paper No 074/2015, Centre for International Finance 
and Regulation, August 2015) <https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2015/08/apo-
nid67377-1188281.pdf>; Andrew D Schmulow, ‘Approaches to Financial System Regulation: An 
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of Prof Sheelagh McCracken on the history and modern legislative framework of 
the RBA.60  
 
2 Significance and Impact 
 
The conclusions of this thesis are significant because of the importance of the 
role of the RBA in financial stability, and the importance of certainty and 
predictability in the RBA’s role in financial stability. The final conclusions of this 
thesis are also significant because the study exposes deficiencies in the 
Australian government’s approach to the regulation of an issue which is important 
to the Australian public. The outcome of this research may inform future law 
reform and could provide a technical legal perspective on the regulation of one 
of Australia’s most important financial regulators. This thesis thereby contributes 
to academic literature on the governance of the RBA through proposals for 
improvements to the RBA’s regulatory framework. 
 
V Research Methodology  
 
The research question does not lend itself to a single research methodology. 
Researching the regulation of a regulator is a sui generis undertaking and 
involves law, regulation more broadly, and some interdisciplinary research 
elements including elements of sociology and political economy. To the extent 
that this research proposes changes to the regulatory framework, it is aligned 
with the law reform methodology. The doctrinal research method is the starting 
point. 
 
International Comparative Survey’ (Working Paper No 53/2015, Centre for International Finance 
and Regulation, 2015) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2556545>. 
 
60 See F Decker and S McCracken, ‘Central Banking in Australia and New Zealand: Historical 
Foundations and Modern Legislative Frameworks’ in Peter Conti-Brown and Rosa María Lastra 
(eds), Research Handbook on Central Banking (Edward Elgar, 2018) 245. 
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A Doctrinal Research Methodology 
 
Doctrinal research will be adopted to analyse the legislative framework of the 
RBA for financial stability.  
 
Doctrinal research is the traditional research methodology employed in law.61 As 
a methodology it aims to ‘systematise, rectify and clarify the law on any particular 
topic by a distinctive mode of analysis of authoritative texts that consist of primary 
and secondary sources’. 62  In this instance, the authoritative texts were 
legislation, and some other formal documents issued by the RBA, the Australian 
government and, where relevant, other parties. Using the doctrinal methodology, 
a researcher typically first collects a body of case law, and then proceeds to 
analyse it, together with relevant legislation, with a view to describing the body of 
law and how the law applies.63 It essentially determines what the doctrine is. As 
there is an absence of case law about the financial stability mandate of the RBA, 
the doctrinal method therefore was applied only insofar as it was possible. 
 
As part of the doctrinal methodology, the research process therefore involves first 
establishing what the legal responsibility of the RBA is for financial stability, by 
analysing the relevant sections the RBA Act, the founding legislation of the RBA. 
Thereafter, secondary sources are consulted, including second reading 
speeches, explanatory memoranda, and other documents that explain the 
rationale behind the relevant legislation. Academic commentary in books and 
journal articles are also identified, collected and analysed. The research extends 
to include any other documents that may be binding (in some way, even if not a 
strictly legal way) on the RBA, such as the RBA’s own public statements of its 
 
61 See N J Duncan and T Hutchinson, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’ (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 83; See also Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui 
(eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2nd ed, 2017) 20-2. 
 
62 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh 
University Press, 2007) 4. 
 
63 See Duncan and Hutchinson (n 61) 83.  
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powers, obligations, functions, role and purpose in relation to financial stability, 
as well as memoranda of understanding the RBA has entered into with other 
regulators and the Treasury.  
 
In the purest form of the doctrinal methodology, the law is limited to the law 
itself;64 there is no consideration of policy interests, and there is no ‘overarching 
theoretical perspective’.65  The ‘pure’ doctrinal research methodology treats the 
law as a ‘self-contained system’.66 Pure doctrinal research of the RBA’s financial 
stability responsibility will however be insufficient in this research project. The 
financial stability responsibility of the RBA is not limited to or expressly contained 
in traditional ‘hard law’ sources, and therefore the doctrinal method on its own is 
inadequate. Being limited to hard law sources is a recognised deficiency of the 
doctrinal method, and the fact that doctrinal research does not take into 
consideration ‘the broader social and political context’67 of law and regulation has 
been identified as one of its shortcomings. The doctrinal analysis will therefore 
be augmented in this research with some elements drawn from the law reform 
methodology, comparative law research method, and interdisciplinary research. 
The research is further situated within regulatory theory to the extent necessary 
to address the research question.  
 
Doctrinal research interacts well with the law reform methodology and it is used 
to supplement the doctrinal approach in this research. Doctrinal research on its 
own can lead to research proposing law reform,68 prompting the researcher to 
consider the problems that affect the law, and ‘the policy underpinning the 
existing law, highlighting, for example, the flaws in such policy. This in turn may 
 
64 For example, inconsistencies in the law itself may be pointed out. 
 
65 Ibid 30. 
 
66 Ibid 32. Teubner for example argued that law is an autopoietic system and is self-contained: 
See Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell, 1993). 
 





lead the researcher to propose changes to the law (law reform)’.69 The doctrinal 
approach is therefore combined with a law reform methodology in this thesis, 
which is discussed in more detail below. 
 
This research can also not be entirely limited to Australia and the Australian legal 
framework. Given the unique nature of central banks, and the fact that the RBA 
shares more characteristics with other central banks than with other domestic 
regulators or financial institutions, the regulatory frameworks of other central 
banks for financial stability will also be considered. The relevant elements of 
comparative law research are discussed below.  
 
In addition, the study of the regulation of a regulator of necessity involves a 
broader practical and regulatory reality as well as the relationship between the 
regulator and the state. The scope of doctrinal research was therefore broadened 
to include historical, sociological, political and public policy aspects but only to 
the extent necessary to address the research question. The historic realities of 
the GFC that brought financial stability into sharp focus internationally cannot be 
ignored, and similarly, the history of the RBA and its historical role in financial 
stability should be taken into consideration. The history of law and regulation is 
important in doctrinal research and when investigating potential law reform. It is 
also always necessary to consider policy issues and determine why certain 
legislation was enacted70 – that is also the case here. A historical analysis of the 
law also opens up a sociological and political dimension to the understanding of 
the law.   
 
Further, the research question requires of this thesis to be both descriptive and 
evaluative, and as such it cannot be confined to doctrinal research. Doctrinal 
research alone cannot do justice to these aspects of the enquiry and additional 
research approaches are adopted. Doctrinal research nevertheless remains 
 
69 Ibid.  
 
70 See McConville and Chui (n 61) 21. 
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highly relevant in this research, as the starting point for all legal research is to 
first establish what the existing law is.71  
 
The complementary and supplementary research methodologies will now be 
discussed in turn. 
 
B Law Reform Methodology 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to expose possible shortcomings in the regulatory 
framework of the RBA, and to recommend changes to that framework if these are 
necessary or desirable. The use of a law reform methodology is therefore relevant 
and appropriate to this research. 
 
Law reform involves ‘the alteration of the law in some respect with a view to its 
improvement’.72 The typical law reform process involves research, expositional 
publications and consultation with stakeholders. 73  Law reform commissions 
utilising a law reform research methodology will complete a thorough doctrinal 
review.74 The law reform methodology is therefore a natural supplement to the 
doctrinal methodology. In the law reform process, initial research and 
consultation are followed by a broader review of the area, and a comparative 
study of the position in other jurisdictions that also includes an assessment of the 




72 W H Hulbert, Law Reform Commissions in the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada 
(Juriliber, 1986) 6 citing the Oxford Companion to Law; See also John H Farrar, ‘Law Reform 
Commissions’ in Peter Cane and Joanne Conaghan (eds), The New Oxford Companion to Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) 683 (‘Law Reform Commissions’). Farrar notes that ‘[l]aw 
reform means legal change of a non‐incremental nature usually effected by statute. It normally 
connotes improvement…’. 
 
73 For example, issue papers, discussion papers, working papers, submissions, interim, final 
and annual reports: See Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (Thomson Lawbook 
Co, 3rd ed, 2010) 66-70. 
 
74 Ibid 66. 
 
75 Ibid 67. 
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private) parties may be included in the suggested amendments or reforms.76 
Although the work of law reform commissions is not always adopted by 
governments, it may influence government policy77 and therefore the law reform 
methodology will take policy issues into consideration. As a research 
methodology, it is therefore well suited to this thesis. 
 
Hutchinson’s flow-chart of the research process in law reform projects78 informs 
the research process of this thesis although the exact process is not followed 
strictly. The steps identified by Hutchinson are:  
• an identification of the problem and the reasons why it is a problem (this 
includes ‘why is it a problem, what are the consequences, what is the law, 
is the law being applied correctly, has the law created the problem, has 
the law attempted to solve the problem, how should the law be 
changed?’79). A significant part of the research for this thesis focuses on 
these issues, using doctrinal analysis, and what has been identified as 
benchmarks of emerging best practice internationally;  
• consultation with those affected (directly or indirectly), including industry 
groups, academics, the public, etc. This research does not involve 
consultation, but the views of academics and others in research and 
position papers are important sources for this study;  
• consultation of sources from other jurisdictions, including foreign 
legislation, and expert and academic publications as well as additional 
empirical research if possible and necessary. This step is fully adopted 
and implemented, by referencing existing and already interpreted 
empirical data. New independent empirical research falls outside of the 












• in-depth reflection on common theses, suggestions, and alternative 
solutions. This reflective step is evident in this thesis in the analysis of the 
RBA’s regulatory framework; and  
• finally, the publication of one or more reports (which would be the output 
of a law reform commission), but is not directly relevant in this research.   
 
The research therefore draws on the law reform methodology but does not 
include all steps in the traditional law reform methodology. It also does not adopt 
a theoretical approach.80 The conclusions reached and recommendations made 
at the end of this thesis are not in the nature of mere legal formalism, but have 
practical consequences in addition to the theoretical consequences. The 
conclusions therefore do not fall within the category described by Farrar as 
‘technical, ‘lawyers' law’ reform’.81 The conclusions and recommendations are set 
out in Chapters 8 and 9. 
 
C Comparative Law Research Methodology 
 
The comparative law methodology has been described as follows: 82 
The essence of comparative law is the act of comparing the law of one country 
to that of another. Most frequently, the basis for comparison is a foreign law 
juxtaposed against the measure of one’s own law. But, of course, the comparison 
can be broader: more than two laws, more than law, more than written words. 
 
80 Conducting law reform research without articulating the political or philosophical positions 
informing the analysis has been criticized: Susan M Armstrong, ‘Evaluating Law Reform’ (2006) 
10 University of Western Sydney Law Review 157. The justification of this thesis and its 
significance demonstrate that the overarching approach in this thesis has practical and legal 
importance. Armstrong also points out that the starting point for any law reform discussion 
should be a basic question of jurisprudence, namely, what is the nature and purpose of law: at 
158. In this thesis, the nature and purpose of the law is to regulate a regulator in order to give 
effect to the broad social benefits associated with financial stability. The thesis concludes with 
recommendations for legislative action. As the RBA is acting as a mandated agent of the 
Government for an important purpose, ‘hard law’ is best suited. 
 
81 Farrar, ‘Law Reform Commissions’, (n 72) 683-4. 
 
82 Edward J Eberle, ‘The Method and Role of Comparative Law’ (2009) 8(3) Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 51, 52; See also John C Reitz, ‘How to Do Comparative 




The key act in comparison is looking at one mass of legal data in relationship to 
another and then assessing how the two lumps of legal data are similar and how 
they are different. The essence of comparison is then aligning similarities and 
differences between data points, and using this exercise as a measure to obtain 
understanding of the content and range of the data points.  
 
In the classic comparative law approach, the structural elements and culture that 
influence law,83 and other ‘legal formants’84 of the particular country are also 
taken into consideration in the comparison drawn. Although comparative law was 
initially used in the area of private law only, there is now a growing body of work 
in comparative constitutional law,85 and comparative law is increasingly relevant 
to areas of law of international concern such as data privacy, because 
comparative law can be of assistance in ‘important public policy questions, 
questions that often transcend national borders’.86  
 
Comparative legal method is beneficial together with the law reform methodology. 
One of the benefits of adopting a comparative approach is that it becomes 
possible to ‘reassess the underlying principles that make up the legal order and 
determine what, if anything, needs to be done, nationally, regionally or 
internationally’.87 
 
Some use of a comparative approach is necessitated by the nature of the RBA 
as a central bank. The regulatory framework for the RBA as the financial stability 
regulator in Australia cannot be effectively evaluated in isolation, without 
considering the manner in which other central banks or other financial stability 
 
83 Eberle (n 82) 52: See also Reitz (n 82) 622. 
 
84 This is the term used by Sacco: Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to 
Comparative Law II’ (1991) 39(1) American Journal of Comparative Law 343, 385.   
 
85 Eberle (n 82) 54; See also Reitz (n 83) 619.  
 
86 Eberle (n 82) 54.  
 
87 Eberle (n 82) 55; See Reitz (n 83); See also McConville and Chui (n 61) 163-4. 
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regulators have been regulated in respect of their financial stability responsibility 
in other jurisdictions. Central banks are unique institutions as there is typically 
only one central bank in each domestic jurisdiction.88 From a legal perspective 
there are more similarities between central banks in different countries, than 
between a central bank and other banks in the same country. A comparative 
analysis can therefore only be done on an international basis.89  
 
A comparative approach is accordingly only adopted in two respects in this thesis. 
First, it is used at a very high level in the description of benchmarks of emerging 
best practice in the regulation of financial stability regulators internationally. 
Second, a comparative approach is adopted when comparing the regulatory 
framework for financial stability of the RBA with the regulatory framework for 
financial stability of comparable central banks. This thesis therefore only involves 
some aspects of the comparative law research methodology. A full comparative 
law methodology is outside of the scope of this thesis and is also not adopted by 
the international regulatory institutions such as the FSB and the IMF in their peer 
and thematic reviews of the regulatory frameworks of the G20 member 
countries.90  
 
The particular comparative approach adopted in this thesis is a thematic 
comparison. This is a specific descriptive approach within the broad comparative 
law research methodology involving comparison based on identified themes.91 
 
88 The case of the European Central Bank (ECB) is unique and domestic central banks in the 
European Union (EU) play a different role to other central banks.  
 
89 This is because there is only one national central bank per jurisdiction, and only a single 
financial stability regulatory framework in any given jurisdiction. 
 
90 See Chapter 8. 
 
91 ‘When one tries to improve one’s own legal system, be it as a legislator or as a scholar, it has 
become obvious to look at the other side of the borders. However, importing rules and solutions 
from abroad may not work because of a difference in context. Hence, a more thorough 
contextual approach may be required. One may also want to inquire to what extent a legal 
evolution in one’s own country finds parallel developments in other countries’: Mark van 
Hoecke, ‘Methodology of Comparative Legal Research’ (2015) Law and Method 1, 3. That was 
the approach adopted in this thesis. Law was not uncritically imported from other jurisdictions, 




The research for this thesis involves comparing the Australian legal framework to 
emerging global trends and in particular emerging ‘best practice’ for the 
regulation of financial stability regulators. It does not select a single jurisdiction 
for the purpose of a full comparison with the Australian legal position. Given the 
purpose of this research, a classic application of the comparative law research 
methodology is not required and not adopted.92  
 
A comparative methodology of the nature conducted in this research – ie 
comparing the RBA’s regulatory framework to international best practice and then 
assessing whether or not the Australian framework is optimal or not – is 
consistent with the generally accepted methodology in this area of reviewing and 
evaluating domestic regulatory frameworks.93  
 
D Interdisciplinary Research Methodology  
 
The research question of this thesis clearly delineates that it is the ‘regulatory 
framework’ of the RBA as a financial stability regulator that will be investigated. 
The focus is on legal regulation. The research for this thesis is therefore not 
conducted using a full ‘interdisciplinary’ research methodology,94 for example a 
law and economics model. The research question is not ideally suited to 
interdisciplinary research. Research questions that are suitable for 
interdisciplinary research include those that (1) have insights developed by two 
or more disciplines, (2) may not be adequately addressed by one discipline alone, 
or (3) is at the interface of various disciplines.95 Although financial stability is a 
matter of interest to the pure economic disciplines and also to studies in the 
 
92 For example, the statutes establishing other central banks were not investigated in depth in 
such a manner that it required a deep analysis of the particular domestic jurisdiction.  
 
93 See also Chapter 8.  
 
94 Interdisciplinary research has increasingly been described as a discrete, if developing, 






political economy, a legal/regulatory approach to the research question, 
supplemented with some interdisciplinary elements, answers the question 
sufficiently. The thesis accordingly does not adopt a law and economics 
methodology. Where appropriate, though, reference is made to economic 
principles and the political economy of central banks, but only to the extent that 
those insights inform this study.  
 
It is however not possible to adequately address the research question without 
venturing outside of the traditional ‘legal’ or ‘doctrinal’ methodology, and the 
research involves elements of the socio-legal approach. Socio-legal research 
involves a ‘broader social and political context with the use of a range of other 
methods taken from the social sciences and humanities’.96 Regard is had to the 
historical, political, economic and philosophical contexts to the extent that the law 
is a function and product of historical, political, economic and philosophical 
contexts. 
 
This thesis also involves issues of public policy. Public policy however lacks the 
methodological focus of the social sciences and the study of public policy faces 
a ‘multiplicity of methodological challenges’. 97  It does not have the same 
methodological focus of the social sciences, and combines ‘an analytical with a 
normative perspective’. 98 The nature of public policy as a research discipline has 
been recognised as a unique and identifiable, interdisciplinary academic 
discipline, drawing on ‘history, economics, political science, governance, 
 
96 McConville and Chui (n 61) 5. 
 
97 ‘Methods of Public Policy’, Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt 
(Web Page) < https://www.brandtschool.de/research-and-phd/methods-of-public-policy/>.  
 
98 Ibid. It is arguable that public policy is a doctrine at large, and as such it appears from time to 
time in the law, as for example the law of contract and torts. It is properly a study in political 
science which is regarded as one of the social sciences. Some consider public policy to be a 
methodology in itself: ‘Being a synthetic meta-discipline within the social sciences, public policy 
research is an inherently methodological form of inquiry and the integration of different 
perspectives on social reality as well as the merging together of theoretical understanding and 
practical engagement is its primary object’: ibid. 
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sociology and law as components of public policy theory development.99 Public 
policy is also a well-recognised extension of the traditional doctrinal research.100 
 
VI Thesis Overview  
 
The thesis will progress as follows.  
 
Chapter 2 analyses what ‘financial stability’ entails for regulatory purposes, and 
examines why and how, as a concept, it involves regulatory difficulties. As a 
concept, financial stability has no generally accepted definition, and its meaning 
may change depending on the context. Financial stability as a concept requires 
interpretation and lacks precision, thereby rendering it difficult for a government 
to create legal certainty for the regulatory agency responsible for financial 
stability. When tasking a regulatory authority with a particular task – in this 
instance ‘financial stability’ – what the regulatory authority is required to achieve, 
should be clear. This chapter therefore provides important context for the analysis 
of the RBA’s responsibility for financial stability in the balance of the thesis. 
 
Not only is financial stability an elusive concept, but central banks per se are sui 
generis organisations. In examining central banks and their roles after the GFC, 
Chapter 3 provides additional context for this thesis. The allocation of a financial 
stability regulatory role affects, and is affected by, the unique nature of a central 
bank. Central banks have important public functions, but are also uniquely 
independent, because of their monetary policy responsibility. The potential 
conflict and synergy between the monetary policy and financial stability 
responsibilities are analysed in this chapter, as well as the view adopted strongly 
after the GFC that central banks should be responsible for financial stability. The 
 
 
99 Heike M Grimm, ‘Introduction: The Added Value of Public Policy Research in the Global 
South’ in Heike M Grimm (ed), Public Policy Research in the Global South: A Cross Country 
Perspective (Springer, 2019). 
 
100 Terry Hutchinson, ‘Developing Legal Research Skills: Expanding the Paradigm’ (2008) 32(3) 
Melbourne University Law Review 1065, 1083-4. 
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post-GFC perspectives as well as the governance and accountability impacts are 
canvassed in Chapter 3 as part of the broader context for this thesis.  
 
The financial stability responsibility of the RBA is then analysed against this 
background. In Chapters 4 and 5 the misleading certainty and simplicity of the 
RBA’s financial stability responsibility suggested by the two quotations at the start 
of this chapter are challenged. Chapter 4 deals with the extent to which the RBA’s 
mandate for financial stability is informal. It highlights that the RBA’s express 
statutory responsibility for financial stability is limited to the payments system. It 
demonstrates how there is no concrete, clear, overarching mandate for financial 
stability in the RBA’s enabling legislation. The financial stability mandate can at 
best be implied generally from the enabling legislation, but the most important 
sources of the mandate – or confirmations of the mandate – come from informal 
documents and statements. There is a preponderance of soft law origins of the 
financial stability mandate, and an absence of key hard law sources. 
 
Chapter 5 deals with the shared and decentralised aspects of the financial 
stability mandate of the RBA. The financial stability functions are shared between 
the RBA, APRA and the Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) in the main, 
although ASIC and the government also have meaningful roles. Coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration between regulators are therefore of the utmost 
importance. This chapter analyses the extent to which this shared and 
decentralised responsibility is also informal, because of the informal structure of 
the CFR as well as the informal regulation of the cooperation and collaboration 
between the responsible regulators.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 critically analyses the legal framework and in particular the 
range of controls and drivers of the RBA’s financial stability actions. It 
demonstrates how notwithstanding the vast number of controls and influences on 
the RBA that could all influence what and how the RBA operates, none of the 
hard law mechanisms directly compels the RBA to pursue financial stability, and 
they are therefore ineffective regulatory controls. The gap left as a consequence 
of the informal and shared and decentralised mandate is thereby enlarged. These 
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chapters examine the governance and accountability mechanisms of the RBA, 
most of which are general in nature, and are therefore not exclusive to the 
financial stability function. These chapters analyse the extent of external and 
internal ‘controls’ and ‘influences’ on the activities of the RBA in relation to 
governance and accountability, reflecting what is described as a continuum of 
governance, transparency, and accountability. As a consequence of the gaps in 
the governance and accountability framework, it is possible that behavioural 
(sociological and psychological) factors as drivers of the RBA’s behaviour could 
play a disproportionately important role.  
 
Chapter 8 provides both practical and theoretical considerations for adjusting the 
RBA’s regulatory framework. It compares the regulatory framework of the RBA 
with international benchmarks of international best practice for financial stability. 
These benchmarks are those endorsed by important international institutions 
such as the FSB, G20, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the IMF, as 
well as by experts, and from the current practices of the G20 member countries. 
The RBA’s regulatory framework is also compared with the design precepts for 
the regulation of central banks as proposed by Paul Tucker. This chapter also 
investigates the possible effectiveness of control through the so-called fourth 
branch of government. This chapter defends the reasons for regulatory 
improvements, including regulator legitimacy, democratic principles and the 
underpinnings of Australia that is a country that respects the rule of law. The 
thesis argues that the balance between hard law and soft law mechanisms in the 
regulatory framework should be adjusted.  
 
Chapter 9 provides specific recommendations for legislative adjustments to the 
financial stability framework. In particular, the thesis concludes by recommending 
that the RBA be provided with an explicit statutory mandate for financial stability, 
that the interaction of APRA and the RBA be clarified in legislation, and that the 
role of the CFR be formalised and integrated into the RBA. The chapter concludes 




CHAPTER 2  
Financial Stability: An Elusive Concept  
 
 




The RBA is the financial regulator responsible for financial stability in Australia. 
What ‘financial stability’ means, however, is not clear, and there is therefore an 
inherent uncertainty about the extent of the RBA’s responsibilities. The 
elusiveness of the concept leads to difficulties in a number of areas but poses 
particular problems when mandating a regulator such as the RBA with financial 
stability. This chapter will analyse the concept of ‘financial stability’, how and why 
it can have different meanings, and why creating a definition is complex.  
 
In this chapter, Part II sets out how and why financial stability remains an elusive 
concept, and how the concept itself has led to confusion. Part II B deals with the 
significance of financial stability as an elusive concept from a regulatory 
perspective, and analyses both the advantages and disadvantages of defining 
financial stability. A working definition of financial stability for this thesis is 
proposed in Part III A, after which the difficulties that are encountered when 
attempting to define financial stability are analysed. Some arise from the 
foundational concepts of finance and stability themselves (Part III B); others from 
the fact that financial stability can be interpreted broadly or narrowly (Part III C). 
Part IV sets out the methodological difficulties in defining financial stability, which 
combined with the inherent characteristics of financial stability lead to significant 
 
1 Wayne Byres, ‘Achieving a Stable and Competitive Financial System’ (Speech, Australian 
Financial Review Banking & Wealth Summit, 29 April 2015). 
 
 36 
challenges when such an elusive concept forms part of a regulator’s mandate. 
The definitional difficulties are therefore not just of theoretical importance but 
have real consequences for the regulatory framework of the RBA for financial 
stability. 
 
II An Elusive Concept  
 
A Conceptual Confusion: An Absence of Consensus on and Clarity of the 
Meaning of ‘Financial Stability’ 
 
The lack of a generally accepted definition of ‘financial stability’ is quite 
remarkable given the importance of financial stability, and the prevalence of the 
term in the media, and in economic, financial and political literature.2 There is 
currently no general consensus in Australia or internationally as to the meaning 
or definition of the term ‘financial stability’,3 despite the fact that governments, 
regulators, and the media use the term frequently. The term is often simply used 
without any clarification of its intended meaning, including in academic research 
and writing as well.4  
 
 
2 ‘Financial stability’ as a search term peaked on Google at the height of the GFC, but its 
prevalence dropped back to roughly pre-GFC levels from 2013: See Chapter 3 Part III A. 
Financial stability continued to be important since the 1990s: See Garry J Schinasi, 
‘Safeguarding Financial Stability: Conceptual Issues and Policy Challenges’ (Conference Paper, 
Annual Symposium of Moneda y Crédito on Monetary and Financial Stability: Harmony or 
Conflict?, 6–7 November 2006) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/events/pdf/conferences/cecwe_conf/Schinasi_paper.pdf?fda0d9c9
df617c000e82456ff201ada5> (‘Safeguarding Financial Stability’). 
 
3 Internationally there is no settled definition of financial stability: Andrew Crockett, ‘‘The Theory 
and Practice of Financial Stability’ (1996) 144(4) De Economist 531, 532. See also Gunnar 
Bårdsen, Kjersti-Gro Lindquist and Dimitrios P Tsomocos, ‘Evaluation of Macroeconomic 
Models for Financial Stability Analysis’ in Charles A E Goodhart and Dimitrios P Tsomocos 
(eds), The Challenge of Financial Stability: A New Model and its Applications (Edward Elgar, 
2012) 32, 34: ‘Academics and policy-makers have suggested a potpourri of definitions’. 
 
4 For example, see Ricardo Correa, Garud Keshav, Juan M Londono and Nathan Mislang, 
‘Sentiment in Central Banks’ Financial Stability Reports’ (Discussion Paper No 1203, Federal 
Reserve Board, March 2017) <https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp/files/ifdp1203.pdf>. 
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The lack of conceptual clarity, and the paucity of studies into what the term 
means, are even more noteworthy given that financial stability has become an 
increasingly important topic in economic, financial and academic literature 
internationally5 since the 1990s and particularly after the GFC. In the 1990s, 
central banks increased their focus on financial stability and commenced the 
publication of financial stability reviews.6 Nevertheless, a definition of financial 
stability was not formalized or even considered in much detail in the 1990s 
including by the central banks in their financial stability reviews. Similarly, during 
and after the GFC, even though the importance of financial stability increased,7 
and the need to protect financial stability was expressed at the highest political 
level, such as by the G20 and by national leaders,8 its meaning was mostly 
ignored, or assumed. Now, more than ten years after the start of the GFC there 





In Australia the concept has been given little formal attention. Although the RBA, 
APRA, the CFR and the Treasury all play a role in financial stability,9 only the 
 
5 The term financial stability was likely only used in this context as from 1994: William A Allen 
and Geoffrey Wood, ‘Defining and Achieving Financial Stability’ (Special Paper No 160, London 
School of Economics Financial Markets Group, April 2005) 1 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/assets/documents/papers/special-papers/SP160.pdf>. 
 
6 See Martin Čihák, ‘Central Banks and Financial Stability: A Survey of Financial Stability 
Reports’ (Paper, Seminar on Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, 23-27 
October 2006) <https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2006/mfl/mc.pdf>. 
 
7 The work of the G20 and creation of the Financial Stability Board evidence this. See 
Douglas W Arner and Michael W Taylor, ‘The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability 
Board: Hardening the Soft Law of International Financial Regulation?’ (2009) 32(2) University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 488.  
 




9 See for example Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘‘Protecting Australia’s Depositors, 
Insurance Policyholders and Superannuation Fund Members’, (Brochure) 4 
<http://www.gtm.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Publications/Documents/APRA_Brochure.pdf>; 
Memorandum of Understanding on Financial Distress Management between the Members of 
the Council of Financial Regulators, signed 18 September 2008 (Memorandum of 
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RBA has provided a description – but not a formal definition – of financial 
stability. 10  The RBA describes what financial stability is as follows on its 
website:11 
A stable financial system is one in which financial institutions, markets and market 
infrastructures facilitate the smooth flow of funds between savers and investors. 
This helps to promote growth in economic activity. 
 
The 2016 Murray Inquiry into the Australian financial system considered financial 
stability in its inquiries and recommendations and asked whether ‘[a]gainst the 
background of developments overseas, … Australia should change its 
institutional arrangements for making and implementing financial stability 
policy’.12 The Murray Inquiry noted that in Australia ‘financial stability’ is equated 
with ‘resilience’ and that these notions are treated as matters of macroprudential 
stability. The final report stated that ‘Australia has long adopted what could be 
called a “macro-prudential” approach to supervision under the rubric of financial 
stability’.13 However the Murray Inquiry did not attempt to define financial stability, 






10 Neither APRA nor ASIC have provided formal definitions of financial stability. For a definition 
related to APRA’s work, see Charles Littrell, ‘What is the Difference Between Macro Prudence 
and Macroprudential Supervision?’ (Speech, Annual Macquarie University Centre for Financial 
Risk, 1 July 2013) <https://australiancentre.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/D1P3-Macro-
prudence-Charles-Littrell-APRA.pdf>. The difference between macro and micro prudential 
supervision is also discussed in Rosa M Lastra (ed), International Financial and Monetary Law 
(Oxford, 2nd ed, 2015) 114-5. 
 
11 Reserve Bank of Australia, ‘Financial Stability’, Reserve Bank of Australia (Web Page) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/fin-stability/>. 
 
12 Commonwealth, Financial System Inquiry (Final Report, November 2014) 234 
<http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final_Report_Consolidated20141210.pdf> (Murray Inquiry 
Final Report). The absence of a more theoretical approach by a commission of inquiry is 
somewhat surprising. 
 





Internationally the concept ‘financial stability’ also has no generally accepted 
definition.14 Only a relatively small number of attempts have been made to define 
financial stability formally and to ‘characterize it in an analytically meaningful 
way’.15 For example, in 1997, although the theme at the prime central banking 
conference in the United States, the annual Jackson Hole Symposium held by 
the Kansas Reserve Bank, was ‘Maintaining financial stability in a global 
economy’, the term financial stability was used without any analysis of its 
meaning.16 Even in the academic literature on central banks there is no real 
analysis or definition of financial stability.17  
 
At the highest international level, the international bodies giving guidance to 
countries on financial stability, such as the G20, the FSB and its precursor, the 
Financial Stability Forum,18 have also not defined financial stability. The FSB 
relies on an intuitive approach to the understanding of the concept financial 
stability and has not defined financial stability in its charter.19 
 
 
14 Crockett (n 3) 532: ‘There is, as yet, no generally accepted definition of financial stability’. See 
also Pawel Smaga, ‘Assessing Involvement of Central Banks in Financial Stability’ (Policy 
Paper, Centre for Financial Stability, 23 May 2013) 
<http://www.centerforfinancialstability.org/research/Assessing_052313.pdf>. 
 
15 Dimitrios P Tsomocos, ‘Equilibrium Analysis, Banking and Financial Instability’ in Charles A E 
Goodhart and Dimitrios P Tsomocos (eds), The Challenge of Financial Stability: A New Model 
and its Applications (Edward Elgar, 2012) 61, 83.  
 
16 In the foreword to the published proceedings of this symposium, Thomas M Hoenig, then 
President of the Kansas Federal Reserve Bank, seemed to identify financial stability with 
avoiding the risk of failed institutions and the possibility of contagion and systemic risk. See 
Thomas M Hoenig, ‘Foreword’ (Speech, Wyoming Symposium on Maintaining Financial Stability 
in a Global Economy, 28–30 August 1997). 
 
17 The work by Hilary Allen, William A Allen and Geoffrey Wood, and Ana Vlahović are some 
exceptions. 
 
18 Financial Stability Board, ‘History of the FSB’, Financial Stability Board (Web Page) 
<http://www.fsb.org/about/history/>.  
 




More than twenty years after 1997, and even after the devastating consequences 
of the GFC highlighted the importance of financial stability, the term is 
continuously used without clarification or examination and there is (still) no single 
definition that has been adopted worldwide.20 Conceptual clarification has been 
neglected. 
 
B The Regulatory Importance of Conceptual Clarity of the Concept 
Financial Stability 
 
The lack of conceptual clarity in regulation/legislation about what financial stability 
entails, is problematic. For example, although central banks engage in and are 
held responsible for financial stability, they use the term financial stability in a 
pragmatic and generally uncritical manner. The term is also often not defined in 
their mandates.21  It is therefore not clear what they are responsible for, as 
‘financial stability’ can have a wide range of different meanings. Meanings can 
vary from an ordinary layperson’s understanding to complex theoretical/economic 
meanings. 22  The concept therefore requires clarification because of its 
importance when used in regulation. Although it may be difficult to create a single 
generally accepted definition of financial stability because of national 
 
20 A number of authors have highlighted the absence of a general definition. See for example 
Luiz A Pereira da Silva, Adriana Soares Sales and Wagner Piazza Gaglianone, ‘Financial 
Stability in Brazil’ (Working Paper Series No 289, Banco Central do Brasil, August 2012) 
<https://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps289.pdf>; See Hilary J Allen, ‘“What is “Financial 
Stability”? The Need for Some Common Language in International Financial Regulation’ (2014) 
45(4) Georgetown Journal of International Law 929 (‘What is “financial stability”’); See 
Morozova Irina Anatolyevna and Sahabutdinova Liliya Ramilevna, ‘Financial Stability Concept: 
Main Characteristics and Tools’ (2013) 22(6) World Applied Sciences Journal 856. 
 
21 See Ana Vlahović, ‘Challenges to the Implementation of a New Framework for Safeguarding 
Financial Stability’ (2014) 3(3) Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice 19, 23. For 
example, a study conducted by Smaga in 2013 revealed that as at 30 June 2012 six of the 27 
EU Member States did not have a definition of financial stability.  
 
22 M M Romaniak notes that different groups have different definitions of financial stability. 
Central banks tend to focus on systems and the systemic aspects of financial stability. There 
are however different scientific approaches and different conceptions of financial crises: See 
M M Romaniak, ‘Financial Stability: The Problem of Interpretation’ (2016) 4 Business Inform 21. 
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differences,23  differences in outlook, 24  different economic theories, 25  or even 
different times,26 conceptual clarity can be enhanced through adopting particular 
definitions in particular contexts.  
 
The lack of conceptual clarity has important consequences for the governance of 
the regulator(s) charged with financial stability, and for the public policy and 
societal objectives of financial stability policies implemented by the regulator. By 
providing conceptual clarity (for example through a definition or description), the 
government can make the underlying public policy goals and purpose of 
government visible to the regulator and the electorate. Conceptual clarity matters 
in principle, also in Australia, even though Australia’s recent stable financial and 
economic history may make it seem unnecessary.27  
 
Conceptual clarification will now be discussed in relation to its importance for the 
regulatory agency tasked with financial stability, importance to society in general 
and its importance from a regulatory perspective. 
 
23 Smaga attributes the absence of a single definition to the uniqueness of financial crises and 
national financial systems, notwithstanding increasing globalisation and liberalisation of financial 
markets: Smaga, (n 14) 14. 
 
24 It is true that it is perhaps not possible to devise a single definition that is acceptable to all 
stakeholders, in all contexts, and at all times, because the role of the stakeholder, the context 
and also the time in which the phrase is used may play a role in the definition of financial 
stability. 
 
25 For example, monetarist economists such as Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz only 
consider a crisis to be a true financial crisis if it resulted from a banking panic, which is 
indicative of a ‘major source of contraction in the money supply’. Non-monetarist economists 
such as Minsky and Kindleberger are however of the opinion that a much broader range of 
circumstances, extending beyond banking crises, could give rise to financial crises. These 
circumstances could include ‘declines in asset prices, failures of both large financial and 
nonfinancial firms, deflations or disinflations, disruptions in foreign exchange markets’: See 
Frederic S Mishkin, ‘Anatomy of a Financial Crisis’ (1992) 2(2) Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics 115, 116 (‘Anatomy of a financial crisis’). 
 
26 Financial stability is not an ahistoric concept, but is influenced by the times in which it is used, 
and the characteristics of the most recent financial crisis.  
 
27 See Commonwealth, Backing Australian FinTech (Report, March 2016) 9 
<https://fintech.treasury.gov.au/files/2016/03/Fintech-March-2016-v3.pdf>. In 2013 Australia’s 
banking system was ‘typically rated among the two or three soundest in the world’, and although 
Australia has known long-term prosperity and stability, ‘in a statistical sense, given there is a 
non-zero chance of systemic bank failure, it is arithmetically inevitable that at some point 
Australia will face a banking and/or economic crisis’: See Littrell (n 10) 3. 
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1 Institutional Importance 
 
Without conceptual clarity a range of difficulties arise for both government and 
the financial stability regulator. Regulators have a core responsibility to 
administer regulation in such a way that it achieves the underlying social and 
economic policy objectives of those that appoint them,28 and ‘in accordance with 
the powers and authority given to [it] through legislation and government 
direction’.29 In Australia, the RBA and the Australian government therefore need 
a clear and shared understanding of what financial stability means,30 in order to 
ensure that the responsibilities are properly given and executed. 
 
Clarity is important for the legitimacy and authority of the regulatory agency. If 
regulator is responsible for financial stability, a definition of financial stability 
clarifies the authority of the regulator and legitimises the actions it takes in pursuit 
of the financial stability goal. A definition also assists in clarifying the scope of the 
regulator’s powers and duties. It has been pointed out that31 
[t]he governance arrangements of a regulator are critical. The legal remit of the 
regulator, the powers it is given, how it is funded and how it is held accountable 
are all key issues that should be carefully designed if the regulator is to succeed 
in combining effective regulation with high standards of integrity and trust.  
 
Clarity also aids strategic and operational governance of the regulator as an 
institution. The objectives and goals of a regulator/regulatory institution shape its 
internal as well as external decisions. A definition of financial stability will assist 
 
28 Australian National Audit Office, Administering Regulation: Achieving the Right Balance 
(Practice Guide, 2014) 3 <http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-494731946/view>, referencing: Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory 





30 Central banks are different from other government financial regulators because of their 
banking functions: See Charles A E Goodhart and Rosa María Lastra, ‘Populism and Central 
Bank Independence’ (2018) 29(1) Open Economies Review 49; See also Martin F Hellwig, 
‘Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, Banking Supervision, and Central Banking’ (Conference 
Paper, ECB Forum, 25 May 2014) 5-6. 
 
31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Governance of Regulators: 
OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy (OECD, 2014) 9.  
 43 
in identifying the objectives that the regulator is required to pursue and achieve. 
Clearly defined objectives guide organisational management and governance, 
including decisions about the use and allocation of its budget and resources. How 
financial stability was defined has for example had a direct impact on the 
organisational structure of a financial stability department at a central bank.32 
Overall, clearly defined objectives can guide a regulator’s strategic direction, its 
employment practices, and relationships with other regulatory agencies.  
 
A definition of financial stability may also indicate what are the powers of the 
regulator, especially where no specific express powers have been provided. It 
will contribute to the governance and direction of the regulator and is of particular 
importance for a government regulator, because a33  
well-governed organisation will clearly understand what it is required to achieve, 
will be organised to achieve it through the success of its executive management 
and will focus on ensuring it achieves its goals [and] …. produce effective 
outcomes.  
 
A definition of financial stability also matters for accountability and compliance. It 
plays an important role in assessing whether the regulator has in fact achieved 
its goal(s) and it will provide a yardstick for determining the agency/institution’s 
success or failure in meeting its objectives.34 This is important when the institution 
must be transparent and report on its activities, be evaluated in respect of its 
successes, and be held accountable for its failures, particularly where it is 
accountable to Parliament and the public. 35  Without a definition of financial 
stability, it may be difficult to determine whether or not the institution has 
succeeded in its financial stability goal(s). As a failure of the mandated institution 
such as the RBA to meet its objectives can have important personal 
 
32 Smaga (n 14) 20. 
 
33 Commonwealth, Review of Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders 





35 See Chapters 7 – 9 below. 
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consequences for high-ranking RBA officials (for example, in certain 
circumstances the Governor of the RBA can be removed from office 36 ), 
inaccurate determinations of ‘failure’ should be avoided. As pointed out by the 
OECD,37 
[r]egulators are playing an increasingly important role in delivering economic and 
societal objectives as well as being tasked with regulating more complex 
situations. At the same time the role of regulators is being continuously examined, 
especially at times of crisis or when issues arise that create public concern.  
 
It is of particular importance that ‘such regulators are key state actors with 
responsibilities and therefore are accountable for the delivery of policy 
outcomes’38 not just to government, but also to stakeholders such as the general 
public. 
 
Although different stakeholders may have different views as to the precise 
meaning of ‘financial stability’, the mandate of the financial stability regulator (eg 
the central bank) should be clear. Clarity will protect both the central bank and 
the stakeholders seeking to hold the central bank responsible for failure to 
procure financial stability and any ensuing losses. In England, for example, legal 
action was brought against the BOE for alleged failures in its legal duties.39 It is 
not impossible that individuals or public interest groups may seek similar redress 
against other central banks for failure to perform their functions.  
 
 
36 See Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) ss 24-5.  
 
37 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Governance of Regulators: 




39 See Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 2) 
[1996] 2 All ER 363; Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and Company of the Bank of 
England (No. 3) [2000] 3 All ER 558; See Johann J de Jager, ‘Three Rivers District Council v 
Governor and Company of the Bank of England: A Red Flag or a Red Herring for Bank 
Supervisors in South Africa’ (2001) 13(4) South African Mercantile Law Journal 531; See Tom 
Howe and Andrew Berger, ‘Misfeasance’ [2012] (98) Legal Briefing 
<http://ags.gov.au/publications/legal-briefing/br98.html>; See also Mark Aronson, 'Misfeasance 
in Public Office: A Very Peculiar Tort' (2011) 35(1) Melbourne University Law Review 1.  
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A definition of financial stability also has technical importance for persons 
engaged professionally in financial stability, including economists, academics 
and experts employed by central banks and other mandated institutions. Without 
a definition and without conceptual clarity, they may find it hard to develop ‘useful 
analytical frameworks’ that can be used to examine financial stability policies.40 
For example, the ‘definition of financial stability has obvious impacts on the scope 
of the financial stability [report]’ of a central bank.41  
 
Lastly, a clear definition may on its own further the goal of achieving financial 
stability, especially if it adds transparency to the actions of the regulator, such as 
a central bank. For example, a central bank responsible for financial stability may 
give an indication of what it considers to be signs of instability42 by what it includes 
in its definition of financial stability, and stakeholders may therefore be able to 
infer from this definition when the central bank is likely to intervene to prevent 
financial instability.43 
 
2 Societal (Public) Importance 
 
From the perspective of the Australian government, clarity in definition is not only 
important for the reasons cited above, but also for the ability of the government 
to justify its own actions in the furtherance of financial stability. Financial stability 
is in the national interest of Australia,44 and also constitutes an international 
 
40 Garry J Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (Working Paper No 04/187, IMF International 
Capital Markets Department, October 2004) 3 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04187.pdf> (‘Defining Financial Stability’). 
 
41 ‘The broader the definition of instability, the more potential threats to stability (and the longer 
the report)’: Čihák (n 6) 13. 
 




44 See Louise Parsons, ‘Regulating Australia's Financial Stability in the National Interest’, in 
John H Farrar, Mary Hiscock, & Vai Io Lo (eds), Australia's Trade, Investment and Security in 
the Asian Century (World Scientific, 2015) 251. 
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public good,45 warranting a definition. Financial stability is important from a public 
policy perspective,46 and a lack of stability may justify government intervention in 
the economy. Intervention may be dependent on when a certain definitional 
threshold is met. In capitalist, market-based economies, government intervention 
in the markets can be met with public resistance,47 and a definition of financial 
stability may be of assistance. As financial stability is in the national interest of 
Australia,48 and also constitutes an international public good,49 clarity in definition 
is also important for the Australian government to justify its own actions in the 
furtherance of financial stability, if needed. 
 
3 General Regulatory Importance: The Advantages and Disadvantages of 
a Definition of Financial Stability  
 
Conceptual clarity about what financial stability is, is advantageous for the 
accountability of the regulatory agency (such as the RBA) to its public 
stakeholders, including the general public and national and international financial 
market participants. In the absence of conceptual clarity and a definition, different 
stakeholders and interest groups may interpret the concept of financial stability 
differently, and they may hold different views as to whether the RBA or the 
government has properly fulfilled its duties in relation to Australia’s financial 
stability. For example, the general public may equate financial stability to 
economic prosperity, growth, price stability, stable inflation and/or low interest 
 
45 Financial stability is a public good: Hilary J Allen, ‘Putting the “Financial Stability” in Financial 
Stability Oversight Council’ (2015) 76(5) Ohio State Law Journal 1087, 1152 (‘Putting Financial 
Stability in the FSOC’). If a public good is only defined as such because it is something that can 
only be provided by public institutions, then financial stability may not be a true public good if it 
can be provided by the private market: See Alon Harel, Why Law Matters (Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 2.  
 
46 Čihák (n 6) 2.  
 
47 President Obama for example promised the US public that after the GFC there would be no 
more bail-outs. See Frank James, ‘Obama: Financial Bill Means “No More… Bailouts, Period”’, 
The Two-Way (Blog Post, 15 July 2010) <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2010/07/15/128549117/obama-financial-bill-means-no-more-bailouts-period>.  
 
48 See Parsons (n 44).  
 
49 Financial stability is a public good: Allen, ‘Putting Financial Stability in the FSOC’ (n 45) 1152. 
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rates. The financial markets may equate financial stability to the absence of 
shocks to the financial system, or an absence of bank failures. Each of these 
stakeholders may, if there is no settled definition of financial stability, hold their 
own views as to the precise meaning of the concept, the mandate of the RBA and 
also its purpose/objectives in safeguarding financial stability. Whether or not the 
regulatory agency such as the RBA then has succeeded in achieving its 
objectives, will depend on the meaning each stakeholder has of what financial 
stability is. Formal conceptual clarity will be of assistance. 
 
A formal definition of financial stability can however create some regulatory 
difficulties. If the definition of financial stability does not cover specific events, the 
responsible regulator may not be empowered to act. A definition that allows for 
flexibility in interpretation would therefore be preferred. A fixed definition of 
financial stability could also lead to potential moral hazard. If a detailed definition 
of financial stability were for example to give an indication as to when a bailout 
may likely be provided to illiquid financial institutions, market participants may act 
accordingly and demonstrate less discipline, relying on liquidity assistance or 
lender of last resort (LOLR) actions.50  
 
Further, defining financial stability can restrict the choices of a regulatory agency. 
A definition that is too restrictive may also limit the actions that a mandated 
regulatory agency such as a central bank may wish to take in order to prevent 
financial instability. Some ambiguity may in effect provide more flexibility to a 
central bank in times of crisis.51  
 
Similarly, a financial stability definition may also hamper the analysis or 
assessment of economic or financial conditions and a determination of financial 
instability. It has been argued that52  
 
50 Financial institutions are regulated so as to avoid relying on central bank bail-outs.  
 
51 Smaga (n 14) 14.  
 
52 Ibid 19. 
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financial stability is such a complex phenomenon, that the lack of a strict scope 
of the definition leaves the necessary flexibility in its analysis (allows to grasp 
new forms of instability) and does not limit the spectrum of analysis, making it 
possible to identify potential sources of risk.  
 
Accordingly, it would be preferable to have a broader, less defined description of 
financial stability if it will allow for a larger variety of financial conditions to be 
classified as ‘financial stability’ or ‘financial instability’. 
 
On balance, it is however useful and important to have a definition of financial 
stability, even if there is no framework, no set of models, or even no clarity as to 
the concept of equilibrium, and even if the definition would not be of the type that 
the discipline of economics would normally ‘demand and use’.53 From a practical, 
regulatory perspective, it is only when there is clarity as to what financial stability 
entails that the ‘efficacy of financial stability-related standards and practices can 
be improved’.54 
 
III Definitional Difficulties 
 
Financial stability is difficult to achieve, and it is ‘difficult even to define’.55 The 
difficulties in creating a definition arise from the inherent subject matter, the 




53 Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (n 40) 4. 
 
54 Allen, ‘What is “financial stability”’ (n 20) 931. 
  
55 Financial stability ‘is ‘harder yet to measure’: Charles A E Goodhart and Dimitrios P 
Tsomocos, ‘Introduction’, in Goodhart, Charles A E, and Dimitrios P Tsomocos (eds) The 
Challenge of Financial Stability A New Model and its Applications, (Edward Elgar, 2012) 1; See 
also: Lars Heikensten, ‘The Riksbank and Risks in the Financial System’ (Speech, Risk 
Management Conference, 16 November 2004) <https://www.bis.org/review/r041117b.pdf>: 
‘[T]he concept of stability is slightly vague and difficult to define’; See Allen and Wood, ‘Defining 
and achieving financial stability’ (n 5) 1; See also generally Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial 
Stability’ (n 40) 3.  
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A. A Working Definition of Financial Stability 
 
It is useful to start the discussion of the definitional difficulties by providing a 
preliminary working definition of financial stability. The term ‘financial stability’ will 
generally be used in accordance with the meaning as per this working definition 
in the balance of this thesis: 
 
Working definition -  
Financial stability describes the conditions in the financial system when 
funds flow in such a manner that productive investment opportunities 
can be utilised without disruption for the benefit of society at large. 
 
The working definition was created based on the following two definitions of 
financial stability. The first is that of former central banker and economist Frederic 
Mishkin,56 who described financial stability as follows: 57 
Focusing on information problems leads to a definition of financial instability: 
Financial instability occurs when shocks to the financial system interfere with 
information flows so that the financial system can no longer do its job of 
channeling (sic) funds to those with productive investment opportunities. Indeed, 
if the financial instability is severe enough, it can lead to almost a complete 
breakdown in the functioning of financial markets, a situation which is then 
classified as a financial crisis.  
 
56 Anatolyevna and Ramilevna (n 20) 856.They cite Mishkin: Frederic S Mishkin, ‘Global 
Financial Instability: Framework, Events, Issues’ (1999) 13(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 
3 (‘Global Financial Instability’). 
 
57 Mishkin, ‘Global Financial Instability’ (n 56) 6 (emphasis unchanged). 
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The second definition is one recently proposed by lawyer and academic Hilary 
Allen, 58  who adopts a more legal/regulatory approach. According to Allen, 
financial stability means59  
a state of affairs wherein (1) financial institutions and markets are able to facilitate 
capital intermediation, risk management and payment services in a way that 
enables sustainable economic growth; (2) there is no disruption to the ability of 
financial institutions or markets to carry out such functions that might cause harm 
to persons (wherever they may be resident) who are not customers or 
counterparties of those financial institutions, nor participants in those financial 
markets; and …  financial institutions and markets are able to withstand economic 
shocks (such as the failure of other markets and institutions, or a chain of 
significant losses at financial institutions) so that … there will be no disruption to 
the performance of the functions … and … no harm will be caused to the persons 
set forth [above]. 
B. Financial Stability as a Possible Contradiction in Terms  
 
Firstly, financial stability cannot and should not be interpreted to mean a fixed 
state. In fact, financial stability may be a misnomer, and even a contradiction in 
terms, especially when the concept is broken down into its constituent parts,60 
namely ‘financial’ (or ‘finance’), and ‘stability’. Finance by its very nature requires 
excesses and shortages (ie instability). There has to be an excess on the one 
side (savings) and a shortage on the other (investment opportunities) for finance 
to work. Similarly, the concept of ‘stability’ presupposes the possibility of 
movement, change and instability, and is therefore defined by its opposite. The 
concept of ‘stability’ cannot exist without the notion of ‘instability’: stability 
depends on instability. The concepts finance and stability and the way in which 
 
58 See Allen, ‘What is “financial stability”’ (n 20).  
 
59 Allen, ‘What is “financial stability”’ (n 20) 935; and replicated in Allen, ’Putting Financial 
Stability in the FSOC’ (n 45) 1147. 
 
60 Schinasi points out that before one tries to define financial stability, it is useful to consider 
some concepts as prerequisites: Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (n 40) 4.  
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they impact on the financial stability definition will now be examined in more 
detail. 
 
1 The Nature of Finance 
 
The nature of finance, as an inherently uncertain, trust-based and unstable 
system, influences the notion of financial stability. To illustrate this point, it is 
necessary to look at the fundamental characteristics of ‘finance’. (It is also 
important to consider the nature of finance in relation to the scope of a financial 
stability objective and the narrow or broader interpretations of the concept 
financial stability – see below.) 
 
(a) Finance, the Financial System and the Importance of Finance 
 
Finance can be defined as ‘the system that includes the circulation of money, the 
granting of credit, the making of investments, and the provision of banking 
facilities’.61 In particular, finance is concerned with the allocation of resources, as 
well as resource management and investment. It allows surplus funds to be used 
for productive investment opportunities, and therefore involves sophisticated 
structures of lending and borrowing. 
 
The financial system includes intermediaries and markets that facilitate the flow 
of funds between lenders and borrowers, and involves financial institutions, 
instruments and services.62 The system connects lenders – typically savers – 
 
61 ‘Merriam Webster Dictionary - ‘Finance’ (Web Page, 2019)  <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/finance>. Tyree et al describe the financial system as follows: ‘‘The 
financial system of a country facilitates the flow of funds from savers to borrowers and provides 
a convenient means to conducting transactions’: Alan Tyree, P M Weaver and W S 
Weerasooria, Weerasooria’s Banking Law and the Financial System in Australia  (LexisNexis, 
6th ed, 2006) 3. 
 
62 ‘The financial system is complex, comprising many different types of private-sector financial 
institutions, including banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, finance companies, and 
investment banks’: Frederic S Mishkin and Stanley G Eakins, Financial Markets and Institutions 
(Pearson 2012) 46. The three key components of the financial system are markets, 
intermediaries and infrastructure: Peter Černák, ‘Assessment and Monitoring of Financial 
Stability’ (Bachelor Thesis, University of Economics Prague, 2008) 
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with borrowers who spend the money. The flow of funds between these two 
groups is facilitated by financial intermediaries and the financial markets. 
Whereas lenders and borrowers connect directly in the financial markets, funding 
is transferred indirectly through financial intermediaries. The financial system is 
depicted in Figure 2.1 below. 
 










<https://vskp.vse.cz/6860_assessment_and_monitoring_of_financial_stability>. Hudson points 
out the importance of the history of the word ‘finance’, meaning ‘to end’. In Hudson’s view 
finance is therefore ‘concerned with providing a person with the wherewithal to act by means of 
providing her with sufficient money (or its equivalent) so that she can achieve her goals’: 























Finance is a vital component of modern economics as it enhances ‘the private 
and social benefits of fiat money’63  and makes economic growth possible.64 
Finance provides a better store of value than fiat money,65 because finance 
includes promises to pay and the potential of charging interest. Throughout 
history, finance has therefore been able to mobilise savings, allocate resources, 
facilitate investments, provide payments and also mitigate risk. Finance also 
increases the availability of liquidity, which can be used for consumption, 
exchange and production,66 and makes economic growth possible. Finance has 
resulted in considerably more social welfare gains than what fiat money alone 
could provide.67 Finance accordingly provides beneficial services and outcomes 
that can be classified as both private and public goods.68 
 
(b) Key Characteristics of Finance and the Financial System 
 
The three key characteristics of finance that play an important role in conceptions 
of ‘financial stability’ and contribute to the difficulties in definitions and 
descriptions are (i) finance’s systemic nature, (ii) its inherent uncertainties and 
 
63 Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (n 40) 5. 
 
64 Ulrich Bindseil, ‘Central Banking, Liquidity Risk, and Financial Stability’ (Lecture, Technical 
University of Berlin, Summer 2009) 4. 
 
65 The current economic system is a system based on money (not on a system of barter). 
Money nevertheless does not function well as a store of value, even though money (fiat money) 
is ‘universally accepted as the economy’s unit of account and means of payment’. It is however 
a good store of value in ‘the very short run or during episodes of financial distress and 
dysfunctions’: See Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (n 40) 4. 
 




68 Finance is considered to be a public good. Money however also performs similar public 
functions: See Brigitte Unger, Daan Van Der Linde, and Michael Getzner (eds), Public or 
Private Goods?: Redefining Res Publica (Edward Elgar, 2017); Financial stability must be 
treated like a public good, because the financial system is linked to the real economy by 
providing credit, benefitting both households and businesses: Bill Mitchell ‘The Central Bank 
Must Treat Financial Stability as a Public Good’, Bill Mitchell Modern Monetary Theory (Blog 
Post, 29 June 2011) <http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=15104>.  
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the fact that it is founded on trust, as well as (iii) its inherent instabilities and 
propensity for crises.  
(i) Systemic Nature of Finance 
 
Unlike the agricultural or manufacturing sectors, finance is a system.69 It includes 
intermediaries and markets that facilitate the flow of funds between lenders and 
borrowers, and involves financial institutions, instruments and services.70 The 
fact that finance is a system places a particular slant on the concept of financial 
stability as it increases the potential for instability, because the stability of a 
system relies on the stability of both the individual actors/participants and also of 
their interconnections. 
 
A brief consideration of the realities of the financial system illustrates the 
complexities involved in determining and defining financial stability. Banks and 
financial institutions are interconnected through payment systems.71 Payment 
systems are typically currency-specific, making them intricately connected.72 The 
payments system links participants in a network, and banks and financial 
institutions channel liquidity ‘to the rest of the financial sector and into the 
economy as a whole’.73 The systemic aspect of the payments system is further 
strengthened by the fact that banks and financial institutions directly or indirectly 
depend on access to central bank liquidity.74 Lastly, the fact that all participants 
in a given currency area have confidence in the currency and in the central bank 
further cements the systemic nature of the financial system.75  
 
69 The same terminology is not used in other industries – there is for example no ‘agricultural 
system’ and no ‘manufacturing system’. The systemic nature of finance is however important. 
 
70 See Černák (n 62).  
 
71 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, ‘Central Banks and Financial Stability: Exploring a Land in 




73 Ibid 7. 
 
74 Ibid 5. 
 
75 Ibid 7.  
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(ii) Inherent Uncertainties in Finance and the Need for Trust 
 
Two important features of finance that create uncertainty and a need for trust, 
and negatively influence financial stability, are firstly, its intertemporal dimension, 
and secondly, information asymmetry.  
 
The intertemporal dimension of finance is one of its key aspects and introduces 
questions and issues about trust into transactions.76  It fundamentally affects 
notions of stability. Promises to pay in the future (eg promises to repay a loan, as 
in finance) introduce elements of uncertainty, and therefore trust becomes an 
issue.77 Modern finance involves ‘human promises to pay back specific amounts 
of fiat money in the future’78 and as a substitute for money, provides ‘temporary 
and reversible intertemporal means-of-payment and store-of-value services’. 
Uncertainty and a lack of trust therefore arise in finance transactions79 because 
a promise to repay a loan in finance is different from a cash payment.80 Trust can 
be ‘fragile’,81 and when trust fails or proves to have been misplaced, or even if 
 
 
76 A loan made in the present is repayable in the future. Future payments are uncertain, and 
loans are therefore generally subject to an examination of the trustworthiness of the borrower. 
 
77 This occurs in a simple IOU but also in a more complex deposit, investment or credit contract: 
Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (n 40) 5.  
 
78 Ibid. Further, this reflects the relationships between lenders and borrowers, and it reflects that 
finance provides methods to effect payment at future times.  
 
79 These are not typical problems when a cash payment is made using fiat money. The only real 
risk with a cash payment is counterfeit. 
 
80 Typical risks in finance include default risk, market risk, and liquidity risk. In modern finance 
the risks that accompany these promises to pay and the level of trust in each transaction are 
nevertheless mitigated, because they are quantified and priced, but the element of risk remains. 
Schinasi states that ‘modern finance provides societies with effective, albeit imperfect, 
mechanisms for transforming, pricing, and allocating economic and financial uncertainties and 





doubts about trust arise, the welfare of individuals, society and the real economy 
can be negatively impacted.82  
 
Although the intertemporal and trust aspects of finance have always been part of 
finance, some additional risks have developed in recent years, as evidenced in 
the GFC (see Chapter 3), because of the expansion in finance. Information 
asymmetries in finance are also problematic for financial stability.83 Asymmetric 
information can lead to negative selection and moral hazard84 that can work 
against financial stability:85  
Information asymmetry is nevertheless a necessary component of the process of 
the flow of funds from savers to productive investment opportunities. In fact, 
‘finance arises due to information asymmetries, without which there would not 
only be no crises but also no return for financial intermediaries.  
 
(iii) Inherent Instability and Propensity to Crises 
 
The nature of finance itself as well as its inherent uncertainties are therefore part 
of the reason that the financial world is prone to crises. Financial crises have 
been described as ‘hardy perennial[s]’.86 The impact of globalisation and the 
liberalisation of controls allowing the free flow of capital across borders and rapid 
financial innovations have further contributed to increased risk in modern finance 
in a global financial system.87 
 
82 Examples include the breach of an investment contract and non-fulfilment of payment 
obligations: Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (n 40) 5. 
 
83 Asymmetric information exists in a situation ‘when one side does not have accurate 
information, which leads to wrong selection and/or, in [the] case of a bank [for example], the 
selection of a borrower prone to risk taking’: Vlahović (n 21) 21.  
 




86 See Robert Z Aliber and Charles P Kindleberger, ‘Financial Crises: A Hardy Perennial’ in 
Robert Z Aliber and Charles P Kindleberger (ed), Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of 
Financial Crises (Palgrave Macmillan, 7th ed, 2015) 5. 
 
87 See Gerard Caprio, ‘Occupying the Wrong Street? The Social Productivity of the Financial 
Sector: Some Comments’ in Douglas Darrell Evanoff, Cornelia Holthausen, George G Kaufman 
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As noted above, the notion of instability is however inherent in the concept of 
financial stability. It is the availability of savings (excess) to satisfy the need for 
funds (scarcity) on the part of producers, ie those with productive opportunities, 
that create the fundamentals of the financial system. The financial system 
therefore depends on a lack of balance and some instability to make it work, and 
therefore finance could not operate if everything was in a fixed state. Economist 
John Maynard Keynes thought that instability was unavoidable. He noted that88  
… apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability due to the 
characteristic of human nature [including] … spontaneous optimism rather than 
mathematical expectations … [and] animal spirits ….  
 
Similarly, the positive benefits of finance and wealth also require some amount 
of risk, and risk brings a measure of instability. Financial stability may in fact 
require some risk:89 
Risk taking is indeed a necessary condition for the creation of wealth. The 
ultimate values of all assets rest on their ability to produce goods and services in 
the future. And the future … is uncertain and hence all investments are risky.  
 
2 The Nature of Stability and Financial Stability 
 
‘Stability’ is a more nebulous and elusive concept than ‘finance’. ‘Stability’ in the 
context of finance can best be described as one or more point(s) along a 
continuum. The continuum extends from extreme instability and perpetual flux on 
the one side, to immutable stability or a fixed state on the other side: 90  
 
and Manfred Kremer (eds), The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability: How Has it 
Changed? (World Scientific, 2013) 297. 
 
88 Thomas Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money (Macmillan, 1936) 
161-2. 
 
89 Alan Greenspan, ‘Opening Remarks’ (Speech, Wyoming Symposium on Maintaining 
Financial Stability in a Global Economy, 28–30 August 1997); Pawel Smaga, ‘Assessing 
Involvement of Central Banks in Financial Stability’ (Policy Paper, Centre for Financial Stability, 
23 May 2013) 19 <http://www.centerforfinancialstability.org/research/Assessing_052313.pdf>. 
 
90 Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (n 40) 8. 
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Since the financial system is in a perpetual state of flux and transformation, the 
concept of financial stability does not refer to a single, sustainable position or 
time path to which the financial system returns after a shock, but rather a range 
or a continuum. This continuum is multidimensional: it occurs across a multitude 
of observable, measurable variables that can be used to quantify (albeit 
imperfectly) how well the financial system is performing its facilitative functions.  
 
Similarly, financial stability is a phenomenon involving the concept of 
equilibrium.91 Although the notion of ‘equilibrium’ invokes a state of ‘stability’, it 
does not refer to a fixed and permanent state. In the context of financial stability, 
then, stability more accurately refers to a specific quality of a state of affairs that 
is variable by its very nature.92 Stability can only mean that the variations will be 
within certain (usually narrow or predicted/predictable) parameters.93 
 
A good way to look at the need for ‘stability’ in an area which is inherently 
‘instable’, is to consider defining the parameters within which instability will be 
acceptable. Certain ‘boundaries’ could be defined beyond which an unacceptable 
level of financial instability will exist. This may be a way to solve the definitional 
conundrum. Such a conceptualization is not dissimilar from the concept of the 
‘snake in the tunnel’, being the way in which currency exchanges were described 
and regulated after the Second World War.94 It is also similar to the concept of 
 
91 This economic model for the analysis of financial stability was created by Goodhart and 
Tsomocos. See Goodhart and Tsomocos, (n 55) 1. For example, a model for financial stability 
has been based on the ‘canonical General Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets (GEI) model’. 
See Tsomocos, (n 15) 61. 
 
92 See Bindseil, (n 64). 
 
93 This description of stability is reminiscent of the analogy of the ‘snake in the tunnel’ approach 
– see below.  
 
94 See Roy Jenkins, European Diary 1977-1981 (Collins, 1989). The snake in the tunnel 
concept was used to describe efforts to stabilise currency fluctuations in the European Monetary 
Union. ‘Under this mechanism, Member States' currencies could fluctuate (like a snake) within 
narrow limits against the dollar (the tunnel) and central banks could buy and sell European 
currencies, provided that they remained within the fluctuation margin of 2.25%’: Angelos 
Delivorias, A History of European Monetary Integration (Briefing, March 2015) 3 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/551325/EPRS_BRI(2015)551325_
EN.pdf>: See also Étienne Deschamps, ‘The European Currency Snake’, CVCE (ePublication, 




price stability, which in many countries, including Australia, is defined by virtue of 
an inflation target, which is expressed as a range.95 Such a model could be an 
economic model, or merely a descriptive model incorporating the type of 
parameters described in Hilary Allen’s definition.96 
 
In conclusion, from the analysis of the components of the concept ‘financial 
stability’, it is clear that some level of instability is inherent in both the concepts of 
‘finance’ and ‘stability’. Defining financial stability, when instability is an inherent 
part of it, poses some fundamental difficulties. 
 
C. The Unclear Scope of Financial Stability 
 
It is not only the definitional uncertainty that results from an inherent instability 
that makes it difficult to define or describe financial stability. There is also a 
fundamental uncertainty about what the scope of financial stability is.  
 
Financial stability can be construed narrowly or broadly. At its narrowest, financial 
stability can refer to the stability of only some institutions within the financial 
system, such as banks, and may be equated with an absence of liquidity 
problems within those institutions, or an absence of banking crises. At its 
broadest, financial stability can refer to broad economic stability and prosperity 
and can be construed to mean continued and predictable economic prosperity 
and growth. The scope of ‘financial stability’ would under this definition extend 
beyond the institutions, markets, systems and instruments that make up the 
financial system.  
 
From a regulatory perspective, the approach taken with the definition has an 
important implication for the regulatory agency responsible for financial stability, 
eg the central bank, because answers to the question as to whether or not the 
 
95 See for example Reserve Bank of Australia, ‘Inflation Target’, Reserve Bank of Australia 
(Web Page) <https://www.rba.gov.au/inflation/inflation-target.html>. 
 
96 Allen, ‘What is “financial stability”’ (n 20) 935; and replicated in Allen, ’Putting Financial 
Stability in the FSOC’ (n 45) 1147. 
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regulator has achieved its task of procuring financial stability will be different 
depending on whether financial stability is defined with a broader or narrower 
focus. This problem of the scope of the financial stability definition arises because 
there is no widely accepted model or analytical framework with which to assess 
financial stability.97  
 
The effect of the uncertainty of the scope of the definition therefore needs 
examination as it is one of the main difficulties in defining financial stability.98 
 
1 A Narrow Scope 
 
When understood narrowly, ‘financial stability’ refers to stability in the financial 
system that involves financial transactions, including payments in and investment 
of money through transactions between lenders and borrowers, and investors 
and sellers. In short, it could simply mean the absence of a bank run,99 or the 
absence of a crisis in the financial sector,100 as opposed to other sectors of the 
economy. The narrow view is the prevalent view of financial stability.101 
 
 
97 Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (n 40) 3. 
 
98 See Čihák (n 6) 10; See also Schinasi, ‘Safeguarding Financial Stability’ (n 2).  
 
99 A ‘bank run’, or ‘run on the bank’ occurs when a large number of bank depositors withdraw 
their deposits (in cash, or cash equivalents) resulting in the financial institution not being able to 
repay all deposits claimed on demand, or at all (becoming insolvent). It is the consequence of 
the factional reserve banking system. To combat the risk of a run on the bank, banks hold 
assets that can be liquidated quickly and at a predictable return, such as gold and government 
bonds.  
 
100 ‘The definition of financial stability is, in general, more controversial. What it generally means 
is the joint stability of the key financial institutions operating within financial markets and the 
stability of those markets. For the financial institutions, this generally means that they are 
sound, meaning they have sufficient capital to absorb normal, and at times abnormal, losses 
and sufficient liquidity to manage operations and volatility in normal periods of time’: Garry J 
Schinasi, ‘Responsibility of Central Banks for Stability in Financial Markets’ (Working Paper No 
03/121, International Monetary Fund, June 2003) 4 (‘Responsibility of Central Banks’). 
 
101 A study completed in 2013 of 27 definitions of financial stability definitions confirmed that the 
concept financial stability in those definitions was mostly used in this narrower sense. See 
Smaga (n 89); See also Vlahović (n 21).  
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(a) Financial Stability Versus Financial System Stability 
 
The issue of the scope of financial stability is complicated by the fact that the 
terms ‘financial stability’ and ‘financial system stability’ are sometimes used 
interchangeably, and ostensibly synonymously. 102  As there is a difference 
between ‘finance’ and the ‘financial system’, it cannot be assumed that the terms 
‘financial stability’ and ‘financial system stability’ are necessarily synonyms, even 
if the narrow scope of the definition of financial stability is adopted. ‘Finance’ 
refers to broad and general practices of capital intermediation, ie of borrowing 
and lending, while the ‘financial system’ refers to the ‘institutional units and 
markets that interact, typically in a complex manner, for the purpose of mobilizing 
funds for investment and providing facilities, including payment systems, for the 
financing of commercial activity’. 103  The financial system therefore involves 
money, financial contracts, financial markets and financial intermediaries. 104 
Even though the concept ‘financial system stability’ is therefore concomitantly 
narrower in scope than ‘financial stability’, the difference in meaning has 
sometimes been ignored, and financial stability has at times simply been equated 
to financial system stability.  
 
In Australia, the tendency at the level of the RBA and the government appears to 
be to consider financial stability narrowly. For example, the RBA’s description of 
financial stability on its website makes reference to the ‘financial system’, without 
clarification of the meanings of the terms ‘financial system’ or ‘financial system 
stability’.105 The RBA Act also refers to financial system stability without defining 
 
102 See for example the RBA’s definition above. 
 
103 International Monetary Fund, Financial Soundness Indicators: Compilation Guide (Guide, 
March 2006) <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fsi/guide/2006/pdf/fsiFT.pdf> as referenced in 
Allen, ‘What is “financial stability”’ (n 20) 944.  
 
104 The role of money and the role of the financial system are linked. John Stuart Mill considered 
money to be ‘a machine for doing quickly and commodiously, what would be done, though less 
quickly and commodiously, without it’: See Milton Friedman, ‘The Role of Monetary Policy’ 
(1968) 58(1) American Economic Review 1, 12;See also Bindseil (n 64) 3. 
 
105 It may therefore possible to conclude that there is no or no significant difference between the 
concepts financial stability and financial system stability in the eyes of the RBA. 
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the ‘financial system’ or ‘stability of the financial system’, but the use of the term 
‘financial stability’ intimates that a narrower interpretation is required.106 Similarly, 
the Murray Inquiry used both the phrases ‘financial stability’ and ‘financial system 
stability’ effectively synonymously in the context of financial stability, but defined 
neither. 107  Because of the synonymous use, it is likely that a narrower 
interpretation of financial stability was adopted. 
 
Limiting the scope of a financial stability definition to what is considered to be ‘the 
financial system’ and specifically to ‘financial institutions’ based on the type of 
institution that they are (such as ‘banks’), however, does not reflect modern 
financial realities. Before the GFC, commercial banks were treated as a special 
class of institution because they are subject to failures, and are vulnerable to so-
called ‘runs’ on banks.108 During the GFC, however, it became clear that runs 
causing financial instability were ‘not unique to commercial banks’109 and it was 
clear that ‘any intermediary that is subject to maturity mismatch (ie using short-
term funding to acquire longer-term assets) can be subject to runs and panics’,110 
including for example so-called ‘shadow’ banks (which include money market 
mutual funds and securities firms).111 After the GFC a broader interpretation of 
financial stability appears to be more reflective of modern realities. 
  
 
106 See Chapter 4 below. 
 
107 Financial System Inquiry, Murray Inquiry Final Report (n 12). 
 
108 Allen, ‘What is “financial stability” (n 20) 945. 
 
109 Ibid. Allen refers to Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, ‘Regulating the shadow banking 
system’ (Paper on Economic Activities No 2, Brookings Institute, 2010) 
<https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/regulating-the-shadow-banking-system-with-
comments-and-discussion/>, and to the discussion on the threats that even medium-sized 
shadow banking entities can pose to financial stability. 
 





2 A Broad Scope 
 
Because it has an important social impact, financial stability is also sometimes 
conceived of more broadly, reflecting its broader public policy goal.112 Financial 
stability can also be interpreted broadly because it can have ‘a measurable effect 
on economic performance (real activity or the rate of inflation)’. 113  Financial 
stability is important because of its close links with the health of the real economy, 
and because of the social costs of economic contractions.114 Financial instability 
has the effect that ‘innocent bystanders get hurt’.115 Accordingly, under a broad 
definition, financial stability is not limited to the financial system and financial 
institutions, but encompasses a wider range of institutions and extends beyond 
the financial system, to (sometimes) the entire economy.116  
 
A broader definition of financial stability can therefore be justified, and a definition 
of financial stability should therefore make it clear that persons who are not 
directly connected to the financial institutions will also be affected by financial 
instability.117 A definition that reflects the public policy aspect of financial stability 
would then demonstrate that118 
 
112 On public policy see Andrew Crockett, ‘Why is Financial Stability a Goal of Public Policy?’ 
(1997) 82(4) Economic Review Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 5 (‘Why is financial 
stability a goal of public policy?’). 
 
113 Crockett (n 3) 532. That is the case even though that measurement is not always easy to 
determine. 
 
114 Allen, ‘What is “financial stability” (n 20) 946; See also Crockett (n 3), referenced by Allen; 
See also Janet L Yellen, ‘A Painfully Slow Recovery for America’s Workers: Causes, 
Implications, and the Federal Reserve’s Response’ (Speech, A Trans-Atlantic Agenda for 
Shared Prosperity Conference, 11 February 2013) 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20130211a.htm>. 
 
115 Allen, ‘What is “financial stability”’ (n 20) 947;  Yellen (n 114). 
 
116 A broad definition reflects the importance of the link between the financial system and the 
broader economy that makes financial stability such an important public policy goal. See Allen, 
‘What is “financial stability”’ (n 20) 946. 
 
117  See Allen, ‘What is “financial stability”’ (n 20) 947. See also Hilary J Allen,‘A New 
Philosophy For Financial Stability Regulation’ (2013) 45(1) Loyola University Chicago Law 
Journal 173, 183. 
 
118 Allen, ‘What is “financial stability”’ (n 20) 947. 
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financial stability is concerned with the externalities of financial system failure 
suffered by persons, not because of their relationships with financial institutions, 
but as a result of the broad economic contractions that flow from financial crises. 
 
As financial instability extends beyond the financial system into the broader 
economy, and has a negative effect in the real economy,119 policymakers and 
governments may therefore adopt a broader definition of financial stability 
including political purposes. 
 
Although a broad definition may be attractive because it reflects the undeniable 
public policy implications of financial stability, from a regulatory perspective it 
presents difficulties. It results in there being almost no distinction between the 
financial system and the economy as a whole, and financial stability simply 
becomes equated to macroeconomic stability.120 In a very broad definition, the 
unique role of financial institutions and the financial sector, and the specific 
importance of financial regulation, are disregarded. Fundamentally, the key issue 
that financial stability is concerned with cannot be disregarded in the definition, 
and that is ‘the ability of financial institutions to cause negative externalities for 
consumers and taxpayers in a way that non-financial institutions generally do 
not’.121 
 
Further, an overly broad definition of financial stability would result in financial 
stability regulation ‘swallowing up the entire economy’, 122  and non-financial 
institutions may also have to be made subject to forms of financial regulation, 
including prudential regulation. There should be some ‘demarcating line between 
 
119 See Crockett (n 3) 531. 
 
120 Allen, ‘What is “financial stability”’ (n 20) 944. Allen cites Alan S Blinder, ‘It’s Broke, Let’s Fix 
It: Rethinking Financial Regulation’ (2010) 6(4) International Journal of Central Banking 277, 
278-79.  
 
121 Allen, ‘What is “financial stability”’ (n 20) 944. 
 
122 Ibid.  
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institutions that populate the financial system, and the broader economy’123 even 
if it is not clear where to draw that line.124 
 
A broad definition can also result in regulatory difficulties for the regulator itself. 
A very broad definition will likely use mostly theoretical, hardly measurable 
concepts. This will have an adverse effect on the clarity and transparency of 
financial stability as a policy objective.125 It will also be difficult to put such a 
definition into practical, operational use.126 It may also create difficulties for a 
regulator with a national focus if the ambit of financial stability involves broad 
cross-border considerations. Ultimately, a broad definition can adversely affect 
the clarity and transparency of financial stability as a policy objective and hinder 
working out an operational version of the definition, which could be used 
practically by the central bank. 127 
 
D. Methodological Difficulties in Creating a Definition of 
Financial Stability  
 
In addition to its inherent nature and scope, methodological difficulties also make 
the concept ‘financial stability’ elusive. 
  
 












1 Defining Financial Stability by its Opposite: Instability 
 
Financial stability is often defined by reference to the opposite – financial 
instability128 or ‘avoiding financial crises’129  and examples of instability, as the 
latter is more easily recognisable.130  
(a) A Range of Different Interpretations of Financial Instability 
 
Using financial instability as a point of departure however does not lead to a 
generally recognized or accepted definition of financial stability as there are still 
different views as to what financial instability is. 131  For example, financial 
instability has been described in terms of the financial system being fragile, and 
not able to withstand ‘normal’ shocks.132  It has also been described as the 
financial system being unable to do its job of channelling funds towards 
productive investment opportunities because of shocks interfering with 
information flows.133 It has also been described as a situation in which the means 
 
128 Crockett notes that ‘[m]uch writing on the subject of monetary and financial stability has been 
from the perspective of the causes and consequences of instability’: Crockett (n 3) 531. 
 
129 Schinasi, ‘Responsibility of Central Banks’ (n 100) 4. See Allen and Wood, ‘Defining and 
achieving financial stability’ (n 5) 5, 11.  
 
130 Crockett notes that this is not unlike the process in medicine, where pathology helps to 
understand physiology: ‘In finance, as in medicine, pathology is a powerful tool for 
understanding physiology’: Crockett (n 3) 531.  
 
131 Different views reflect different theoretical underpinnings and/or different historical 
perspectives.  
 
132 For example, Borio and Drehmann, both senior economists at the BIS, describe financial 
instability as ‘a situation in which normal-sized shocks to the financial system are sufficient to 
produce financial distress; it is therefore a situation in which the financial system is “fragile”’: 
Claudio Borio and Mathias Drehmann, ‘Towards an Operational Framework for Financial 
Stability: “Fuzzy” Measurement and Its Consequences’ (Working Paper No 284, Bank for 
International Settlements Monetary and Economic Department, 11 June 2009) 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/work284.pdf>. 
 
133 Mishkin in 1999 when considering financial instability focussed in particular on how the key 
function of the financial system is the ‘channeling (sic) funds to those individuals or firms that 
have productive investment opportunities’. He noted that ‘[i]f the financial system does not 
perform this role well, then the economy cannot operate efficiently and economic growth will be 
hampered’. Mishkin also defined financial stability by its opposite, financial instability. The role 
of the financial system in performing the core functions of ‘finance’ and investment is central to 
Mishkin’s definition: Mishkin, ‘Global Financial Instability’ (n 56) 3-4. He notes that ‘[f]ocusing on 
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of payment are not available at any price,134 or where both the means of payment 
and investment opportunities are not available.135 More fundamentally, financial 
instability has also been described as economic impairment through fluctuations 
in asset prices, or when intermediaries are unable to meet contractual 
obligations.136 These different approaches evidence a wide range of possible 
interpretations or emphasis.  
 
(b) Problems Associated with Using Financial Instability as a Starting 
Point for the Definition 
 
Defining financial stability using financial instability as a starting point or guide is 
neither very helpful nor ideal. 137  Treating financial stability as meaning the 
 
information problems leads to a definition of financial instability: Financial instability occurs 
when shocks to the financial system interfere with information flows so that the financial system 
can no longer do its job of channeling funds to those with productive investment opportunities. 
Indeed, if the financial instability is severe enough, it can lead to almost a complete breakdown 
in the functioning of financial markets, a situation which is then classified as a financial crisis’: at 
6. See also Anatolyevna and Ramilevna (n 20) 856, citing Mishkin, ‘Global Financial Instability’ 
(n 56) 3. 
 
134 See for example the work of Allen and Wood. William Allen is an economist and former 
central banker; Geoffrey Wood is a professor of economics. Allen and Wood, ‘Defining and 
achieving financial stability’ (n 5) 6.  
 
135 Ibid 7. Allen and Wood note that the financial system will be stable ‘if there is efficient 
allocation of savings to investment opportunities’. This is also the approach of Anna Schwartz. 
She defines a financial crisis with reference to some of the key elements that also appear in 
definitions of financial instability. ‘A financial crisis is fuelled by fears that the means of payment 
will be unobtainable at any price and, in a fractional reserve banking system, leads to a 
scramble for high-powered money. It is precipitated by actions of the public that suddenly 
squeeze the reserves of the banking system…’: Anna J Schwartz, ‘Real and Pseudo-Financial 
Crises’, in Anna J Schwarz (ed), Money in Historical Perspective (University of Chicago Press, 
1987) 271, 277. E Philip Davis provides a similarly broad definition. He describes a financial 
crisis as ‘a major collapse of the financial system, entailing [the] inability to provide payments 
services or to allocate credit to productive investment opportunities’: Anatolyevna and 
Ramilevna (n 20) 856-7, citing E Davis, ‘A Typology of Financial Instability’ (2001) 2 
Oesterreichische National Bank Financial Stability Report 92. 
 
136 Crockett (n 3) 532. In his opinion, financial instability is ‘a situation in which economic 
performance is potentially impaired by fluctuations in the prices of financial assets or in the 
ability of financial intermediaries to meet their contractual obligations’: See also Vlahović (n 21) 
22. 
 
137 The problems that result from defining financial stability by virtue of its opposite, financial 
instability, has been pointed out more than 20 years ago by a former RBA Assistant Governor 
(Financial System): J F Laker, ‘Monitoring Financial System Stability’ [1999] (October) Reserve 
Bank of Australia Bulletin 1. Although in some other areas of law the definition of a concept by 
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absence of financial instability, is at best a starting point and not sufficient on its 
own,138 for the following reasons. 
 
Firstly, financial instability is often associated with a specific financial crisis. 
Accordingly, a definition of financial stability that is based on that specific example 
of financial instability will be too narrow and overly situation-specific. For 
example, if a run on a bank by depositors were a definitive characteristic, then 
the definition of financial stability would or could be ‘the absence of bank-runs by 
depositors’. Such a definition would however have been too narrow to 
encapsulate the circumstances of the GFC.139 It would ironically mean that there 
would have been financial stability by definition before the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers at the start of the GFC – that was not the case.140  
 
Secondly, risk avoidance could become the dominant objective of financial 
stability regulation, if the pursuit of financial stability equates to the avoidance of 
financial instability.141 Regulators may for example have to move against rapid 
economic growth in a particular area of the economy, if it could potentially create 
financial instability. That may undermine normal economic growth and may even 
be unnecessary.  
 
 
virtue of its opposite can be helpful (for example it is easier to define good faith by virtue of the 
absence of bad faith), that is not always the case with the definition of financial stability. 
 
138 Ibid 2. 
 
139 In the GFC, financial institutions failed as a consequence of financial instability, but the 
ensuing credit crunch caused significant financial instability even in the absence of failed 
institutions. Government bail-outs (or government facilitated bail-outs) prevented some 
institutional failures.  
 
140 Even though Lehman Brothers collapsed because of underlying or latent weaknesses and 
so-called ‘amplification mechanisms’ (the seeds of financial instability), those only really 
became apparent when Lehman Brothers failed. See Allen, ‘What is “financial stability”’ (n 20) 
942.  
 
141 If policy objectives were simply geared at avoiding financial instability, then policy decisions, 
analyses, and analytical frameworks could become biased, and both private and social benefits 
of finance could be sacrificed. See Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (n 40). 
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One of the key disadvantages of limiting a definition of financial stability to the 
absence of financial instability is that it limits the perception of financial stability 
‘strictly to the lack of [a] financial crisis’.142 Not every disruption is a financial crisis, 
because ‘asset bubbles can build up and systemic risk can accumulate [even] in 
the absence of visible signs of … [a] crisis’.143 If avoiding financial instability were 
however a general policy objective, economic growth may be detrimentally 
affected.144 One of the key social and private benefits of finance – the creation of 
economic growth – can thereby be lost. 
 
Thirdly, defining financial stability from the perspective of financial instability 
creates difficulties for the financial stability regulator. A definition needs clarity, 
and ‘[d]efining “financial stability” with sufficient clarity to guide actions and create 
a structure for accountability is difficult’.145 Basing a definition of financial stability 
on what is construed to be financial instability, may unintentionally focus only on 
some of the causes of financial instability, rather than the concept itself, and may 
not provide a definition of sufficient generality or clarity. 
 
(c) Advantages of Not Basing a Definition on Financial Instability 
 
Not basing the definition on financial instability has advantages. Such an 
approach would not limit the concept of financial stability to a single quantitative 
indicator,146 as for example the existence of a specific event of instability. It would 
also be forward-looking,147 and would not necessarily be influenced by the most 
recent financial crisis. Lastly, it would recognize that aiming for financial stability 
 








146 Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (n 40) 11.  
 
147 Ibid.  
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will likely involve a trade-off between resilience and efficiency, meaning that at 
times, systems may be efficient (eg lead to growth) through certain failures (ie a 
lack of resilience). At other times, resilience should be prioritised over efficiency.  
 
2 Describing Rather Than Defining Financial Stability 
 
Providing a description rather than a definition has some practical benefits. The 
concept is not ring-fenced, but there is still guidance as to whether there is 
financial stability or not. Buiter suggests four dimensions of financial stability that 
can be highlighted in a description: ‘the prevention and/or mitigation of asset and 
credit booms’,148 the ‘prevention and/or mitigation of funding liquidity crises for 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and for the sovereign’,149 the 
prevention and/or mitigation of market liquidity crises involving markets for 
systemically important financial instruments, 150  and the prevention and/or 
mitigation of solvency crises for SIFIs.151 
 
Although defining financial stability by using financial instability as a starting point 
is common and practical, it is not necessarily the best way of defining financial 
stability. Such definitions are seldom completely objective and ahistoric. The 
potential influences on definitions of financial stability will now be analysed. 
 
3 Difficulties Measuring and Modelling Financial Stability 
 
One way of defining financial stability could be through economic models or 
mathematical formulae. For example, under the inflation-targeting model, the 
 
148 Willem H Buiter, ‘The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability: How Has it Changed?’ 





150 Ibid 2. 
 
151 Ibid 1-2. Buiter, a well-known banker and economist, asks: ‘[F]inancial stability: what is it?’ 
but then does not formulate a definition. Instead, Buiter points to four dimensions of financial 
stability, thereby adopting a more descriptive approach. 
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‘measure’ of successful monetary policy operations is whether the annualised 
rate of inflation as defined remained within the targeted bands. Although financial 
stability modelling is not yet fully developed as a discipline, the notion of ‘stability’ 
involves discretion, and mathematical and/or numerical terms may be less ideal 
than descriptive options for legislative purposes. 
 
In any event, quantification of financial stability is difficult. Jeanneau points out 
that152  
even if some elements were quantifiable, multiple trade-offs would nevertheless 
be faced by policy makers in the absence of a straightforward method for (eg) 
setting off … Still, some quantification could be useful, wherever possible.  
 
Ultimately, compliance with the financial stability mandate may not be a 
quantifiable matter but should be judged qualitatively. The problem with financial 
stability is that (unlike monetary policy) it is ‘messy’,153 and financial instability 
can arise from a range of different, and often unforeseen causes. Financial 
stability can be influenced by a large number of disparate known (and unknown) 
factors including bank liquidity, availability of credit, payment systems, consumer 
protection, even the tax system. 154  The tools of financial stability are wide-
ranging, and financial stability can be improved or damaged by a very wide range 






153 Luci Ellis, ‘Financial Stability and the Banking Sector’ (Speech, Sydney Banking and 
Financial Stability Conference, 12 July 2016) <https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2016/sp-so-
2016-07-12.html>. 
 
154 See Luci Ellis, ‘Macroprudential Policy: What Have We Learned?’ (Presentation, Bank of 
England Roundtable for Heads of Financial Stability) 16 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/information/foi/disclosure-log/pdf/131413.pdf>. 
 
155 See John Simon, ‘Ten Years of Research – What Have We Learnt Since the Financial 
Crisis?’ (Speech, Economic Society of Australia (QLD) and Griffith University Symposium, 7 
March 2019) <https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2019/sp-so-2019-03-07.html>. 
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4 Difficulties Creating Neutral and Objective Definitions 
 
In principle, definitions, including financial stability definitions, are not entirely 
objective, a-temporal and ahistoric.156 They reflect external influences of their 
time of creation, including the political and intellectual climate. That raises some 
fundamental difficulties.  
 
Firstly, definitions reflect the times in which they are created. Conceptions of 
financial stability have changed over time, and definitions of financial stability 
(and revised definitions of financial stability) can reflect the causes and/or 
characteristics of the latest financial crisis. That may make it harder to hold 
regulators accountable if the definition does not fit the current circumstances. 
Further, if a definition is not neutral, the situation may arise where the criteria of 
stability inherent in a definition of financial stability may be met, so there may be 
stability in theory, but in fact there may not be actual financial stability.  
 
The GFC for example had an important influence on perceptions of financial 
stability. Before the GFC financial instability was effectively equated to instability 
in the banking system, frequently occasioned by runs on bank and bank failures. 
Definitions of financial stability before and after the GFC reflect the influence of 
these events. The RBA’s definitions demonstrate similar historical changes. For 
example, in 1999, the RBA defined financial stability as:157  
… in broad terms, … the avoidance of disruptions to the financial system that are 
likely to cause significant costs to real output.158 
 
The post-GFC description of financial stability provided by the RBA on its website 
(a more detailed version compared to the one quoted above in Part II A 1 above), 
 
156 All definitions will likely contain some measure of subjectivity reflective of the subjective 
circumstances of the author and their historic time.  
 
157 See Laker (n 137). 
 
158 See also Crockett, ‘Why is financial stability a goal of public policy?’ (n 112); See C Kent and 
G Debelle, ‘Trends in the Australian Banking System: Implications for Financial System Stability 




references characteristics of the GFC that were shown to have an important effect 
on financial stability. The extended description post-GFC description reads as 
follows:159 
A stable financial system is one in which financial intermediaries, markets and 
market infrastructure facilitate the smooth flow of funds between savers and 
investors and, by doing so, help promote growth in economic activity. Conversely, 
financial instability is a material disruption to this intermediation process with 
potentially damaging implications for the real economy. From this perspective, 
the safeguarding of financial stability can be seen to be a forward-looking task – 
one that seeks to identify vulnerabilities within the financial system and, where 
possible, take mitigating action. Some of these vulnerabilities have a 
macroeconomic dimension, such as changes in the condition of household and 
corporate sector balance sheets, and developments in credit and asset markets, 
all of which have the potential to affect the level and distribution of financial risk 
within the economy. Other vulnerabilities relate to the way in which financial 
intermediaries and financial market participants price and manage their various 
risks. In addition, a resilient financial system is one in which there are well 
developed crisis management arrangements for handling distressed financial 
institutions in such a way that public confidence in the financial system will not 
be undermined. 
 
Post-GFC indicators in this definition of financial stability include: 
• an emphasis on a smooth flow of funds – in the GFC the inability to obtain 
and the unwillingness to provide credit in the interbank market created the 
costly credit crunch. This approach to financial stability differs from the 
earlier focus on the failure of institutions and the creation of systemic risk; 
• an enlargement of the perceived risks to financial stability to include a large 
array of vulnerabilities, which are not limited to the liquidity or solvency of 
financial institutions only; 
• an acknowledgement of the potentially destabilising effects of the mis-
pricing of risk – reminiscent of the problems experienced during the GFC 
 




with the inaccurate valuation of complex financial products by credit rating 
agencies; and 
• a reference to the availability of crisis management. After the GFC, for 
example, ‘living wills’ and individual resolution plans were developed for 
the unwinding of large complex institutions, as one of the methods of 
resisting moral hazard arising from organisations that are too big to fail 
(TBTF) and that relied on and expected public financial assistance.160 
 
These characteristics demonstrate how a definition of financial stability can be 
influenced by the time in which it is created and by the understanding of financial 
stability at that time. 
 
Secondly, apart from evidencing temporal influences, definitions of financial 
stability can also reflect specific underlying economic theories. For example, a 
monetarist approach will likely emphasise the link between monetary conditions 
and financial stability. In monetary economics ‘an excess demand for money 
which the central bank in its capacity as lender of last resort had an obligation to 
relieve’161 was viewed as ‘a central feature of financial crises’.162  
 
Thirdly, definitions are often also subjective and contextual. For example, central 
bank definitions appear to be generally narrower than government definitions of 
financial stability. 163  Further, although definitions of financial stability display 
similarities, there are also differences in emphasis, and differences indicative of 
the specific approach of the author of the definition.164 Different definitions can 
 
160 See further Chapter 3. 
 
161 See David Laidler, ‘Financial Stability, Monetarism and the Wicksell Connection’ (Working 
Paper No 2007-3, Economic Policy Research Institute, 2007) 
<https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=
1041&context=economicsepri_wp>. Laidler references differences between monetary 
economics and Wicksellian economics. 
 
162 Ibid.  
 
163 Smaga (n 89) 15-17. Central banks do not appear to focus very much on the ‘crisis’ element. 
 
164 See Smaga (n 89).  
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reflect the subjectivity of the unique characteristics of national financial systems; 
globalization and liberalization of financial markets have not removed all national 
differences.165 It may be impossible to formulate a single universally accepted 
definition because of national differences, and in view of the fact that different 
views may be taken on what constitutes a financial crisis (ie definitions 
demonstrate specific temporal and other biases).166  
 
Finally, financial stability is multi-dimensional, and different definitions emphasise 
different dimensions. 167  These characteristics of financial stability definitions 
have important practical and regulatory implications, particularly for the 




This chapter has demonstrated how financial stability is an elusive concept. It is 
therefore not straightforward to make ‘financial stability’ the objective of a 
regulatory agency. There are methodological difficulties in determining what such 
an objective entails, and the exact nature and scope of financial stability can vary. 
Economics is also still grappling with the notion of financial stability, and therefore 
financial stability cannot be easily measured. Further, financial stability can be 
interpreted narrowly or broadly. In any event, financial stability may even be 
something of a misnomer, given that in principle both the concepts of ‘finance’ 
and ‘stability’ presuppose and require instability, thereby creating difficulties when 
financial stability is included in the mandate of a regulatory agency such as a 




165 Ibid, 14-15.  
 
166 This conclusion is based on an analysis of the work of Smaga.  
 
167 As referred to by Serge Jeanneau, ‘Financial Stability Objectives and Arrangements – 
What’s New?’ in M S Mohanty (ed) The Role of Central Banks in Macroeconomic and Financial 
Stability (BIS Papers, No 76, February 2014) 48 <https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap76.pdf>.  
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The definitional difficulties cannot be ignored from a regulatory perspective, as:168 
“financial stability” alone as an objective leaves wide open the important 
questions of how much stability is desired, in what elements of financial system 
behaviour it is desired, and at what expense with respect to other policy concerns. 
 
Defining financial stability therefore matters from a regulatory point of view. When 
there is a ‘heightened need for accountability in financial stability actions’, clear 
objectives play a ‘special role’ in accountability.169 Defining what is meant by the 
term financial stability may be one of the key issues when setting objectives for 
financial stability for a regulator. A definition of financial stability is also important 
for effective governance and accountability mechanisms for the RBA. At the most 
basic level, what the RBA is required to do, and whether it has achieved those 
objectives, require clarity. The fact that the concept is uncertain makes it a difficult 





168 Ibid 47-8. Although there are some definitional difficulties in relation to monetary policy, 
these have largely been overcome by the inflation targeting model.  
 
169 See Bank for International Settlements, Central Bank Governance and Financial Stability 
(Report, May 2011) <http://www.bis.org/publ/othp14.pdf> (‘Ingves Report’). 
 
 77 
CHAPTER 3  
 




Bagehot ’s principal message is that the first task of a central bank during a 
financial panic is to end the panic.1 
 
In times of crisis, a central bank should lend freely against good collateral at 
high rates.2 
 
As the lender of last resort to the financial system – the economic equivalent of 





The analysis of the unique nature of central banks in this chapter demonstrates 
how the existing characteristics and roles of central banks as institutions impact 
on their roles in financial stability, and on the regulation of that role.4 Mandating 
 
1 Richard G Anderson, ‘Bagehot on the Financial Crises of 1825...and 2008’ (2009) 7 Economic 
Synopses 1. 
 
2 This is a paraphrase of Bagehot’s formula. Vincent Bignon, Marc Flandreau and Stefano 
Ugolini, ‘Bagehot for Beginners: The Making of Lender of Last Resort Operations in the Mid-
Nineteenth Century’ (2012) 65(2) Economic History Review 580. 
 
3 Paul Tucker, Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the 
Regulatory State (Princeton University Press, 2018), 7. 
 
4 This chapter reflects research that was also conducted and published before and during the 
candidature for this PhD, in particular the following publications: John H Farrar and Louise 
Parsons, ‘Financial Stability After the Global Financial Crisis: Globalisation, Nationalism and the 
Potential Demise of a Rules-Based Order’ in John H Farrar, Bee Chen Goh and Vai Io Lo (eds), 
Scholarship, Practice and Education in Comparative Law: A Festschrift in Honour of Mary 
Hiscock (Springer, forthcoming); Louise Parsons, ‘Domestic Regulatory Architecture for the 
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a central bank with financial stability is complex. The experiences and lessons of 
the GFC, however, have largely cemented the view that central banks are – 
alternatively should be – responsible for financial stability, notwithstanding the 
challenges identified.5 
 
Part II A of this chapter deals with the sui generis nature of central banks that is 
rooted in their history. Part II B examines how the unique nature of central banks 
is influenced by the fact that they are statutory bodies and operate subject to a 
mandate or charter, as agents of government (or perhaps as trustees or 
guardians6) with important public policy objectives. Nevertheless, central banks 
are generally intended to be independent and free from political influence. They 
characteristically have wide discretion and powers, extending beyond banking 
and monetary policy. Further, central banks can make financial and/or economic 
policy that can affect the economy of a whole country. The democratic deficit of 
their powers has accordingly been critiqued, particularly in respect of monetary 
policy and their role as LOLR (see Part II B 2). The LOLR function is arguably the 
most significant financial stability tool of central banks, and that ability, combined 
with central banks’ unique expertise and system-wide view, make central banks 
well-suited to play a lead role in financial stability.  
 
 
Protection of Financial Stability after the GFC: Global Order or Disorder’, in Leon Wolff and 
Danielle Ireland-Piper (eds), Global Governance and Regulation: Order and Disorder in the 21st 
Century (Routledge, 2018) 147; Louise Parsons, ‘Regulating Australia's Financial Stability in the 
National Interest’ in John H Farrar, Mary Hiscock, and Vai Io Lo (eds), Australia's Trade, 
Investment and Security in the Asian Century (World Scientific, 2015) 251; Louise Parsons, 
‘Developments in Central Banking after the GFC: Central Banks, the State, Globalisation and 
the GFC’ in John H Farrar and David G Mayes (eds), Globalisation, the Global Financial Crisis, 
and the State (Edward Elgar, 2013) 218; John H Farrar and Louise Parsons, ‘Globalisation, the 
GFC and Paradigm Shift’ (2013) 32(12) Banking & Financial Services Policy Report 14; John H 
Farrar and Louise Parsons, ‘Globalisation, the Global Financial Crisis and the Reinvention of 
the State’ (2012) 24(2) Singapore Academy of Law Journal 367. It also builds on the research 
for an earlier publication: John H Farrar, Louise Parsons and Pieter I Joubert, ‘The 
Development of an Appropriate Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis’ (2009) 
21(3) Bond Law Review 1. 
 
5 See Louise Parsons, ‘Developments in Central Banking after the GFC: Central Banks, the 
State, Globalisation and the GFC’ in John H Farrar and David G Mayes (eds), Globalisation, the 
Global Financial Crisis, and the State (Edward Elgar, 2013) 218 (‘Developments in Central 
Banking’). 
 
6 See Tucker (n 3) Chapter 4.  
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Part III analyses the historical importance of the GFC in cementing the role of 
central banks in financial stability. It does so by considering the role of central 
banks during and after the GFC (Part III A), in particular the addition (or 
accentuation) of a financial stability mandate (Part III B). 
 
These characteristics of central banks raise particular challenges for their roles 
in financial stability: they are uniquely independent but have public policy 
objectives; they are currency and monetary policy authorities; they are regulatory 
agents; they are also banks (Part III B). Their independence flows from their 
monetary policy and currency issuing obligations, but the high level of 
independence enjoyed generally by central banks may conflict with financial 
stability obligations. 
 
This chapter provides important background and context for the analysis of the 
RBA as a central bank with a financial stability responsibility that is undertaken in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
II. Central Banks are Unique Institutions 
 
Central banks are unique institutions. In brief, they act as agents of government, 
but also as the banker of banks, and (with the exception of central banks in 
economic unions such as the European Union) there is only one central bank per 
country. They are uniquely powerful entities, ‘as guardians of monetary stability 
(and financial stability) and dictate price levels, influencing the level of risk-taking 
in the economy’.7 Monetary policy decisions, as well as many other central bank 
functions,8 impact everyone in the country. Some key characteristics related to 
this thesis are discussed below. 
 
7 Charles Goodhart and Rosa María Lastra, Central Bank Accountability and Judicial Review 
(Policy Note No 32, May 2018) 3 <https://www.suerf.org/policynotes/2585/central-bank-
accountability-and-judicial-review/html>. 
 
8 Such as the issuing of notes and coin and ensuring the availability of physical currency, as 
well as the domestic and international value of the currency.  
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A. Central Banks are Sui Generis Institutions 
 
Central banks are sui generis institutions. Their unique nature is derived from 
their history, origin and roles. 
 
1 The Nature of a Central Bank: Origin, History and Roles 
 
Central banks were not originally expressly created to ensure financial stability. 
The first central banks were created to fund the government of the day.9 For 
example, the Swedish Riksbank, the earliest central bank, was created in 1668 
as a joint stock bank. It was authorised to lend funds to the government and also 
to act as a clearing house for commerce.10 The BOE was created in 1694 for the 
purchase of government debt.11 As these early central banks engaged in banking 
activities and held deposits of other banks, they became bankers for banks, 
facilitating transactions between the different banks. These central banks had 
large reserves, operated ‘extensive networks of correspondent banks’,12 and had 
become ‘the repository for most banks in the banking system’.13 It was a natural 
 
9 Michael Bordo, ‘A Brief History of Central Banks’, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 




10 Central banks have also at times been responsible for providing loans to governments to fund 
government projects, and even war. Some have secondary responsibilities such as maintaining 
full employment. See Tomas Otahal, ‘Rent-seeking Origins of Central Banks: The Case of the 
Federal Reserve System’ (Working Paper in Business and Economics No 8/2011, Model 
University in Brno, 2011) 1 <http://ideas.repec.org/p/men/wpaper/08_2011.html>; See also 
Bordo (n 9); See Forrest Capie, Charles Goodhart and Norbert Schnadt, ‘The Development of 
Central Banking’ in Forrest Capie, Stanley Fischer, Charles Goodhart, Norbert Schnadt (eds), 
The Future of Central Banking: The Tercentenary Symposium of the Bank of England 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) 1 <http://eprints.lse.ac. 
uk/39606/1/The_development_of_central_banking_%28LSERO%29.pdf>. See also Rosa M 
Lastra (ed), International Financial and Monetary Law (Oxford, 2nd ed, 2015) 50-51. 
 
11 Bordo (n 9); See also David Kynaston, ‘Till Time's Last Sand: A History of the Bank of 
England 1694-2013’ (Bloomsbury, 2017). 
 





development for them to become lenders of last resort in a crisis.14 As providing 
liquidity assistance to banks preserves financial stability, it can be said that 
central banks in fact always had a role in financial stability, even if that role was 
not expressly part of the central bank’s charter.15  
 
The role of LOLR further developed in the 1800s, and the now-famous 
formulation of William Bagehot – that central banks should lend freely to banks 
with liquidity crises against sound collateral and at a high interest rate – have 
assisted in avoiding banking crises.16 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the focus in central banking shifted to 
maintaining the money supply in accordance with the amount of gold reserves, a 
form of price stability.17 In 1913, for example, the United States created the 
Federal Reserve Bank, ending an era of banking crises in the so-called ‘free 
banking era’.18  
 
The shift to ‘modern’ central banking came in the middle of the twentieth century. 
Mid-twentieth century central banking was characterised by considerations of 
inflation and unemployment, and an increase in central bank independence. For 
example, the Federal Reserve Act19 secured the independence of the Federal 
Reserve in 1951,20 and the RBA was created as an independent central bank in 




15 See Tucker (n 3) Chapter 20. 
 






19 Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 12 USC 
 
20 Bordo (n 9). 
 
21 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth). 
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importance of monetary policy in the battle against inflation in the later part of the 
twentieth century.22 
 
Apart from conducting monetary policy, central banks also act as LOLR23 to 
financial institutions in liquidity crises, discussed further below. Central banks 
have often also been the banker to government and it is by definition the banker 
to other (commercial) banks.24 Central banks fulfil many other functions as well. 
Typical central bank functions also include providing and overseeing payment 
systems, 25  issuing notes and coin, holding foreign reserves, and publishing 
financial stability reviews. Some central banks are also the microprudential 
supervisor and are responsible for bank supervision. 
 
Central banks have an important role in crisis management and crisis prevention.  
They have ‘traditionally focused on treating financial crises’,26 with the ‘main 
objective during a financial crisis … to contain the damage and limit the impact 
on the real economy’.27 From that perspective, then, central banks have in some 
way been involved in preventing financial instability. 
 
 
22 See Mario Draghi, ‘Central Bank Independence’ (Lecture, Lamfalussy Lecture National Bank 
of Belgium, 5 October 2018). 
 
23 See Paul Tucker, ‘The Lender of Last Resort and Modern Central Banking: Principles and 
Reconstruction’ (Paper, BIS Papers No 79, 2014); Bank for International Settlements, ‘Re-
thinking the Lender of Last Resort’ (BIS Papers No 79, September 2014) 10. It’s an important 
function but the role of lender of last resort could be modernised, as intimated in these sources. 
See also Lawrence Schembri, ‘Stress Prevention: Central Banks and Financial Stability’ 
(Speech, Bank of Canada, International Monetary Fund, Centre for International Governance 
Innovation and Peterson Institute for International Economics Workshop, 6 May 2016). 
 
24 See Bank for International Settlements, Issues in the Governance of Central Banks (Report, 
May 2009) 19 <http://www.bis.org/publ/othp04.pdf>; See Otahal (n 10) 1. 
 
25 Bank for International Settlements, Central Bank Oversight of Payment and Settlement 
Systems (Report, May 2005) <https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d68.pdf>. Payment systems 
responsibilities were new additions to the task list of central banks and reflect technological 
advancements and innovations in payments systems. 
 
26 Vittorio Corbo, ‘Financial Stability in a Crisis: What is the Role of the Central Bank?’ (BIS 





2 Central Banks are Mandated Institutions 
 
Central banks act on government authority, as agents for government with 
(mostly) a formal mandate. The government provides a central bank with its 
powers and objectives through its regulatory framework. Central banks are often 
‘mandated’ or ‘chartered’ regulatory agencies and are therefore somewhat 
unique. They have both specific and formal obligations but are generally also 
independent from government.  
 
Not all responsibilities of government agencies are ‘mandates’ and not all tasks 
central banks perform are referred to as ‘mandates’. For example, it is not 
customary to refer to central banks as having a ‘mandate’ for payment system 
regulation, or a ‘mandate’ to issue currency.28 The monetary policy role of the 
central bank is however generally referred to as a ‘mandate’, and it is often 
considered to be the defining or key central bank ‘mandate’. Any additional or 
new ‘mandate’, such as a financial stability mandate, will impact on existing 
mandates, and vice versa.  
 
The concepts ‘charter’ and ‘mandate’ have not received much academic 
consideration, even though they are frequently used academically, professionally 
and in the media to describe the way in which governments have allocated 





28 The note printing function is more likely to be referred to as a ‘monopoly’. Even though the 
central bank may be responsible for money in circulation, the actual design and issue of 
domestic currency is likely to be subject to the approval of government. 
 
29 For example, in an article about the RBA entitled ‘Our Charter, Core Functions and Values’, 
the word ‘charter’ is only used in the heading of the piece and is not subjected to any further 





(a) Mandates and Charters in General 
 
A ‘charter’ can be described as an instrument granted by a sovereign or 
legislative power that establishes a body politic (such as the United Nations (UN)) 
or another organization, and/or that grants rights, liberties or powers to citizens 
or members of a group. It can also refer to an instrument of incorporation (eg of 
a municipality), or another formal written document that creates an organisational 
structure, and prescribes its powers, privileges and duties (eg a university or 
corporation).30 
 
Being established by a charter is traditionally a prestigious way of incorporation 
because it carries the stamp of the sovereign. For example, throughout history, 
just over 1,000 charters have been granted by the British monarch, with the BOE 
being one of the earliest recipients of a charter.31 The BOE originally existed 
under a ‘charter’32 and still refers to its ‘charter’ on its website.  
 
In Australia, the RBA Act does not expressly provide a ‘charter’ or ‘mandate’ to 
the RBA, but the RBA’s ‘charter’ is generally considered to be contained in 
s 10(2).33 The RBA makes reference to its ‘charter’ in its publications and on its 
website34  even though it never had a charter of the same ilk as the BOE’s 
 
30 See generally Bryan A Garner and Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary (Thomson 
Reuters, 10th ed, 2014) 284. The essential characteristics based on this and other descriptions 
seem to be that the charter is granted in writing by a sovereign and creates, authorises and 
empowers an entity with rights and privileges. 
 
31 Privy Council Office, ‘Chartered Bodies’ Privy Council Office (Web Page) 
<https://privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/royal-charters/chartered-bodies/>. 
 
32 See Bank of England Act 1694 6 Wm & M 1.  
 
33 ‘Our Role’, Reserve Bank of Australia (Web Page) <https://www.rba.gov.au/about-rba/our-
role.html>. 
 
34 See for example Reserve Bank of Australia, (n 33).  
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charter.35 A charter is often used in relation to banks - some modern commercial 
banks in the US are ‘chartered’ banks.36 
 
The meaning and effect of a mandate is similar to that of a charter and the terms 
are used interchangeably and synonymously. A mandate can be described as a 
written command given by a principal to an agent, in which the agent is requested 
and authorised to act in a certain manner.37 A mandate can also be an official 
order, and sometimes allows the mandated agent to not only act on behalf of the 
principal but also act independently.38  
 
Both the words charter and mandate refer to the granting of significant authorities 
and powers to the central bank by the state. They are therefore also both related 
to the concept of agency and central banks have been seen to be independent 
agencies.39 
 
It is observed that a mandate/charter can fulfil (at least) two functions: 
• It can authorise or empower the agent to take certain actions; and/or 
• It can compel or command the agent to take certain actions. 
It therefore can provide both the ‘may’ and ‘must’ of the agent’s actions, or either 
one of the two. Not all mandates spell out whether the agent is merely 
empowered to take certain actions at its discretion, or whether the agent is also 
compelled to take those actions, leaving the agent no discretion. Importantly, in 
both senses it likely means that the agent is constrained to acting within the 
parameters of the mandate/charter. 
 
35 See Privy Council Office (n 31). Neither the RBA nor its predecessor, the Commonwealth 
Bank, was established by a charter under the authority of the British monarch. Rather, both 
were established purely by the Australian Parliament. It’s interesting to note that some banks 
operating in Australia did in fact have a Royal Charter. 
 
36 See ‘How Can I Start a Bank?’ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Web 
Page, 2 August 2013) <https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/banking_12779.htm>. 
 
37 Garner and Black (n 30) 1105. The term comes from Roman and Civil Law.  
 
38 Ibid. These seem to be the key characteristics based on a range of descriptions. 
 
39 See Tucker (n 3) 11. Tucker however considers that the true role of a central bank 




The nature of the central bank’s mandate/charter is fundamentally informed by 
the fact that it is granted by the state. Central banks are usually creatures of 
statute, as their mandates/charters are provided by the government/state through 
legislation.40 A central bank mandate/charter typically includes a goal that needs 
to be pursued and provides the authority to do so.41 It still provides the central 
bank with considerable independence and freedom to set the parameters within 
which it operates. There can of course be some constraints and not all central 
banks are equally independent.42 
 
Irrespective of whether a central bank’s mandate/charter merely empowers or 
also compels, it effectively allows the central bank to make and implement public 
policy, giving central banks considerable freedom and independence.  
 
(b) Relationship between Mandates/Charters and Central Bank 
Independence 
 
The concept of a mandate/charter is fundamental to central bank independence, 
and central bank independence is closely linked to it having a mandate/charter. 
Having a mandate implies that the central bank has the authority to make 
decisions independently,43 and it essentially gives the central bank freedom, 
 
40 ‘Given that central banks are created by government legislation and derive their powers from 
such legislation, they cannot be completely separate from the government’: Bernie W Fraser, 
‘Central Bank Independence: What Does It Mean?’ (Speech, SEANZA Central Banking Course, 
23 November 1994) <https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/1994/sp-gov-231194.html>.  
 
41 ‘[G]ive central banks a charter which includes a strong commitment to price stability, and the 
freedom to pursue it. This does involve the government in setting the goals, but that is the way it 
should be: central banks cannot expect to determine the goals they should pursue, but they 
should have adequate scope to pursue the goals that have been set’: Ibid. 
  
42 There is a very large body of literature on central bank independence and the measuring of 
central bank independence. See for example Alex Cukierman, ‘Central Bank Independence and 
Monetary Policy-Making Institutions: Past, Present and Future’ in David Mayes and Geoffrey E 
Wood (eds), Designing Central Banks (Routledge, 2009) 68. 
 
43 ‘[C]entral banks with multiple goals have more independence, because they have extra 
dimensions on which they must make decisions’: Fraser (n 40) 4. 
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albeit within certain parameters. Independence can be seen to be the 
consequence of being provided with a mandate, and even to some extent a 
prerequisite of fulfilling that mandate. Central banks are generally intended to be 
politically independent from government and to not be subject to the direct control 
of government and its political motives. Central banks are therefore mandated to 
fulfil public functions for the benefit of a state or nation and despite being granted 
independence by the state to fulfil that mandate, are still subject to some direction 
and control by the government. (The independence of central banks is analysed 
further in Part II B below). 
 
The significant independence of central banks that arises predominantly from the 
monetary policy function (and historically also from the money printing function) 
means that they cannot be classified simply as a typical ‘agent’, because in some 
instances they are free to create the parameters of their powers.44 Even though 
there are some limits on central bank mandates, which may either be expressed 
in the relevant statute or may be imposed through other forms of regulation such 
as the inflation-targeting model, the extent of a central bank’s independence may 
exceed that of a regular ‘mandated agent’. That means that the nature of the role 
played by central banks could approach that of trustee or even guardian.45  
 
(c) Implications of the Relationship between Central Bank 
Mandates/Charters and Central Bank Independence  
 
Clarity in the mandate/charter given to a central bank is important because the 
mandate/charter is the instrument of delegation used by government. The actions 
of central banks can be judged by the extent to which they comply with their 
mandate, and their credibility can be affected if their compliance is found to be 
wanting.46 For example, the Federal Reserve was heavily criticised in the GFC 
 
44 See Tucker (n 3) 73, and on independent agencies generally. 
 
45 Ibid, for example at 81, 449. 
 
46 See generally Tucker (n 3). See also Alan S Blinder, ‘Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We 
Care?’ How Do We Build It? (Working Paper No 7161, National Bureau for Economic Research, 
June 1999) <https://www.nber.org/papers/w7161.pdf>. 
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for acting as LOLR for insolvent (rather than just illiquid) institutions.47 A central 
bank’s mandate/charter should therefore be seen as both a sword and a shield.  
 
The scope or ambit of the mandate should be clear as it defines the parameters 
of the agency’s responsibilities. Central bank independence allows the central 
bank considerable discretion. ‘Central bank discretion (a key component of 
independence) is [however] the freedom to act within a legal framework’.48 The 
scope or ambit of the mandate is relevant in relation to the type of actions as well 
as the specific functional area (for example, in monetary policy, the mandate 
given will determine whether the central bank may set the inflation targets/goals, 
and choose the instruments with which to achieve it, or whether it may just choose 
the relevant instruments). If the mandate is intended to compel certain actions, it 
should not merely be phrased as authorising certain actions, and vice versa.  
 
Although mandates/charters are by virtue of their technical nature and history 
formal concepts, mandates/charters are sometimes treated in an informal 
manner. Central bank mandates are for example sometimes said to have 
changed, evolved or grown, even when there has been no change in the formal 
or legal mandate.49 For example, in the early 1990s, ‘the greater reliance on 
market-based policies (rather than controls) in Australia … significantly enhanced 
the degree of independence of the Reserve Bank, without any change in the 
 
 
47 Levy Economics Institute, ‘The Lender of Last Resort: A Critical Analysis of the Federal 
Reserve’s Unprecedented Intervention After 2007’ (Report, Levy Economics Institute, April 
2013) <http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/rpr_4_13.pdf>; See also James B Stewart, ‘Solvency, 




48 Goodhart and Lastra (n 7) 4 (emphasis added). 
 
49 This sort of language was common after the GFC. See for example Gill Marcus, ‘The 
Changing Mandates of Central Banks – The Challenges for Domestic Policy’ (Speech, Gordon 
Institute of Business Science, 30 May 2012); See Charles A E Goodhart, ‘The Changing Role of 
Central Banks’ (Working Paper No 326, Bank for International Settlements, November 2010), 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/work326.pdf>; See Dimitris N Chorafas, The Changing Role of Central 
Banks (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Another example is the RBA’s mandate for financial stability 
that is referred to as a mandate, but is in fact not a classic legal mandate. 
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Bank’s charter’.50 This demonstrates the extent to which legal and non-legal 
conceptions of a mandate can differ. Legal conceptions of a mandate are that 
they are formal and will require express granting and explicit changing. Non-legal 
conceptions entail a simple granting of authority that is fluid and adaptable. If non-
legal conceptions of a mandate prevail, the legal underpinning of an actual 
mandate can be diminished to the extent that it can be worthless. The need for a 
formal mandate will be discussed in Chapters 8 and 9 of this thesis. 
 
3 Central Banks are Regulatory Agencies 
 
Central banks are not typical regulators.51 ‘Regulators’ are generally understood 
to be formal government-authorised bodies capable of making legally binding 
regulations that affect the conduct of others.52 Regulators are generally statutory 
bodies empowered to issue delegated legislation/regulation, and exist in various 
industries. Regulators therefore have the ability to affect the conduct of others 
through legally binding regulations, but also through other means.  
 
In Australia, the financial regulators are APRA and ASIC, and the RBA is included 
as the third government financial regulator.53 All three – APRA, ASIC and the 
RBA – issue formal regulations. The RBA can issue regulations in relation to the 
payments system,54 but the RBA can also influence the behaviour of market 
participants through other means, including the publication of the financial 
stability review. In countries where the central bank is also responsible for 
microprudential supervision and bank supervision, the central bank will perform 
 
50 See Fraser, (n 40). 
 
51 The role of the RBA has however been described as ‘essentially regulatory in nature’, 
although it is also a bank: Sheelagh McCracken, John Stumbles, Greg Tolhurst and Olivia 
Dixon, Everett and McCracken’s Banking and Financial Institutions Law (Lawbook, 9th ed, 2017) 
30-1. 
 
52 APRA and ASIC are typical regulators in that they are authorized to make regulations.  
 
53 Ibid, 20. 
 
54 Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 (Cth). 
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some classic ‘regulatory’ functions through the issuing of prudential regulation. 
That is not the case in Australia. 
 
4 Central Banks are Banks 
 
Central banks are, however, also banks, and can for example accept deposits 
and lend money. Their combined nature of being both a regulatory agent and a 
bank puts them in a special position.55 Commercial banks hold bank accounts at 
central banks (for example the exchange settlement accounts in Australia),56 and 
‘settlement’ of payments only occur once the relevant amount has been 
transferred in the bank’s accounts held by the central bank.57 Central banks can 
also operate bank accounts and have often served as banker to government 
including government departments.58 Effectively monetary policy is implemented 
through the banking functions in that the central bank can raise or lower the 
interest that it charges commercial banks. Arrangements can also exist for 
liquidity arrangements to facilitate real time gross settlement (RTGS) through 
payment systems operated by a central bank.59 The role of the central bank as 
banker therefore is important for its financial stability role as well as for its role of 
providing liquidity – this function is related to the next point. 
 
 
55 Because of this dual nature central banks need a special accountability regime: Goodhart and 
Lastra (n 7).  
 
56 Reserve Bank of Australia, ‘Net Settlement in Payments Systems’ (Media Release, 1 March 
1999) <https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/1999/mr-99-02-role.html>. 
 
57 ‘Final and irrevocable settlement is achieved by the simultaneous crediting and debiting of 
Exchange Settlement Accounts (ESAs) held at the Reserve Bank of Australia’: ‘About RITS’, 
Reserve Bank of Australia (Web Page) <https://www.rba.gov.au/payments-and-
infrastructure/rits/about.html>; See also Reserve Bank of Australia, ‘Net Settlement in Payments 
Systems’ (Media Release, 1 March 1999) <https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/1999/mr-99-
02-role.html>. 
 
58 For example, the RBA is a banker to government: ‘About the RBA’, Reserve Bank of Australia 
(Web Page) <https://www.rba.gov.au/about-rba/>. 
 
59 For example, at the South African Reserve Bank the national payment system involves an 
agreed ‘repo’ system with participants, and at the RBA, the RITS system allows for the provision 
of liquidity to banks with exchange settlement accounts. 
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5 Central Banks are Lenders of Last Resort 
 
The so-called LOLR function of central banks60 is typically used when a financial 
institution/bank experiences illiquid circumstances and there is a risk of failure 
with potential systemic consequences.61 This role therefore typically comes to the 
fore in the face of a potential financial crisis. The classic Bagehot formula, that 
central banks should lend freely to institutions that have liquidity problems (but 
are still solvent) against high interest rates, is the foundation of the central bank’s 
role as LOLR.62  
 
The LOLR function is of critical importance, but the central bank has a discretion 
whether or not to provide LOLR assistance. The extent to which a central bank is 
entitled to make LOLR decisions on its own is indicative of its independence.63 
The ability of the central bank to use its balance sheet in order to provide LOLR 
assistance is unique,64 and although it is an example of the ‘banking’ function of 
central banks, it also goes much further. Through the LOLR function central 
banks effectively become ‘[d]elegated managers of the consolidated state 
balance sheet’. 65  Any losses sustained by central banks when providing 
 
60 For in-depth contemporary analysis of this function, see Bank for International Settlements, 
‘Re-thinking the Lender of Last Resort’ (BIS Papers No 79, September 2014) 10. See also 
Lastra (n 10) 45-51. 
 
61 See for example Vicente Jakas, ‘The Credit Crunch: Revisiting the Problem of Systemic Risk 
as a Strong Case for the Lender of Last Resort’ in Greg N Gregoriou (ed), The Banking Crisis 
Handbook (CRC Press, 2009). For an explanation of systemic risk see: London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE), ‘What is Systemic Risk?’ (YouTube, 17 February 2015) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UzW195qWHYg>. 
 
62 The LOLR role is also referred to as emergency liquidity assistance (ELA). It has also been 
seen to be a macro-prudential action: Lastra (n 10) 49. 
 
63 This independence has far-reaching consequences. A decision not to provide LOLR can lead 
to a financial crisis with dire consequences for a whole country. Similarly, a decision to provide 
LOLR assistance can prevent widespread losses, but it can also place an undesirable burden 
on the public purse. 
 
64 See Goodhart (n 49). 
 
65 Paul Tucker, ‘How can Central Banks Deliver Credible Commitment and be “Emergency 
Institutions”?’ (Speech, Hoover Institution Conference, 21 May 2015): ‘Net losses flow to the 
central treasury in the form of reduced seigniorage income, entailing either higher taxes or lower 
spending in the longer run (and conversely for net profits)’.  
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emergency liquidity assistance can affect the state’s balance sheet, because the 
government guarantees the central bank, and unrecovered LOLR funds can also 
deplete any surplus income that the central bank would normally have paid over 
to the state.66 Ultimately, therefore, if the central bank is unable to recoup any of 
the funds provided as LOLR, the loss will be borne directly or indirectly by the 
taxpayers.67 The central bank therefore effectively has a fiscal role.68 
The LOLR is also a key reason why central banks are/should be responsible for 
financial stability: providing emergency liquidity promotes financial stability by 
counteracting systemic risk.69 
 
6 Central Banks are Monetary Authorities  
 
Modern central banks are primarily responsible for monetary policy.70 Central 
banks71 set the interest rate at which the central bank is prepared to lend to 
commercial banks, thereby generally influencing interest rates in the country.72 
Lifting interest rates usually has a cooling effect on economic activity; lowering 




67 Central banks generally pay over surpluses made from their operations to the government. 
Any losses sustained through LOLR activities may reduce the amounts paid over to the 
government. The government may also be required to provide funding to the central bank as it 
operates under an implied/express government guarantee. 
 
68 This is one of the concerns that Tucker and others have about the powers of unelected 
officials to bind the nation’s fiscal assets. 
 
69 See Masaaki Shirakawa, ‘Future of Central Banks and Central Banking’ (Speech, 
International Conference, 26 May 2010). 
 
70 Bank for International Settlements, Issues in the Governance of Central Banks (Report, May 
2009) <http://www.bis.org/publ/othp04.pdf> 17. Lastra notes that ‘monetary policy’ is often 
undefined: Lastra (n 10) 37-8. 
 
71 Often through a monetary policy committee. 
 
72 See generally about RITS and standing facilities: ‘Standing Facilities’, Reserve Bank of 
Australia (Web Page, 1 June 2017) <https://www.rba.gov.au/mkt-operations/resources/tech-
notes/standing-facilities.html>. 
 
73 Increasing interest rates generally increase the price of goods and may curb spending; 
lowering interest rates generally lower prices and increase spending. In that way the supply and 
demand economic cycle is influenced. In periods of high inflation, interest rates may be lifted to 
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decisions impact prices, inflation and economic conditions. Monetary policy is 
concerned with price stability, both in relation to the internal (domestic) and 
external (international) value of the currency. In particular, domestic currency 
instability is linked to inflation, which was a serious problem in the second half of 
the twentieth century.74 Central banks earned considerable prestige and respect 
as a consequence of their effective fight against inflation in the late twentieth 
century.75 
 
An important development in the conduct of monetary policy came through the 
inflation targeting model, originally developed in New Zealand. In this model, the 
optimal range of inflation is set by the government, and the central bank then is 
required to maintain national inflation levels within those bands.76 Some measure 
of inflation is necessary to ensure economic growth, but high levels of inflation 
have a negative impact on the economy. 
 
The link between central bank independence and central bank monetary policy 
is important and is discussed in the next section on central bank independence.  
 
 
force a lowering of prices; in periods of low inflation, interest rates may be lowered to stimulate 
economic activity. 
 
74 On the so-called ‘Great Inflation’ of the 1970s and 1980s, see John Singleton, Central 
Banking in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
 
75 See Claudio Borio and Pierre L Siklos, ‘Central bank Credibility Before and After the Crisis’ 
(Working Paper No. 21710, National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2016); See Michael 
Bordo and Pierre L Siklos, ‘Central-bank Credibility, Reputation and Inflation Targeting in 




76 ‘Inflation targeting is a monetary-policy strategy that was introduced in New Zealand in 1990, 
has been very successful, and as of 2007 had been adopted by more than 20 industrialized and 
non-industrialized countries. It is characterized by (a) an announced numerical inflation target, 
(b) an implementation of monetary policy that gives a major role to an inflation forecast and has 
been called ‘inflation-forecast targeting’, and (c) a high degree of transparency and 
accountability’: Lars E O Svensson, ‘Inflation Targeting’, in Steven N Durlauf and Lawrence E 
Blume (eds), Monetary Economics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 127, 127. 
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B. Central Bank Independence, Monetary Policy and the So-
called Democratic Deficit 
 
Central bank independence falls into a special category of independence that is 
not shared by other regulators. Central bank independence has at times been 
equated to that enjoyed by the judiciary77 and even the military.78 In order to 
achieve their objectives, central banks have to be independent both from 
politicians and from the market stakeholders affected by their 
regulation/direction.79 The broad discretion of an independent central bank will 
however impact on the way in which it may perform a financial stability mandate. 
Central bank independence depends on political will, is determined by the 
government and reflects the relationship between the state and the central bank. 
Central bank independence was initially justified because the potential for political 
influence over money printing or money creation and lending to government was 
considered to be too dangerous to entrust to a politically motivated entity.80 
People were more likely to trust a reputable third party like a central bank rather 
than the sovereign/government, for example when money was raised for the 
purposes of the sovereign, such as war.81 Modern central bank independence 
still involves trust, although it’s no longer an issue, for example, of whether the 
government will repay loans. 82  Trust issues for central banks now relate to 
citizens being confident that the central bank will act in the interest of the national 
 




79 See Tucker (n 3). Not all central banks are of course equally independent – the nuances of 
independence will be discussed below. 
 
80 See Fraser (n 40) on the danger of entrusting government with the issue of paper money and 
of conflicts of interest between politics and commerce.  
 
81 See Michael D Bordo, Øyvind Eitrheim, Marc Flandreau, and Jan F Qvigstad (eds), Central 
Banks at a Crossroads: What Can We Learn from History? (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 
24. Paul Tucker also emphasizes the need for the credibility and legitimacy of central banks in 
view of their ‘unelected power’: See generally Tucker (n 3) but in particular Part IV on power.  
 




economy when conducting monetary policy and when performing its central 
banking tasks. The potential for political influence over monetary policy and the 
potential to use monetary policy for political gain justifies central bank 
independence.83 In essence, it is thought that ‘an independent, expert body not 
bound up in the electoral cycle would do a better job than politicians in conducting 
monetary policy’. 84  Accordingly, central banks are provided with a 
mandate/charter which grants authority to act independently. 
 
1 Increased Central Bank Independence: A Recent Consequence of the 
Monetary Policy Function 
 
The level of central bank independence has changed over time, and the 
significant level of independence alluded to above that most central banks 
currently enjoy arose in the late 20th century, when it was demonstrated that 
increased independence correlated favourably with reduced inflation.85  
 
In the earlier part of the 20th century, governments reduced the independence of 
central banks as a consequence of their perceived failures following the Great 
Depression and the collapse of the gold standard.86  The gold standard and 
central bank independence had become associated with deflation and 
unemployment, and central banks were criticised for policy errors and a lack of 
clarity in their theoretical foundations.87  Governments consequently resumed 
 
83 ‘Keynes expressed his thoughts on central bank independence while testifying before the 
1913 Royal Commission into an Indian central bank. The ideal central bank, he said, “would 
combine ultimate government responsibility with a high degree of day-to-day independence for 
the authorities of the bank”. He added that it would be desirable “to preserve unimpaired 
authority in the executive officers of the bank, whose duty it would be to take a broad and not 
always commercial view of policy”’: Fraser (n 40) 1, quoting David Ricardo in a paper on the 
establishment of a national bank from 1824.  
 





86 Goodhart (n 49) 2; Bordo et al (n 81) 69-70. 
 
87 See John Singleton, ‘The Winds of Change for Central Banks’ (2010) 20(3) Central Banking 
23; See Parsons, ‘Developments in Central Banking’ (n 5). 
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control over monetary policy. 88  The result was a decline in central bank 
independence after the Great Depression and the Second World War, and the 
creation of inter alia the IMF as a way to protect financial stability.89 
 
The German central bank, the Bundesbank, however, became the model for 
central bank independence.90 It was an exception to post-Depression central 
banks91 in being largely independent from government. It was a very successful 
central bank and the Deutsch Mark become the most stable currency.  
When inflation became a worldwide problem in the mid-1970s, central banks 
shifted their focus to ensuring price stability, and over time it became generally 
accepted that central bank independence was required for effective monetary 
policy operations.92 Independence from the political pressures of government 
was necessary to implement monetary policy for the common good.93 Politicians 
or government departments may serve predominantly political agendas, whereas 
independent central banks may be more inclined ‘to subordinate other goals, 
such as growth and employment, to the fight against inflation’. 94  Empirical 
research confirmed the benefits of central bank independence in the fight against 
inflation.95 In fact ‘[e]conomic theory suggests that [central bank independence], 
coupled with an explicit mandate for maintaining price stability, offers an 
 
88 See Goodhart (n 86); See Parsons, ‘Developments in Central Banking’ (n 5).  
 
89  See Harold James, ‘Central Banks: Between Internationalisation and Domestic Political 
Control’ (Working Paper No 327, Bank for International Settlements, November 2010) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/work327.pdf>; See Parsons, ‘Developments in Central Banking’ (n 5).   
 
90 See James (n 89), 12; See Parsons, ‘Developments in Central Banking’ (n 5).  
 
91 Ibid.  
 
92 See Alexandre Lamfalussy, ‘Keynote Speech’ (Speech, Bank for International Settlements 
Annual Conference, 24−25 June 2010)>; See Parsons, ‘Developments in Central Banking’ (n 5).  
 
93 See John B Goodman, ‘The Politics of Central Bank Independence’ (1991) 23(3) 
Comparative Politics 329, 329; See Parsons, ‘Developments in Central Banking’ (n 5).  
 
94 See Goodman (n 93) 329.  
 
95 Ibid.  
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institutional device for realising the social benefits associated with law and stable 
inflation rates’.96 
 
In the mid-1990s, more central banks became independent, demonstrating the 
political commitment to price stability.97 It constituted a ‘quiet revolution’98 and a 
‘quantum upward jump’,99 and contrasted with the preceding 40 years which was 
characterised by little, if any, reform in central banking.100 For example, in 1997 
the BOE became operationally independent from government, even though there 
was no formal legislative change.101 Central banks in other countries, including 
developing countries, also became more independent. 102  The issue is what 
impact this independence will have on the financial stability function.  
 
2 The Democratic Deficit 
 
The consequence of central bank independence is that unelected officials 
perform important public functions with a high level of independence. It amounts 
to ‘delegating responsibility to un-elected technocrats’.103  This has led to criticism 
of central banks and their independence. Over the past 10 to 20 years, central 
 
96 Wolfram Berger and Friedrich Kissmer, ‘Central Bank Independence and Financial Stability: A 
Tale of Perfect Harmony?’ (2013) 31 European Journal of Political Economy 109, 109.  
 
97 See Sylvester C W Eijffinger and Jakob De Haan, ‘The Political Economy of Central-Bank 
Independence’ (Special Paper No 19, Princeton Studies in International Economics, 1996) 1; 
See Parsons, ‘Developments in Central Banking’ (n 5).   
 
98 See Alan S Blinder, The Quiet Revolution: Central Banking Goes Modern (Yale University 
Press, 2004). 
 
99 Cukierman (n 42) 70.  
 
100 See Parsons, ‘Developments in Central Banking’ (n 5).  
 
101 Cukierman (n 42) 74; Goodhart (n 86) 5.  
 
102 For example, the independence of the South African Reserve Bank was enshrined in the 
new South African Constitution in 1994. 
 
103 Mark Beeson and Stephen Bell, ‘Independent Central Banking and the Democratic Deficit: The 
Reserve Bank of Australia and the Politics of Ambiguity’, UQ eSpace (Web Page, 1 January 2004) 
1 <https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:10019>. See also Annelise Riles, Financial 




banks have become more transparent in their operations, because transparency 
and accountability are seen as important measures of addressing the democratic 
deficit, but they are still seen as secretive institutions.104  
 
The democratic deficit has important consequences for a financial stability 
mandate. Financial stability policy in the hands of a central bank may be more 
difficult for the government/state to direct (compared to, for example, the inflation-
targeting model that directs monetary policy at least to some extent), and 
therefore financial stability policy may lie within the purview of non-democratically 
appointed officials.  
 
3 Different Forms of Independence105 
 
The form and degree of central bank independence vary. There is a large and 
well-researched body of literature about the different degrees of independence of 
central banks, but a detailed discussion of that literature is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.106 The following key characteristics of central bank independence are 
however relevant for purposes of a financial stability role of central banks: 
 
1. Central banks have a double dimension of independence – they are both 
independent from government and from the financial markets.107 They 
 
104 See Riles (n 103). 
 
105 See also Frans Van Dijk, ‘Independence and Autonomy: The Parallel Worlds of Courts and 
Public Agencies’, Blog of the Montaigne Centre for Rule of Law and Administration of Justice 
(Blog Post, 11 December 2018) 
<http://blog.montaignecentre.com/index.php/1265/independence-and-autonomy-the-parallel-
worlds-of-courts-and-public-agencies/>. Van Dijk, referring to the work of Koen Verhoest, also 
compares central banks in the EU to courts. He considers managerial autonomy, policy 
autonomy, structural autonomy, financial autonomy, legal autonomy and interventional 
autonomy. 
 
106 Much of this literature was produced and inspired by Alex Cukierman, and it involved the use 
of economic models to determine the degree of independence of central banks, using various 
indicia of independence, such as the appointment of the governor, duration of the governor’s 
service, role of government representatives in the decision-making of the central bank and so 
forth. See for example Alex Cukierman, Steven B Webb, and Bilin Neyapti, ‘Measuring the 
Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes’ (1992) 6(3) World Bank 
Economic Review 353. 
 
107 See Goodhart and Lastra, (n 7). 
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operate in the public interest: they do not operate in the political interest of 
governments, or in the private profit interest of market players;108  
 
2. Central banks are accountably independent – that means that their 
accountability is part and parcel of their independence.109 Transparency 
and accountability are the pillars of central bank independence110 (See 
also Chapters 6 and 7); 
 
3. There are degrees of independence, and independence is not necessarily 
absolute.111 The independence of a central bank lies somewhere on a 
continuum from it being totally independent to only marginally 
independent. Degrees of independence have been measured by 
academics such as Alex Cukierman.112 For example, the Australian RBA 
is considered to be moderately independent because of the important role 
that government representatives play in some of the RBA’s activities, and 
for the strong hand of government in the appointment of the governor and 
other high-ranking officials and board members; 
 
4. Even if a central bank is classified as ‘independent’, there may be a 








110 See Florin Cornel Dumiter, ‘Central Bank Independence, Transparency and Accountability 
Indexes: A Survey’ (2014) 7(1) Timisoara Journal of Economics and Business 35. 
 
111 Goodhart and Lastra, (n 7). 
 
112 See for example Alex Cukierman, ‘Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policy-Making 
Institutions: Past, Present and Future’ in David Mayes and Geoffrey E Wood (eds), Designing 
Central Banks (Routledge, 2009) 68. 
 
113 Legal independence refers to the legal guarantee or protection of central bank 
independence, often found in its founding legislation, or at times a fundamental constitution, as 
is the case in South Africa. Factual independence denotes real independence in practice. 
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5. Depending on the extent of independence that a government wishes the 
central bank to have, the central bank can be goal independent, or 
instrument independent, or both; and 
 
6. The ‘inflation-targeting’ model of monetary policy, originally implemented 
by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and since adopted by some 20 
jurisdictions, regulates the relationship between the state and central bank 
by granting the central bank effectively only instrument independence. The 
government sets the inflation target between certain margins, and the 
central bank has discretion to choose the monetary policy instruments to 
achieve those targets.114 The central bank is accountable to Parliament in 
respect of meeting the inflation target through periodic addresses by the 
central bank governor. 
 
It is not clear whether the current level of central bank independence is also 
appropriate for a financial stability responsibility. 
  
C. Central Bank Governor: A Special and Significant role  
 
The unique and significant role of the Governor of a central bank contributes to 
central bank’s unique nature. The Governor is the leader and figurehead of the 
organisation and their personal characteristics are highly significant. Central bank 
governors hold great personal esteem and markets react to their appointment, 
dismissal or retirement.115 Their role has no private or public sector equivalents 
and it is unlike that of the CEO of a commercial/retail/investment bank, in that the 
role is generally unconstrained by a board of directors, and it is also unlike that 
 
114 The central bank’s choice of instruments may be constrained by statute or otherwise: See 
Eijffinger and De Haan (n 97) 2-3;See also Goodhart (n 86), 5; See also Parsons, ‘Developments 
in Central Banking’ (n 5). 
 
115 See Christoph Moser and Axel Dreher, ‘Do Markets Care about Central Bank Governor 
Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets’ (2010) 42(8) Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 1589; Frédéric Lebaron and Aykiz Dogan, ‘Do Central Bankers’ Biographies Matter?’ 
(2016) 10(2) Sociologica 1.  
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of a minister in charge of a state department, who is part of cabinet. Despite the 
fact that central bank governors are required to act independently in accordance 
with the independent nature of the central bank as an organisation, central bank 
governors may still in some instances be appointed by politicians exercising 
political power. A recent example is the appointment of Jeremy Powell by 
President Trump to replace Janet Yellen as chairperson of the Federal 
Reserve.116 
 
The individual characteristics of the central bank Governor are significant, and 
this person is appointed in accordance with processes provided for in the 
founding legislation of the central bank.  
 
Notwithstanding the importance of central bank governor, there is relatively little 
academic literature on their roles.117 The special role of the RBA’s Governor is 
analysed in Chapters 6 – 8, and the importance of the personal characteristics 
and even personality of a Governor is also discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
In conclusion, the sui generis nature of central banks both facilitate but also 
complicate the role of a central bank as financial stability regulator. The 
democratic deficit that flows from independence also impacts the financial 
stability responsibility because a closer relationship with government may be 
more appropriate.  
 
 
116 Although Mr Powell is arguably less academically qualified than Dr Yellen to lead the Fed 
and Dr Yellen had a stellar track record at the Fed, Mr Powell is a Republican, and Dr Yellen a 
Democrat. See ‘New Fed Chair Jerome Powell was the Best Choice… for Trump’, The 




117 See for example: Moser and Dreher (n 115); Guillermo Vuletin and Ling Zhu, ‘Replacing a 
“Disobedient” Central Bank Governor with a “Docile” One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank 
Independence and Its Effect on Inflation’ (2011) 43(6) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
1185; Walter A de Wet, ‘Thinking like a Governor: Central Banking under an Inflation Target’ 
(2003) 71(4) South African Journal of Economics 792; Berthold Herrendorf and Ben Lockwood, 




It is not only the general characteristics of central banks that impact their financial 
stability responsibility. The GFC has also resulted in changed perceptions of the 
roles and responsibilities of central banks in financial stability. The GFC and its 
impact on central banks will be discussed next. 
 
III. The GFC and its Effect on the Roles and Responsibilities 
of Central Banks 
 
The GFC was a momentous historical event that significantly impacted central 
banks, because of the role that they played in both the unfolding and resolution 
of the crisis, and also in the role that central banks have subsequently been 
required to play in financial stability. The GFC was also an important event that 
should (and did) inform the actions of governments when creating an appropriate 
regulatory framework for the financial stability regulator. 
 
A. GFC – A Costly Crisis of Financial Stability  
1 An International Crisis of Financial Stability 
 
The GFC was a protracted crisis, and its disruptive effects were global in their 
reach, traversing all layers of society. It fundamentally affected companies, 
industries and the personal lives of many people all over the world.118 The GFC 
followed the Great Moderation, and was largely not foreseen.119 It is not just the 
fact that a major crisis was not foreseen in general, but that the very regulators 
 




119 Some economists like Prof Raghuram Rajan saw the possibility of a financial crisis. 
Bernanke however critically misjudged the impact of the problems experienced in the subprime 
mortgage market when he concluded: ‘At this juncture, however, the impact on the broader 
economy and financial markets of the problems in the subprime market seems likely to be 
contained’: Ben S Bernanke, ‘The Economic Outlook’ (Testimony, Joint Economic Committee, 




and institutions that were expected to prevent instability missed the warning signs 
of the crisis. Blinder summarised the impact of the unusual crisis well:120 
Nobody thought this might happen. Things can go wrong. But the number of 
things that have gone wrong, and the ferocity with which they have gone wrong I 
think was beyond the imagination of almost everyone. 
What started as a crisis in the subprime mortgage market in certain parts of the 
US mortgage market, spiralled quickly into a fully-fledged credit crunch, in which 
financial institutions not only refused providing credit to each other, but failed, or 
almost failed. Multiple causes of the GFC have been identified in key studies,121 
but generally the circumstances that brought about the GFC include: 122 
• deficiencies in lending standards and practices in the USA and the ‘bubble’ 
in the subprime mortgage market,  
• the complexities and opacity of sophisticated securitised products, for 
example collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and financial 
conglomerates,123 
• flawed credit-rating practices and inaccurate asset valuation by credit-
rating agencies, 
 
120 Remarks by Alan Blinder during a radio interview on US Public Broadcasting Service, 9 
January 2009, and cited by David Gruen, ‘Reflections on the Global Financial Crisis’ (Speech, 
Sydney Institute, 16 June 2009) 
<https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2017/06/Sydney_Institute_Address.pdf>.  
 
121 See eg High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Report (Report, 25 February 
2009) 
<https://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf?351e1b35ec1ca5e855d2e
465383a311f> (De Larosière Report); Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis: 
Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in 
the United States (Inquiry Report, January 2011) <http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf>. 
 
122 See John H Farrar and Louise Parsons, ‘Globalisation, the GFC and Paradigm Shift’ (2013) 
32(12) Banking & Financial Services Policy Report 14; John H Farrar and Louise Parsons, 
‘Globalisation, the Global Financial Crisis and the Reinvention of the State’ (2012) 24(2) 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 367; John H Farrar, Louise Parsons and Pieter I Joubert, 
‘The Development of an Appropriate Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis’ (2009) 
21(3) Bond Law Review 1. 
 
123 ‘In conclusion, it is clear that the systemic phase of the current global financial crisis was 
triggered by the failure of large complex global financial conglomerates’: Douglas W Arner and 
Joseph J Norton, ‘Building a Framework to Address Failure of Complex Global Financial 
Institutions’ (2009) 39(1) Hong Kong Law Journal 95, 127. 
 
 104 
• flawed remuneration incentives,124 especially for mortgage brokers and 
bank sales personnel and managers; 
• high levels of leveraging supported by doubtful assets,125  
• the presence of assets of dubious or unknown value (subprime 
mortgages) in securities; and  
• globalisation and the internationalisation of finance that contributed to the 
rapid spread of the crisis: what started in the United States in some 
localised neighbourhoods spread across the globe, and eventually 
virtually no country was unaffected.126  
 
Enormous losses were sustained during the GFC. One author called it a two 
trillion dollar crisis. 127  The fiscal cost of the GFC (referred to as the Great 
Recession by some) is said to have exceeded that of the Great Depression.128 In 
2017, the level of output in the US was still 13% below pre-crisis output. In the 
UK, the losses are estimated to have been 16% of GDP, and ‘are [proportionately] 
larger than in the US and indeed larger than those that followed the Great 
Depression’.129 In the UK and EU, the opportunity costs for citizens have been 
the highest for at least a century.130 In fact, ‘the banking sector entered a zone of 
 
124 Gruen for example refers to ‘perverse incentives in financial markets – too much pay for 




126 See also Charles Goodhart, ‘The Background to the 2007 Financial Crisis’ (2008) 4(4) 
International Economics and Economic Policy 331. 
 
127 Charles R R Morris, The Two Trillion Dollar Meltdown (Public Affairs, 2008). For a summary 
of the cost, see also Barak Orbach, ‘Regulation: Why and How the State Regulates’ 
(Foundation Press, 2013), 11-3. See also International Monetary Fund, World Economic 




128 Andrew G Haldane, ‘Rethinking Financial Stability’ (Speech, Rethinking Macroeconomic 
Policy IV Conference, 12 October 2017).  
 
129 Ibid.   
 
130 Ibid.  
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several years of negative performance’.131 The real economy was caught in a 
‘liquidity spiral that became a dangerous threat to the smooth functioning of the 
most vital and crucial segment of the financial system until then – the banking 
sector, and this resulted in a high amount of non-performing loans’.132 More than 
ten years after the start of the GFC, its negative impact is still being felt in some 
places in the world.133 
2 The Onset of the GFC and the Roles of Central Banks  
 
The GFC presented a crisis particularly for central banks, because it arose in their 
backyards and, as it were, played out in their front yards.134 Central banks did not 
foresee the GFC, and the manner in which the crisis progressed was also not 
foreseen.135 Central banks took much of the credit for the Great Moderation, 
because the favourable conditions during that time were attributed to a decline in 
inflation volatility. Managing and reducing inflation had been one of the key 
objectives of central banks.136 The GFC however brought the Great Moderation 
to an abrupt end.137  
 
Central banks were both blamed for the onset of the GFC but also praised for 
their efforts in resolving the GFC.138 There was evidence of some extraordinary 
 
131 Ana Vlahović, ‘Challenges to the Implementation of a New Framework for Safeguarding 
Financial Stability’ (2014) 3(3) Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice 19, 20. 
 
132 Ibid, 20-1. 
 
133 Malcolm Edye, ‘Reflections on the Financial Crisis’ (Speech, CFO Summit, 16 March 2014) 
<http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2014/sp-ag-160314.html>; See Parsons, ‘Developments in 
Central Banking’ (n 5). 
 
134 Central banks were criticised for their roles in the GFC and suggestions were made for 
improvements in their operations. See Kara M Westercamp, ‘A Crack in the Façade and the 
Whole Building Came Tumbling Down: A Critical Examination of the Central Banks’ Response 
to the Subprime Mortgage Loan Crisis and Global Financial Market Turmoil’ (2009) 18(1) 
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 197. 
 
135 See Parsons, ‘Developments in Central Banking’ (n 5). 
 
136 See Ben Bernanke, ‘The Great Moderation’ (Speech, Eastern Economic Association, 20 
February 2004). 
 
137 See Gruen (n 120). 
 
138 See Tucker (n 3) 2. 
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central banking actions (many of these were actions by the Federal Reserve), 
including: 
• acting as LOLR on a large scale for illiquid institutions – and perhaps, in 
some cases, insolvent institutions (there has been some criticism of for 
example the Federal Reserve exceeding its mandate); 139 
• extending the LOLR assistance to institutions beyond those that would 
normally qualify for LOLR assistance;140 
• substantially increasing their balance sheets;141 
• using novel ways to alleviate the credit crunch;142 
• negotiating with commercial banks to shore up other banks through 
takeovers;143 
• reducing interest rates to extraordinary low levels to encourage lending; 
• collaborating across international borders for example to reduce interest 
rates;144 
• relinquishing the appearance of independence through joint public 





140 For example AIG, an insurer, and car manufacturer Chrysler. 
 
141 See Guy Debelle, ‘Lessons and Questions from the GFC’ (Speech, Australian Business 
Economists Annual Dinner, 6 December 2018) 5 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2018/pdf/sp-dg-2018-12-06.pdf>. Debelle notes: ‘The re-
intermediation by central banks mitigated the withdrawal of intermediation by the banking 
sector. A part of that increase in the balance sheet addressed the large counterparty risk 
aversion. Central banks were willing to stand between institutions that were unwilling to deal 
with each other, as well as accommodate the rapid increase in demand for liquidity. That large 
increase in central bank balance sheets mitigated the large contraction in the financial sector, 
which goes a long way to explaining why it has still yet to lead to a marked rise in inflation, 
despite this being foreshadowed by a number of commentators over the past decade’. 
 
142 Ibid 6. 
 
143 Henry M Paulson, On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial 
System (Business Plus, 2010) Chapter 9.  
 
144 Ashley Seager and Kathryn Hopkins, ‘Another Day of Global Market Turmoil Despite Rate 
Cut Action’, The Guardian (online, 9 October 2008) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/oct/08/interestrates.banking>. 
 
145 The case of Ben Bernanke and Hank Paulson is particularly interesting. Sometimes Tim 
Geithner also joined the other two in public appearances. 
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• acquiring assets that could be potentially valueless through the schemes 
to purge toxic assets from the balance sheets of banks.146 
 
Central banks play the role of first responder or ‘firefighter’ during a crisis and the 
GFC was no exception. Their actions were praised, but also criticised. An 
important development during the GFC as to the perceived role of central banks 
is that central banks should play a lead role in financial stability, and that they 
should focus more on their financial stability mandate (see discussion below.) 
 
3 Australia in the GFC 
 
Australia escaped some of the worst effects of the GFC but was not unaffected.147 
Early in the GFC, then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd reassured the Australian public 
that Australia was ‘better positioned than practically every other country in the 
world to see its way through this crisis’ because of its strong banks, regulators 
and budget surplus. 148  The Australian government provided fiscal stimulus 
quickly and effectively.149  A government guarantee on wholesale debts and 
 




147 See Michael Priestley, Australia, China and the Global Financial Crisis, (Parliamentary 
Library Briefing Book, 12 October 2010) 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/
pubs/BriefingBook43p/australiachinagfc>, Chapter 2 Key Financial Developments Since the 
Wallis Inquiry; See also Alison Lui, Financial Stability and Prudential Regulation: A Comparative 
Approach to the UK. US, Canada, Australia and Germany (Routledge, 2017) Chapter 4. 
 
148 Kevin Rudd, ‘{Untitled interview}’ (Interview at Press Conference, Prime Minister's Courtyard, 
Parliament House, Canberra, 12 October 2008). 
 
149 ‘Rudd Unveils $10.4b Stimulus Plan’, Sydney Morning Herald (online, 14 October 2008) 
<https://www.smh.com.au/business/rudd-unveils-104b-stimulus-plan-20081014-50a6.html>. 
See also Guy Debelle, ‘Lessons and Questions from the GFC’ (Speech, Australian Business 
Economists Annual Dinner, 6 December 2018) <https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2018/pdf/sp-
dg-2018-12-06.pdf>: ‘Fiscal stimulus in Australia in my view was absolutely necessary and was 
a critical factor behind Australia's good economic outcomes. While one can argue about the 
exact nature of the implementation, the fact that it was designed to take effect quickly was vital 
in the circumstances: “go hard, go early, go to households” as Ken Henry put it’ (footnotes 
omitted). Further, Michael Priestley, in a report to Federal Parliament, concluded: ‘Australia’s 
strong economic performance during the GFC can be attributed to the Government’s stimulus 
measures, a sound and liquid banking system and not least China’s robust demand for energy 
and minerals imported from Australia’: Priestley (n 147). 
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deposits was also provided on 12 October 2008.150 In Australia there was no 
need for any government bailout of banks.  
 
Part of the Australian success can be attributed to the actual events of the GFC. 
In that respect Australia was somewhat lucky,151 but Australia also benefited from 
China’s strong growth at the time and Australia’s trade links to China. 152 
Australian banks however made less use of opaque securitised products, and 
banks were well-regulated. The Twin Peaks regulatory system has since been 
praised for being an effective regulatory structure for microprudential and conduct 
regulation.153 The Australian banks were also less exposed to issues relating to 
poor asset quality. 154  Further, Australia did not have the same level of 
counterparty uncertainty because of similar structures in Australian banks.155 
Australia’s well-regulated financial system therefore received significant 
praise.156 
 
4 GFC Lessons 
 
The relevant ‘lessons’ that can be identified as resulting from the GFC and that 
are relevant to the Australian central bank as financial stability regulator, are:157 
 
150 Debelle (n 149) 8.  
 




153 Andrew Schmulow, ‘Financial Regulation: Is Australia's 'Twin Peaks' Model a Successful 
Export?’, Interpreter (Blog Post, 1 March 2016) <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-
interpreter/financial-regulation-australias-twin-peaks-model-successful-export>. 
 
154 Debelle (n 149) 9. 
 
155 Ibid 8. 
 
156 See for example Financial Services Institute of Australasia (Finsia), Navigating Reform: 




157 A full list of all the lessons from the GFC are beyond the scope of this thesis, as many of the 





1. Financial stability as a concept gained significant prominence and 
importance: Financial stability as a concept assumed new prominence 
world-wide during and after the GFC.158 The events and fall-out of the GFC 
led governments and central banks worldwide to take significant steps to 
restore (some) financial stability. There was a proliferation of discussion of 
financial stability and the need to secure financial stability by policy 
makers, market leaders and academics. ‘Financial stability’ became the 
buzzword in the GFC159, as evidenced, inter alia, by its popularity as a 
search term on Google (see figure 3.1). 
 
Image 3.1 Interest in the term ‘financial stability’ since 2004 
 
 
Screenshot taken by the author of the prevalence of the term financial stability on Google. 
 
 
158 ‘When the north-Atlantic financial crisis erupted in August 2007, the economics profession in 
the advanced economies and some central bankers rediscovered financial stability’: Willem H 
Buiter, ‘The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability: How Has it Changed?’ (Discussion 
Paper No 8780, Centre for Economic Policy Research, January 2012) 1 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988710>.  See also Lastra (n 10) 39. 
 
159 See Hilary J Allen, ‘What is “Financial Stability”? The Need for Some Common Language in 
International Financial Regulation’ (2014) 45(4) Georgetown Journal of International Law 929. 
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2. Financial stability is a public good and a national priority: There is 
agreement that insufficient emphasis had been placed on financial stability 
before the GFC. In fact, ‘achieving and preserving financial stability has 
now become a key policy objective in our societies’, 160  and financial 
stability has come to be regarded as ‘not only a national but an 
international public good’. 161  The importance of financial stability is 
generally accepted. If there is financial instability, ‘innocent bystanders get 
hurt’.162 Accordingly a system-wide approach is needed for the regulation 
of financial stability, nationally and internationally.  
 
3. Regulation is important: An important lesson from the GFC was that the 
financial markets are not entirely ‘self-stabilising’ under certain 
conditions,163 and that they ‘do not self-stabilise at any socially acceptable 
cost’.164 Alan Greenspan also noted that contrary to his earlier views, it 
was shown that self-interest of commercial enterprises was not sufficient 
to safeguard broader interests. 165  The following solution has been 
proposed: 166 
The answer is not to repress financial markets. Rather, it is to recognise 
that markets need rules, constraints and careful monitoring so that market 
failures are less frequent and less costly. And that the rules, constraints 
and monitoring exercises need a macroprudential approach – that is, one 
that tries to capture not only individual risks but system-wide risks. 
 
160 Peter Praet, ‘The (Changing) Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability Policies’ (Speech, 
Annual Internal Banking Conference, 10 November 2011). 
 
161 Charles B Blankart and Erik R Fasten, ‘Financial Crisis Resolution – The State as a Lender 
of Last Resort?’ (2009) 29(3) Economic Affairs 47, 50. 
 
162 Allen (n 159), 946.  
 
163 Vlahović (n 131) 27. 
 
164 Ibid.  
 
165 Alan Beattie and James Politi, ‘“I Made a Mistake,” Admits Greenspan’, Financial Times 
(online, 24 October 2008) <https://www.ft.com/content/aee9e3a2-a11f-11dd-82fd-
000077b07658>. 
 
166 Jaime Caruana, ‘Systemic Risk: How to Deal with It’ (Paper, Bank for International 




4. Central banks should play the lead role in financial stability: One of the key 
lessons of the GFC was that central banks should play a key role in 
financial stability. 
 
5. A macro-prudential focus is important: The GFC highlighted the so-called 
‘fallacy of composition’, namely the assumption that the individual 
resilience of financial institutions would also ensure the resilience of the 
financial system as a whole. Empirical data and the events of the GFC 
showed that systemic risk cannot be mitigated by the resilience of 
individual firms alone.167 The GFC highlighted that regulators needed to 
focus more broadly than on specific sectors in isolation and needed to 
consider macroeconomic issues and macroprudential policy. ‘Out of this 
intellectual vacuum, a new framework for regulation has been born – 
macroprudential regulation’.168  
 
6. A systemic approach is required. Similarly, the importance of preventing 
systemic risk169 on a global level became evident, and this realisation led 
to the eventual introduction of specific regulatory regimes for so-called 
SIFIs170 and gSIFIs.171 The manner in which systemic risk is avoided is 
 
167 See Haldane (n 128); See also Andrew Crockett, ‘The Theory and Practice of Financial 
Stability’ (1996) 144(4) De Economist 531. 
 
168 Haldane (n 128).  
 
169 The concept of systemic risk is not new and was an important consideration long before the 
GFC. The Group of Ten in January 2001 defined it as follows: ‘Systemic risk is the risk that an 
event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainty 
about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough to quite probably have 
significant adverse effects on the real economy. … The adverse real economic effects from 
systemic problems are generally seen as arising from disruptions to the payment system, to credit 
flows, and from the destruction of asset values’: Group of Ten, Consolidation of the Financial 
Sector (Report, 30 January 2001) <https://www.bis.org/publ/gten05.htm>. 
 
170 Systemically Important Financial Institutions. 
 
171 Globally Systemically Important Financial Institutions. 
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through a macroprudential perspective, and the need for a 
macroprudential regulator was born out of the GFC:172  
In summary, the market failures associated with fire-sale externalities and 
behavioural tendencies which can drive short-termism provide a strong 
case for a macroprudential regulator with an objective of preserving the 
dynamic resilience of the financial system, both among banks and, 
prospectively, among non-banks.  
What the appropriate instruments and tools are for macroprudential policy, 
is however not clear: 173  
There is no settled, practical approach to defining the breadth of 
objectives of a macroprudential regime. … Nor, in the main, is there any 
settled approach to defining the appropriate set of macroprudential 
instruments.  
 
7. A focus on macroprudential policy is required: ‘The global financial crisis 
has highlighted the costs of systemic instability at both the national and 
global level, as well as the need for dedicated macro-prudential policies to 
achieve financial stability’.174  
 
5 Post GFC Regulatory Responses 
 
The following regulatory responses are however particularly relevant to the 




172 Haldane (n 128).  
 
173 Ibid.  
 
174 Sean Hagan and Ross Leckow, ‘The Role of Law in Preserving Financial Stability’, IMF Blog 
(Blog Post, 1 July 2016) <https://blogs.imf.org/2016/07/01/the-role-of-law-in-preserving-
financial-stability/>. 
 
175 For an early account of the regulatory responses, see Farrar, Parsons and Joubert (n 122). 
A full account of the regulatory response to the GFC is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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(a) International Responses 
 
Internationally the regulatory response was coordinated through the FSB. The 
most significant regulatory changes subsequent to the GFC were in relation to 
liquidity, capital and resolution regimes for distressed financial institutions.176 
Special resolution arrangements have been created for SIFIs and gSIFIs.177 
Stress-testing has been widely adopted, and in some jurisdictions the concept of 
a ‘living will’ or predetermined resolution strategy for complex institutions have 
been devised.178 The IMF and FSB perform peer reviews of member countries, 
and report on the financial stability frameworks in each country against pre-
determined criteria.179 
 
In some countries, such as the UK, the USA and South Africa, legislative change 
was implemented in respect of the roles, powers and functions of the financial 
stability regulator. In 2009, the BOE was given a legislative mandate for financial 
stability; 180  in 2010 the Federal Reserve was tasked with financial stability 
through the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Committee (FSOC).181 In 
2017, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was provided with an express 
 
176 See Reserve Bank of Australia, Submission to the Australian Government, Financial System 
Inquiry (March 2014), Part 3; See also Kevin Davis, ‘Financial Regulation after the GFC’ 




177 See the standards adopted by the FSB members: Financial Stability Board, Key Attributes of 
Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (Standards, 15 October 2014) 
<http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf>. 
 
178 See for example David H Carpenter, “Living Wills”: The Legal Regime for Constructing 
Resolution Plans for Certain Financial Institutions (Report, 4 December 2014) 
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43801.pdf>. 
 
179 See Financial Stability Board, FSB Framework for Strengthening Adherence to International 
Standards (Standards, 9 January 2010) <http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_100109a.pdf>. 
 
180 See Bank of England Act 1998 UK, Part 1A Financial Stability.  
 
181 Under the Dodd−Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 USC (2010), 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was established as a federal body. 
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financial stability mandate.182 In the EU, changes were also implemented after 
the GFC and for example the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was 
created on the recommendations of the De Larosière report and as a direct 
response to the GFC.183 ‘In pursuit of its macroprudential mandate, the ESRB 
monitors and assesses systemic risks and, where appropriate, issues warnings 
and recommendations’.184 
 
(b) Australian Response 
 
In Australia, the Australian Government and the RBA confirmed the RBA’s 
responsibility for financial stability in the 2010 version of the Joint Statement on 
the Conduct of Monetary Policy, jointly issued by the Treasurer and the Governor 
of the RBA.185 This is a non-statutory public document of some significance (even 
if not legally binding).186 In this document, the RBA’s responsibility for financial 
stability was characterised as a ‘long-standing’ obligation. 187  There were no 
statutory changes to the regulatory framework of the financial stability regulators 
in Australia after the GFC.  
 
 
182 See Corlia van Heerden and Gerda van Niekerk, ‘Twin Peaks in South Africa: A New Role 
for the Central Bank’ (2017) 11(4) Law and Financial Markets Review 157. 
 





185 ‘Financial stability is a longstanding responsibility of the Reserve Bank and its Board, and 
was reconfirmed at the time of significant changes made to Australia's financial regulatory 
structure in July 1998. … The Reserve Bank Board oversees the Bank's work on financial 
system stability. Without compromising the price stability objective, the Reserve Bank seeks to 
use its powers where appropriate to promote the stability of the Australian financial system. It 
does this in several ways, …’: The Treasurer and the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Statement 
on the Conduct of Monetary Policy (Statement, 30 September 2010) 
<http://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/framework/stmt-conduct-mp-5-30092010.html>.  
 
186 See further Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
187 Although the RBA had been publishing financial stability reviews as separate publications 
since 2004, and although the Wallis Inquiry Report also confirmed the role of the RBA in 
financial stability, the RBA’s role in financial stability has not been codified or legislated. See 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
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B. Financial Stability as a Key Central Bank Objective after the 
GFC   
 
Financial stability and the role of central banks in financial stability became more 
important during and after the GFC.188 It is not entirely settled whether central 
banks should be responsible for financial stability, given that their main focus is 
price stability (monetary policy), and may require an accompanying responsibility 
for systemic regulation (prudential supervision of financial institutions).189 Not all 
central banks are also microprudential supervisors.  
1 Financial Stability: An Existing or Desirable Central Bank 
Responsibility  
 
The role of central banks in financial stability has been studied and analysed by 
central bankers, politicians, and academics. Some hold the view that central 
banks are responsible for financial stability simply by being central banks.190 
Financial stability is widely seen as ‘one of the key tenets of a central bank’s 
functions’. 191  Others consider that central banks should be responsible for 
financial stability, if they are not already.192 For some, financial stability is the 
 
188 See Peter J N Sinclair, ‘Central Banks and Financial Stability’ (2000) 40(4) Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin 377 
 
189 Cukierman (n 42) 31. Rosa M Lastra and Luis Garicano argued in 201 that central banks are 
best placed for macroprudential supervision: Lastra (n 10) 48. 
 
190 That central banks should be responsible for financial stability, see for example Group of 
Thirty, Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability (Report, 15 January 2009) 1-2 
<https://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_FinancialReformFrameworkFinStability.
pdf; See also Rebecca Hicks, ‘A Potential New Role for Central Banks: A Comparison of Expert 
Proposals for Reform, Developments in Banking and Financial Law’ (2009) 28 Review of 
Banking and Financial Law 448; See Charles A E Goodhart, The Regulatory Response to the 
Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar, 2009). 
 
191 Alison Lui, Financial Stability and Prudential Regulation: A Comparative Approach to the UK. 
US, Canada, Australia and Germany (Routledge, 2017) 3. According to the BIS, 90 per cent of 
central banks consider they have a financial stability responsibility: ibid. 
 
192 In addition to sources cited in n 190, see for example Masaaki Shirakawa, ‘Future of Central 
Banks and Central Banking’ (Speech, International Conference, 26 May 2010); See Bank for 
International Settlements, Central Bank Governance and Financial Stability (Report, May 2011) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/othp14.pdf> (‘Ingves Report’); Praet noted that the so-called ‘Jackson 
Hole consensus’, in terms whereof central banks had a minimal direct role to play in financial 
stability but did so by maintaining price stability and minimising the effects of bubbles, had 
broken down: Peter Praet, ‘The (Changing) Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability Policies’ 
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consequence of price stability, and therefore central banks can be said to have 
two objectives – price stability and financial stability.193 However, achieving price 
stability does not automatically ensure macroeconomic stability.194 Nevertheless, 
central banks may assume (explicitly or implicitly) responsibility for financial 
stability in support of their monetary policy mandate because monetary policy 
cannot be effective in the absence of financial stability. Financial stability can 
therefore be seen as an implied obligation of central banks.195  
Financial stability objectives do not only attach to central banks’ monetary policy 
obligations, but also their LOLR function, and on that basis central banks can be 
said to have an established responsibility for financial stability. Providing 
emergency liquidity assistance can promote or secure financial system stability 
and can prevent or counteract the systemic risk that can be caused by a failing 
financial institution.196 
 
Further, some expressed the view that the importance of a central bank’s 
responsibility for financial stability outweighs its monetary policy obligations. 
Goodhart, for example, always maintained that monetary policy (ie price stability) 
was the first and core purpose of a central bank.197 Other functions, such as the 
LOLR function, would be secondary. However, Goodhart changed his view, 
arguing that financial stability is the key function,198 and that monetary policy 
could be outsourced to a specialist committee, or even government 
 
(Speech, Annual Internal Banking Conference, 10 November 2011). See further Parsons, 
‘Developments in Central Banking’ (n 5) 235-238.  
 
193 Goodhart (n 86) 1; Cukierman, (n 42) 69. 
 
194 See Shirakawa (n 69).  
 
195 See Parsons, ‘Developments in Central Banking’ (n 5).  
 
196 See Shirakawa (n 69).  
 
197 Charles A E Goodhart, The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar, 
2009) 35. 
 
198 Goodhart (n 86)19. 
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department.199 He emphasised that only the central bank through the use of its 
balance sheet could enhance financial stability.200 
 
Central banks may not have the microprudential tools required to influence the 
activities and behaviour of regulated institutions, but central banks have the 
following ‘tools’ that can be used positively for financial stability: 
 
1. Expertise, knowledge, research and analysis: Central banks have the 
advantage of operating well-respected research departments, which 
places them in a superior position for executing a financial stability 
responsibility; 
 
2. Central banks are well-suited for a macroprudential focus: 
Macroprudential policies are time-sensitive policies, often requiring pro-
cyclical action, something for which central banks are well-suited;201  
 
3. Monetary policy can contribute to financial stability; 
 
4. The central bank balance sheet and the ability to act as LOLR is a key 
financial stability tool;  
 
5. Payment systems have the potential to create financial stability difficulties, 
for example through Central Counterparties (CCPs), and central banks 
that have supervisory powers over the payment system and CCPs can 
control risks that could have systemic consequences;  
 
6. Many central banks already publish financial stability reviews. This and 
other communications are key tools in procuring financial stability. The 
 
199 Ibid 5. 
 
200 Ibid 19. 
 
201 See Nellie Liang, ‘Rethinking Financial Stability and Macroprudential Policy’, Up Front (Blog 




prestige within which central banks are generally held enhance the 
effectiveness of central bank communication; and 
 
7. Communication: Central banks use influence and persuasion to impact 
economic behaviour. The forms of communication used by central banks 
include formal, published communication, but also informal 
communication in meetings with various stakeholders, as well as moral 
suasion. 
 
The RBA also uses these tools. 
 
2 The Challenges and Effects of a Financial Stability Mandate 
 
(a) Microprudential Regulation and Supervision  
 
Allocating a responsibility for financial stability to one regulatory authority requires 
consideration of the regulator responsible for prudential regulation and bank 
supervision. Difficulties can arise if the central bank is the financial stability 
regulator but not also the microprudential supervisor. For example, the 
communication and information problems experienced between the BOE and the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK at the time of the problems of 
Northern Rock Bank at the start of the GFC have led to a reintegration of the bank 
supervision function into the central bank in 2009.202 The UK, US and South 
Africa have adopted the so-called integrated model after the GFC.203  
 
Involvement in macro-prudential matters would however expose central banks to 
the political economy: 204  
 
202 See Julia Black, ‘The Credit Crisis and the Constitution’ in Dawn Oliver, Tony Prosser and 
Richard Rawlings (eds), The Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 92, 124; See also David G Mayes, ‘The Role of Central Banks in Financial 
Supervision and Regulation’ (2009) 29(3) Economic Affairs 40, 40. 
 
203 Mayes (n 202) 40; See also Chapters 5 and 8.  
 
204 Haldane (n 128). 
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It has probably also contributed to some people questioning the appropriate 
scope of central banking, its degree of independence from the political process 
and from wider society and appropriate accountability mechanisms.  
 
(b) The Importance of Central Bank Independence, Monetary Policy and 
Concerns about the Democratic Deficit 
 
The extent to which government should be involved in financial stability decisions 
is important but is ultimately a political question. It is not clear whether the same 
level of independence – that is the level that is appropriate for monetary policy – 
is also appropriate for financial stability. Arguably it is not, as financial stability 
policy has a broader fiscal impact. Inherently, financial stability issues are much 
more unpredictable in both their cause and in their solution. The GFC is an 
excellent example, where financial instability was the consequence not of 
institutions failing because of liquidity problems and a classic ‘run on the bank’, 
but because of a spiralling credit crunch. The financial instruments that were 
intended to spread risk in a positive way, also did so negatively.205 Instead of 
providing liquidity in the normal manner, central banks had to provide 
intermediation to alleviate the credit crunch.206 
 
Furthermore, as the LOLR function can directly impact taxpayers, the level of 
independence required by a central bank acting as LOLR may differ from the 
current high level of independence that central banks enjoy. Current regulatory 
frameworks do not always provide for financial stability actions.   
 
The central bank’s democratic deficit can be even further exaggerated through 
an additional financial stability responsibility, especially if it includes a 
responsibility for microprudential supervision. As Paul Tucker cautions in his 
 
205 That was the impact of complex securitized instruments such as CDOs. 
 
206 See Debelle (n 149) 5; See Gruen (n 120). 
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recent book, such a powerful central bank would sit well outside democratic 




The current roles, nature and regulatory set-up of central banks make a financial 
stability role for central banks complex – including from a legal and regulatory 
perspective. Central banks are sui generis institutions, operate as independent 
mandated regulatory agents and conduct monetary policy – arguably the most 
significant role among the many important roles of central banks. Central banks 
are also well-placed to regulate and ensure financial stability, not least because 
of their ability to act as LOLR, but also through monetary policy, payment systems 
regulation and their unique aptitude for macroprudential policy. Central bank 
expertise, prestige and research capabilities are important contributors to their 
effectiveness in the role of financial stability regulator. 
 
The unique nature and roles of a central bank, whilst making them ideal for a role 
in financial stability, also makes it complex to provide a central bank with a 
financial stability mandate. There are however no easy or clear answers as to 
how a financial stability responsibility would fit in with, and would affect and be 
affected by, the central bank’s other responsibilities. The two most contentious 
issues are microprudential supervision and central bank independence. The 
important role that central banks play with monetary policy has important 
consequences for a financial stability responsibility, not least because of the way 
in which modern central banks behave and are regulated. Importantly, their 
current levels of independence derive predominantly from their monetary policy 
obligations, and independence has come to define modern central banks. As 
there are larger public policy issues involved with financial stability, the existing 
levels of central bank independence may not be appropriate. Furthermore, it is 
not clear what type of governance and accountability arrangements would 
 
207 See generally Tucker (n 3). 
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adequately balance out the independence of a central bank that is both 









CHAPTER 4  
 
The RBA’s Responsibility for Financial Stability: An Informal 
Mandate  
 
It is well-established that every statutory power and discretion is limited by the subject 
matter, scope and purpose of the statute under which it is conferred.1 
 




This chapter and the next analyse the regulatory framework and nature of the 
RBA’s financial stability mandate.  
 
It is somewhat surprising that the mandate of the RBA for a goal as important as 
financial stability is ‘informal and decentralised’.3 Those words – ‘informal’ and 
‘decentralised’ -  were used by the Murray Inquiry to describe the institutional 
 
1 R v Secretary for State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131, as 
cited by Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Statutory Interpretation and Rationality in Administrative 
Law: National Lecture on Administrative Law 2015’ (2015) 82 Australian Institute of 
Administrative Law Forum 1. 
 
2 Henry David Thoreau, ‘Civil Disobedience’ (Web Page) 
<https://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/disobey.htm>. 
 
3 ‘Australia has long adopted what could be called a ‘macro-prudential’ approach to supervision 
under the rubric of financial stability. Yet, Australia’s institutional structure is relatively informal 
and decentralised. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) and APRA each have responsibility for 
financial stability. However, most macro-prudential tools can only be deployed by APRA. This 
places a strong premium on cooperation between the two agencies’: Commonwealth, Financial 
System Inquiry (Final Report, November 2014) 233 




structure of the Australian financial stability mandate.4 An informal mandate for 
financial stability is also surprising because one may have expected that the 
significance that financial stability assumed during the GFC may have been 
reflected in subsequent legislation. Also surprising is the confidence with which 
the Australian government and Australian financial regulators confirm that the 
RBA does indeed have a financial stability mandate. 
 
In brief, the responsibility of the RBA for financial stability is informal, in that it is 
not an express, legislated responsibility. Rather, the responsibility for financial 
stability can (at best) be implied in the RBA’s founding legislation. The 
responsibility has become a de facto or customary responsibility and is rooted in 
the history of the RBA. The execution of the financial stability responsibility further 
relies on non-legislative and non-binding agreements between the RBA and other 
regulators to cooperate and collaborate in the pursuit of financial stability. In 
short, the RBA’s general and overarching responsibility for financial stability has 
no hard law origin and is based on soft law. 
 
The responsibility for financial stability in Australia is further decentralised. The 
responsibility for financial stability is shared between the RBA, APRA and the 
CFR. Ultimate responsibility is said to lie with the RBA, but the RBA is not 
exclusively responsible for financial stability. In fact, APRA has a significant 
number of financial stability tools, and the CFR influences the RBA’s fulfilment of 
its financial stability mandate. 
 
This chapter analyses how the responsibility of the RBA for financial stability is 
informal. In Chapter 5 the decentralised nature of the responsibility will be 
analysed. Although the regulatory framework of the RBA and other regulators 
and bodies involved will be discussed in historical perspective, the focus will be 
on the current regulatory architecture of the RBA (and on the other financial 
regulators only to the extent relevant). 
 
 
4 The Murray Inquiry Final Report (n 3) 233. 
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Part II of this Chapter starts with an analysis of the RBA’s legislative framework 
for financial stability and the express and implied statutory mandate for financial 
stability. It analyses any possible hard law origins of the RBA’s financial stability 
mandate. Part III analyses the soft law origins of the RBA’s financial stability 
mandate, and the extent to which the RBA’s mandate is de facto and historical. 
It also identifies express but non-legal sources (or confirmations) of the RBA’s 
financial stability mandate. This chapter concludes that there is a preponderance 
of soft law in the regulatory framework of the RBA’s financial stability 
responsibility. 
 
II Hard Law: The Use of Hard Law to Create the RBA’s 
Responsibility for Financial Stability 
 
In stark contrast to the Murray Inquiry’s description of the financial stability 
mandate as ‘informal’, the RBA and APRA have described the regulatory 
framework for financial stability in Australia as ‘clear and established’. This 
characterisation was made in an important document, namely the background 
document for the IMF FSAP team for the Australian country peer review.5 The 
RBA and APRA noted: 6 
Australia’s financial stability policy framework involves clear mandates for 
financial stability distributed across several agencies, with the Council of 
Financial Regulators (CFR) playing a central coordinating role. The prudential 
elements of that framework rest with APRA, with analytical support from the RBA.  
In fact, the RBA does not have a formal legislated mandate for financial stability, 
and no clear mandate, as will be shown below. The RBA only has a limited 
 
5 Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Macroprudential 
Analysis and Policy in the Australian Financial Stability Framework’, Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (Web Page, September 2012) <https://www.apra.gov.au/macroprudential-
analysis-and-policy-australian-financial-stability-framework>. This document – originally 
prepared as background for the IMF FSAP team in early 2012 – sets out the tools and practices 
of these two agencies that are designed to support financial stability from a system-wide 
perspective. The Australian authorities view macroprudential policy as subsumed within the 
broader and more comprehensive financial stability policy framework.  
 
6 Ibid (emphasis added).  
 
 126 
express legislated mandate for financial stability in relation to the payments 
system. Similarly, APRA’s legislated ‘mandate’ in respect of financial stability is 
also not a clear mandate. Financial stability is not a statutory stand-alone 
objective. APRA’s mandate is limited to considering financial system stability 
when balancing APRA’s objectives of ‘financial safety and efficiency, competition, 
contestability and competitive neutrality’ of the entities it regulates, when 
performing and exercising its functions and powers.7 As will be analysed below 
in this chapter, there is no statutory, overarching, financial stability obligation for 
the RBA that can be construed to be a broad and ‘clear’ mandate for financial 
stability.8 The analysis classifies the different ‘sources’ of the RBA’s financial 
stability mandate as different manifestations of ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’. 
A. Hard Law Versus Soft Law – Introductory Comments 
 
Hard law – or black letter law - is generally construed to be law or regulations that 
are legally binding, and legally enforceable by a central government authority.9 
Typical hard law instruments are parliamentary legislation and regulation 
promulgated under a legislative authority. Hard law is typically certain, formal, 
and has the highest level of democratic legitimacy.10  
 
 
7 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth) s 8(2). 
 
8 This thesis focuses on the mandate of the RBA, but as the mandate is shared, the mandate of 
the APRA is also considered.  
 
9 ‘In legal terms “hard law” refers to rules that can be enforced by state sanctions, be they civil, 
criminal or administrative’: Arie Freiberg, Regulation in Australia (Federation Press, 2017), 210. 
 
10 The best example of hard law is statute or formal regulation passed under a statute: Ibid. 
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Soft law - or ‘grey-letter law’11 - gives rise to hortatory obligations but can still 
regulate and influence conduct in a strong and powerful manner.12 The term soft 
law has been used to denote agreements, principles and declarations that are 
not legally binding. Soft law is considered to be quasi-legal instruments with no 
or weaker binding legal force.13 Soft law includes ‘the range of rules, instruments 
and standards’ that influence compliance, but ‘which do not form part of explicit 
government regulations’.14 Soft law has also been described as consisting of 
‘rules issued by public or private bodies that do not comply with procedural 
formalities necessary to give the rules a specific legal status’.15 
 
Although soft law instruments feature predominantly in the international sphere,16 
there are also many national examples.17 For example in administrative law, a 
 
11 This phrase was used by the Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee: Commonwealth 
Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, Grey-Letter Law (Report, December 1997) 
IX <https://www.pc.gov.au/research/supporting/grey-letter-law/greyletterlaw.pdf>. The 
Committee described black-letter law as ‘explicit government regulation’. In its report, ‘the term 
“quasi-regulation” refers to the range of rules, instruments and standards where government 
influences businesses to comply, but which does not form part of explicit government 
regulations. Quasi-regulation can take many forms such as codes of practice, advisory notes, 
guidelines, and rules of conduct, issued by either non-government or government bodies. In the 
context of a regulatory spectrum, quasi- regulation might be considered as “grey-letter law”’. 
 
12 In some instances, soft law can be more effective and important than hard law. 
 
13 J Paul Lomio, Henrik Spang-Hanssen and George D Wilson, Legal Research Methods in a 
Modern World: A Coursebook (Djoef, 2011). 
 
14 See Freiberg (n 9) 210. 
 
15 Rolf H Weber, ‘Overcoming the Hard Law/Soft Law Dichotomy in Times of Financial Crises’ 
(2012) 1(1) Journal of Governance and Regulation 8 11. 
 
16 See John Kirton, Marina Larionova and Paolo Savona (eds), Making Global Economic 
Governance Effective: Hard and Soft Law Institutions in a Crowded World (Routledge, 2010). 
Examples of international soft law instruments include for example those of the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF), Basel III, the G20 Communiqués and publications from International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO); See also Rolf H Weber, ‘Overcoming the 
Hard Law/Soft Law Dichotomy in Times of Financial Crises’ (2012) 1(1) Journal of Governance 
and Regulation 8; See also Chris Brummer, ‘Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance – 
And Not Trade’ (2010) 13(3) Journal of International Economic Law 623; See also European 
Center for Constitutional and Human Rights E V, ‘Term: Hard Law / Soft Law’, European Center 
for Constitutional and Human Rights E V (Web Page)  <https://www.ecchr.eu/en/glossary/hard-
law-soft-law/>.  
 
17 See Robin Creyke, ‘”Soft Law” and Administrative Law: A New Challenge’ (2010) 61 
Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 15 <http://www.aial.org.au/aial-forum/volume-
61-2010>; See also Robin Creyke and John McMillan, 'Soft Law v Hard Law' in Linda Pearson, 
Carol Harlow and Michael Taggart (eds), Administrative Law in a Changing State: Essays in 
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range of documents such as internal departmental guidelines, practice manuals, 
and codes of conduct play an important role.18 In the context of financial stability, 
soft law includes, for example, memoranda of understanding, government 
documents and formal statements by the Australian government and the RBA.19 
Soft law can be very effective as a regulatory tool.20 It however lacks some 
democratic credibility. 
 
B. Limited Hard Law Mandate for Financial Stability Relating to 
the Payments System Only 
 
This analysis starts with the hard law sources of the RBA’s mandate. 
 
The RBA currently is responsible for financial stability in two areas: 
1. it has an overarching and general responsibility for financial stability, and 
2. it has a narrow, limited express responsibility for financial stability in 
relation to the payments system.21 
 
However, only the latter of these is reflected in legislation. The first is implied; the 
latter is express. A limited express financial stability mandate in relation to the 
 
Honour of Mark Aronson (Hart Publishing, 2008) 377. The use of soft law in the regulatory 
framework of financial regulators in Australia has been analysed in Andrew Godwin and Ian 
Ramsay, ‘Twin Peaks: The Legal and Regulatory Anatomy of Australia’s System of Financial 




18 Eight categories of soft law have been identified namely procedural rules, interpretive guides, 
instructions to officials, prescriptive/evidential rules, commendatory rules, voluntary codes, rules 
of practice, management or operation, and consultative devices and administrative 
pronouncements: See Robin Creyke, (n 16) 15.  
 
19 These are identified and discussed below. 
 
20 See Ellis Ferran and Kern Alexander, ‘Can Soft Law Bodies be Effective? The Special Case 
of the European Systemic Risk Board’ (2010) 35(6) European Law Review 751; See also Arie 
Freiberg, Regulation in Australia (Federation Press, 2017) 205. 
 
21 The phrase ‘financial system stability’ appears in Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) 
s 10B(3)(b)(iii). As the Payment System Board is also directed to consider the greatest 
advantage of Australia, there is also an implied obligation of financial stability overall in the 
payment systems obligations: Ibid s 10B(3)(a). 
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payment system has been introduced into the RBA Act in 1998, but the RBA Act 
does not expressly confer any overarching general responsibility for financial 
stability on the RBA. 
 
The RBA Act – the RBA’s enabling legislation – contains three references to 
financial stability,22 but all three relate to the RBA’s role as the payments system 
regulator. In fact, the charter of the RBA (or more specifically, of the Reserve 
Bank Board23), which is contained in s 10(2) of the RBA Act24 is a key source of 
the RBA’s roles and responsibilities, powers and obligations, does not make any 
express mention of a financial stability responsibility. Although the financial 
stability obligations in relation to the payments system may at first glance appear 
to be broad obligations (particularly because the phrase ‘overall stability of the 
financial system’ is used twice25), they are in fact limited and narrow obligations, 
and cannot be interpreted to extend to a broader obligation of financial stability 
as will be demonstrated below. The financial stability obligations in relation to the 
payments system are now considered in more detail.  
 
1 Express Statutory Financial Stability Obligations in Relation to the 
Payments System 
 
Two of the three references to financial stability in the RBA Act appear in s 10B 
and the third is in s 25. 
  
 
22 Ibid ss10, 25. 
 
23 The RBA has two boards, the Reserve Bank Board, and the Payment Systems Board, each 
with its own objectives and responsibilities.  
 
24 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 10(2). 
 




(a) Section 10 RBA Act 
 
The RBA, through the Payments System Board, is responsible for the stability of 
the financial system within certain parameters and in a particular context. Section 
10B(3) of the RBA Act sets out the ‘charter’ of the Payments System Board of the 
RBA,26 with objectives that are broadly similar to those of the Reserve Bank 
Board set out in s 10(2), but for the noticeable difference that s 10B(3) includes 
express references to financial stability. The Payment Systems ‘charter’, as 
s 10B(3) is sometimes referred to, states that the Payments System Board needs 
to consider ‘overall financial system stability’. 27  Notwithstanding the phrase 
‘overall stability of the financial system’ used in this section, this is not an 
obligation for overarching financial stability for the following reasons. 
 
Section 10B(3) includes two references to the ‘overall stability of the financial 
system’, and states:28 
It is the duty of the Payments System Board to ensure, within the limits of its 
powers, that: 
a. the Bank’s payments system policy is directed to the greatest advantage 
of the people of Australia; and 
b. the powers of the Bank under the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 
1998 and the Payment Systems and Netting Act 1998 are exercised in a 
way that, in the Board's opinion, will best contribute to:  
i controlling risk in the financial system; 
 ii promoting the efficiency of payments system; and 
iii promoting competition in the market for payment services, 
consistent with the overall stability of the financial system; and 
 
26 Ibid s 10B(3) 
 
27 Ibid s 10B(3). 
 
28 Ibid s10B (emphasis added). 
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c.  the powers and functions of the Bank under Part 7.3 of the Corporations 
Act 2001 are exercised in a way that, in the Board's opinion, will best 
contribute to the overall stability of the financial system.  
 
When considering the text of the legislation within its context and purpose,29 it is 
clear that this section does not confer a general responsibility for financial stability 
in a broad sense on the RBA. In the absence of definitions in the RBA Act of the 
phrases ‘financial stability’, ‘stability of the financial system’ or ‘financial system’, 
or of the individual words in those phrases, the context becomes more important 
in interpreting the legislation. In the context (particularly that of ss 10B(3)(b)—
(c)), it is clear that financial stability here refers merely to financial stability directly 
linked to the effective functioning of the payments system.30  
 
Further, this interpretation is also supported by the historical context. The 
Payments System Board and the powers for the RBA in relation to the payments 
system were created following the Wallis Inquiry in light of, inter alia, concerns 
about the impact of new technologies in payments systems. 31  Failure of a 
financial institution to settle – a failure that can be caused by a problem in the 
payments system – entails a potential financial stability risk, and was of concern 
at the time the legislation was passed.32 It is worth noting that the RITS payment 
 
29 General principles of statutory interpretation, namely giving consideration to the words or text 
of the legislation, within their context and purpose, will be adopted. See Chief Justice Robert 
French, ‘What Were They Thinking? Statutory Interpretation and Parliamentary Intention’ (Sir 




30 Read in context and especially in light of the introductory words in s 10B(3)b, the term 
‘financial system stability’ in s 10B3(iv) refers to financial stability directly linked to the effective 
functioning of the payment system. 
 
31 The creation of the Payments System Board coincided with potential risks associated with a 
dramatic increase in technological developments in payment systems. 
 
32 The payments system is ‘the infrastructure which facilitates the several million payments 
made each day in Australia, that is, the mechanics of how individuals, businesses and 
governments are enabled to meet their monetary obligations to others’: Explanatory 




system,33 Australia’s first RTGS system, was introduced in 1998, around the 
same time that the Payments System Board in the RBA was created and the 
payments system regulatory obligations given to the RBA. RITS, the RTGS that 
was intended to dramatically reduce the risk of payment failures between the 
banks, is an important example of technological advancements at the time of the 
promulgation of the legislation. Because of the highly sensitive nature of payment 
settlements, regulation of the system has always been of paramount importance. 
It was emphasised in the explanatory memorandum34 to the RBA amendment 
legislation in 1998 (an amendment to include the payments system regulatory 
obligations for the RBA) that ‘[a] safe and reliable payments system is also 
essential for the smooth functioning of a country's economy’,35 and is important 
for the general functioning of the Australian economy.36 In summary, the focus 
was on (1) the payments system’s safety and integrity, (2) its efficiency, (3) 
competition among service providers, and (4) the manner in which the RBA used 
its powers in relation to the payments system. It is with reference to the last two 
of these objectives that the legislation expressly requires the RBA to consider 
financial stability. Financial stability can become an issue with competition in the 
payments system (see s 10B(3)(b)(iii)), as for example the introduction of new 
players into the payments systems market can create a risk that could lead to 
payments system – and potentially financial system – instability.  
 
Similarly, in s 10B(3)(c) of the RBA Act, which requires the RBA to exercise its 
powers and functions under Part 7.3 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in a way 
 
33 See ‘About RITS’, Reserve Bank of Australia (Web Page) <https://www.rba.gov.au/payments-
and-infrastructure/rits/about.html>. 
 




36 The reason is that ‘[t]he risks, which are of particular interest to those responsible for 
managing the national payments system, come from exposures between institutions' 
participation in the payments clearing and settlement process. These risks would crystallise 
(sic) if an institution were unable to meet its settlement obligations to other participants in the 
payments system’: Explanatory Memorandum Payments Systems (Regulation) Bill 1998 (n 32). 
Further, reforms were necessary after the Wallis Commission for ‘the enhancement of the 
safety and integrity of the system’, and ‘to improve the efficiency with which payments 
instructions are handled and funds made available, and to promote greater competitive equity 
among service providers’.  
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that will ‘best contribute to the overall stability of the financial system’,37 the 
express responsibility for the stability of the financial system is a limited 
responsibility. It is limited to the context of potential instability in the system 
created by clearance and settlement services providers. Although the responsible 
Minister issues licences to clearing and settlement services providers, the RBA 
has limited regulatory influence under Part 7.3 of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth).38 The RBA may in its discretion39 set standards40 for licensed service 
providers,41 in consultation with clearance and settlement service providers and 
ASIC, 42  and may revoke the standards in consultation with ASIC. 43 
Considerations of financial system stability in this context are therefore very 
narrow.44 The Central Counterparty (CCP) Standards regulate the conduct of 
central counterparties that generally reduce risk in the system, and play an 
important role in financial stability in the payments system. The standards are 
aimed at ensuring that there is stability in the payments system. The Securities 
Settlement Facilities (SSF) Regulations for securities settlement facilities are 
intended to ensure that the licencees properly identify and control risks that are 
associated with the operation of the securities settlement facilities and that SSFs 
conduct their affairs in accordance with the SSF Standards so as to promote 
overall stability of the financial system. The SSF Standards also do not define 
 
37 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s10B(3)(c). 
 
38 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Part 7.3 and ss 820A, 820B, 820C. Applications are made to the 
Minister who may also place conditions on a licence, and vary or cancel licences.  
 
39 The RBA has discretionary powers (‘may’): Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), 827D(1). 
 
40 There are two sets of standards, namely the Financial Stability Standards for Central 
Counterparties (CCP Standards) and the Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement 
Facilities (SSF Standards): See ‘Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties 




41 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 827D. 
 
42 Ibid ss 827D(3), 827D(6). 
 
43 Ibid s 827D(8).  
 
44 When considering the focus and content of these standards, it is clear that the express 
legislative responsibility of the RBA for financial stability in this regard also focuses on a narrow 
conception of financial stability.  
 
 134 
‘financial system’ nor do they contain a definition of ‘financial system stability’ or 
any synonymous term.  
 
In conclusion, s 10 of the RBA Act therefore, firstly, does not contain an express 
mandate for financial stability in a broad and general sense, but limits the financial 
stability responsibility to the payments system. Secondly, the obligations in 
relation to financial stability in s 10 of the RBA Act are limited to making financial 
stability a consideration and not a clear goal/objective in itself. 
 
(b) Section 25 RBA Act 
 
The third express reference to ‘financial stability’ in the RBA Act is in s 25M(1)(d). 
Section 25M requires the RBA’s Payments System Board to provide an annual 
report to the Minister of Finance in relation to standards determined under s 827D 
of the Corporations Act 2001 for operators of clearing and settlement systems.45 
The considerations of financial stability relevant to this section are considerations 
that relate to the clearing and settlement industry, part of Australia’s payments 
system. In this context there is also no broad overarching mandate for 
considerations of financial stability, and considerations of financial stability are 
limited to potential financial instability that can ensue as a result of problems in 
the clearing and settlement industry.  
 
An ancillary obligation exists in s 827D of the Corporations Act 2001. It empowers 
the RBA to set financial stability standards. Under the Corporations Act 2001, 
both the RBA and ASIC have various powers relating to licensing, standard-
setting and direction over providers of clearing and settlement facilities.46  
 
45 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 25M(1). The Payment Systems Board must provide an annual 
report to the Minister. 
 
46 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 821-7. ‘The Corporations Act 2001 includes as an objective 
“the reduction of systemic risk and the provision of fair and effective services by clearing and 
settlement facilities”. To support this objective, the Act … gives the RBA the power to set 
financial stability standards, and gives both the RBA and ASIC various powers … The two 
agencies agreed on an MOU in 2002, detailing the processes and information-sharing 
arrangements they would follow in pursuit of these joint responsibilities’: Reserve Bank of 
Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (n 5). 
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Section 25 of the RBA Act therefore also does not give a clear and express 
mandate for general financial stability to the RBA. In fact, the strongest legislated 
‘mandate’ for financial stability is simply to balance financial stability 
considerations with other objectives, 47 and is not a direct stand-alone goal. 
 
2 An Implied Statutory Mandate for Financial Stability in the RBA Act: A 
Mandate that Attaches to the Nature of a ‘Central Bank’, its Policies 
and Broad Public Obligations 
 
Although there is no express specific mandate for financial stability, the RBA’s 
general mandate to act as a central bank has on occasion been interpreted to 
imply a mandate for financial stability. 
It can be argued that the RBA’s responsibility for financial stability is implied in 
the RBA Act, and that a responsibility for financial stability forms part of its 
‘monetary and banking policy’48  or simply part of its role as a central bank. 
Alternatively, or additionally, it can be argued that the RBA’s role in financial 
stability has become binding as an entrenched de facto role, one that was always 
part of the responsibilities of the central bank, albeit not expressly identified as 
such. The implied mandate will be examined after a brief summary of the RBA’s 
general express legal mandate/charter. Other sources that confirm the RBA’s 
financial stability mandate – but that cannot legally create a mandate – will be 




47 Regarding competition, ‘the strongest legislated mandate … is simply to ‘balance’ it with other 
objectives while promoting financial system stability’: See Productivity Commission, Competition 




48 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 8A(2). 
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(a) The RBA’s General Express Statutory Mandate or Charter 
 
No express responsibility for financial stability was incorporated into either the 
mandate of the RBA in the RBA Act when the RBA was first created as a central 
bank under that name in 1959, or in the 1901 charter of its predecessor, the 
Commonwealth Bank, the first Australian central bank. 
The mandate of the RBA in the RBA Act is included in s 10(2)49 and is also 
referred to as its ‘charter’. In terms of s 10(2) the RBA (through the Reserve Bank 
Board) has the duty to: 50 
ensure that the monetary and banking policy of the Bank is directed to the 
greatest advantage of the people of Australia and that the powers of the Bank … 
are exercised in such a manner as, in the opinion of the Reserve Bank Board, 
will best contribute to: 
a. the stability of the currency of Australia; 
b. the maintenance of full employment in Australia; and 
c. the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia. 
 
The ‘monetary and banking policy’ referred to in s 10 forms part of the express 
obligations of the RBA pursuant to s 8A(2) of the RBA Act,51 which states that 
‘[t]he Reserve Bank Board is responsible for the Bank’s monetary and banking 
policy’. 
Although its charter does not contain an express legislative requirement for the 
RBA to promote financial stability, the RBA has been considered to have a 
‘longstanding responsibility’ to maintain the stability of the Australian financial 
 
49 Ibid s 10(2). 
 
50 Ibid s 10(2); See for example also, ‘Our Charter, Core Functions and Values’, Reserve Bank 
of Australia, (Web Page, 2015) <https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/annual-
reports/rba/2015/our-charter-core-functions-and-values.html>. 
 
51 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 8A2. 
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system.52 This has for example been confirmed by the RBA and APRA in the 
document provided to the IMF for the Australian Country peer review. They 
noted:53 
Given the serious damage to employment and economic prosperity that can 
occur in times of financial instability, the [RBA] Act has long been interpreted to 
imply a mandate to pursue financial stability. 
The general responsibility of the RBA for financial stability is endorsed by the 
Australian government. The Australian government has at times even referred to 
having actively provided this mandate to the RBA, albeit not through legislation.54 
This position has also been echoed by the RBA. For example, Dr Luci Ellis of the 
RBA has stated publicly in Sydney in 2016 55  that the RBA considers the 
statements made by the Treasurer during the Second Reading Speech of the 
APRA Act in Parliament in 1998 to be the legal source of the RBA’s mandate for 
financial stability (this point will be returned to later).  
Statements by both the Australian government and the RBA regarding the RBA’s 
mandate for financial stability however intimate a level of formality in mandating 
that does not in fact exist, as the manner in which the Australian government has 
provided a financial stability responsibility to the RBA is decidedly informal/non-
legal, and there’s no formal legal mandate. (The informal origins of the mandate 
are dealt with in more detail below). Further, the content of the RBA’s financial 
stability responsibility has not been clarified. The general responsibility for 
 
52 See for example, The Treasurer and the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Statement on the 
Conduct of Monetary Policy (Statement, 30 September 2010) <http://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-
policy/framework/stmt-conduct-mp-5-30092010.html>. 
 
53 Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (n 5); See also 
Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Macroprudential 
Analysis and Policy in the Australian Financial Stability Framework (Report, September 2012) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/fin-stability/resources/2012-09-map-aus-fsf/pdf/2012-09-map-aus-
fsf.pdf> (emphasis added). 
 
54 See below.  
 
55 Luci Ellis, ‘Financial Stability and the Banking Sector’ (Speech, Sydney Banking and Financial 
Stability Conference, 12 July 2016) <https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2016/sp-so-2016-07-




financial stability is therefore at best the product of soft law, and is a non-legal, 
non-binding, customary, de facto and/or implied responsibility.56  
 
Before moving to the discussion of the financial stability mandate as an implied 
mandate, it should be noted that a creature of statute (such as the RBA) is legally 
bound by the authorities granted to it by its founding statute. Its amount of legal 
‘wiggle room’ is probably small. Failure to comply with its statutory obligations 
can have consequences of varying significance for the institution concerned.57 
Therefore, although it could be argued that an implied responsibility for financial 
stability exists under the RBA Act, such arguments are only moderately 
convincing because a very liberal interpretation of the statute would have to be 
taken to find that such a unique and specific responsibility has in fact been 
implied. This view was also expressed in the Murray Inquiry, namely that ‘the 
RBA takes its mandate to promote financial stability as implied under the Reserve 
Bank Act 1959’.58 Financial stability is also explicitly included in the Statement on 
the Conduct of Monetary Policy 59  agreed between the Treasurer and the 
Governor of the RBA, most recently in October 2013. The possible implied 
statutory mandate for financial stability is now discussed. 
 
 
56 ‘This implicit goal has been made more explicit by successive governments. In 1998, the then 
Treasurer explicitly referred to financial stability being the regulatory focus for the RBA, in the 
Second Reading Speech in support of the APRA Act. More recently, in 2010 the RBA and the 
Government recorded their common understanding of the RBA's longstanding responsibility for 
financial system stability, as part of the periodically updated Statement on the Conduct of 
Monetary Policy’: See Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(n 5). 
 
57 The potential consequences are discussed in Chapter 7. They range from minor (potentially a 
proverbial slap on the wrist), to more serious, including termination of employment of key 
officials including the Governor. 
 
58 See Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (n 5) 
(emphasis added). 
 
59 The first such statement was made in 1996. The Treasurer and the Governor (designate) of 




(b) An Implied General Statutory Mandate for Financial Stability? 
There are four possible reasons why a responsibility for financial stability could 
be said to be implied in the RBA Act. These are examined below, including the 
inherent difficulties in each of the four arguments.  
(i) Central Banks as Institutions are Generally Responsible for 
Financial Stability: The RBA as a Central Bank  
The first possible argument is that the RBA is a central bank and as such is 
responsible for financial stability because financial stability is considered by many 
to be a central bank responsibility (see Chapter 2). Central banks traditionally 
have broad general powers, and in the opinion of at least some experts, an 
automatic responsibility for financial stability.60 
The RBA was clearly established expressly as a central bank under the RBA 
Act:61 
26 Reserve Bank to act as a central bank  
The Reserve Bank:  
(a) is the central bank of Australia;  
(b) shall carry on business as a central bank; and  
(c) subject to this Act and to the Banking Act 1959 shall not carry on business 
otherwise than as a central bank.  
 
The fact that the RBA would be a central bank – and a central bank only – was 
the key reason for the introduction of the 1959 legislation to create the RBA as 
separate from the Commonwealth Bank which was the central bank up to that 
point. This shift in the Commonwealth Bank’s focus was important, and it was a 
 
60 For example, Claudio Borio and Gianni Toniolo, ‘One Hundred and Thirty Years of Central 
Bank Cooperation: A BIS perspective’ (Working Paper No 197, Bank for International 
Settlements Monetary and Economic Department, February 2006) 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/work197.pdf>, Charles A E Goodhart, ‘The Changing Role of Central 
Banks’ (Working Paper No 326, Bank for International Settlements, November 2010), 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/work326.pdf>, Alex Cukierman, ‘Central Bank Independence and 
Monetary Policy-Making Institutions: Past, Present and Future’ in David Mayes and Geoffrey E 
Wood (eds), Designing Central Banks (Routledge, 2009) 68. 
 
61 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 26. 
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vigorously debated topic in Parliament, resulting in the draft legislation having to 
be resubmitted a number of times.62 Some of the contentious issues included the 
changes proposed to the Commonwealth Bank, which, since its inception in 
1910, conducted both central banking and commercial banking functions, and the 
impact of those changes on the Commonwealth Bank and other banks. The role 
and impact of a central bank divorced from the Commonwealth Bank were not 
generally acceptable to members of Parliament.63 However, the RBA Act was 
ultimately passed and the RBA was created as a central bank – and only a central 
bank – in 1959.  
In the Second Reading speech of the Reserve Bank Bill in 1959, the then 
Treasurer, the Hon Harold Holt, made no mention of financial stability, and 
emphasised the creation of an independent central bank without any commercial 
banking functions.64 The purpose of the Reserve Bank Bill 1959 (Cth) was simply 
to establish a central bank:65 
The Reserve Bank Bill is related to the first of these main purposes - namely, the 
establishment of the Reserve Bank of Australia as the central bank for the 
 
62 See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 February 1959, 
375-378 (Harold Holt) (Second reading speech). 
 
63 See the debate in the House of Representatives: Parliamentary Debate, following second 
reading speech, Reserve Bank Bill 1959, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 10 March 1959, 440–468; Parliamentary Debate, Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 11 March 1959, 485–540. 
 
64 In the second reading speech the various tasks/obligations of the RBA were listed as follows: 
‘Like the Commonwealth Bank it will control the note issue and it will also have important 
responsibilities under the Banking Act. These will include administration of the statutory reserve 
deposit provisions, exchange control, acquisition and sale of gold, protection of depositors in 
other banks, determination of advance policy to be followed by trading banks and savings banks 
and, subject to the approval of the Treasurer, the regulation of bank interest rates. Except for 
the substitution of statutory reserve deposits for the present special accounts, these are all 
functions now discharged by the Commonwealth Bank and, with some changes of detail which I 
shall discuss in the Banking Bill, the duties and powers of the Reserve Bank in relation to them 
will be the same as those of the Commonwealth Bank’: See Harold Holt (n 62) 378. In addition, 
the RBA also took on the function of the ‘Rural Credits Department’: at 376. 
 
65 See Holt (n 62) 376. See also Frank Decker and Sheelagh McCracken, ‘Central Banking in 
Australia and New Zealand: Historical Foundations and Modern Legislative Frameworks’ in 
Peter Conti-Brown and Rosa María Lastra (eds), Research Handbook on Central Banking 




Australian monetary and banking system and as an institution that will not be 
directly associated with the conduct of retail banking business. 
 
Financial stability is currently widely considered to be a central bank function, as 
set out above in Chapter 3, and the role of the RBA as a central bank in financial 
stability is further discussed as part of a de facto mandate below [Part III]. It can 
therefore be implied that as central banks are now also perceived to be 
responsible for financial stability, the RBA may also be perceived to be 
responsible for financial stability, even though that role was not envisaged at the 
time of its creation.  
(ii)  Financial Stability is Inherent in the Broad Goals and Objectives 
of the RBA’s Express Charter 
 
The second argument that could be made in favour of an implied mandate for 
financial stability under the general mandate of the RBA in the RBA Act, is that 
the broad goals and objectives of the RBA’s charter allow for the RBA to pursue 
financial stability. In fact, financial stability could be said to be inherent in the 
broad goals and objectives of the RBA’s express charter. The pursuit of financial 
stability can be seen as a way to achieve ‘the greatest advantage of the people 
of Australia’66 and ensure the ‘economic prosperity and welfare of the people of 
Australia’.67 In fact, the RBA and APRA noted:68 
[g]iven the serious damage to employment and economic prosperity that can 
occur in times of financial instability, the [RBA] Act has long been interpreted to 
imply a mandate to pursue financial stability.  
 
 




68 See Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (n 5). 
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At the time of the passing of the Reserve Bank Bill 1959 as well as the 
Commonwealth Bank Bill 1959,69  consideration was specifically given to the 
‘stability’ and ‘stable development’ of the Australian economy.70 Although these 
expressions used by the then Treasurer may not fully encompass what is 
currently understood under the term ‘financial stability’, they do reflect the broader 
possible consideration of the concept of financial stability (as discussed in 
Chapter 2 above).  
Nevertheless, even if the references to the welfare of the Australian economy in 
the RBA’s charter are to be interpreted as references that are effectively 
synonymous with ‘financial stability’, the charter still does not give the RBA any 
direct responsibility for financial stability. Instead, financial stability (or the 
economic welfare of Australia) is merely a consideration, albeit an important one, 
in the conduct of the responsibilities of the RBA, and not an objective in itself. 
There is no direct ‘mandate’ for financial stability: the RBA Act merely requires 
that the monetary and banking policy should be implemented and that the powers 
of the RBA should be exercised in a manner that would promote welfare 
(including financial stability). Welfare (including financial stability) operates as a 
check or brake on other powers, not as a separate goal or objective.  
It is also important to consider that the reference to the RBA’s powers in this 
context refers to the powers provided to the RBA as general powers in the RBA 
Act. These powers are necessary for the RBA to fulfil its functions and give effect 
to the purposes of the RBA Act (although the purposes of the RBA and the RBA 
Act have not been clearly defined or set out in the RBA Act). Although the RBA’s 
enumerated powers set out in s 8 of the RBA Act are a non-exclusive list, they 
are nevertheless quite specific (and by implication limited) powers:71 
 
69 Commonwealth, Bills Digest (Senate Official Hansard No 16 of 1959, 15 April 1959) 
<https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22hansard80%2
Fhansards80%2F1959-04-15%2F0046%22;src1=sm1 > (Commonwealth Bank Bill 1959). 
 
70 See Holt (n 62) 378. 
 
71 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 8. 
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Section 8 General powers  
The Bank has such powers as are necessary for the purposes of this Act and any 
other Act conferring functions on the Bank and, in particular, and in addition to 
any other powers conferred on it by this Act and such other Acts, has power:  
(a) to receive money on deposit;  
(b) to borrow money;  
(c) to lend money;  
(d) to buy, sell, discount and re-discount bills of exchange, promissory notes and 
treasury bills;  
(e) to buy and sell securities issued by the Commonwealth and other securities;  
(f) to buy, sell and otherwise deal in foreign currency, specie, gold and other 
precious metals;  
(g) to establish credits and give guarantees;  
(h) to issue bills and drafts and effect transfers of money;  
(i) to underwrite loans; and  
(j) to do anything incidental to any of its powers.  
 
The RBA’s powers do not include any express powers in relation to financial 
stability, although the RBA could conceivably impact financial stability in the 
fulfilment of any and/or all of its tasks. Notwithstanding the broad characterisation 
of the powers of the RBA in s 8, the powers of the RBA should be interpreted 
reasonably to be limited to powers ‘necessary’ for particular purposes, so as to 
avoid an interpretation that gives the RBA virtually unlimited powers. Such a 
reasonable or more limited interpretation is now in line with the requirements of 
the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) (PGPA 
Act), including in particular s 26 of the PGPA Act, which requires officials to act 
with ‘proper purpose’.72 Ultimately, as per the 1959 Second Reading speech of 
 
72 Under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) s 26 the RBA 
officials are obliged to act honestly, in good faith and for a proper purpose.  
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the Reserve Bank Bill,73 the Reserve Bank Board had to ensure that the RBA 
stayed within the powers given to it.  
The RBA Act also limits the powers of the RBA by allowing for the government to 
override the policy of the RBA. This reassurance was emphasised to Parliament 
during the Second Reading Speech. Then Treasurer, the Hon Harold Holt 
stated:74 
The duty is laid upon the board, as it is now laid upon the Commonwealth Bank, 
to ensure within the limits of its powers that the monetary and banking policy of 
the bank is directed to the greatest advantage of the people of Australia, and that 
the powers of the bank are used to promote the stability of the currency, the 
maintenance of full employment and the economic prosperity and welfare of the 
people of Australia. There are also provisions, similar to those in the present act, 
which require the board to keep the Government informed regarding the 
monetary and banking policy of the bank and, in the event of a difference of 
opinion between the board and the Government on that policy, give the 
Government an ultimate power to determine the policy of the bank. Under the 
board, the Governor will manage the bank. He will, as I have said, continue to be 
chairman of the board.  
Lastly, even though it is clear that the powers of the RBA were to be interpreted 
broadly, broad powers are not unlimited powers, and finding implied powers and 
implied mandates in legislation should as a matter of principle be a conservative 
endeavour.  
(iii) Financial Stability Is a Consequence of Monetary Policy 
 
An argument could also be made that a mandate for financial stability can be 
implied through the responsibility of the RBA for monetary policy. Although the 
charter in s 10(2) of the RBA Act does not contain an express monetary policy 
mandate or specific operational responsibilities, it refers broadly to the ‘monetary 
 
73 See Holt (n 62) 377. 
 
74 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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and banking policy’ of the RBA – a reference likely intended to encompass all the 
tasks and functions of the RBA as a central bank,75 and reasonably interpreted 
to have that meaning. In terms of s 8A(2)76 too, ‘[t]he Reserve Bank Board is 
responsible for the Bank’s monetary and banking policy’. These references are 
probably not broad enough to encompass financial stability, although there are 
some experts who consider financial stability to be a fundamental requirement 
and consequence of monetary policy.77 Before the GFC, for example, there was 
a widely held view that monetary stability also equalled financial stability. In the 
1970s and 1980s, when inflation threatened domestic economies, effective 
monetary policy (that maintained the domestic and international value of the 
currency) certainly contributed to financial stability. Financial stability can be or is 
a consequence of monetary stability, and financial stability can potentially be 
seen as the ultimate goal of monetary policy. On that basis a responsibility for 
financial stability may be considered to be implied in the RBA’s charter.78 Given 
the significantly different considerations of financial stability policy compared to 
monetary policy, however, this conclusion is open to criticism.  
 
(iv) Financial Stability Is a Consequence of the RBA’s Banking 
Policy 
 
Arguments that a financial stability mandate can be implied through the 
references to the RBA’s ‘banking policy’ in the RBA Act are somewhat 
persuasive. In 1959, the RBA was responsible for the oversight and supervision 
of banks and financial institutions – that role was only removed from the RBA in 
1998 with the creation of APRA. To the extent, however, that the RBA’s role as 
 
75 See generally Holt (n 62) 375-378.  
 
76 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 8A2. 
 
77 See for example William Dudley, ‘Why Financial Stability is a Necessary Prerequisite for an 
Effective Monetary Policy’ (Speech, Andrew Crockett Memorial Lecture, Bank for 
International Settlements 23 June 2013) 
<https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/dud130624.html>. 
 
78 See for example Thomas C Baxter, ‘Financial Stability: The Role of the Federal Reserve 
System’ (Speech, Future of Banking Regulation and Supervision in the EU Conference, 15 
November 2013) <http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/bax131120.html>. 
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lender of last resort to distressed financial institutions could form part of the 
‘banking policy’ of the RBA, financial stability could be argued to be implied as a 
responsibility of the RBA. It should however be noted that the role of the central 
bank as LOLR is a very limited part of the overall pursuit of financial stability, and 
an obligation on the RBA to conduct its banking policy for the benefit of the 
Australian people does not lead to the conclusion that there is in fact an implied 
mandate for financial stability in a broad sense on the RBA.  
In conclusion, the RBA’s mandate for financial stability has a very limited basis in 
hard law, in the absence of an express mandate for an overarching responsibility 
for financial stability. The express statutory obligations in relation to financial 
stability do not equate to a general ‘mandate for financial stability’. The RBA’s 
‘general financial stability mandate’ would at best have to be implied from other 
statutory obligations. The other sources of the RBA’s mandate for financial 
stability are soft law sources. These will be discussed below. 
 
III The Soft Law Origins of the RBA’s Financial Stability 
Mandate  
 
In addition to the argument that a mandate for financial stability can be implied 
into the statutory role of the RBA as a central bank per se, it can be argued that, 
through its role since its first inception, the Australian central bank has always 
contributed to financial stability. Its role in financial stability has therefore become 
a de facto role in financial stability: the implied mandate effectively equates to a 
de facto mandate. In this section, the other soft law origins of the RBA’s financial 
stability mandate are discussed that contribute to the de facto mandate. 
Responsibilities of regulators can also arise from non-legally binding sources, 
even though the legal nature and consequences of such responsibilities are 
different. 
 
The potential soft law origins of the RBA’s financial stability responsibility include 
statements by the Australian government (eg in Parliament and in semi-formal 
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public documents), statements by the RBA itself (including on its public website, 
public documents, and in collaboration with the Treasurer in semi-formal public 
documents), and undertakings given through memoranda of understanding with 
other financial regulators. These other potential soft law sources of a financial 
stability mandate are analysed below. 
 
A A De Facto Historical Responsibility for Financial Stability  
 
As noted above (See Chapter 3 and Part II B 2 above) a compelling argument 
can be made that central banking per se has a positive effect on financial stability, 
and in this vein, then, it can be argued that the Australian central bank has in fact 
always had a responsibility for financial stability since its inception. For the de 
facto mandate to have been historically part of the functions of the Australian 
central bank since its inception, the concept of financial stability needs to be 
construed broadly.79  
 
Even though the RBA has never had an express or explicit legislative mandate 
for safeguarding financial stability in an overarching manner, both the RBA and 
its predecessor, the Commonwealth Bank, have always directly or indirectly 
(intentionally or incidentally), contributed to the promotion of financial stability in 
Australia. Financial stability was achieved as a consequence of fulfilling the 
central bank’s other or general functions. The RBA and the Commonwealth Bank 
have therefore always been involved – in one way or another – in promoting 
and/or protecting financial stability. 
 
This conclusion can be reached even though a possible mandate of the 
Australian central bank for financial stability did not expressly form part of the 
discussion in Parliament during the Second Reading Speech debates when the 
relevant enabling legislation was tabled and discussed in the House of 
 
79 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the narrow versus broad interpretation of financial stability. 
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Representatives and the Senate in 1910 (for the creation of the Commonwealth 
Bank) or in 1959 (for the creation of the RBA). 
 
Even though there was no express (or determinable) legislative intent in 1910 or 
1959 to make the Australian central bank responsible for financial stability, by the 
time of the Wallis Inquiry in 1997 it was well recognised that the RBA indeed 
contributed to financial stability, and financial stability had almost imperceptibly 
become a ‘central bank function’, albeit an unarticulated function. Nevertheless, 
the recommendation by the Wallis Inquiry in 1998 that the RBA should ‘retain its 
responsibility for financial stability’80 is indicative of the fact that financial stability 
was at that time a perceived established function of the RBA, potentially from the 
very first time that the RBA or its predecessor acted as a central bank. Given the 
rising importance of financial stability as a concept in the 1990s, this reference 
by the Wallis Inquiry may simply be a reflection of economic thought at the time.  
 
Historically, however, an overarching and general consideration of financial 
stability evolved over time, starting with the predecessor of the RBA, the 
Commonwealth Bank. The RBA’s role in financial stability is therefore deeply 
rooted in its history.  
 
1 History of the Creation of the First Australian Central Bank and its Role 
in and Responsibility for Financial Stability – the Commonwealth Bank 
and its De Facto Mandate for Financial Stability 
 
The role that the RBA and its predecessor, the Commonwealth Bank, played in 
financial stability can be traced back to the time of the creation of the 
 
80 The Wallis Commission recommended (in Recommendation 56) that the RBA should remain 
responsible for system stability. It noted that the RBA was best placed ‘to ensure the stability of 
the financial system and to manage systemic risks’ in consultation with Treasury and other 
regulators. Recommendation 60 was that the RBA should retain the responsibility for liquidity 
management to preserve stability. Recommendation 62 was that the payment systems board 
should implement payments systems efficiency objectives: See Commonwealth, Financial 
System Inquiry (Final Report, March 1997) 




Commonwealth Bank, from which time it developed into a de facto mandate for 
financial stability.81 
 
(a) The Commonwealth Bank of 1911 – Financial Stability Through Safe 
Banking Services and Stability in the Banking Sector 
 
(i) A Federally Guaranteed Bank – a Safer Commercial Bank 
 
In 1911, following a number of bank crises in Australia and the inevitable public 
toll of those crises,82 the Australian government passed legislation to create the 
Commonwealth Bank as a government-owned people’s bank83 with the purpose 
of providing safer and cheaper banking services to the Australian public. At the 
time of its creation, the Commonwealth Bank was empowered to conduct savings 
as well as general (trading) bank business and was the only bank to be involved 
in these two traditionally separate business areas. The Commonwealth Bank was 
however not a true ‘central bank’ at this time,84 but rather only a commercial bank 
with a government guarantee. 85  The Commonwealth Bank was intended to 
benefit the Australian public by not only being more secure, but also by providing 
 
81 For a history of the Commonwealth Bank see: ‘Our History’, Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
(Web Page, 2019) <https://www.commbank.com.au/about-us/our-company/history.html>. 
 
82 See generally Chay Fisher and Christopher Kent, ‘Two Depressions, One Banking Collapse’ 
(Research Discussion Paper No 1999-06, Reserve Bank of Australia, June 1999) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/rdp/1999/pdf/rdp1999-06.pdf>. 
 
83 The governing Australian Labor Party, under the leadership of Tim Fischer, introduced the 
first Bill to establish the Commonwealth Bank in 1911. The Commonwealth Bank started 
operating in 1912. See Commonwealth Bank of Australia (n 81); See also ‘A Brief History’, 
Reserve Bank of Australia (Web Page) <https://www.rba.gov.au/about-rba/history/>. 
 
84 Selwyn Cornish, The Evolution of Central Banking in Australia (Reserve Bank of Australia, 
2010) 3. See also Stephen Bell, Australia’s Money Mandarins: The Reserve Bank and the 
Politics of Money (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 8. The Commonwealth Bank performed 
(limited) central banking functions. 
 
85 The Commonwealth Bank broadly contributed to financial stability. As it had a federal 
government guarantee, it would not experience a traditional ‘run’ on a bank, and would 
therefore not create systemic risk.  
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financial services more cheaply than the privately owned banks.86 It functioned 
as a commercial bank to the public, but also as banker to government, under a 
federal government guarantee. No other bank had that privilege.87 
 
The way in which the Commonwealth Bank was regulated in terms of its statutory 
framework laid the groundwork for its ultimate evolution as a full service central 
bank and financial stability regulatory agency, in large part due to its original 
government guarantee.88 The provision of safer banking services backed by a 
government guarantee contributed to financial stability, and the creation of the 
Commonwealth Bank by the Australian Government contributed to financial 
stability. Creating a stable commercial bank that was protected from liquidity 
problems and where, as a consequence, depositor funds would be safe, was an 
important step in counteracting financial instability. While the stability of a single 
institution does not guarantee broad-spectrum financial stability, the instability of 
a single institution can create financial instability on a broader scale and lead to 
systemic risk.89 Consequently, although the stability of the Commonwealth Bank 
could not safeguard the entire financial system, as a stable bank it would unlikely 
create systemic risk and thereby not put the financial system at risk.90 
 
 
86 Cornish (n 84) 2. 
 
87 See Commonwealth Bank of Australia (n 81). It however also did not have the right to issue 
its own notes: Frank Decker and Sheelagh McCracken, ‘Central Banking in Australia and New 
Zealand: Historical Foundations and Modern Legislative Frameworks’ in Peter Conti-Brown and 
Rosa María Lastra (eds), Research Handbook on Central Banking (Edward Elgar, 2018) 245, 
251. 
 
88 In relation to the role of a government guarantee, see Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti, Itay 
Goldstein, and Agnese Leonello, ‘Government Guarantees and Financial Stability’ (Working 
Paper Series No 2032, European Central Bank, February 2017) 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp2032.en.pdf>. 
 
89 In relation to systemic risk, see Garry J Schinasi, ‘Defining Financial Stability’ (Working Paper 
No 04/187, IMF International Capital Markets Department, October 2004) 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04187.pdf>. A single failed institution can 
create systemic risk if through its failure other institutions may also fail.  
 
90 This conclusion is supported by comparing the impact and activities of the Commonwealth 
Bank with the working definition of financial stability (see Chapter 2).  
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When the original functions of the Commonwealth Bank were expanded, its role 
in safeguarding financial stability was also consequently enlarged, as will be seen 
below. 
 
(ii) Lender to Banks: The Federal Guarantee Creates Stability and 
Develops the LOLR Function 
 
The Commonwealth Bank soon developed informally into a ‘banker to banks’, 
because of the security provided by the government guarantee,91 and the deposit 
security it offered attracted both private and institutional customers. In 1924 
legislation was passed by the Australian government formalising the role of the 
Commonwealth Bank as ‘banker to banks’. This legislation expanded the 
Commonwealth Bank’s role and thereby increased the effect that the 
Commonwealth Bank had on the financial system, by introducing a safety net for 
banks that faced liquidity problems through the Commonwealth Bank’s lender of 
last resort function. The Commonwealth Bank’s role in financial stability was 
thereby augmented, as the availability of emergency liquidity from the central 
bank has always been an important financial safety net.92 In this respect too, the 
Commonwealth Bank therefore promoted the safeguarding of financial stability 
by preventing bank failures through possible emergency liquidity assistance. 
 
(b) The Development of the Commonwealth Bank into a True Central 
Bank  
 
During World War 1 (1914 – 1918) (WW1) the Commonwealth Bank already 
performed what can be considered to be key central banking functions. It 
performed the role of banker to government and assumed the role of manager of 
government debt at the end of WW1, even though at that time it was still primarily 
 
91 ‘Our History’, Commonwealth Bank of Australia (Web Page, 2019) 
<https://www.commbank.com.au/about-us/our-company/history.html>. 
 
92 See Chapter 2. 
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a savings and trading bank. 93  The Commonwealth Bank also assisted with 
marketing arrangements for Australia’s export products.94 At that point in time, 
however, the main central banking role of the Commonwealth Bank was still the 
provision of support to the private banking system.95  
 
After the end of WW1, the Commonwealth Bank continued to develop as a central 
bank and contributed to financial stability through the undertaking of typical 
central banking functions, such as:  
1. Issuing of Australian bank notes - In 1924, the Commonwealth Bank, still 
a commercial bank in essence, was given control over the issue of 
Australian banknotes,96 a function previously performed by the Treasury.97 
The Commonwealth Bank’s involvement came through the creation of the 
Australian Notes Board, 98  an independent body administered by a 
separate department of the Commonwealth Bank and chaired by the 
Governor of the Commonwealth Bank.99 (Whilst centralized notes issue is 
perhaps in the 21st century is no longer an important component of 
financial stability, the need for a reliable production of currency and the 
efficient provision of payment mechanisms nevertheless contribute to 
financial stability. Control over the notes issue can therefore be included 
in the list of central banking functions that contribute to financial stability); 
 
2. Inter-bank settlement - As banker to banks, the Commonwealth Bank 
settled transactions between banks. The efficient settlement of inter-bank 
 
93 Cornish (n 84) 8.  
 
94 Ibid, 3.  
 
95 Bell (n 84) 8. 
 
96 Ibid 9. 
 
97 See ‘The Commonwealth Bank and the Note Issue: 1920 - 1960’, Reserve Bank of Australia 
Museum (Web Page) <https://museum.rba.gov.au/displays/commbank-and-note-issue/>. 
 
98 Ibid; See also ‘History of Banknotes’, Reserve Bank of Australia Banknotes (Web Page) 
<https://banknotes.rba.gov.au/australias-banknotes/history/>. 
  
99 See Reserve Bank of Australia, (n 98).  
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debt is an important component of financial stability as the inability of one 
bank to settle payment obligations to other banks, especially when 
sizeable payment obligations are involved, has the potential to create 
systemic risk.100 This practice is continued by the RBA, including through 
the exchange settlement accounts (ESAs); 
 
3. Regulator of banks and holder of bank reserves/capital - As from 1932, 
the Commonwealth Bank developed into the regulator of banks by 
implementing a ‘range of controls’101 over the banking system, such as 
over policy and interest rates. Private banks were also required to hold 
funds with the Commonwealth Bank in designated accounts.102 One of the 
goals of the regulation of commercial banks was the prevention of bank 
failures, and through this regulatory function, the Commonwealth Bank 
contributed to financial stability. (The RBA is no longer the bank 
supervisor, but that function was expressly provided to APRA subsequent 
to the Wallis Inquiry); 
 
4. Exchange rate control and control over Australian gold reserves - In 1932 
the Commonwealth Bank was also tasked103 with the management of the 
exchange rate of the Australian currency after the abolition of the gold 
standard.104 This function complemented the role that the Commonwealth 
 
100 A failure to settle by one institution can create systemic risk if other institutions as a 
consequence are also unable to settle. Prior to the implementation of real-time gross settlement 
in the 1990s, settlement was always delayed by a few days in most cases, creating an inherent 
stability risk: See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, ‘Payment, Clearing and 
Settlement Systems in Australia’ in Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Payment, 
Clearing and Settlement Systems in the CPSS Countries (Bank for International Settlements, 
2011) 1 <https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d97.pdf>. ‘This process serves to reduce the demand 
upon the relevant banks’ liquidity and permits participants to maintain a lower level of funds in 
their ES accounts’. Tyree et al note that ‘[a]uto-offset automatically searches for bilateral 
offsetting transactions between banks to allow for simultaneous settlement’ thereby reducing 
risk’: Alan Tyree, P M Weaver and W S Weerasooria, Weerasooria’s Banking Law and the 
Financial System in Australia  (LexisNexis, 6th ed, 2006) 76. 
 






104 Bell (n 84) 9. 
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Bank had since 1929, namely the control of gold in Australia.105 Currency 
stability broadly contributes to financial stability.106 Even though the gold 
standard no longer exists and the Australian dollar has a floating exchange 
rate, the RBA is still involved in the external value of the Australian dollar 
through monetary policy;107 and 
 
5. Being independent and asserting independence108 - At this early stage in 
the history of the Australian central bank just after WW1, the 
Commonwealth Bank acted in a manner that has subsequently been 
considered to be typical of a central bank, when it asserted its 
independence through refusing to support the government’s fiscal stimulus 
plans in the late 1930s. 109  These steps, however, ultimately led to a 
revision of the ‘independence’ sections in the legislation governing the 
Commonwealth Bank. (The RBA is currently a moderately independent 




105 Ibid. The Commonwealth Bank was also tasked with control over the gold as from1929, 
another typically central banking function. 
 
106 By performing this responsibility, the Commonwealth Bank also contributed to financial 
stability. 
 
107 See ‘The Exchange Rate and the Reserve Bank's Role in the Foreign Exchange Market’, 
Reserve Bank of Australia (Web Page, January 2018) <https://www.rba.gov.au/mkt-
operations/ex-rate-rba-role-fx-mkt.html>. 
 
108 For the past three decades, especially since the late 1980s, there has been wide-ranging 
acceptance that central banks should be independent from government. See Guy Debelle, 
‘Lessons and Questions from the GFC’ (Speech, Australian Business Economists Annual 
Dinner, 6 December 2018) <https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2018/pdf/sp-dg-2018-12-06.pdf>; 
See also Donato Masciandaro and Davide Romelli, ‘Ups and Downs of Central Bank 
Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and 
Empirics’ (2015) 22(3) Financial History Review 259. 
 
109 See David Gruen and Colin Clark, ‘What Have We Learnt? The Great Depression in 




110 See for example the various Statements on the Conduct of Monetary Policy; See also Bernie 
W Fraser, ‘Central Bank Independence: What Does It Mean?’ (Speech, SEANZA Central 
Banking Course, 23 November 1994) <https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/1994/sp-gov-
231194.html>; Bernie W Fraser, ‘Reserve Bank Independence’ (Speech, National Press Club, 
15 August 1996) <https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/1996/sp-gov-150896.html>. Bell points out 
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2 The Establishment of the Reserve Bank of Australia Formally as a 
Central Bank – with a Focus on Monetary Policy and Bank Supervision 
 
The RBA as an institution started operating as the central bank of Australia on 
14 January 1960, subsequent to its creation by the RBA Act (promulgated in 
1959), as noted above. Essentially the Commonwealth Bank was split in two.111 
The central banking functions of the Commonwealth Bank were transferred to the 
RBA, and the commercial bank and savings bank functions of the Commonwealth 
Bank became the responsibilities and business focus of the Commonwealth Bank 
of Australia (CBA).112 The CBA no longer had a government guarantee. The RBA 
Act however included the same ‘policy charter’ as that of its predecessor,113 the 
board was virtually identical to that of the Commonwealth Bank, and it was 
headed by the same Governor. 
 
(a) The ‘Charter’ of the RBA – Still Unchanged 
 
The ‘policy charter’ or ‘mandate’ of the RBA is, as noted above, contained in 
s 10(2) of the RBA Act. It tasks the RBA through the Reserve Bank Board114 to 
essentially direct its monetary and banking policy for the benefit of the people of 
Australia. 115  The RBA’s charter in s 10(2) of the RBA Act has remained 
 
that the RBA moved from an ‘instrument’ to an ‘actor’: See Matthew Smith, ‘From Instrument to 
Actor: The Changing Role of the RBA’, Australian Review of Public Affairs (Web Page, 21 
February 2005) <http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2005/02/smith.html>, reviewing 
Stephen Bell, Australia’s Money Mandarins: The Reserve Bank and the Politics of Money 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
 
111 The central banking roles transferred to the Reserve Bank of Australia while the commercial 
banking activities remained with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia.  
 
112 See Reserve Bank of Australia (n 83). 
 
113 See Glenn Stevens, ‘Address to the Reserve Bank of Australia’s 50th Anniversary Gala 
Dinner’ (Speech, Anniversary Gala Dinner, 8 February 2010). 
 
114 In terms of Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 8A(2) ‘[t]he Reserve Bank Board is responsible 
for the Bank’s monetary and banking policy’. 
 
115 Under its charter (s 10(2) Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth), the RBA has the duty to: 
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unchanged since 1959, and the RBA’s responsibility for or role in the 
safeguarding of financial stability has (as noted above) been recognised as a 
long-standing obligation by the RBA itself and by others, even though there is no 
exact date on which the responsibility can be pinpointed as ‘originating’, or having 
been recognised or labelled as such.  
 
In the years between 1960 and 1998, the conduct of monetary policy was a 
priority, given the problems of inflation and currency fluctuations experienced 
worldwide at that time. In the 1990s the notion of financial stability, as a separate 
consideration or objective, increased in importance. Before 1998, the RBA was 
also the supervisor of banks, and therefore responsible for the microprudential 
regulation and supervision of banks in Australia. Financial stability as a concept 
was in the early 1990s often closely linked to stability in the banking sector, and 
financial instability was equated with bank runs. These developments in the 
history of the RBA were commensurate with developments in central banks 
elsewhere in the world.116  When the responsibility for bank supervision was 
removed from the RBA in 1998 and placed with APRA, some responsibilities that 
can be categorised as financial stability responsibilities and are related to 
prudential supervision also shifted away from the RBA to APRA.  
 
Nevertheless, the intention of the Australian government appears to have been 
that the RBA would remain responsible for financial stability. The comments by 
the then Treasurer, the Hon Mr Peter Costello, during the second reading speech 
of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Bill to the effect that the RBA 
remains responsible for financial stability, is testament to that fact117 (see further 
 
‘ensure that the monetary and banking policy of the Bank is directed to the greatest 
advantage of the people of Australia and that the powers of the Bank … are exercised in 
such a manner as, in the opinion of the Reserve Bank Board, will best contribute to: 
a. the stability of the currency of Australia; 
b. the maintenance of full employment in Australia; and 
c. the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia’. 
 
116 See Peter J N Sinclair, ‘Central Banks and Financial Stability’ (2000) 40(4) Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin 377. 
 
117 ‘There are three fundamental regulatory objectives for government intervention in the 
financial system. The first is the maintenance of financial stability, including through ensuring a 
safe and reliable payments system. This goal, which has close links with the price stability 
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Part III 2). It is evident that at this stage what constituted financial stability was no 
more than a very narrow interpretation, and it was not limited to the prevention of 
failures of banks/financial institutions. This was evident from the second reading 
speech too and was also linked to stability in the payment system.118  
 
A focus on the safeguarding of financial stability as a separate or specific central 
bank function developed in the 1990s among central banks internationally, and 
saw the establishment of financial stability departments, and the publication of 
financial stability reviews119 by a number of central banks. That was also the case 
with the RBA – the first stand-alone Australian Financial Stability Review was 
published by the RBA in March 2004. Prior to that the RBA had commented on 
financial stability in its other official publications.120  
 
(b) The RBA’s Monetary Policy and Financial Stability 
 
After its creation in 1959, the RBA was nevertheless continuously, and always at 
least to some extent, involved in the safeguarding of financial stability in Australia, 
predominantly through the conduct of monetary policy and (until 1998) prudential 
supervision. There was also an underlying presumption at that time that the 
successful conduct of monetary policy will also result in financial stability – ie that 
a stable currency combined with low inflation and low interest rates will result in 
stability in financial institutions. It was the view that these prerequisites would 
 
objective of monetary policy, is to be the regulatory focus of the Reserve Bank of Australia’: 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 March 1998, 1649 





119 See, for example, Caroline Bradley, ‘Changing Perceptions of Systemic Risk in Financial 
Regulation’ in Pablo Iglesias-Rodriguez, Anna Triandafyllidou, and Ruby Gropas (eds), After the 
Financial Crisis: Shifting Legal, Economic and Political Paradigms (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 
75, 89. 
 
120 The 1999 Annual Report of the RBA is a good example, as it followed the introduction of the 
new structures in the government regulators: See Reserve Bank of Australia, 1999 Report and 




create the type of stable conditions envisaged by financial stability (as per the 
working definition adopted in this thesis). 121  The RBA, as supervisor and 
regulator of banks (until 1998) as well as the LOLR, also focussed on the stability 
of individual financial institutions and the potential impact of possible liquidity 
problems on the overall banking system in Australia.122  
 
B Express but Non-legally Binding Official Statements Confirming the 
Financial Stability Responsibility of the RBA  
 
Certain express statements by the Australian government that the RBA is 
responsible for financial stability have been relied upon (by the RBA and the 
government) when referring to the ‘mandate’ of the RBA for financial stability. In 
addition, some undertakings given by the RBA itself have been relied upon as 
support for (or evidence of) the RBA’s financial stability mandate.  
 
1 The APRA Act Second Reading Speech 1998  
 
As noted above, Dr Luci Ellis acknowledged reliance on statements made by the 
Hon Mr Peter Costello, the then Treasurer, in the Second Reading Speech of the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Bill before Parliament in 1998, as 
evidence of the mandate of the RBA for financial stability.123 The RBA and APRA 
 
121 In the 1980s and 1990s the prevailing view was that low/stable inflation and stable exchange 
rates would result in financial stability: See John Taylor, ‘The Great Inflation, The Great 
Disinflation, and Policies for Future Price Stability’ (Conference Paper, Reserve Bank of 
Australia Conference, 1992) <https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/confs/1992/taylor.html>.  
 
122 ‘The Bank's strong view was that bank supervision should remain in the central bank 
because there were major synergies between monetary policy, financial system stability and 
bank supervision’: Reserve Bank of Australia, Report and Financial Statements 1997 (Annual 
Report, 30 June 1997) 27 <https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/annual-
reports/rba/1997/pdf/1997-report.pdf>. 
 
123 Ellis (n 55). ‘Financial Stability and the Banking Sector’ (Speech, Sydney Banking and 




too have confirmed that the comments by Mr Costello should be interpreted in 
that manner.124 Mr Costello stated:125 
The first [objective] is the maintenance of financial stability, including through 
ensuring a safe and reliable payments system. This goal, which has close links 
with the price stability objective of monetary policy, is to be the regulatory focus 
of the Reserve Bank of Australia.  
 
Notwithstanding the government’s express intention that the RBA should be 
responsible for financial stability, the RBA Act was left unchanged at that stage, 
and has remained unchanged since. 
 
Legally, the reliance on Mr Costello’s second reading speech is problematic. 
Firstly, the legislation under discussion was the APRA Act, not the RBA Act. In 
terms of traditional statutory interpretation principles, 126  the second reading 
speech of a different piece of legislation has very little, if any, bearing on the 
interpretation of the actual legislation that is being interpreted, unless the two 
pieces of legislation were considered by Parliament simultaneously. At the time 
of the second reading speech of the APRA Act, the RBA Act had already been in 
force for almost 40 years, and was intended to be left unchanged. At most 
Mr Costello’s statement can be seen to be a corroboration of a general view held 
at that time that the RBA was responsible for financial stability – although such 
responsibility was not an express legislated mandate. 
 
124 See Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (n 5). 
 
125 Government intervention in the financial system is justified for the maintenance of financial 
stability, to provide specialised regulation for ‘conduct, disclosure and dispute resolution’, and 
for ‘prudential supervision of those parts of the financial system which require more intense 
regulation for safety and stability reasons’: Costello (n 117). 
 
126 ‘The [statutory interpretation] approach now ascendant in Australia has been labelled ‘literal 
in total context’: it explains statutory interpretation in terms of the attribution of meaning to the 
words of a statutory text in the totality of the ‘context’ in which the statutory text was enacted’: 
Stephen Gageler, ‘Common Law Statutes and Judicial Legislation: Statutory Interpretation as a 
Common Law Process’ (2011) 37(2) Monash University Law Review 1, 1. Although Gageler 
cautioned against a pedantic, semantic and mechanical approach to statutory interpretation, 
and against making ‘a fortress out of the dictionary’, there is doubt that the second reading 
speech of a specific piece of legislation (the APRA Act 1998) can be a reliable interpretive tool 
for another piece of legislation that passed through parliament approximately 40 years earlier 




2 The Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy 2010 
 
In 1996, the Government and the RBA jointly issued a public statement, entitled 
‘Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy’.127 The purpose of this statement 
was to formalise the inflation-targeting model of monetary policy that was adopted 
in 1996.128 A revised Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy was issued 
in 2010, after the Federal election,129  including for the first time an express 
reference to financial stability. The government, through the Treasurer, and the 
RBA, through the Governor as Chairperson of the RBA Board, in this document 
again demonstrated the informality of the allocation of a financial stability 
responsibility to the RBA when they jointly stated that130  
[f]inancial stability is a longstanding responsibility of the Reserve Bank and its 
Board, and was reconfirmed at the time of significant changes made to Australia's 
financial regulatory structure in July 1998. 
 
This was the first occasion on which the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary 
Policy included a statement on the financial stability responsibility. It may not be 
entirely coincidental that at the time of the 2010 Statement financial stability was 
prominently in the public spotlight in the aftermath of the GFC. 131  In some 
 
127 The Treasurer and the Governor (designate) of the Reserve Bank, Statement on the 
Conduct of Monetary Policy (Statement, 14 August 1996) <https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-
policy/framework/stmt-conduct-mp-1-14081996.html>. This was the first such statement: See 
‘Agreement on Framework for Monetary Policy’, Reserve Bank of Australia (Web Page) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/framework/>. 
 
128 ‘This statement records the common understanding of the Governor (designate) of the 
Reserve Bank and the Government on key aspects of Australia's monetary policy framework. It 
is designed to clarify respective roles and responsibilities’: The Treasurer and the Governor 
(designate) of the Reserve Bank (n 127). See also Frank Decker and Sheelagh McCracken, 
‘Central Banking in Australia and New Zealand: Historical Foundations and Modern Legislative 
Frameworks’ in Peter Conti-Brown and Rosa María Lastra (eds), Research Handbook on 
Central Banking (Edward Elgar, 2018) 245, 257. 
 
129 The Treasurer and the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Statement on the Conduct of 
Monetary Policy (Statement, 30 September 2010) <http://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-
policy/framework/stmt-conduct-mp-5-30092010.html>. The statements issued in 2003, 2006 




131 See Chapter 2.  
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respects, it can be seen as the first direct, formal or official confirmation of the 
RBA’s financial stability mandate.  
 
As a document, the 2010 Statement is however an odd choice for such a broadly 
public and official (but not legally-formal) statement by the government (and the 
RBA) as to the RBA’s responsibility for financial stability. The peculiarities 
include: 
 
1. that the reference is inserted after years of the Statement on the Conduct 
of Monetary Policy not referring to financial stability, although 
(presumably) during all those years the RBA was responsible for financial 
stability; and  
 
2. that, if the statement is to be interpreted as a formal confirmation of 
responsibility, the provision of that financial stability responsibility comes 
in a document, that  
(a) is a ‘statement’ not a ‘directive’,  
(b) deals with monetary policy; 
(c) is issued and signed by the party conferring the responsibility and the 
party receiving the responsibility. Typically, the provision of a mandate by 
government to a statutory body is done in a top-down manner, not a 
collaborative manner, and the RBA is not in a legal position to be required 
to ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ the responsibilities given to it as a government agent; 
and  
(d) confirms an existing mandate and can therefore not be construed as 
the first granting of a mandate. Typically a mandating process is 
prospective not retrospective. 
 
In the 2010 Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy, the Australian 
government and the RBA also set out part of the history of the RBA’s financial 
stability responsibility. It is noted that ‘[t]he stability of the financial system is 
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critical to a stable macroeconomic environment’. 132  It also reaffirmed the 
longstanding nature of the RBA’s responsibility in this regard and that it had 
preceded the reallocation of responsibilities to APRA in 1998. 
 
Perhaps the predominant purpose of this Statement on the Conduct of Monetary 
Policy was however political in nature, and it had a placatory or reassuring role 
for the Australian public in the turmoil of the GFC. This conclusion is borne out 
by the comment included in the Statement to the effect that the Treasurer 
supports the financial stability arrangements set out in the Statement, and that 
these had ‘served Australia well during the recent international crisis period’,133 
referring to the GFC. The reference to the RBA’s financial stability responsibility 
has been repeated in all subsequent Statements on the Conduct of Monetary 
Policy. 
 
The subsequent two Statements on the Conduct of Monetary Policy (issued in 
2013 and 2016) provide a more abbreviated and matter-of-fact reflection of the 
responsibility of the RBA and exclude a reference to the 1998 legislative 
changes:134 
The Reserve Bank promotes the stability of the Australian financial system 
through managing and providing liquidity to the system, and chairing the Council 
of Financial Regulators (comprising the Reserve Bank, Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and 
the Treasury). 
 
There is also a perceptible difference in the descriptions of the role of the RBA in 




133 The Treasurer and the Governor of the Reserve Bank (n 129).  
 
134 See The Treasurer and the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Statement on the Conduct of 
Monetary Policy (Statement, 19 September 2013) <https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-
policy/framework/stmt-conduct-mp-6-24102013.html>; The Treasurer and the Governor of the 




stronger role for the RBA in financial stability as from 2013. In 2010, the role of 
the RBA was described as follows:135 
The Reserve Bank Board oversees the Bank's work on financial system stability. 
Without compromising the price stability objective, the Reserve Bank seeks to 
use its powers where appropriate to promote the stability of the Australian 
financial system. It does this in several ways, including through its central position 
in the financial system and its role in managing and providing liquidity to the 
system, and through its chairmanship of the Council of Financial Regulators, 
comprising the Reserve Bank, APRA, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission and Treasury. 
 
In 2013 and 2016, the role is described as follows, and includes a role in financial 
system policy for the RBA:136 
The Reserve Bank promotes the stability of the Australian financial system 
through managing and providing liquidity to the system, and chairing the Council 
of Financial Regulators (comprising the Reserve Bank, Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and 
the Treasury). … In addition, the Governor and the Reserve Bank will continue 
to participate, where appropriate, in the development of financial system policy, 
including any substantial Government reviews, or international reviews, of the 
financial system itself. 
 
This analysis of the Statements on the Conduct of Monetary Policy therefore also 
reflects the increasing importance of the RBA’s financial stability 
responsibilities.137 The Statements are however not a hard law source of the 
financial stability responsibilities, but can be construed to have persuasive power 
 
135 The Treasurer and the Governor of the Reserve Bank (n 129).  
 
136 See the 2013 and 2016 Statements on the Conduct of Financial Stability: The Treasurer and 
the Governor of the Reserve Bank (n 134) and The Treasurer and the Governor of the Reserve 
Bank (n 134).  
 
137 Ibid. See also concern expressed about the effect of the focus on financial stability and its 
effect on inflation and wages: Stephen Kirchner, ‘The RBA’s Shift to Worrying About Financial 




as soft law. It would be difficult for either the RBA or the Government to deny 
what has been publicly confirmed in these Statements.  
 
3 Memoranda of Understanding with Other Regulatory Agencies 
 
A further soft law source of the RBA’s financial stability mandate is the framework 
of memoranda of understanding that underpins the operation of the CFR. The 
RBA has entered into a number of memoranda of understanding with the other 
financial regulators to regulate their interaction as members of the CFR. These 
memoranda of understanding reflect the role of the RBA in financial stability. 
These are further discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
There are a number of problems with these MOUs operating as soft law origins 
of the RBA’s financial stability responsibility. A public role – such as the 
overarching responsibility for financial stability – cannot (or should not) simply be 
assumed by agreement between regulators in a parliamentary democracy. 
Similarly, an agreement in the form of an MOU between a regulator, such as the 
RBA, and a government representative such as Treasury, confirming the 
responsibility of the RBA for financial stability, does not constitute a legally 
binding mandate. Not only is Treasury a branch of the executive, and not part of 
the legislature, but a memorandum of understanding per se is not a binding 
agreement. 
 
The content of the MOUs is nevertheless important to develop an understanding 
of the RBA’s de facto mandate. In the 1998 MOU between the RBA and APRA 
(the ‘RBA-APRA MOU’), their different roles in financial stability are set out as 
follows:138  
2. The responsibilities of the RBA and APRA for promoting financial stability are 
largely complementary. 
 
138 Memorandum of Understanding between the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority, signed 12 October 1998 (Memorandum of Understanding) 
<https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/MoU-RBA-Reserve-Bank-of-Australia.PDF> 
(emphasis added).  
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3. The RBA’s role is focused on the objectives of monetary policy, overall financial 
system stability and regulation of the payments system. It has no obligation to 
protect the interests of bank depositors and will not supervise any individual 
financial institutions. The RBA does, however, have discretion to provide 
emergency liquidity support to the financial system. 
4. APRA is responsible for the prudential supervision of banks, life and general 
insurance companies and superannuation funds. Supervision of building 
societies, credit unions and friendly societies will transfer to APRA from State 
jurisdictions at a later date. APRA has powers to act decisively in the interests of 
depositors or policy holders and fund members if a supervised institution is in 
difficulty.  
 
In the 2002 MOU between the RBA and ASIC (the ‘RBA-ASIC MOU’) the different 
responsibilities of the RBA and ASIC in relation to stability standards are 
clarified.139 This MOU, referencing in particular the RBA’s responsibility in terms 
of financial stability standards under the Corporations Act, does not confirm the 
RBA’s overarching responsibility for financial stability.  
 
In the more recent 2008 MOU between the RBA, APRA, ASIC and Treasury on 
Financial Distress Management140 entered into during the GFC (the ‘Financial 
Distress Management MOU’), the overarching responsibility of the RBA for 
financial stability is confirmed:141 
The RBA has primary responsibility for the maintenance of overall financial 
system stability, including stability of the payments system, and for providing 
liquidity support to the financial system or to individual financial institutions where 
appropriate.  
 
139 Memorandum of Understanding between the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission and the Reserve Bank of Australia, signed 18 March 2002 (Memorandum of 
Understanding) <https://download.asic.gov.au/media/1340888/MOU-ASICandRBA.pdf>. The 
MOU lists the various responsibilities of the parties in relation to financial stability standards and 
compliance monitoring, also under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
 
140 Memorandum of Understanding on Financial Distress Management between the Members of 








The criticism of the RBA-APRA MOU as an example of soft law founding the 
mandate of the RBA is also applicable to the Financial Distress Management 
MOU. The addition of the Treasury as a party to this MOU does not change the 
circumstances. In fact, it is clear from the words used in the MOU that the role of 
Treasury is not that of legislative government ie Parliament – Treasury acts as a 
member of the executive branch of the Australian government only.142 
 
The relevance of the MOUs as soft law for purposes of this discussion is mainly 
that they confirm the de facto mandate of the RBA for financial stability. MOUs 
are soft law, but they are perhaps the ‘most binding’ form of undertaking that can 
be given by one government regulator to another. A formal binding contract with 
legally enforceable obligations and remedies and that could potentially give rise 
to litigation in the event of breach is not appropriate in the context, as no such 
legal consequences could reasonably be intended. Nevertheless, from an 
operational point of view, the employees of the regulators may be expected to 
comply with their undertakings in the MOU, and it is an important ‘quasi-legal’ 
document. However, notwithstanding the effectiveness of an MOU in regulating 
relationships among regulators, it cannot create any broader public roles that 
would normally lie in the purview of Parliament to assign to regulators.  
  
 
142 See for example the following statements in the MOU regarding financial distress 
management: ‘The Treasury provides advice to the Government on policy and possible reforms 
that promote a sound financial system, including on financial distress management 
arrangements. The Treasury has responsibility for advising the Government on matters relating 
to the exercise of the Treasurer's powers, and on the broader economic and fiscal implications 
of developments that pose a threat to the stability of the financial system’: Memorandum of 
Understanding on Financial Distress Management between the Members of the Council of 






4 Other General Statements and Confirmations by the RBA of its De 
Facto Responsibility for Financial Stability 
 
General confirmations of the RBA’s financial stability role can be found in other 
soft law sources, including significant RBA publications that are nevertheless not 
legal documents. 
 
The first of these are the RBA’s statements on the RBA website – a detailed and 
key source of information about the RBA. The RBA states on its website that 
‘[m]aintaining the stability of the financial system is a longstanding responsibility 
of the Reserve Bank’.143 The RBA also has a financial stability department.144 
 
A second important document is the financial stability review. Although the RBA 
published overviews of its assessment of financial stability in Australia in its 
Annual Reports,145 the first stand-alone Financial Stability Review was published 
by the RBA in March 2004.146 In this document the RBA again confirms its ‘long-
 
143 ‘Financial Stability’, Reserve Bank of Australia (Web Page) <https://www.rba.gov.au/fin-
stability/>. 
 
144 ‘Organisational Structure’, Reserve Bank of Australia (Web Page) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/about-rba/structure/organisational.html>. 
 
145 See Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review (Review, March 2004) 1 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/fsr/2004/mar/pdf/0304.pdf> (Foreword): ‘As part of its 
longstanding responsibility for the stability of the Australian financial system, the Reserve Bank 
has periodically outlined its assessment of the state of the financial system, including in its 
Annual Report. This Financial Stability Review is the first occasion on which a more detailed 
assessment has been published in a stand-alone publication – a practice that will be continued 
half-yearly from now on’. In its Annual Report of 1998, the RBA included a chapter on 
‘Surveillance of the Financial System’ and confirmed that financial stability was a perpetual 
responsibility of the RBA: See Reserve Bank of Australia, 1998 Report and Financial 
Statements (Annual Report, 30 June 1998) 6-23 <https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/annual-
reports/rba/1998/pdf/1998-report.pdf>. In the 1999 Annual Report, the RBA noted: ‘[The 
financial stability] mandate was reconfirmed by the Government when it introduced landmark 
changes to Australia’s financial regulatory structure, which came into effect from 1 July 1998’: 
Reserve Bank of Australia, 1999 Report and Financial Statements (Annual Report, 3 August 
1999) 26 <https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/annual-reports/rba/1999/pdf/1999-report.pdf>. 
This is most likely a reference to the statements of Mr Costello in the Second Reading Speech 
of the APRA Act. 
 




standing’ responsibility in respect of financial stability, and announces its decision 
to publish financial stability reviews separately as from that date on a bi-annual 
basis.147 The publication of financial stability reviews was a new trend in the 
1990s and early 2000s, and many central banks started publishing financial 
stability reviews. What this demonstrates is that through the publication of 
separate financial stability reviews, financial stability was thrown into ‘sharper 
relief’148 compared to the RBA’s other functions. The financial stability reviews 
were, right from the first edition, longer than the sections devoted specifically to 
financial stability issues in the earlier RBA Annual Reports.  
 
The significance of these confirmations of the RBA’s responsibility is that they all 




This chapter demonstrated that the RBA’s mandate for financial stability has not 
been conferred in a formal legal manner. Instead, the RBA’s mandate for financial 
stability is a de facto mandate that derives mostly from soft law instruments. The 
only express statutory responsibility for financial stability of the RBA is in relation 
to the payments system. Although the RBA Act does make reference to ‘financial 
stability’ and ‘financial system stability’, there is no clear, concrete, legislated and 
overarching mandate for financial stability in the RBA’s enabling legislation and 
these references are only directives to the RBA to consider the financial stability 
implications of its payment systems responsibilities. The RBA’s legislative 
 
147 Ibid 1. The chapter ‘Surveillance of the Financial System’ was retained in the RBA’s Annual 
Reports and changed to ‘Financial System Stability’ in 2000: Reserve Bank of Australia, 
Reserve Bank of Australia: Annual Report 2000 (Report, 3 August 2000) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/annual-reports/rba/2000/pdf/2000-report.pdf>. 
 
148 ‘In publishing the Financial Stability Review, the Reserve Bank has joined a growing number 
of central banks that are addressing their stability mandates through publishing a formal report. 
… In Australia's case, the supervision of individual financial institutions was transferred to the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) in 1998, with the Reserve Bank maintaining 
its responsibility for the overall stability of the financial system’: Reserve Bank of Australia, 
Financial Stability Review (Review, March 2004) 1 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/fsr/2004/mar/pdf/0304.pdf>. 
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financial stability mandate is at best implied generally from the enabling 
legislation, or from its nature as a central bank, but the most important sources 
of the mandate – or confirmations of the mandate – are contained in informal 
documents and statements, ie soft law. As will be discussed in Chapters 5 — 9, 
the informality of the mandate, as well as the fact that it is also shared between 
the RBA and other regulatory agencies, have negative implications for the 
governance and accountability of the RBA. The consequences of the uncertainty 
and uneasiness in the RBA’s mandate for financial stability which result from both 
its informal nature and its decentralised nature will be analysed below (see 






CHAPTER 5  
The Regulatory Responsibility for Financial Stability in 
Australia: A Shared and Decentralized Responsibility 
 
The institutional responsibility in the financial system for supporting 
competition is loosely shared across APRA, the RBA, ASIC and the 
ACCC. In a system where all are somewhat responsible, it is inevitable 




The financial stability responsibility in Australia is both an informal and a 
decentralised and shared responsibility. This chapter analyses how the financial 
stability responsibility of the RBA is shared between the RBA and other 
regulators. Part II provides an overview of the financial stability regulators in 
Australia, as well as the regulatory architecture of each, but with an emphasis on 
the RBA. Part III analyses the different roles of the different regulators, including 
the Twin Peaks regulatory design, much of which is a legacy of the Wallis Inquiry. 
Part IV evaluates the decentralised and shared elements of the financial stability 
responsibility and assesses the need for collaboration and communication 
between regulators. The chapter concludes that the shared responsibility as a 
whole is also characterised by informality, and as none of the regulatory 
authorities has an express legislative overall responsibility for financial stability, 
there is uncertainty. The involvement of different regulators also directly impacts 
the RBA’s responsibility for financial stability. 
 
 
1 Productivity Commission, Competition in the Australian Financial System: Overview and Draft 





II Overview of the Regulatory Structure of the Australian 
Regulators involved in Financial Stability  
 
In order to assess the role and responsibility of the RBA for financial stability, it is 
necessary to consider the entire regulatory framework of Australian regulators 
involved in financial stability. The components of a ‘regulatory framework’ for 
financial stability for purposes of this discussion include the regulatory 
architecture of the agencies/institutions, their structures, forms, functions, 
obligations, powers, and tools, as well as the interactions between regulators. 
The regulatory framework therefore encompasses how the different regulatory 
agencies have been structured in order to perform this task, what the functions 
of each of the regulatory agencies are, and how the different regulatory agencies 
collaborate and cooperate. The structural regulatory framework in Australia for 
example determines that the RBA as central bank is responsible for financial 
stability overall, although APRA, an entirely separate regulator, is responsible for 
prudential supervision. This division is a relevant consideration as in other 
countries the prudential supervision is often structurally integrated into the central 
bank.2 
 
A Informal and Decentralised Regulation: Some Preliminary Comments 
about who the Responsible Parties are and the Content of their 
Responsibilities 
 
As noted above, the regulation of financial stability adopted by the Australian 
government has been described by the Murray Inquiry as being ‘relatively 
informal and decentralised’.3 This is an apt description, as it is ‘informal’ in the 
sense that the responsibilities of the regulators have not been comprehensively 
spelled out in legislation or any other formal clear documentation, and it is 
 
2 See Chapter 8 for common practices in the G20 countries. 
 
3 Commonwealth, Financial System Inquiry (Final Report, November 2014) 
<http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final_Report_Consolidated20141210.pdf> (Murray Inquiry 
Final Report) See Chapter 5.  
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‘decentralised’ in the sense that the main responsibilities for financial stability are 
shared between the RBA and other regulatory agencies. As noted in Chapter 4, 
the Australian government through the Treasurer, and the RBA through the 
Governor, demonstrated the informality of the allocation of the financial stability 
responsibility in the 2010 Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy, when 
they jointly stated that financial stability was a longstanding responsibility of the 
RBA, and reconfirmed in July 1988.4 Although this statement demonstrates the 
informality of the financial stability responsibility, it does not reflect the fact that 
the responsibility is decentralised or shared between the RBA and the APRA, but 
intimates that it is a responsibility of the RBA only. Apart from APRA and the RBA, 
the CFR also has an important role in financial stability. The Charter of the CFR 
confirms the decentralised nature of the financial stability responsibility in 
Australia and includes the CFR as a third responsible party that has a role in the 
promotion of financial stability in Australia. Its Charter states that one of its two 
ultimate objectives is to ‘promote stability of the Australian financial system’.5 
(Both the RBA and APRA are members of the CFR, and the RBA’s Financial 
Stability Reviews are only published after reading at the CFR.6) 
 
 
4 The Treasurer and the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Statement on the Conduct of Monetary 
Policy (Statement, 30 September 2010) <http://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-
policy/framework/stmt-conduct-mp-5-30092010.html>. 
 
5 The present version of the Charter of the Council of Financial Regulators, which reflects the 
changes brought about by the collapse of HIH Insurance, was adopted on 13 January 2004. It 
notes that: ‘The Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) aims to facilitate cooperation and 
collaboration between the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA), the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and The Treasury. Its 
ultimate objectives are to contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of regulation and to 
promote stability of the Australian financial system. The CFR provides a forum for: identifying 
important issues and trends in the financial system, including those that may impinge upon 
overall financial stability; ensuring the existence of appropriate coordination arrangements for 
responding to actual or potential instances of financial instability, and helping to resolve any 
issues where members' responsibilities overlap; and harmonising regulatory and reporting 
requirements, paying close attention to the need to keep regulatory costs to a minimum’: 
Council of Financial Regulators, ‘Charter’, Council of Financial Regulators (Web Page) 
<https://www.cfr.gov.au/about/charter.html>; See also ‘History’, Council of Financial Regulators 
(Web Page) <https://www.cfr.gov.au/about/history.html>. 
 
6 Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Macroprudential 





From these preliminary statements and comments, it is apparent that there is also 
informality in the decentralisation of financial stability responsibilities, and a lack 
of legal clarity in the allocation of responsibilities for financial stability in the 
structural regulation in Australia. Despite this evident lack of clarity, the regulatory 
framework for financial stability in Australia has been described as ‘clear and 
established’ by the RBA and APRA in their background document for the IMF 
FSAP team for the Australian country peer review:7  
Australia’s financial stability policy framework involves clear mandates for 
financial stability distributed across several agencies, with the Council of 
Financial Regulators (CFR) playing a central coordinating role. The prudential 
elements of that framework rest with APRA, with analytical support from the RBA.  
 
This chapter analyses and critiques the decentralised nature of the financial 
stability responsibility, and the lack of ‘clear mandates’. 
 
B The Regulatory Agencies Involved in Financial Stability: An 
Introductory Overview of the Australian Regulatory Framework and 
Architecture 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the financial stability regulatory 
architecture in respect of the role of the different regulators. The purpose of this 
overview is to give a snapshot of the key roles of each of the role players to 
contextualise the more detailed discussion of each individual regulator in Part III 
below. Notwithstanding the RBA’s overarching responsibility for financial stability, 
the CFR plays a central role in this shared and decentralised responsibility (see 
figure 5.1 below). 
 
 
7 Ibid (emphasis added): ‘This document – originally prepared as background for the IMF FSAP 
team in early 2012 – sets out the tools and practices of these two agencies that are designed to 
support financial stability from a system-wide perspective. The Australian authorities view 
macroprudential policy as subsumed within the broader and more comprehensive financial 
stability policy framework’.  
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Figure 5.1 Division of responsibility for financial stability between the CFR 
Members and the CFR  
 
This figure shows the membership and roles of the CFR. 
 
 
The regulatory architecture for financial stability in Australia comprises three key 
role-players, namely the RBA, APRA (the two key government regulatory 
agencies), and the CFR. The regulatory framework however also includes the 
Australian government, in particular Parliament and Treasury, and to a lesser 
extent, ASIC. The Australian government creates and empowers the government 
regulators through their founding legislation. The Treasurer and the Treasury fulfil 
certain specific functions together with the government financial regulators and 
collaborate with the financial regulators and regulatory bodies/agencies. 
Importantly, the Australian government and Parliament represent the Australian 
people and their interest. The summary below provides a snapshot that is 
elaborated upon later. 
 
1. The RBA: As part of its overarching responsibility for financial stability, the RBA 
plays an important role, including through the publication of research on financial 
stability. The RBA also plays a lead role in the CFR by chairing the CFR, providing 
administrative support to the CFR, and reporting the findings and 
recommendations of the CFR in the RBA’s Financial Stability Reviews. 
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2. APRA: APRA is a statutory body created by the APRA Act, which includes an 
express albeit limited mandate for financial stability in s 8(2).8 As prudential 
regulator of financial institutions, APRA plays an important role in the 
implementation of prudential policy and microprudential supervision. The object 
of microprudential supervision is, at least indirectly, financial stability. Prudently 
managed financial institutions are less likely to fail, and therefore systemic risk, 
or knock-on effects as a consequence of the failure of a single financial institution, 
are less likely to occur.9  
 
3. The CFR: The CFR is not a statutory body and has no legal personality, but 
nevertheless plays a key role in financial stability in Australia as it is the forum for 
the facilitation of collaboration and cooperation of the financial stability 
regulators.10 The CFR is an Inter-Agency Committee (IAC)11 and was created 
following the Wallis Inquiry. It adopted a charter in January 2004 and operates 
through a series of MOUs entered into by and between the various members of 
the CFR. The members are, as noted above, the RBA, APRA, ASIC and 
Treasury, and it is chaired by and administratively supported by the RBA.  
 
 
8 The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth) s 8(2) requires the following: ‘In 
performing and exercising its functions and powers, APRA is to balance the objectives of 
financial safety and efficiency, competition, contestability and competitive neutrality and, in 
balancing these objectives, is to promote financial system stability in Australia’. 
 
9 For example, the requirements of the Basel III Accord increased the requirements for Tier 1 
and Tier 2 capital after the GFC, so as to create stronger banks and increase financial stability: 
See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, High-level Summary of Basel III Reforms’, Bank 
for International Settlements  (Note, December 2017) 
<https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf>. 
 
10 The CFR is important. ‘Agencies coordinate their actions through the Council of Financial 
Regulators, a body that demonstrated its worth, if any demonstration was needed, through the 
global financial crisis’: David Gruen, ‘Towards an Efficient and Stable Financial System’ 
(Speech, CEDA State of the Nation 2014, 23 June 2014) 
<https://treasury.gov.au/speech/towards-an-efficient-and-stable-financial-system/>. 
 
11 For a discussion of interaction and coordination between agencies, see Erland Walter Nier, 
‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ 




4. Treasury: Treasury functions as the executive arm of the Australian 
government and represents government and public interest in its dealings with 
the government financial regulators/agencies. Treasury is represented on the 
CFR and is required to be consulted by the regulatory agencies in various tasks. 
The Treasury is also involved in financial regulation by providing policy advice to 
the government.12 The Minister has the legal power to give policy direction to 
APRA and ASIC, although this power has not been used in the case of APRA 
and has only been used once in the case of ASIC.13  
 
5. ASIC: ASIC has no financial stability mandate, and there is indeed nothing in 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act) 
that suggests that it does. 14  ASIC nevertheless undoubtedly plays a vital 
supporting role because of its role in market supervision. It is also expressly 
responsible for payment system stability, for which it derives powers from the 
Corporations Act. ASIC is also a member of the CFR.  
 
6. Other regulators: Other regulators include the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) responsible for promoting competition and fair 
trade in the marketplace, and the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis 
Centre (AUSTRAC), a financial intelligence unit (FIU) responsible for combating 
money laundering and terrorism financing (AML/CFT).  
 
The manner in which the Australian government has decentralised the 
responsibility for financial stability to the different regulatory agencies/bodies in 
Australia can be summarised as follows: 
 
12 ‘Policy Topics’, Australian Government The Treasury (Web Page) 
<https://treasury.gov.au/policy-topics/>. 
 
13 See Joanna Bird, ‘Regulating the Regulators: Accountability of Australian Regulators’ (2011) 
35(3) Melbourne University Law Review 739. 
 
14 See Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (n 6).  
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(hard/soft law) 






No express legal mandate, 
but an implied or de facto 
mandate. 
Lack of formal mandate in 
hard law supplemented by 
soft law that confirms rather 
than creates the mandate. 
Chairing role of the 
CFR; provision of 
administrative 
support to the 
CFR; reporting of 
the findings and 
recommendations 
of the CFR in 
Financial Stability 
Reviews published 
as the RBA. 
 




Express legal mandate in 
the RBA Act 
Express powers in the 
Corporations Act (hard law) 
 
APRA Statutory body 
with independent 
legal personality 
Financial stability is 







Express legal mandate 
provided in the APRA Act 
(limited scope) (hard law) 
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of regulators with 
Treasury captured 
in legislation  
 
Part of executive arm of 
federal government 
 
III Analysis of the Decentralised Financial Stability 
Responsibility in Australia 
 
This Part sets out and analyses the roles of the different Australian financial 
regulators in financial stability in more detail. 
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A The RBA’s Financial Stability Role as Envisaged by the Wallis Inquiry 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, despite the absence of an express legislative 
mandate for financial stability, the RBA is generally considered to be the key 
regulatory agency responsible for financial stability. 
 
Throughout its history Australia’s central bank improved financial stability as a 
consequence of its operations. The financial stability ‘mandate’ in its present 
conceptualisation was more formally identified at the time of the Wallis Inquiry. 
The Wallis Inquiry recommended that the three key functions of the RBA were to 
be: 
• monetary policy,  
• systemic stability and  
• payment systems regulation.15  
 
The Australian Government mostly accepted the recommendations of the Wallis 
Inquiry in this regard,16 and a suite of legislation was passed to implement the 
Twin Peaks regulatory model, create APRA and incorporate the payment 
systems regulation function into the RBA. No amendment was however made to 
the RBA Act in respect of the responsibility for financial stability. 
 
The role of the RBA in the ‘financial system stability’ was however confirmed by 
the Australian government in a statement by the then Treasurer, the Hon Mr Peter 
Costello, on 2 September 1997.17 He announced that:18 
 
15 Commonwealth, Financial System Inquiry (Final Report, March 1997) 25 
<https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2018/07/01-fsi-fr-Prelim.pdf> (Wallis Inquiry Final 
Report). See figure 5.2 below.  
 
16 The Government’s Response to the Wallis Inquiry was made in the House of Representatives 
by the Treasurer, The Hon Peter Costello MP on 2 September 1997: Peter Costello, ‘Australian 





18 Ibid (emphasis added). 
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The Government has decided: 
first, that the Reserve Bank of Australia will be strengthened and its role focused 
on the objectives of monetary policy, overall financial system stability and 
regulation of the payments system. As part of this, a new Payments System 
Board will be appointed within the Reserve Bank with stronger regulatory powers 
to ensure safety, greater competition and efficiency in the payments system.  
 
It is necessary to comment briefly on the phrase ‘systemic stability’ in this context. 
From the wording of the Wallis Inquiry it is clear that the concept ‘systemic 
stability’ mostly related to the use by the RBA of its LOLR function, from the 
perspective that typically ‘systemic instability’ was usually created by bank 
illiquidity and failure. The Wallis Inquiry’s use of the phrase ‘systemic stability’ 
seems to carry the same meaning as that of financial stability in the working 
definition.  
 
The wording used by the Wallis Inquiry demonstrates that financial stability was 
considered to be a general and overarching responsibility of the RBA. Although 
this responsibility was ill-defined and not incorporated expressly in the RBA Act, 
it appears to have been generally accepted by the Wallis Inquiry, the Australian 
government and the RBA that it was the case. The Wallis Inquiry further 
recommended that financial stability should be conducted ‘in consultation as 
necessary with the Treasurer and other financial sector regulatory authorities’.19 
As monetary policy is not conducted in consultation with government or other 
regulators, the role of the RBA in financial stability was conceived to be on a 
different level of independence compared to the monetary policy function of the 
RBA. There is no evidence that this implied difference in role received any 
express consideration at the time, and there is no evidence that consideration 
was given to the potential impact on the independence of the RBA. The 
 
19 The Wallis Inquiry recommended in Recommendation 56 that the RBA should ‘remain 
responsible for system stability’ as ‘the central bank is best placed to ensure the stability of the 
financial system and to manage systemic risks’. There should however be ‘consultation as 
necessary with the Treasurer and other financial sector regulatory authorities’: The Wallis 
Inquiry Final Report (n 15) 21. 
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establishment of the CFR gave effect to the recommendation of the Wallis Inquiry 
that financial stability issues required consultation.20  
 
The contribution of the RBA to financial stability was viewed to be (predominantly) 
the provision of LOLR assistance to banks. Changing the banks’ perception that 
LOLR assistance would be virtually guaranteed in the event of the illiquidity 
and/or failure of a bank if the RBA was also the prudential supervisor, was an 
important consideration for the Wallis Inquiry. That was one of the key reasons 
why APRA was created,21 ie the reduction of potential moral hazard. In particular, 
the Wallis Inquiry stated: 22  
…while the central bank may still provide support to maintain financial stability, there 
is no implied or automatic guarantee of any financial institution or its promises in the 
event of insolvency.  
 
The Wallis Inquiry however noted that financial instability could arise as a 
consequence of ‘a wide variety of sources’,23 and that it should therefore be 
‘addressed by the monetary authorities’. 24  This was the motivation why ‘the 
systemic stability of the financial system should remain the responsibility of the 
central bank’.25 The RBA was to retain its role as LOLR, and the Wallis Inquiry 
was of the view that such assistance should only be available to financial 
institutions that had ESAs with the RBA.26 The Wallis Inquiry also emphasised 
 
20 It was recommended that the CFR be retained for sharing and cooperation: Ibid 28.  
 
21 The government accepted the Wallis Inquiry’s recommendation to remove prudential 
supervision from the RBA to avoid the supervised banks expecting a virtual guarantee of 
government assistance through the LOLR function, in the event of illiquidity. 
 
22 See the introductory overview: The Wallis Inquiry Final Report (n 15) 21 (emphasis added). 
 






26 ‘The RBA should continue to have powers as a lender of last resort to those financial 
corporations operating ESAs with it. However, the RBA should cease to have explicit 
responsibilities for the protection of bank depositors and should act instead in the national 
interest only’: Ibid.  
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the importance of the effective and proper functioning of the payment systems for 
stability. 
 
About this time (ie in the late 1990s, early 2000s), the RBA contributed to the 
safeguarding of financial stability in Australia – directly and/or indirectly through: 
 
1. its ability to use its balance sheet to assist banks with liquidity problems – 
ie the LOLR functions (it was anticipated that by removing the bank 
supervisory functions from the RBA that the risk of moral hazard of 
financial institutions and banks27 would be reduced and that there would 
be no or less reliance on the ability of the RBA to provide bailout funds by 
supervised financial institutions); 
 
2. its role in macro-prudential analysis; 
 
3. the conduct of monetary policy – it was generally considered that financial 
stability would flow from monetary stability (ie that the stable value of the 
currency and low inflation would result in financial stability); and 
 
4. oversight, regulation and strengthening of the payments system. 
 
The RBA still fulfils those roles and they can be said to be the key roles that the 
RBA plays in financial stability.28 
  
 
27 Sheelagh McCracken, John Stumbles, Greg Tolhurst and Olivia Dixon, Everett and 
McCracken’s Banking and Financial Institutions Law (Lawbook, 9th ed, 2017) 18-9. 
 
28 See also Reserve Bank of Australia, 1999 Report and Financial Statements (Annual Report, 3 
August 1999) 26-7 <https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/annual-reports/rba/1999/pdf/1999-
report.pdf> for a discussion of what foundations of financial stability (including low inflation, 




B The Introduction of Twin Peaks, the Creation of APRA and APRA’s 
Role in Financial Stability 
 
The Wallis Inquiry of 1996 is an important milestone in the history of the RBA and 
other financial regulators in Australia. The purpose of the inquiry was to take stock 
of the results of the financial deregulation of the Australian financial system and 
consider likely further changes in the financial system, specifically the effect of 
developments in technology.29 In particular the Inquiry’s mission stated that:30 
Recommendations will be made on the nature of the regulatory arrangements 
that will best ensure an efficient, responsive, competitive and flexible financial 
system to underpin stronger economic performance, consistent with financial 
stability, prudence, integrity and fairness.  
 
From the mission statement of the Wallis Inquiry it is clear that financial stability 
was perhaps not the key focus, but still an important consideration, even in the 
absence of a definition in the Terms of Reference of what financial stability 
entailed. It can be concluded that at this time the concept of ‘financial stability’ 
generally focussed on the avoidance of potential systemic risk through liquidity 
problems in banks. 
 
One of the main achievements of the Wallis Inquiry was the subsequent 
introduction by the Australian government of the now much-admired Twin Peaks 
regulatory system.31 Following the implementation of the recommendations of the 
 
29 The Wallis Inquiry was established in June 1996 to perform ‘a stocktake of the results arising 
from the financial deregulation of the Australian financial system since the early 1980s … and 
… technological development’. It had to make recommendations for ‘regulatory arrangements 
that will best ensure an efficient, responsive, competitive and flexible financial system to 
underpin stronger economic performance, consistent with financial stability, prudence, integrity 
and fairness’: The Wallis Inquiry Final Report (n 15) 5. The Terms of Reference were included 
as Annexure A in the final report: at 707 – 9. 
 
30 Ibid (emphasis added).  
 
31 Andrew Schmulow, ‘Financial Regulation: Is Australia's 'Twin Peaks' Model a Successful 
Export?’, Interpreter (Blog Post, 1 March 2016) <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-
interpreter/financial-regulation-australias-twin-peaks-model-successful-export> (‘“Twin Peaks” 
Model a Successful Export?’). 
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Wallis Inquiry, APRA was created as the prudential regulator of all financial 
institutions and the supervisor of banks. 32  The removal of the prudential 
supervision of banks from the RBA was an important component of the creation 
of the Twin Peaks system of regulation in Australia. ASIC was created as the 
regulator responsible for market supervision and consumer protection. 33 
Generally the ‘macroprudential supervisor’ would be responsible for the 
safeguarding of financial stability. In Australia, however, there has not been a 
designated macroprudential supervisor, and the role of the APRA has been 
described as ‘microprudential supervision with a macroprudential focus’.34 Both 
the RBA and APRA are however of the view that the RBA retained a 
‘macroprudential analysis’ function35 subsequent to the Wallis Inquiry changes. 
This role has not been formalised in legislation. 
 
The basic structure and allocated roles between the RBA, APRA and ASIC in the 
Twin Peaks system were devised by the Wallis Inquiry and are depicted in the 




32 Since the introduction of the Australian Government’s Financial Claims Scheme (depositor 
protection) the imperative for the separation of lender of last resort and bank supervisor has 
also diminished in significance. For an overview of the deposit guarantee scheme, see 
‘Financial Claims Scheme’, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (Web Page) 
<https://www.fcs.gov.au>. 
 
33 For a discussion of Twin Peaks, see Andrew Godwin and Ian Ramsay, ‘Twin Peaks: The 
Legal and Regulatory Anatomy of Australia’s System of Financial Regulation’ (Working Paper 
No 074/2015, Centre for International Finance and Regulation, August 2015) 
<https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2015/08/apo-nid67377-1188281.pdf>; See 
Andrew Schmulow, ‘Twin Peaks: A Theoretical Analysis’ (Working Paper No 64/2015, Centre 
for International Finance and Regulation, 2015) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2625331>; See also Schmulow, '”Twin 
Peaks” Model a Successful Export?’ (n 31).  
 



















This figure shows the Twin Peaks regulatory architecture. 
 
C The Role of APRA in Financial Stability 
 
APRA was created in 1998 following the Wallis Inquiry, pursuant to the APRA 
Act. The primary role of APRA is prudential regulation of financial institutions. 
APRA ‘is required to promote financial system stability in Australia while 
balancing its objectives of financial safety and efficiency, competition, 
contestability and competitive neutrality’.36 APRA has a very large regulatory 
 
36 Ibid, in particular the section on ‘Mandates’. Note also that APRA describes its mandate as 





















purview, and is responsible for the prudential regulation and supervision of the 
banking, insurance and superannuation industries.37 
 
1 Role in Financial Stability 
 
The responsibility of APRA for financial stability is set out in s 8(2) of the APRA 
Act.38 APRA is required to ‘pursue financial stability considerations in concert with 
its other goals’.39 In 2006, legislative reform was implemented that gave APRA 
an express mandate for financial system stability. This amendment was in line 
with amendments to the regulatory framework in New Zealand, and it was aimed 
(as far as could be established) at promoting cooperation between Australia and 
New Zealand. Each regulatory agency is meant to support and consult the other. 
The provision of an express mandate to APRA for financial stability was 
significant as previously it was the responsibility of the RBA only. 
 
Section 8(2) of the APRA Act states:  
In performing and exercising its functions and powers, APRA is to balance the 
objectives of financial safety and efficiency, competition, contestability and 
competitive neutrality and, in balancing these objectives, is to promote financial 
system stability in Australia.  
 
This section uses the phrase ‘financial system stability’, continuing the 
terminological confusion evident in the RBA Act. Although there is no helpful 
commentary available on how the phrase is to be interpreted, it appears to have 
 
Australian community by establishing and enforcing prudential standards and practices 
designed to ensure that, under all reasonable circumstances, financial promises made by 
institutions we supervise are met within a stable, efficient and competitive financial system’: 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 17/18 Annual Report (Report, 28 September 2018) 3 
<https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/2017-18_apra_annual_report.pdf>; See also 
‘APRA's Mandate, Vision and Values’, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (Web Page, 
2019) <https://www.apra.gov.au/apras-madate-visions-and-values>; See also ‘About APRA’, 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (Web Page, 2019) <https://www.apra.gov.au/about-
apra>. 
 
38 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth) s 8(2).  
 
39 Ibid. See also Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (n 6). 
 
 188 
been considered to be synonymous with financial stability. APRA’s duty for 
financial stability was also reinforced by the Treasurer's 2007 Statement of 
Expectations for APRA which notes that prudential regulation is aimed at 
reducing market failure through limiting ‘the systemic risks associated with 
breaches of financial promises’.40 The Statement of Expectations is a soft law 
instrument that supplements the APRA Act. 
 
Cooperation between the RBA and APRA is essential, and arrangements are 
encapsulated in the RBA-APRA MOU signed in 1998.41 This document includes 
‘some of the specifics of the modes of cooperation and procedures for information 
sharing’. 42  There is no express legal obligation to share information and 
cooperate. 
 
2 Regulatory Roles and Powers43 
 
As prudential regulator, APRA is responsible for the framework of prudential 
regulation for the banking, finance, insurance and superannuation sectors. It 
implements Australia’s adaptation of the Basel III framework.44 APRA is also the 
microprudential supervisor, a role in which it adopts a risk-based approach.45 
 
40 See Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (n 6), in 




42 Ibid. See also Memorandum of Understanding between the Reserve Bank of Australia and 
the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, signed 12 October 1998 (Memorandum of 
Understanding) <https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/MoU-RBA-Reserve-Bank-of-
Australia.PDF> (‘RBA-APRA MOU’). 
 
43 For a restatement of the government’s view of APRA’s responsibilities for prudential 
regulation, the administration of the Financial Claims Scheme and the need to balance the 
objectives of financial safety and efficiency, competition, contestability and competitive 
neutrality, see Australian Government, ‘Statement of Expectations 2018’, Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (Web Page, 2018) <https://www.apra.gov.au/statement-expectations-
2018>. 
 
44 See ‘International Assessments’, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (Web Page, 
2019) <https://www.apra.gov.au/international-assessments>. 
 
45 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 17/18 Annual Report (Report, 28 September 
2018) 3 <https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/2017-18_apra_annual_report.pdf>. 
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APRA further administers the Financial Claims Scheme, providing depositor 
protection in the event of the failure of a financial institution.46 
 
3 Contribution to Financial Stability 
 
As the prudential regulator, and by ensuring the financial safety of individual 
institutions, APRA contributes to overall financial stability by preventing systemic 
risk.47 One of the key recent policy priorities of APRA was the implementation of 
‘unquestionably strong’ capital ratios for banks,48 with a view to enhancing the 
safety of the Australian financial system. APRA has also recently been tasked 
with implementing the Banking Executive Accountability Regime (BEAR), 49 
aimed at avoiding the negative consequences of compensation and 
accountability regimes for bank executives as was highlighted during the GFC. 
 
APRA also has significant crisis management/response powers, which have 
been strengthened recently. Although the LOLR powers lie with the RBA, APRA 
can and should take steps to minimise the negative consequences of a liquidity 
crisis suffered by one of its supervised entities. 50  Nevertheless, APRA has 
publicly stated that it does not pursue a situation where there is no failure on the 
part of any financial institution.51 By implication, the overall financial stability 
 





48 See Australian Government, Statement of Expectations 2018 (n 43).  
 
49 Treasury Laws Amendment (Banking Executive Accountability and Related Measures) Act 
2018 (Cth). 
 
50 APRA is expected to act swiftly and effectively to resolve a crisis and to reduce consumer, 
financial system and economic distress: Australian Government, Statement of Expectations 
2018 (n 43). 
 
51 APRA nevertheless does not ‘pursue a zero failure objective’: Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority, ‘Statement of Intent – September 2018’, Australian Prudential Regulation 




considerations remain those of the RBA, and the RBA is primarily responsible for 
systemic stability. 
 
4 Relationship Between APRA and the Australian Government  
 
APRA’s relationship with the government is not just regulated by the APRA Act, 
but also by the government’s Statement of Expectations, such as the 2018 
Statement. In its Statement of Intent that responds to the Statement of 
Expectations, APRA sets out its understanding of and undertakings in relation to 
its relationship with government. The details of these are beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
 
D The Role of ASIC in Financial Stability 
 
ASIC is established and regulated by the ASIC Act and is Australia’s corporate, 
markets and financial services regulator52 but also performs a large number of 
functions under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). ASIC is also subject to a 
Statement of Expectations issued by the Treasurer and has issued a Statement 
of Intent in response.53 
 
The ASIC Act requires ASIC to: 54 
• maintain, facilitate and improve the performance of the financial system and 
entities in it; 
 
52 ‘Our Role’, Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Web Page, 1 February 2019) 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/Our+role?openDocument>. 
 
53 Commonwealth, ‘Statement of Expectations – Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission April 2018’, Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Web Page, 26 
September 2018) <https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/our-role/statements-of-
expectations-and-intent/statement-of-expectations-australian-securities-and-investments-
commission-april-2018/>; ‘ASIC’s Statement of Intent’, Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (Web Page, 26 September 2018) <https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/our-
role/statements-of-expectations-and-intent/asic-s-statement-of-intent/>. 
 
54 Ibid; Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2).  
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• promote confident and informed participation by investors and consumers in 
the financial system; 
• administer the law effectively and with minimal procedural requirements; 
• enforce and give effect to the law; 
• receive, process and store, efficiently and quickly, information that is given to 
ASIC; and 
• make information about companies and other bodies available to the public 
as soon as practicable. 
 
Although it is an independent regulatory agency, it falls under the portfolio of the 
Minister of Finance.  
 
1 Role in Financial Stability 
 
According to the IMF 2012 Country Report on financial stability in Australia, ASIC 
is a ‘highly regarded enforcer of market regulation’.55 It plays an important role in 
securing financial stability by, for example, regulating the conduct of business 
supervision for companies such as insurance companies.56 It also sets capital 
requirements, large exposure rules, and reporting requirements for Australian 
financial services licence holders.57 
 
2 Regulatory Roles and Powers 
 
ASIC has regulatory authority over ‘Australian companies, financial markets, 
financial services organisations and professionals who deal and advise in 
investments, superannuation, insurance, deposit taking and credit’.58 It has three 
 
55 International Monetary Fund, Australia: Financial System Stability Assessment (Report No 
12/308, November 2012) 6 <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12308.pdf>. 
 




58 Australian Securities and Investments Commission (n 52).  
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broad regulatory roles. It firstly acts as the consumer credit regulator. ASIC issues 
licences and regulates individuals and businesses (including banks, credit 
unions, finance companies, finance brokers, mortgage brokers and the like) 
involved in consumer credit activities,59 and enforces standards set out in the 
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth).60 Secondly, ASIC is the 
markets regulator. ASIC monitors compliance of authorized financial markets with 
their legal obligations aimed at operating fair, orderly and transparent markets.61 
Apart from advising the Minister about authorizing new markets, it has also been 
responsible for ‘supervision of trading on Australia’s domestic licensed equity, 
derivatives and futures markets’62 since 1 August 2010. Thirdly, ASIC is the 
financial services regulator. ASIC licences and monitors financial services 
businesses to ensure that they operate efficiently, honestly and fairly. These 
businesses typically deal in superannuation, managed funds, shares and 
company securities, derivatives, and insurance.63 
  
According to ASIC, its strategic priorities are: 64 
 
1. Ensuring confident and informed investors and financial consumers 
through education, by increasing responsible investment decisions by 


















2. Establishing fair and efficient financial markets through ASIC’s role in 
market supervision and competition, and corporate governance; and  
 
3. Providing an efficient registration and licensing regime. 
 
The significance of ASIC’s overall role in financial stability in Australia is evident 
from the description given by ASIC of its importance in the 2007 Statement of 
Intent published in response to the government’s Statement of Expectations. 
ASIC stated:65 
ASIC recognises the importance for the economy as a whole of effectively delivering 
on [its] these responsibilities. Corporations play an important role in the economy, 
and ASIC’s role is to provide reliable, efficient infrastructure for their formation and 
operation. ASIC’s role as a conduct and disclosure regulator in capital markets and 
financial products and services is vital for the confident and informed participation of 
investors and consumers in the financial system, and for maintaining Australian 
markets’ reputation for integrity. An example is the priority we have announced on 
our work in the retail market for financial products and services. 
 
The most recent Statement of Intent of 2018 has a broadly similar gist, and 
specifically confirms that ASIC’s ‘vision is for a fair, strong and efficient financial 
system for all Australians’.66 
 
3 Contribution to Financial Stability 
 
ASIC makes an important contribution to financial stability in relation to the 
payments system. Problems in the payments system can create risk for the entire 
financial system if there are difficulties with the settlement of large payment 
obligations. In conjunction with the RBA, ASIC is responsible for taking regulatory 
 
65 ASIC’s Statement of Intent’, Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Web Page, 
26 June 2007) <https://download.asic.gov.au/media/1321681/ASIC_Statement_of_Intent.pdf>. 
 
66 ‘ASIC’s Statement of Intent’, Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Web Page, 




actions to minimise systemic risk in clearing and settlement systems.67 In terms 
of the Corporations Act, ASIC has as an objective ‘the reduction of systemic risk 
and the provision of fair and effective services by clearing and settlement 
facilities’.68 The RBA’s powers to set financial stability standards support this 
objective. Under the Corporations Act both ASIC and the RBA have powers over 
the licensing of, setting of standards for, and provision of directions to such 
facilities.69 In particular, the directions power of ASIC under s 823E to holders of 
clearing and settlement facility licences contribute to the reduction of systemic 
risk.70 The MOU between the RBA and ASIC set out their agreement in relation 
to these joint responsibilities.71 
 
ASIC contributes indirectly to financial stability through its market conduct, 
disclosure and financial services regulation. ASIC’s Strategic Framework 
however is not directly focussed on systemic stability but rather on the following 
strategic priorities or outcomes:72 
• Confident and informed investors and financial consumers 
• Fair and efficient financial markets; and  
• Efficient registration and licensing. 
 
ASIC’s contribution to financial stability is therefore indirect. 
 
 
67 Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (n 6) 2. 
 
68 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Chapter 7. 
 
69 See Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (n 6) 3. 
 
70 Ibid. When giving such directions, ASIC is required to consult with the RBA. 
 
71 Memorandum of Understanding between the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission and the Reserve Bank of Australia, signed 18 March 2002 (Memorandum of 
Understanding) <https://download.asic.gov.au/media/1340888/MOU-ASICandRBA.pdf>; See 
also Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (n 6) 3.  
 
72 ‘Strategic Framework’, Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Web Page, 15 
August 2017) <https://asic.gov.au/strategic-framework>. 
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E The Role of Other Regulators in Financial Stability 
 
Other regulators include the ACCC, responsible for promoting competition and 
fair trade in the market place, and AUSTRAC, an FIU responsible for anti-money 
laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. 73  Their direct roles in 
financial stability are small. 
 
F The Creation of the CFR and its Role in Financial Stability 
 
The CFR, as an IAC, has as its current members the RBA, APRA, ASIC as well 
as the Treasury. This type of committee is found in many countries and often has 
financial stability objectives and tasks.74 Quite often such an IAC exists even in 
countries where the central bank has an express mandate for financial stability, 
although there may be some differences between the mandates of the central 
banks and the IACs.75 
 
The CFR was established in 1998 with the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Wallis Inquiry. It replaced the Council of Financial 
Supervisors, which had been tasked with facilitating coordination and 
communication between the financial regulators at that time, being the RBA, the 
Insurance and Superannuation Commission, the Australian Securities 
 
73 International Monetary Fund, Australia: Financial System Stability Assessment (Report No 
12/308, November 2012) <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12308.pdf>, a country 
report. 
 
74 The focus of the CFS is on financial stability: See Serge Jeanneau, ‘Financial Stability 
Objectives and Arrangements – What’s New?’ in M S Mohanty (ed) The Role of Central Banks 
in Macroeconomic and Financial Stability (BIS Papers, No 76, February 2014) 54-5 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap76.pdf>. In some countries, IACs were created after the 
GFC. In some the governor of the central bank is also the chair of the IAC, but not in all of them. 
See also ‘Council of Financial Regulators’, Reserve Bank of Australia (Web Page) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/fin-stability/reg-framework/cfr.html>. 
 
75 See Jeanneau (n 74) 55. 
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Commission and the Australian Financial Institutions Commission.76 The Council 
of Financial Supervisors existed from 1992 to (February) 1998.77  
 
1 Background – the Wallis Inquiry 
 
The CFR was seen by the Wallis Inquiry as ‘the collaborative dimension of the 
regulatory agencies' activities’.78 Accordingly, the CFR was created as an inter-
agency body with a view to ensure cooperation and collaboration between its 
member agencies. The Wallis Inquiry did not envisage the CFR as a separate 
body, but considered that its strength would come from the commitment of its 
members to co-operate closely. 79  The need for closer collaboration and 
coordination of the financial regulators was identified by the report of the Royal 
Commission into the collapse of HIH Insurance in 2001.80 
 
The first members of the CFR were the RBA, APRA, and ASIC; the Australian 
Treasury became a member in June 2003.81 The reason for the inclusion of the 
Treasury was ‘to ensure that coordination among the principal financial regulatory 
agencies with an interest in financial stability would continue at the highest 
level’. 82  This timing also coincided with the introduction of new governance 
arrangements for APRA, with its board being replaced by ‘a three-member 
executive group’.83 This changed membership reflects the need for government 
 







79 Council of Financial Regulators, Annual Report 1998 (Report, 1998) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/annual-reports/cfr/1998/pdf/1998.pdf>.  
 
80 Royal Commission into the Failure of HIH Insurance (Final Report, 4 April 2003) (HIH Royal 
Commission). 
 







to be involved in financial stability matters. According to the CFR, since the 
expansion of its membership in 2003, there has been a heavy focus on financial 
stability in its discussions and deliberations. It has considered both domestic and 
international issues of financial stability, 84  and ‘the adequacy of Australia's 
financial regulatory architecture in dealing with potential threats to financial 
stability’.85 The three examples cited by the CFR relating to its investigations into 
financial stability are all in connection with the Financial Claims Scheme, 
implemented during the GFC and continued in a revised form after the GFC.86  
 
Although they are not members of the CFR, the ACCC, AUSTRAC and the 
Australian Taxation Office (ATO) can attend meetings of the CFR as necessary.87 
 
2 Lack of Institutional Character 
 
As noted above, the Wallis Commission did not see the need to constitute the 
CFR as a separate body, 88 but envisaged that its members would commit ‘to 
cooperate closely’.89 Given the importance of financial stability that necessitated 
the creation of the CFR in the first instance, it is surprising that the method of 
regulation of this pinnacle body does not include any formal organization, any 




85 Ibid. No explanation is provided for what the Council means with this reference.  
 
86 Ibid. The examples cited include advice to the Government in November 2008 on a package 
of measures, including the introduction of a Financial Claims Scheme to protect depositors and 
policyholders in the event of a failure of an authorized deposit-taking institution and/or an 
insurer, assisting with the implementation of the Financial Claims Scheme as well as a 
Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding in the second half of 2008, and 
an assessment for the Government in 2010 on the structure of the Financial Claims Scheme 
post-GFC and advice on its implementation in 2011. 
 
87 ‘The Inquiry does not see a need to expand the permanent membership of the CFR to include 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the Australian Transaction 
Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) or the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), as these 
agencies can already attend meetings as necessary’: Murray Inquiry Final Report (n 3). 
 
88 Council of Financial Regulators, ‘History’ (n 76). 
 
89 Ibid.  
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structuring a body of this nature, as the entire regulatory framework is based in 
soft law, making the nature, tasks and role of this body discretionary and 
potentially open to the subjective views and possible whims of powerful 
personalities.90 
 
3 Charter of the CFR 
 
The CFR has evolved and has become somewhat formalised by for example 
adopting a charter91 setting out its objectives. It however has no legal personality 
or obligations.92 It is not a statutory body and has no regulatory functions that 
exist separately from those of its members.93 The Governor of the RBA chairs the 
CFR.94 
 
According to its charter, the ultimate objectives of the CFR are two-fold: 95  
• to contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of regulation; and  
• to promote stability of the Australian financial system.  
 
There is however no legal compulsion on any of its members to participate, 
collaborate or cooperate in the CFR.96 
 
 
90 The potential for personality to be disproportionately important as a regulatory mechanisms in 






93 Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (n 6) 3.  
 
94 ‘Organisation’, Council of Financial Regulators (Web Page) 
<https://www.cfr.gov.au/about/organisation.html>. 
 
95 ‘Charter’, Council of Financial Regulators (Web Page) 
<https://www.cfr.gov.au/about/charter.html>. 
 
96 It is however not suggested that the CFR or any of its members have in any way acted with 
impropriety in the past. 
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4 Contribution to Financial Stability 
 
The CFR describes its role as contributing to the efficiency and effectiveness of 
financial regulation and promoting the stability of the Australian financial 
system.97 It appears however that the most important aspect of the role of the 
CFR is the protection of the stability of the financial sector. It fulfils its functions 
by providing a high-level forum of cooperation98 for the member agencies. In this 
forum, members share ‘information and views on financial sector conditions and 
risks, [discuss] regulatory reforms and, if the need arises, [coordinate] responses 
to potential threats to financial stability’.99 Meetings are held more or less every 
two months, 100  and steps are taken to ensure ‘appropriate coordination 
arrangements for responding to actual or potential instances of financial 
instability’.101 It is also the forum for members to discuss conflicts that arise 
because of responsibility overlap.102 
  
The RBA’s Financial Stability Review is also tabled at the meetings of the CFR 
and only published thereafter. This practice was implemented shortly after a 
revision of the charter of the CFR in 2003 to, firstly, increase the focus on financial 
stability, and, secondly, to include the Treasury as a member.103 The inclusion of 
the Commonwealth Treasury in the CFR indicates that the Australian government 
cannot reasonably be excluded from the regulatory framework of financial 







99 Ibid. It started its own website in 2013: Council of Financial Regulators, ‘Launching the 
Council of Financial Regulators Website’ (Media Release No 2013-01, 11 February 2013) 
<https://www.cfr.gov.au/news/2013/mr-13-01.html>. 
 






103 Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review (Review, March 2004) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/fsr/2004/mar/pdf/0304.pdf> Foreword, 1. 
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The CFR describes its own functions as including sharing of information among 
members, the discussion of regulatory issues, and coordination of responses to 
potential threats to financial stability.104 It also advises the Australian government 
on whether Australia's financial regulatory arrangements are adequate105 and 
whether ‘Australia’s financial system architecture [is adequate] in light of ongoing 
developments’. 106  The CFR thereby contributes to the ‘efficiency and 
effectiveness of financial regulation by providing a high-level forum for 
cooperation and collaboration among its members’.107 It is seen as a flexible and 
low-cost approach to coordination. 108  Its value as ‘an effective means of 
coordinating responses to potential threats to financial stability’ 109  was 
demonstrated in the GFC.  
 
5 The MOUs between Different Regulators that are Members of the CFR: 
Interaction between Members and their Obligations 
 
The relationships between the regulators in the CFR are governed by a suite of 
memoranda of understandings. These have already been mentioned in Chapter 
4. The MOUs confirm the lead role of the RBA in financial stability and also 
regulate the relationships between the different regulators. The result is that the 
relationships between the key financial regulators in Australia and the members 
of the CFR are regulated predominantly by soft law instruments. The significant 
interaction required between the regulatory agencies for purposes of financial 
















For ease of reference, the relevant MOUs and their main purposes and content 
are summarised in Table 5.2 below.  
 








RBA and APRA 12 October 
1998 
Sets out a framework for 
cooperation aimed at 
promoting the stability of the 
Australian financial system.110 
RBA-ASIC 
MOU 
RBA and ASIC 20 March 2002 Entered into to ‘…assist each 
agency in the performance of 
its regulatory responsibilities 
under the Corporations Act 
2001 in relation to clearing 
and settlement facilities … 
and to promote transparency, 
help prevent unnecessary 
duplication of effort and 
minimise the regulatory 




APRA and The 
Treasury 
Unknown Sets out ‘an agreed basis for 
policy and operational co-
ordination between Treasury 
and APRA. The Memorandum 
is non-binding and each party 
reserves the right to vary its 
terms at any time, following 
consultation with the other 
party.’112  
 
110 Memorandum of Understanding between the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority, signed 12 October 1998 (Memorandum of Understanding) 
<https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/MoU-RBA-Reserve-Bank-of-Australia.PDF> (first 
paragraph) (‘RBA-APRA MOU’).  
 
111 Memorandum of Understanding between the Australian Securities and Investments 




112 Memorandum of Understanding between the Treasury and the Australian Prudential 




APRA and ASIC New version 
signed on 18 
May 2010, 
replacing the 
MOU of 30 
June 2004. 
Sets out a framework for 
cooperation on matters ‘in 
areas of common interest 
where cooperation is essential 
for the effective and efficient 
performance of their 












Understanding of Financial 
Distress Management.114 
 
In the RBA-APRA MOU, signed on 12 October 1998, the RBA’s responsibility for 
financial stability is confirmed.115 The purpose of this MOU, namely to set out the 
framework for cooperation between the two organisations in relation to the 
promotion of stability in the Australian financial system,116 reflects the historical 
developments of the removal of the bank supervision function from the RBA after 
the Murray Inquiry, and the advent of Twin Peaks. Clause 3 of the MOU sets out 
the responsibilities in relation to financial stability of the RBA and the RBA’s role: 
‘The RBA’s role [in promoting financial stability] is focused on the objectives of 
monetary policy, overall financial system stability and regulation of the payments 
system’.117 In similar vein, the role of the RBA as supporter of the ‘financial 
system’ rather than of individual banks, is also clarified in clause 12. The RBA is 
 
<https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/MoU-Treasury.pdf> (clause 1) (‘APRA-Treasury 
MOU’). 
 
113 Memorandum of Understanding between the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority and 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, signed 18 May 2010 (Memorandum of 
Understanding) <https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/ASIC-MoU.pdf>  (‘APRA-ASIC 
MOU’) (clause 1.1). 
 
114 Memorandum of Understanding on Financial Distress Management between the Members of 
the Council of Financial Regulators, signed 18 September 2008 (Memorandum of 
Understanding) <https://www.cfr.gov.au/financial-institutions/crisis-management-
arrangements/pdf/mou-financial-distress-management.pdf> (‘Financial Distress Management 
MOU’). 
 
115 RBA-APRA MOU: See the document as a whole, but in particular clauses 1, 2, 3, 11 and 12.  
 
116 Ibid clause 1. 
 
117 Ibid clause 3 (emphasis added).  
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responsible for establishing ‘whether, and how, it might provide emergency 
liquidity support to the financial system. It does not see its balance sheet as 
available to support the solvency of an individual financial institution in 
difficulty’.118  This MOU also sets out some of the specifics of the modes of 
cooperation and procedures for information sharing.119  
 
The RBA-ASIC MOU of 2002 sets out the processes and information-sharing 
arrangements agreed upon in pursuit of their joint responsibilities.120 
 
The Financial Distress Management MOU signed by all relevant regulators in 
2008 expressly confirms that the RBA ‘retains its responsibility for financial 
stability’.121 In this MOU the role of the RBA in financial stability – or ‘financial 
system stability’, as it is referred to at times – is clarified. It is evident that there is 
an assumption that financial stability results from the role of the RBA as LOLR 
and also from its role in monetary policy and the payments system. This MOU 
also sets out clear principles and the roles of the members of the CFR in the 
event of circumstances of actual or potential financial instability and provides a 
non-exclusive list of three examples of such circumstances:122 
• financial distress in an authorised deposit-taking institution (ADI), general 
insurer, life insurer or superannuation fund; 
• disruption to financial markets; or 
• interruptions to the smooth functioning of financial system infrastructure 
(including payment and settlement systems). 
 
The Financial Distress Management MOU contains a number of obligations that 
the signatories have assumed simply by virtue of their signature to the MOU, and 
the obligations therefore arise from, or are confirmed in, soft law. These are 
 
118 Ibid clause 12. 
 
119 Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (n 6) 2. 
 
120 Ibid 3. 
 
121 See the Financial Distress Management MOU. 
 
122 Ibid clause 1. 
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however key obligations for Australia’s financial stability. Nevertheless, as an 
instrument the MOU is not legally binding, and it is likely unenforceable against 
any of the signatories. It is very doubtful whether a member of the public would 
be able to enforce any of the obligations undertaken against any of the regulators. 
At the start of the MOU it states: 123 
This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the members of the 
Council of Financial Regulators (Council) sets out the objectives, principles and 
processes for dealing with stresses in the Australian financial system. 
The MOU identifies the responsibilities of each Council member and is intended 
to facilitate a coordinated response to stresses in the financial system. 
 
The language used in this MOU also deserves comment. The signatories 
undertake to act in accordance with and assume responsibility for their statutory 
mandates,124 although the ‘mandates’ of the regulators are, as demonstrated 
above, not always statutory, and not as clear as the language in the MOU may 
suggest. Further, notwithstanding the reference to the binding statutory mandates 
of each of the signatories to the MOU, the MOU nevertheless summarises and 
details the roles of each of the regulators as follows:125  
[t]he responsibilities of each member for dealing with stress in the financial system 
are as follows: 
• The RBA has primary responsibility for the maintenance of overall financial 
system stability, including stability of the payments system, and for providing 
liquidity support to the financial system or to individual financial institutions 
where appropriate. 
• APRA is responsible for the prudential supervision of banks, building 
societies, credit unions, life and general insurance companies, friendly 
societies and certain superannuation funds. In performing its functions to 
protect the interest of depositors, policyholders and fund members, APRA is 
required to balance the objectives of financial safety and efficiency, 









objectives, is to promote financial system stability in Australia. APRA has 
failure management and enforcement powers to deal with a distressed 
institution and will be responsible for administering the Financial Claims 
Scheme (FCS). 
• ASIC is responsible for monitoring, regulating and enforcing corporations and 
financial services laws, and for promoting market integrity and consumer 
protection across the financial services sector and the payments system. 
• The Treasury provides advice to the Government on policy and possible 
reforms that promote a sound financial system, including on financial distress 
management arrangements. The Treasury has responsibility for advising the 
Government on matters relating to the exercise of the Treasurer's powers, 
and on the broader economic and fiscal implications of developments that 
pose a threat to the stability of the financial system. 
 
As a regulatory mandate cannot be created by agreement between regulators, 
this MOU is not a formal source of a formal mandate. It demonstrates both the 
informal aspects and decentralised aspects of the financial stability mandate.  
 
Two further important observations should be made in light of the above. Firstly, 
the fact that the MOU refers to the RBA as having ‘primary responsibility’ is 
important and reflects the generally accepted view that the RBA is responsible 
for financial stability in an overarching manner (see Chapter 4). Secondly, the 
MOU demonstrates the extent to which the Australian government is involved in 
financial stability. The role of the Treasury as advisor to the Australian 
government on policy and potential reforms reaffirms the government’s active 
role in financial stability and expressly acknowledges the importance of financial 
stability for the broader economy in Australia. It also reflects a different 
relationship of independence of the RBA in relation to financial stability. 
 
The MOU however also extends beyond the mere regulation of the relationships 
between the different signatories but includes the principles for decisions and 
actions. The MOU confirms that the work in the CFR will be aimed at contributing 
‘to the efficiency and effectiveness of regulation’ and will be geared ‘to promote 
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stability of the Australian financial system’. 126  Even though an MOU is not 
formally binding in nature, the persuasive nature of the MOU means that it is likely 
that this non-binding document that establishes protocols and boundaries also 
fundamentally influences decision-making separate from the protocols and 
boundaries. It also addresses the substantive matters of financial stability. This 
document is however an example of a regulatory process where decision-making 
and regulation is ultimately left up to statutory and other bodies without a clear 
guideline from government that will hold the agencies accountable. It is 
essentially the signatories who determine how financial stability will be achieved, 
and although government is represented on the CFR, it does not control the 
process or outcomes. This situation does not accord with democratic principles 
or the rule of law. The role of MOUs as governance mechanisms is further 
addressed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
IV Evaluation of the Decentralised and Shared Regulatory 
Framework for Financial Stability 
 
The effect of a decentralised mandate is that a number of role-players share that 
mandate. The sharing of financial stability responsibilities create a number of 
difficulties. The RBA and APRA have responsibilities that overlap at least to some 
extent. Both the RBA and APRA prioritise the safety of the financial system, 
although APRA is the microprudential regulator and the only one with prudential 
regulatory tools. The RBA’s tools include interest rates, payment systems 
regulation, the LOLR facility that can influence financial markets, as well as the 
dissemination of information and research. It has been noted that both APRA and 
the RBA conduct their tasks with a macroprudential focus, but in Australia there 




127 For a discussion of the difference between macroprudence and macroprudential supervision, 
see Charles Littrell, ‘What is the Difference Between Macro Prudence and Macroprudential 




When a mandate or responsibility is decentralised, it also means that the different 
responsibilities of regulators when combined, should make up the whole of the 
regulatory oversight. As the overarching goal of financial stability regulation in 
Australia has not been expressed (or perhaps even conceptualised) it is not 
possible to determine whether the sum of the parts make up the whole, and 
whether or not there are any gaps. In addition, when a regulatory responsibility is 
shared, the roles and responsibilities of each of the responsible entities should 
be clear, and the manner in which they should interact with other regulators 
should be clear as well. That is also not the case with the financial stability 
responsibility in Australia. Although the tasks of the different regulators have been 
described, and their interactions have been stipulated to some extent albeit 
through informal means, what the overarching financial stability mandate of the 
RBA entails, has not been clarified. There is accordingly a significant gap in the 




This chapter demonstrated the extent to which the financial stability mandate in 
Australia is a decentralised and shared mandate. The financial stability regulatory 
responsibilities are shared between the RBA, APRA and the CFR (although other 
regulators such as ASIC and the Treasury also play a part). In particular, APRA 
has most of the tools that could be used for financial stability purposes – those 
being predominantly prudential tools. Coordination, cooperation and 
collaboration between regulators are therefore of the utmost importance, and the 
CFR has been created to fulfil that need, as well as the need to enhance 
communication between the regulators. However, the CFR itself is an informal 
arrangement, relying on MOUs for its operation, and all of its obligations as well 
as some of those of its members, are encapsulated in soft law instruments. This 
chapter has demonstrated how the MOUs do not sufficiently address the 
regulatory responsibilities of the regulators. The decentralised, shared and 
informal character of the financial stability responsibility leads to potential 
difficulties with overlaps, gaps, lack of interactions and an absence of an 
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overarching goal. The RBA’s performance of its financial stability mandate is 
therefore fundamentally affected by the fact that it alone is not responsible for 
financial stability. This has important consequences for the governance and 
accountability of the RBA. 
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CHAPTER 6  
Governance of the RBA as Financial Stability Regulator 
 
In practice, law-makers have to understand the capabilities and 
propensities of regulatory agencies and design regulatory frameworks 
that make good use of them.1 
 




Chapters 6 and 7 critically examine the governance and accountability 
arrangements of the RBA for financial stability. Chapter 6 deals with governance; 
Chapter 7 deals with accountability. Governance and accountability 
mechanisms can act as controls and drivers of the RBA in its financial stability 
responsibilities in the absence of an express statutory mandate for financial 
stability. Governance and accountability mechanisms can ‘steer the flow of 
events and behaviour’.3 Together these chapters argue that the governance and 
accountability regulatory regime of the RBA for financial stability is not optimal. 
The analysis conducted in these chapters are summarised in table form in 
Appendix 3. 
 
This chapter commences with a discussion of the importance of governance, 
transparency and accountability for independent central banks (Part II). It 
describes a functional continuum of governance, transparency and 
 
1 Malcolm K Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Problems, and Managing 
Compliance (Brookings Institution Press, 2000) 6. 
 
2 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 November 1911, 2644 
(Andrew Fisher) 2645 (Second Reading Speech). 
 
3 Freiberg refers to governance mechanisms that are ‘about steering the flow of events and 
behavior (sic)’: Arie Freiberg, Regulation in Australia (Federation Press, 2017) 5, citing 
Braithwaite, Coglianese and Levi-Faur. 
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accountability mechanisms that drive and control the conduct of central banks.  
This chapter then focusses on three key governance mechanisms that can 
potentially control and drive the RBA in its financial stability responsibilities: the 
powers and mandate of the RBA as an agent of the Australian government (Part 
III), the functional relationship of the RBA with the state in relation to financial 
stability, in particular how the RBA has been created as an independent central 
bank and the role of government in its operations (Part IV); and the internal 
governance arrangements of the RBA that influence RBA decision-making (Part 
V A). In light of the relative ineffectiveness of the first two governance 
mechanisms, and the unusually significant role of the Governor (see Part V B), 
this chapter postulates that behavioural factors that have their root in the 
behavioural sciences can be ultimate drivers of the RBA’s financial stability 
actions. In this chapter the role of ‘personality’ is examined. This chapter 
concludes that the governance mechanisms are not truly effective as controls or 
drivers of the RBA’s financial stability responsibilities, and in light of the 
preponderance of soft law and non-legal controls and drivers, the principles of 
democratic rule-making and the adherence to the principles of the rule of law 
have not been supported. 
 
II Governance, Transparency and Accountability: Essential for 
Independent Central Banks 
 
A Designing a Regulator for Financial Stability: An Independent Central 
Bank as a Regulatory Agency 
 
The regulatory framework that a government puts in place when making an 
independent central bank responsible for financial stability should reflect the 
government’s objectives for the central bank, and the central bank’s 
responsibilities. When effecting its ‘architectural choices’4 in creating a public 
policy regulator, the government should not only give general direction, but 
 
4 Paul Tucker, Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the 
Regulatory State (Princeton University Press, 2018) 72. 
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should also include measures to ensure that the central bank executes its 
obligations and meets the objectives set. Accordingly, governance and 
accountability mechanisms in the regulatory framework should reinforce the 
regulatory goals, and because of central bank independence, should also be 
effective as drivers and controls of the central bank’s actions. 
 
Generally, in the context of central banks, governance, transparency and 
accountability have always been considered to be the counterweights and 
countermeasures of the central bank’s independence.5 As is reflected in an 
extensive body of literature, governance, transparency and accountability are 
the triumvirate of independent central banks, relating mostly to the 
independence of central banks as monetary policy authorities.6 An in-depth 
discussion of this body of literature is beyond the scope of this thesis. The focus 
in this thesis is on governance and accountability as controls and drivers of the 
RBA’s financial stability mandate. 
 
Central bank independence has many benefits, but independence requires 
responsibility. 7  ‘Democratic accountability for unelected officials and arm’s 
 
5 This point enjoys wide acceptance in the literature on central bank independence. For a recent 
commentary on the independence of the RBA, see Guy Debelle, ‘Central Bank Independence in 
Retrospect’ (Speech, Bank of England Independence: 20 Years On Conference, 28 September 
2017) <https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2017/pdf/sp-dg-2017-09-28.pdf>; See also Ben S 
Bernanke, ‘Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability’ (Speech, Institute 
for Monetary and Economic Studies International Conference Bank of Japan, 26 May 2010) 
<https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100525a.pdf>. 
 
6 For a recent survey of indices measuring independence, accountability and transparency, see 
Florin Cornel Dumiter, ‘Central Bank Independence, Transparency and Accountability Indexes: 
A Survey’ (2014) 7(1) Timisoara Journal of Economics and Business 35; See also N Nergiz 
Dincer and Barry Eichengreen, ‘Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and 
New Measures’ (Working Paper No 2013-21, 4 September 2013) 2 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2579544>. 
 
7 ‘Central bank independence is widely advocated as a means of insulating monetary policy from 
short-term political pressures; it is seen as an efficient means of addressing the time-consistency 
problems that plague discretionary policy. …[Nevertheless] with independence … comes ... 
responsibility’: Pierre L Siklos, ‘Central Bank Transparency: Another Look’ (2011) 18(10) Applied 
Economics Letters 929, 929.  
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length institutions necessitate behaviour that demonstrates sensitivity for the 
public’s need to understand how policy is made’.8 Debelle has noted:9 
[W]ith independence has come the accountability. The accountability is to the 
politicians and the population at large, not a small group of central banking 
aficionados, nor the financial markets.  
 
The framework of governance and accountability mechanisms is important 
because the RBA is an independent central bank and regulatory agent of the 
Australian government, acting as agent, and perhaps even trustee 10  or 
guardian of the national financial stability responsibility on behalf of the 
Australian government. As an independent government agency, the RBA is 
therefore subject to a unique governance, transparency and accountability 
framework. The RBA differs from a typical government regulatory agency. 
Government regulatory agents usually form part of the executive branch of the 
government, are created through statutory authority to perform public 
functions, and are subject to oversight from the legislative branch (Parliament) 
and the judiciary through judicial review. The RBA’s unique governance, 
transparency and accountability framework will be analysed in relation to the 
financial stability function.  
 
B Governance, Transparency and Accountability: A Regulatory 
Functional Continuum 
 
This thesis proposes that the three requirements of governance, transparency 
and accountability can be viewed from a regulatory perspective as being on an 
operational continuum:  
Governance → Transparency → Accountability 
 
 
8 Dincer and Eichengreen (n 6), 2.  
 
9 Debelle (n 5) (footnotes omitted). 
 
10 This view about the role of the central bank in financial stability is espoused by Paul Tucker. 
Tucker (n 4). 
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This operational continuum also has a temporal layer and a functional layer: 
 
Operational Governance → Transparency → Accountability 
 
Temporal Ex ante → Ex post facto 
 
Functional Prevention → Disclosure →Explanation→Justification → Sanction 
PROACTIVE → REACTIVE 
 
Governance mechanisms are proactive measures that lie on one end of the 
continuum, ensuring that the regulatory agency, such as the RBA, acts in 
accordance with what is required of it. They aim at regulating organisational 
behaviour so as to prevent problems. They are about steering and/or guiding.11 
While the RBA’s governance mechanisms focus on the sound operations of 
the RBA as a regulatory agency, the RBA demonstrates compliance by making 
its actions (including views and decisions) transparent. Transparency 
mechanisms give visibility to governance and the adherence to governance 
principles. Transparency allows both the organisation and others to consider 
whether the organisation is indeed doing what it is required to do. 
 
Transparency is therefore the first step of, and part of, accountability, which lies 
at the opposite end of the operational continuum. Accountability overlaps to 
some extent with, and includes, transparency, in that at the lowest end of the 
spectrum of the range of accountability mechanisms, an organisation may 
simply be required to disclose certain matters (ie provide a factual account). 
Accountability a little higher up on the spectrum means that explanations and 
justifications are also provided in addition to a factual account. At the highest 
 
11 See Julia Black, Legitimacy and the Competition for Regulatory Share (Working Paper No 
14/2009, LSE Law, Society and Economy, 2009) 4 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1424654>. See also Freiberg, (n 3). 
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end of the scale of accountability, however, consequences for failure to comply 
are introduced (for example corrections or reversals of decisions) and at the 
most severe end of the scale, there may be sanctions and even punitive 
measures.12 Accountability is therefore reactive in nature.13 
 
The continuum is illustrated in the figure below. 
 




This figure reflects proactive and reactive arrangements/measures, and indicates 
preventative and sanctioning measures. Governance involves essentially ‘ex ante’ measures, 
whereas transparency is both ex tempore and ex post facto. Accountability is in essence ex 




12 See Julia Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric 
Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2(2) Regulation & Governance 137, 150. Accountability involves 
‘informing, explaining and justifying’. 
 
13 Ibid, 150. The origin of the concept ‘accountability’ and of the requirement ‘to account’ is 
‘literally to give “a count”’. 
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Governance, transparency and accountability in relation to the RBA’s actions 
in respect of financial stability will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
C Governance Mechanisms 
 
The manner in which an institution is governed is important in controlling its 
actions. Governance involves the structures, mechanisms and processes that 
are in place to ensure that the regulatory agency acts in the manner it is 
supposed to act in furtherance of its responsibilities. These include government 
and self-imposed mechanisms and processes as well as external influences, 
such as international ‘best’ practice and the market. Although engaging in 
governance involves reflection, self-evaluation and self-correction, it is 
essentially a proactive measure.14 Good governance measures are adopted to 
ensure that the entity acts correctly and appropriately, and ultimately does not 
attract some sanction. Governance measures also function as a process-
orientated safety net.  
 
The governance mechanisms of the RBA originate from a wide number of 
sources, namely: 
 
1. RBA-specific governance requirements directly or indirectly derived 
from the founding legislation of the RBA as a regulatory agency, namely 
its mandate and powers;  
 
2. The relationship of the RBA with the state, in particular the level of 
operational independence of the RBA from government, and the extent 
 
14 The concept of governance focusses on how the entity operates. In this thesis, the word 
‘governance’ is used to mean ‘that large subset of governance that is about steering the flow of 
events and behavior (sic)’: Freiberg, (n 3). It involves notions of control similar to that of the term 
in ‘corporate governance’: See John H Farrar, Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles and 
Practice (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2008) 3. Governance has however also been 
described as ‘the aspect of regulation whereby governments engage individuals and private or 
non-governmental organisation to achieve public policy objectives’: Freiberg, at 5.  
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to which the Australian government has retained a measure of control 
over the RBA’s operations and actions; 
 
3. Internal governance structures of the RBA such as the board structure 
and the role of the Governor (these may be wholly or partially statutory 
in nature);  
 
4. Other governance mechanisms linked to the fact that the RBA is a 
regulatory agency and/or a body corporate including non-RBA specific 
measures such as the PGPA Act (these may also be wholly or partially 
statutory in nature); and 
 
5. Some disclosure (transparency) requirements that serve a governance 
functions (these may also be wholly or partially statutory in origin). 
 
The most significant governance mechanisms will now be discussed in turn, 
being statutory powers and mandate, the relationship with government, and the 
internal governance of the RBA, in particular the role of the Governor. 
 
III Powers and Mandate of the RBA as a Regulatory Agent of 
the Australian Government: Key Governance Mechanisms 
 
The governance mechanisms discussed in this Part are proactive, ex ante 
measures that have the potential to control and drive the actions of the RBA. 
The first of these is the mandate of the RBA provided by the Australian 
government. This Part considers the RBA’s informal and decentralised 




A Governance of Agents of the State 
 
1 Powers and Mandates of State Agents 
 
The first and most important aspect of the governance of a regulatory agent of 
the State created by statute are its statutory mandate including its powers. 
 
The regulatory framework that forms part of the ‘architectural design’ for the 
RBA should take into consideration that the central bank will act as agent of 
the State. The essence of an agency relationship is that the agent’s mandate 
is specifically defined, and that the agent is only authorised to act, and is only 
required to act, within the parameters of its mandate.15 It may include some 
elements of the well-known command-and-control management framework,16 
to the extent that as a management framework it also reflects the principles of 
agency.17 It sets out who should do what, within which parameters, and what 
the consequences of a failure to do so would be. This is also relevant to a 
creature of statute that acts for and on behalf of the government. In fact, ‘the 
role of Government in a mandating relationship is that of a traditional command 
and control orientation that is defined through legislation and implemented 
 
15 G E Dal Pont, Law of Agency  (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2014). There is no general definition of an 
agent. Sometimes, an ‘agent’ may not be an agent in the legal sense of the word, and at times 
agency is only part of the relationship (for example, a lawyer-client relationship can be 
contractual as well as one of agency: at 4. Definitions of an agent can be narrow or wide. At its 
broadest, an agent can be described as ‘a person who has authority to act on behalf of a 
principal, either generally or in respect of some particular act or matter’: at 5.  
 
16 The command and control management technique is typically used in the military, and is 
characterized by a ‘top-down’ hierarchical approach. Superiors instruct (command) 
subordinates on what to do, and then check (control) that subordinates have in fact performed 
the work. As a management technique it has been subject to critique, but it is still widely 
practiced. See John Seddon, Freedom from Command and Control: A Better Way to Make the 
Work Work (Manager, 2005). 
 
17 See however Black (n 12) 150. The command and control relationship is not always just a 
one-way relationship, but rather a dialectic relationship. The accountor also influences the 
accountee. When suggesting in this thesis that there should be greater clarity in the manner in 
which the RBA is regulated as a regulatory agency, the dialectic elements of the relationship are 
largely ignored for purposes of efficiency of discussion. 
 
 218 
through agency regulation’. 18  Although command-and-control models of 
regulation have been demonstrated to be less effective in the regulation of 
regulatees such as banks and financial institutions,19 a regulator, acting as the 
agent for government (such as the RBA), needs clear direction as to its goals, 
powers and objectives, and as it acts in the public interest, its performance 
should be controlled. The formal powers and mandate of the agent also grants 
it legitimacy. This principle therefore aligns with Australian democratic values 
and supports the rule of law.  
 
The most important governance mechanisms are the statutory mechanisms. 
Statutory mechanisms carry the necessary democratic sanction of 
Parliamentary endorsement and are fundamental for the operation of principles 
of the rule of law. Statutory mechanisms would therefore provide the necessary 
level of legitimacy to the RBA. 
  
The RBA Act creates the RBA, provides it with mandates and powers, and 
creates the internal governance structures and roles of the boards and relevant 
officials.20  Although the RBA performs a public function and has reporting 
mechanisms that reflect its public role, it is also an independent body corporate. 




18 Christopher J Koliba, Jack W Meek, Asim Zia, and Russell W Mills, Governance Networks in 
Public Administration and Public Policy (Routledge, 2nd ed, 2018) 264, citing T Fox, H Ward and 
B Howard, Public Sector Roles in Strengthening Corporate Social Responsibility: A Baseline 
Study (World Bank, 2002) 3.  
 
19 See Deborah E Rupp and Cynthia A Williams, ‘The Efficacy of Regulation as a Function of 
Psychological Fit: Reexamining the Hard Law/Soft Law Continuum’ (2011) 12(2) Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 581, 582-3. See also Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 above. The level of regulation at 
which the command and control model does not work as well is between the regulatory agent 
and the regulated entities, for example between ASIC and the financial institutions. 
 
20 The RBA Act is supplemented by Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 (Cth). 
 
21 See Anona Armstrong, Xinting Jia and Vicky Totikidis, ‘Parallels in Private and Public Sector 
Governance’ (Conference Paper, GovNet Annual Conference on Contemporary Issues in 






Independent regulatory agents such as the RBA can be effectively governed 
by a clear mandate that stipulates what the government expects of the relevant 
regulatory agent. The mandate or charter of a regulatory agent accordingly has 
particular regulatory significance when a government seeks to make an 
independent central bank responsible for financial stability. As was set out in 
Chapters 4 and 5, the RBA’s mandate is however at best implied or de facto, 
and it is also decentralised and shared with APRA, the CFR and government. 
In essence, it is informal because it is based on unclear foundations and 
documents that are not legally binding, namely:  
• a comment in a second reading speech of another piece of legislation, 
not the RBA Act;  
• a joint statement by the Governor and the Treasurer in a Statement on 
the Conduct of Monetary Policy issued after the GFC;  
• various other confirmations that the RBA is responsible for financial 
stability; 
• MOUs between the RBA and other government regulatory agencies 
confirming that the RBA is responsible for financial stability;  
• voluntary acts by the RBA including the creation of a financial stability 
department and the publication of a financial stability review;  
• general central bank practice, and doing ‘what central banks do’ 
including possibly considering financial stability to form part of ‘banking 
policy’ (both unclear and undefined concepts); and 
• history and tradition that included a financial stability role for the RBA 
that has been accepted both by the Australian government and the RBA. 
 
(a) Regulatory Consequences of an Informal Mandate 
 
There is no express formal legal mandate/obligation for financial stability in an 
overarching sense for the RBA, rather, the origin of the mandate lies in soft 
law. Accordingly, the Australian government has not utilised the most 
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significant regulatory mechanism available. This has an important impact on 
the governance of the RBA.  
 
The deficiencies relate to a lack of certainty and clarity as to: 
 
1. The very existence of the RBA’s financial stability responsibility (is the 
RBA responsible for financial stability and what does the responsibility 
entail?); 
 
2. The objective(s) of the RBA’s financial stability responsibility (what is the 
RBA required to achieve in relation to financial stability, especially in the 
absence of a numerical target as is the case with monetary policy?); 
 
3. The meaning of ‘financial stability’ for purposes of this role of the RBA 
(whether financial stability is limited to the narrow financial system, ie 
mostly the payments system, or whether financial stability is considered 
broadly to encompass national economic welfare, or something in 
between); 
 
4. The scope of the RBA’s role in the financial stability responsibility 
(whether the RBA is responsible for overseeing, pursuing, protecting, 
furthering, or actually achieving financial stability); and 
 
5. The liability of the RBA for actions and outcomes in relation to financial 
stability including those that are not in its control (whether the RBA can 
be held responsible for failures in achieving objectives that are not clear 
and are also shared). 
 
A regulatory agent that performs functions outside of its mandate or does not 
execute its mandate loses legitimacy and credibility. Similarly, regulatory 
agencies taking on public responsibilities of their own accord or without proper 
government sanction can undermine the democratic process and rule of law 
principles. 
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3 Specific Statutory Powers 
 
An important measure of control over the RBA is by the state’s grant of powers 
to the RBA, which are constrained under the RBA Act. Section 8 of the RBA 
Act provides a non-exclusive but nevertheless very specific list of general 
powers to the RBA.22  The list of various general powers of the RBA 23  is 
expanded by RBA Act s 7(1)(j) which grants the RBA the power ‘to do anything 
incidental to any of its powers’24 and any other powers conferred by the RBA 
Act.25 However, the RBA’s powers are still expressly constrained to only ‘such 
powers as are necessary for the purposes of the Act’.26 Any acts by the RBA 
that have not been provided for under this section (and the sections 
incorporated by the introductory part of this section of the RBA Act) may 
therefore be considered to be ultra vires. The consequences of the RBA acting 
outside of its statutory powers are however not spelled out under the RBA Act. 
The limitation of powers of the RBA therefore does not provide a significant 
control or directive for its financial stability responsibilities. 
 
 
22 Section 8 provides that the RBA has ‘such powers as are necessary for the purposes of this 
Act and any other Act conferring functions on the [RBA] and, in particular, and in addition to any 
other powers conferred on it by this Act and such other Acts, has power: 
(a) to receive money on deposit; 
(b) to borrow money; 
(c) to lend money; 
(d) to buy, sell, discount and re‐discount bills of exchange, promissory notes and treasury bills; 
(e) to buy and sell securities issued by the Commonwealth and other securities; 
(f) to buy, sell and otherwise deal in foreign currency, specie, gold and other precious metals; 
(g) to establish credits and give guarantees; 
(h) to issue bills and drafts and effect transfers of money; 
(i) to underwrite loans; and 
(j)  to do anything incidental to any of its powers’. 
 
23 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 8. 
 
24 Ibid s 8(j). 
 
25 Ibid s 8, General Powers: ‘The Bank has such powers as are necessary for the purposes of 
this Act and any other Act conferring functions on the Bank and, in particular, and in addition to 
any other powers conferred on it by this Act and such other Acts, has power:…’  (emphasis 
added).  
 
26 Ibid s 8 (emphasis added). 
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In addition to providing a clear mandate and powers, the government seeking 
to make an independent central bank responsible for financial stability should 
also impose governance and accountability obligations on that central bank as 
a regulatory agent27 to support the financial stability responsibility, and control 
and drive its activities.  
 
IV Governance of the RBA through the Relationship between 
the RBA and the State  
 
The second governance mechanism is that of the independence of the RBA – 
ie its relationship with the state and the role that the state has in the RBA’s role 
as financial stability regulator.  
 
A General Independence of the RBA and Operational Involvement of the 
Australian Government 
 
An important method of control by the Australian government over the RBA is 
through moderating its independence as a central bank: the RBA can be 
described as being only moderately independent.28  
 
The RBA has been established as a separate body corporate under the 
leadership of its Governor,29  and primarily because of its monetary policy 
function, it has a significant degree of independence compared to other 
regulatory agencies, such as APRA and ASIC. The RBA is not a government 
 
27 See the discussion of the importance but also potential negative consequences of 
accountability regimes on government regulators: See Joanna Bird, ‘Regulating the Regulators: 
Accountability of Australian Regulators’ (2011) 35(3) Melbourne University Law Review 739. 
 
28 For example, the 2002 legislative change can be interpreted to be a reduction in the level of 
independence of the RBA because the responsibility for the appointment of the Governor was 
transferred from the Governor-General to the Treasurer. The most independent central banks in 
the world are those that have been created most recently, such as those in the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Latvia, Hungary, Armenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina: See Dincer and Eichengreen (n 6), 25, 
29.  
 
29 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 7(a). 
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department, and is considered to be a ‘corporate Commonwealth entity’30 with 
separate legal personality, that can ‘act in its own right exercising certain legal 
rights such as entering into contracts and owning property’.31 As a corporate 
Commonwealth entity the RBA is subject to the PGPA Act 2013,32  which 
applies in a unique way to the corporate Commonwealth entities because of 
their different legal status.33 The role of the PGPA Act is discussed below. The 
RBA has also implemented a code of conduct for its staff,34 a form of self-
governance.  
 
When compared to other central banks, however, the RBA is a moderately 
independent central bank. 35  The RBA has no constitutional guarantee of 
independence and its enabling statute also does not expressly establish it as 
an independent central bank.36 The RBA’s independence is provided by the 
fact that it is a body corporate37 and not a government department. Also, the 
person who chairs of the RBA Board (ie the Governor) is not a government 
employee. The RBA Board is not fully controlled by government 38  but 
Governors and board members are government appointees. The decisions of 
 
30 Other examples of Commonwealth corporate entities are Airservices Australia and the 
Commonwealth Superannuation Association: See ‘Governance Structures in the Public Sector’, 









34 See for example ‘Code of Conduct for Reserve Bank Staff’, Reserve Bank of Australia (Web 
Page) <https://www.rba.gov.au/about-rba/our-policies/code-conduct-rba-staff.html>. 
 
35 The case of the SARB is different. In terms of s 224 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996, ‘the South African Reserve Bank, in pursuit of its primary object, must 
perform its functions independently and without fear, favour or prejudice, but there must be 
regular consultation between the Bank and the Cabinet member responsible for national 
financial matters’. 
 
36 See Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth). 
 
37 Ibid s 7(a). 
 
38 See Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth). 
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the RBA Board are also not subject to government approval,39 although there 
is input from a government representative on the RBA Board.  
 
The RBA has instrument independence in relation to monetary policy, but not 
goal independence.40 The inflation targeting policy entails that the government 
provides the RBA with an inflation goal that the RBA is expected to achieve, 
but it allows virtually complete instrument independence to the RBA.41 This 
level of independence has existed since 1996, when the Australian government 
increased the RBA’s independence in the conduct of monetary policy. The 
Australian government confirmed the Reserve Bank’s independence to set the 
price of money, thereby relinquishing government control over interest rates, 
and allowed the RBA to decide on interest rates based on the national interest 
and not the political cycle.42  This was an important political step but also 
aligned with economic theory of the time, namely that a more independent 
central bank was preferred for better inflation outcomes. At the time, the level 
of the RBA’s independence was influenced by four key factors,43 namely (1) 
the RBA had multiple objectives, (2) the inflation-target was flexible, (3) the 
RBA was required to consult with the Treasurer, and (4) there was a ‘good 





40 See Chapters 4 and 5 above. That means that the RBA has freedom to exercise its 
responsibility, but it must do so in line with government’s goal of an efficient and stable financial 
system best able to support growth. ‘This independence, and explicit government support for 
this independence, is critical to ensuring the effectiveness of our financial regulators’: David 
Gruen, ‘Towards an Efficient and Stable Financial System’ (Speech, CEDA State of the Nation 
2014, 23 June 2014) <https://treasury.gov.au/speech/towards-an-efficient-and-stable-financial-
system/>. 
 
41 See Debelle (n 5). 
 
42 See Paul Kelly, ‘The Howard Decade - Separating Fact From Fiction’ (2008) 7 New Critic 
<http://www.ias.uwa.edu.au/new-critic/seven/howarddecade>. See also The Treasurer and the 
Governor (designate) of the Reserve Bank, Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy 
(Statement, 14 August 1996) <https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/framework/stmt-conduct-
mp-1-14081996.html>. This was an important political move on the part of the Australian 
Government.  
 




The role of the Australian government in the functioning of the RBA however 
tempers its independence significantly (the specifics of the government’s 
involvement are discussed in relation to the RBA’s internal governance 
structures below, as well as in the limitation of the RBA’s powers). Some of the 
measures of control that the government has over the RBA are direct, such as 
in the appointment of key officials and the strong role of the government in the 
RBA’s governance structures. In addition, government participates in decision-
making at board level, including in monetary policy decisions because of the 
presence of a treasury official on the RBA Board. This is rather unique, and the 
RBA is the only central bank in the OECD with a government representative on 
the board.45 It is not an ideal situation,46 because independence of the central 
bank ‘enhances the effectiveness and credibility of monetary policy’.47 The 
RBA’s moderately low level of independence is exacerbated by the fact that 
the government is also represented at the CFR by the Treasurer.48  
 
The presence of the Secretary to the Department of the Treasury on the RBA 
Board means that the Australian government has a voice inside the RBA and 
at the highest level of the RBA as an organisation, on the board that ultimately 
has the biggest corporate and political influence. This presence overshadows 
the role of the government in relation to the Payments System Board, which 
 
 
45 In the proposed Reserve Bank Amendment (Enhanced Independence) Bill 2008 (which was 
not adopted), it was pointed out that the RBA is the only central bank in the OECD with a 
treasury official on its governing board: See Commonwealth, Bills Digest (Digest No 97 of 
2007–08, 20 March 2008) 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/bd0708/08bd097> 
(Reserve Bank Amendment (Enhanced Independence) Bill 2008). 
 
46 There is what has been referred to as ‘a considerable body of economic literature’ to that 
effect. See Commonwealth (n 45).  
 
47 Ibid. This point was reiterated when the proposed amendment to the Reserve Bank of 
Australia Act 1959 was introduced.  
 
48 As of December 2018, the CFR publishes a statement following its meetings: Council of 
Financial Regulators, ‘Quarterly Statement by the Council of Financial Regulators’ (Media 
Release 2018-02, 13 December 2018) <https://www.cfr.gov.au/news/2018/mr-18-02.html>. 
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has a direct reporting obligation to the Minister of Finance in relation to the 
standards determined under s 827D of the Corporations Act.49 
 
Through the presence of government representatives in meetings where 
operations decisions may be made, and through the presence of the Treasurer 
at the CFR, the government therefore has influence but not control over the 
operations of the RBA. 
 
B Government Influence over and Control of Policy 
 
The RBA’s independence is also reduced by the ability of the Australian 
government to finally determine RBA policy, 50  through a statutory right to 
intervene in RBA policy.51 
 
The general duty of the RBA to ‘liaise’ with government is included in s 13 of 
the RBA Act, and although the obligations under that section do not expressly 
compel consultation, the context of the section makes it clear that consultation 
is required. According to the RBA, ‘[i]n practice this is done in the regular, 
generally monthly meetings which the Governor and Deputy Governor have 
with the Treasurer, shortly after each meeting of the Reserve Bank Board’.52 It 
is also mandatory for both RBA boards, namely the Reserve Bank Board and 
the Payments System Board, to inform the government of the policy of the RBA 
from time to time. Even though the duty to inform is mandatory, the content of 
the information to be provided and its frequency are however not regulated by 
statute. 
 
49 These reports should also include a discussion of developments in the clearing and 
settlement industry during that financial year. 
 









The reasonably strong government influence seems to have the potential to 
affect the financial stability function of the RBA, but the RBA enjoys more 
independence on a policy level in financial stability than what it does in relation 
to monetary policy, because of the inflation-targeting model for monetary 
policy. 
 
However, the RBA’s independence in relation to financial stability – along with 
its other policy decisions – is affected by the fact that the Australian government 
may override the RBA’s policy. Under s 11 of the RBA Act, the Australian 
government must be informed of RBA policy emanating from both boards, and 
under section 11(2) of the RBA Act the government has the right to question 
RBA policy, albeit only on the ground that RBA policy is not ‘directed to the 
greatest advantage of the people of Australia’.53 The RBA Act prescribes that 
in the event of a disagreement between the Treasurer and the RBA, the 
Treasurer and the relevant RBA Board should endeavour to reach agreement. 
If no agreement can be reached, the relevant Board is required to provide the 
Treasurer with a statement on the disputed issue. The matter is then finally 
determined by the Australian government, 54  albeit through the Governor-
General. Under s 11(4) of the RBA Act the Treasurer may, on receipt of the 
statement by the RBA, ‘submit a recommendation to the Governor-General, 
and the Governor-General, acting with the advice of the Federal Executive 
Council, may, by order, determine the policy to be adopted by the [RBA]’.55 The 
RBA is compelled to implement the policy as directed, although the RBA Act 
limits the RBA’s responsibility to acts that are within its powers.56 The actions 
 
53 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 11(2). 
 
54 Ibid s 11. 
 
55 Ibid s 11 (4). 
 
56 Under s 87, the RBA is protected against claims based on invalidity of its actions or 
transactions: ‘The validity of an act or transaction of the Bank shall not be called in question in 
any legal proceedings on the ground that any provision of this Act has not been complied with’. 
Further, although the Commonwealth has guaranteed the debts of the RBA (s 77 Guarantee by 
Commonwealth), creditors are precluded from taking legal action against the Commonwealth: 
‘The Commonwealth is responsible for the payment of all moneys due by the Bank but nothing 
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of the Treasurer are open to Parliamentary scrutiny, as the Treasurer is 
required to inform both Houses of Parliament as to the order that was given in 
respect of the RBA’s policy. In addition, a copy of the statement by the relevant 
RBA Board, as well as a statement by government in relation to the matter, 
must be provided to Parliament as well. As far as could be established, these 
powers have never been used. 
 
The potential for policy override, however, remains a significant governance 
mechanism. 
 
C Regulatory Consequences of RBA’s Moderate Independence 
 
The regulatory consequences of the government’s operational involvement in the 
RBA’s operations and policy formulation are overall moderate. Because of the 
presence of government representatives at operational level, government may at 
least to some extent influence central bank operations and policy formulation. 
The extent to which that would assist in the governance and accountability of the 
RBA for the financial stability responsibility, is however not clear, but the potential 
is there.  
 
V Internal Governance Structures and the Role of the Governor  
 
Internal governance mechanisms of the RBA as an institution are the third 
governance mechanisms analysed in this chapter – the role of the Governor is 
of particular importance. 
  
 
in this section authorizes a creditor or other person claiming against the Bank to sue the 




A Internal Governance Mechanisms in the RBA and the Role of the 
Governor 
 
In order to appreciate the governance impact of the role of the Governor, it is 
necessary to briefly sketch the internal governance structures of the RBA.  
 
1 Internal Governance: The Board(s) Structure of the RBA 
 
Internal governance mechanisms provide important measures of control and 
direction for an organisation. Decision-making in the RBA is characterised by 
its twin board structure. 57  The RBA Board is responsible for the RBA’s 
monetary and banking policy, and the RBA’s policy on all other matters, except 
for its payments system policy (RBA Act s 10).58 The Payments System Board 
is responsible for the RBA’s payments system policy (s 10B).59 The relationship 
between the two boards is regulated by ss 8 and 10 of the RBA Act. Generally, 
the policy of the Reserve Bank Board prevails if policies are inconsistent, and 
disagreements between the boards are ‘resolved as determined by the 
Governor’,60 who chairs both boards. The boards are discussed in more detail 
below. 
 




57 Ibid s 8A. 
 
58 Ibid s 8A(2). The RBA Board is constituted as provided for in Part III of the Reserve Bank Act 
1959 (Cth). 
 
59 Ibid s 8A(3). 
 
60 Ibid ss 8A(4), 10C(2), 10C(3). 
 












Figure 6.2: This figure reflects the information as provided by the RBA in its August 2018 
Annual Report. 
 
(a) The Reserve Bank Board 
 
The role and constitution of the Reserve Bank Board is of particular importance, 
because apart from considering financial stability issues, the Reserve Bank 
Board also performs the role of the monetary policy committee. That is not 
always the case in other central banks. In monetary policy, a high level of 
independence is required (as discussed in Chapter 3).  
 
The composition of the Reserve Bank Board reflects both independence and a 
strong government influence. One of the factors that enhance the 
independence of the RBA is the presence of non-RBA and non-government-
affiliated persons on the Reserve Bank board. 62  Nevertheless, all board 
 




















members who are at the time of their appointment to the board an RBA official, 
hold their office ‘during the pleasure of the Treasurer’. 63  The Treasurer 
appoints both the Governor and Deputy-Governor, 64  and they ‘hold office 
subject to good behaviour’,65 but on terms and conditions determined by the 
Reserve Bank Board.66  Effectively the Treasurer therefore can control the 
presence on the board of all nine members of the Reserve Bank Board: the 
Treasurer appoints six board members,67 one board member is a subordinate 
of the Treasurer (the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury), and the 
Treasurer can terminate the appointment of the Governor and Deputy-
Governor at the Treasurer’s pleasure. The composition of the RBA Board is 
commensurate with the need for more government involvement in financial 
stability matters, although a strong government involvement and lower levels 
of independence are negatively indicated for the effective conduct of monetary 
policy.  
 
There are however measures in place to protect the RBA’s independence. 
Reserve Bank Board members may not be directors, officers or employees of 
ADIs,68 and are required to make an oath or affirmation of allegiance and a 
declaration of secrecy on appointment to the Reserve Bank Board. These 
requirements reflect the public nature of the role they play as members of the 
Reserve Bank Board. In addition to the possibility of termination of their 
appointment by the Treasurer, the RBA Act contains a number of other 
directives as to when board members will cease to be board members.69 Those 
circumstances are not relevant here. 
 
63 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 14(3). 
 
64 Ibid s 24(1). 
 
65 Ibid s 24(1)(c). Under s 25, a number of other reasons for the vacation of office are spelled 
out, including the bankruptcy of the Governor or Deputy-Governor. 
 
66 Ibid s 24A. 
 
67 Ibid s 14(1)(d). 
 
68 Ibid s 17(1). 
 




Despite the presence of external persons that are not RBA employees on the 
Reserve Bank Board, the role of the Governor remains significant. The RBA 
Board is chaired by the Governor, with the Deputy Governor as the Deputy 
Chairperson,70 and ex officio they have particular power and importance,71 
including a deliberative vote and casting vote.72 The role of the Governor is 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
The Reserve Bank Board has very broad powers and responsibilities that are 
however limited by the Payments System Board and the fact that the Reserve 
Bank Board is not directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the RBA. A 
non-statutory ‘Executive Committee’ is ‘the key decision-making committee of 
the Reserve Bank for matters of a management and/or administrative nature’.73 
The RBA describes it as a management committee, with the role of assisting 
and supporting the Governor in performing their obligations in managing the 
RBA. 74 It is chaired by the Governor.75 The Executive Committee functions to 
some extent like a management committee of a large corporation and the 
Reserve Bank Board relies on the Executive Committee for operational 
(management/administrative) matters.76  
  
 
70 Ibid s 20. 
 
71 Ibid s 21. 
 
72 Ibid s 21(5). 
 




75 As expected in a management committee, the senior officials of the RBA attend the meetings 
of this committee, generally held weekly. Certain senior managers, such as the heads of the 
Audit, Information and Risk and Compliance departments and the General Counsel also attend 
these meetings in an advisory capacity: See Reserve Bank of Australia (n 61). 
 
76 Ibid. The fact that the Governor chairs both the Reserve Bank Board and the Executive 
Committee is different to the normal operation of a corporate Executive Committee and Board of 




(b) The Payments System Board 
 
The composition of the Payments System Board is also regulated by the RBA 
Act. 77  The Governor also chairs the Payments System Board. 78  A 
representative from APRA sits on the Payments System Board, but there is no 
Treasury representative on the Payments System Board.79 Nevertheless, the 
hand of government is evident in the Payments System Board through the role 
of the Treasurer in appointing all board members to the Payments System 
Board other than the two RBA board members and the APRA board member.80 
Nevertheless, as chair, the Governor has important powers, including directing 
the times and places at which the Payments System Board will meet,81 and if 
the Governor presides, they will have a deliberative and/or casting vote.82 As 
is the case with the RBA Board, the Treasurer may terminate the appointment 
of members of the Payments System Board.83 In the case of a conflict between 
a decision of the Payments System Board and Reserve Bank Board, the 
decision of the Reserve Bank Board prevails. 
 
(c) Board Members (Including the Governor and Deputy-Governor) 
 
Members of the RBA Board and the Payments System Board have specific 
statutory disclosure obligations relating to their material personal interests 
 
77 See Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) Part IIIA. 
 
78 Ibid s 25C. 
 
79 Ibid s 25A. 
 
80 Ibid s 25B. 
 
81 Ibid s 25F. 
 
82 Ibid s 25F. Note that if the other RBA official appointed to the Payments System Board were 
to chair the meeting, they would have these powers. 
 
83 Ibid s 25L(3) and (4). 
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under the RBA Act.84 Although these disclosure obligations do not directly 
regulate the actions of the RBA itself, they provide a measure of control over 
the acts of the RBA by preserving – at least to some extent – the independence 
and neutrality of the decision-makers in the RBA. These disclosures also 
protect the RBA’s independence and the integrity of its decisions. It should be 
noted that even if a board member has declared ‘a material personal interest’ 
in a matter, the board member may still be present at a board meeting that 
considers the matter, and the board member may also vote on that matter.85 
 
All RBA board members are effectively appointed by the Australian 
government, represented by the Treasurer.86 A fairly recent attempt to increase 
the independence of board members failed when a Bill introduced to change 
the manner of appointments of board members was defeated in Parliament.87 
Although the Bill was defeated, it is important to note that the rationale behind 
it was to prevent a recurrence of the so-called Robert Gerard affair, where the 
then Treasurer, Mr Peter Costello, for political reasons, had intervened in the 
shortlisting and nomination process of a board member. 88  As no further 
attempts at increasing the independence of the RBA board members have 
been made since, an inference can be drawn that the political perspective in 
Australia is that the current balance of independence reflects the political will 
of government and desired level of control over the actions of the RBA. 
 
The board structure of the RBA and in particular the role of the government in 
the boards, favour the conclusion that in the absence of an explicit and 
 
84 The disclosure obligations of the RBA Board members are under ss 7B and 7C Reserve Bank 
Act 1959 (Cth); those of the Payments System Board under s 7C. 
 
85 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) ss 7B(1) and 7B(2). 
 
86 Ibid ss 14(1)(d) and 25B(3). 
 
87 The Bill was introduced on 20 March 2008. See Commonwealth, Bills Digest (Digest No 97 of 
2007–08, 20 March 2008) 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/bd/bd0708/08bd097> 
(‘Reserve Bank Amendment (Enhanced Independence) Bill 2008’). 
 
88 Ibid. Mr Robert Gerard was an influential donor of the Liberal Party, but was also being 
investigated by the Australian Tax Office. 
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prescriptive mandate for financial stability, interaction between board members 
(including the Governor) can control and direct the actions of the RBA. In the 
absence of strong legislative directives in relation to financial stability, the 
boards may be open to persuasive arguments from individual board members, 
most likely the Governor. 
 
(d) Role of the Governor 
 
The role of the Governor is quite extraordinary, and affects all aspects of the 
RBA’s activities, including the financial stability role. As an individual, the 
Governor has a very high level of control over the RBA as an organisation, in 
a management and policy capacity, and there are few checks and balances on 
their role – unlike, for example, the checks and balances on the role of a CEO 
in a corporation that may be subject to the control of the board, or the role of a 
minister in a Government department, which may be controlled by the Prime 
Minister or Cabinet. The governor’s role instead reflects the presidential model 
of governance, where the president holds the ultimate say, except in this 
instance, extraordinary powers are placed in the hands of an unelected 
individual.89  
 
The importance of the person who holds the position of Governor cannot be 
overemphasized. In fact, in the 1911 Parliamentary discussion about the role 
of the central bank Governor, the Hon Andrew Fischer described the 
characteristics of a Governor as follows:90 
… one first class man should be trusted and given ample powers. … In some 
respects he will have an autocrat’s position, and if we get the right man, I have 
no doubt that we are pursuing a right course in that regard. … With the 
safeguards regarding audit to which I have referred, we can place confidence 
 
89 Tucker expressed concerns about the power of ‘unelected’ central banks and their governors. 
See Tucker (n 4).  
 
90 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 15 November 1911, 
2644 (Andrew Fisher) 2645 (Second Reading Speech) (emphasis added).  
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in the Governor. As his honour, good name, and integrity will be involved, he 
will have power to appoint and to dismiss employees of the bank as he chooses 
… We hope to have a wise man at the head of this institution … 
 
Parliament was persuaded to place considerable faith in a particular individual 
who would be a trust-worthy and benevolent autocrat. While that model of 
governance may have been broadly acceptable at that time, corporate 
governance models have since changed. The Governor’s statutory role has 
however effectively hardly changed since 1959, or, indeed, since 1911.  
 
The Governor’s powers are augmented by their chairing both the Reserve Bank 
Board as well as the Payments System Board. There is no higher governing 
board in the RBA overseeing the role of the Governor. The Governor can 
determine the timing and number of board meetings,91 and undoubtedly the 
agenda. The role of the Governor outside of the RBA is also significant and 
contributes to their powers. Domestically, the Governor also chairs the 
meetings of the CFR. Internationally, the Governor represents Australia and 
attends the G20 and BIS meetings and the Plenary of the FSB.92 The Governor 
is also (currently) a member of the Standing Committee on Assessment of 
Vulnerabilities of the FSB, in addition to occupying other significant 
international leadership roles.93 The Governor also has important obligations 
and importance under the PGPA Act (see Part III C below). The Governor is 
the RBA’s figurehead and main public face, and personally powerful.  
 
The Governor’s stature and powers are protected by their security of office. 
The Governor and Deputy Governor are both appointed by the Treasurer for 
 
91 See Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s21(1)) which makes it clear that the Governor as 
Chairperson may direct the times and places of the meetings of the RBA Board; the RBA Board 
itself may also make such a determination. Pursuant to s21(5) Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) the 
Governor may have a deliberative or casting vote. 
 
92 The Governor is also Co-Chair of the Regional Consultative Group for Asia. The RBA’s 
international involvement is detailed in the 2018 Annual Report. See Reserve Bank of Australia, 





fixed terms, and they hold office unless otherwise determined by the Treasurer, 
and subject to the requirements of the RBA Act.94 The Governor and Deputy 
Governor hold office for their full term unless they satisfy the requirements the 
RBA Act for termination of their appointment, ie become bankrupt, disabled, or 
behave with impropriety.95 
 
The roles of the Governor and Deputy Governor and their relationship to 
government are important in respect of both the independence of the RBA, and 
how the RBA is governed and controlled by the government of the day. The 
extent to which the role of the Governor (and Deputy Governor) is controlled 
and/or influenced by the government, and in particular a Treasurer with political 
affiliations, may change the way in which the RBA itself is governed and 
controlled.  
 
The formal relationship between the Governor and the Australian government 
is also of particular importance because of the significant influence and 
importance of the Governor. The need for the government to have some control 
over the appointment and termination of appointment of the Governor is 
important. This was an issue in 2007/8, as noted above, when a Bill to enhance 
the independence of the RBA was proposed by the governing Australian Labor 
Party but did not pass.96 The objective of the Bill was to remove the Treasurer’s 
right to terminate the employment of the Governor and Deputy Governor, and 
instead require both Houses of Parliament to make a recommendation for 
implementation by the Governor-General. Effectively this would revert to the 
statutory position before 2002, when appointments were subject to the 
approval of the Governor-General.97 Although the Opposition was not against 
 
94 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) Part III, dealing with the Reserve Bank Board and the Governor 
and Deputy Governor of the Bank. 
 
95 Ibid s 25(1)(c).  
 
96 Reserve Bank Amendment (Enhanced Independence) Bill 2008. 
 
97 These powers were passed to the Treasurer in 2002 through the Financial Sector Legislation 
Amendment Act (No. 1) 2003 (Cth). The Treasurer was given the powers and functions of 
appointing and terminating the appointment of RBA Board members (ss 14 and 18), and 
appointing the Governor, Deputy Governor and members of the Payments System Board, and 
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increasing RBA independence, the Bill was defeated on the basis that it was 
impractical, and limited the grounds for termination of employment, ie it would 
reduce the level of control that the Government would have over the Governor. 
During Parliamentary Debate in the House of Representatives, the Hon 
Malcolm Turnbull, for the Liberal Party (in opposition at that time), pointed to 
the need for some measure of control over the acts of the Governor, 
highlighting that if the Governor were to act in a manner that is ‘corrupt, 
dishonest or reckless or which brings the [RBA] into disrepute or which brings 
[the] whole financial system into disrepute’,98 there would be no power under 
the proposed legislative amendments to terminate the Governor’s 
employment.99 Effectively, the final ‘hold’ that the Australian government has 
over the Governor is the risk of their loss of employment.100 The control that 
Parliament has over the actions of the Governor and the RBA by virtue of the 
Governor’s appearances before Parliament, was also emphasised.101 There 
was some support for more accountability by the RBA and an increase in the 
number of appearances by the Governor in Parliament.102  
 
Some examples of central bankers’ improper behaviour suggest that concerns 
about the character and actions of a central bank governor are warranted, 
although such circumstances occur rarely. An example is Antonio Fazio, former 
 
also terminating their appointments. These powers were granted for the purposes of efficiency, 
but they did not provide safeguards for the acts of a potentially capricious treasurer: See 
Reserve Bank Amendment (Enhanced Independence) Bill 2008. 
 
98 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 May 2008, 2769 




100 In any event, Turnbull argued, as the Governor-General would act on the advice of 
Government, the practical effect of the implementation of the Bill would not be much different.  
 
101 Turnbull also stated that the Opposition was in favour of increasing the number of times that 
the Governor was to appear before the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Economics thereby demonstrating a preference for more accountability by the RBA: Turnbull (n 
98) 2772. 
 
102 It should be noted that the ‘control’ referred to here may exist in the potential for being 
criticised, embarrassed or sanctioned. Behavioural factors may therefore play a role here – the 
anticipation of disclosure and the potential of criticism, embarrassment and even sanction may 
play a proactive role in the governance of the RBA’s behaviour as well. 
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governor of the Bank of Italy, who although reluctant to leave his position, finally 
resigned in the face of alleged wrong doing. He was later convicted of market-
rigging.103 What is important in the case of Fazio is that it highlighted that it can 
sometimes be difficult to remove a governor from office. 
 
The Governor plays a very significant role in the RBA, and to a large extent 
controls – or can control – the policies and practices of the RBA. Despite the 
measures of control over the Governor, there is still significant leeway for an 
RBA Governor to choose a direction which is against the public interest, 
perhaps because of political affiliations. For example, in the USA, political 
affiliations and the relationship between the then chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, Arthur Burns, and President Nixon were highly controversial.104 In 
Australia, the independence of former RBA Governor Bernie Fraser was also 
questioned when then Prime Minister Paul Keating bragged that because of 
his relationship with Governor Fraser, Keating had the RBA ‘in his pocket’.105  
 
The personality and personal power of the Governor are therefore significant 
controlling and directive powers in the governance of the RBA.  
 
 
103 See Sara Rossi, ‘Court Cuts Jail Sentence of Ex-Bank of Italy Boss’, Reuters (online, 29 May 
2012) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-banks-governor-idUSBRE84R0N020120528>. 
Malcolm Turnbull referred to this scandal in July 2005 pointing to ‘allegations of corruption, 
nepotism and very poor policy by the Bank of Italy’: Turnbull (n 98) 2771. 
 
104 See Doug French, ‘Burns Diary Exposes the Myth of Fed Independence’, Mises Daily 
Articles (Web Article, 27 December 2010) <https://mises.org/library/burns-diary-exposes-myth-
fed-independence>; See also Burton A Abrams, ‘How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: 
Evidence from the Nixon Tapes’ (2006) 20(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 177.  
 
105 See Bernie W Fraser, ‘Reserve Bank Independence’ (Speech, National Press Club, 15 
August 1996) <https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/1996/sp-gov-150896.html>. Fraser disowned 
the comments: ‘Much of the wind beneath the view that the Bank was ‘political’ flowed from Paul 
Keating's comment at a press conference in February 1989 that ‘they do what I say’, and from a 
more celebrated but harder to document comment at a supposedly private dinner in December 
1990 that he had the Reserve Bank (among others) ‘in his pocket’. I believe Mr Keating 




B Governance by Personality? The Potential for Behavioural Factors to 
Play a Disproportionate Role in Governance 
 
1 Behavioural Factors can play the Role of Governance Mechanisms 
 
What then compels, or controls, drives and steers the RBA to pursue a financial 
stability objective, and pursue it in a manner that meets the requirements of the 
Australian public? There is no clear statutory mandate for the RBA to do so, 
and the implied or de facto mandate is informal, decentralised and shared. The 
Australian government exerts some control over the RBA through curtailing the 
RBA’s independence, and theoretically can alter RBA policy, but such a step 
would be reactive rather than proactive and therefore not a true governance 
mechanism. There are accordingly regulatory gaps in governance mechanisms 
for the RBA’s financial stability responsibility.  
 
In the absence of a clear hard law mandate for the RBA, and inadequate 
supplementary governance mechanisms acting as drivers and controls of RBA 
actions, behavioural factors potentially play a disproportionately important role 
in influencing the acts of the RBA. This thesis argues that behavioural factors 
(originating in the behavioural sciences such as psychology and sociology) 
could be unduly important in the regulation of the RBA’s conduct in financial 
stability, and that ultimately it may be because of the personal power of the 
RBA Governor that the RBA pursues a financial stability objective. 
 
Sociological and psychological factors have been recognised as drivers of 
human (and organisational) behaviour in a legal context by legal theorists,106 
for example to explain why laws are obeyed, or why certain acts are taken or 
avoided. A detailed discussion of this theory is beyond the scope of this 
 
106 See for example Tom R Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton University Press, 
2006). Work by Christine Parker and John Braithwaite in relation to tax and competition 
compliance, and other scholars about compliance with environmental regulation, are further 
examples, but beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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thesis.107 These behavioural factors are not inherently negative or positive, and 
apply to individuals, and individuals when acting for an institution or 
corporation. 
 
Behavioural factors that can most likely play a role108 in the case of the RBA’s 
financial stability responsibility, are  
 
1. the personal characteristics of individuals, in particular those of the 
Governor (‘personality’, as referred to this thesis) and  
 
2. the pursuit of prestige.109  
 
Assuming that the RBA is a model regulator, with the highest professional and 
ethical standards, employing the most competent, professional and ethical 
personnel (including the Governor and Deputy Governor), what compels the 
RBA to pursue financial stability as a goal?110 The answer may be that strong 
personal qualities and leadership, in particular those of the Governor, gives 
effect to public policy goals, and leads the organisation (and the country) in the 
desired direction – that is the power of personality. As it is an ex ante factor, 
and operates proactively, it is therefore discussed with governance 
mechanisms in this chapter.  
 
Alternatively, or additionally, the answer may be that the RBA as an 
organisation and its leaders and officers seek prestige and work to impress and 
 
107 The focus of this thesis is on the gaps in the existing framework and the threats of 
behavioural factors, not behavioural governance factors per se.  
 
108 These factors can provide both the impetus for action, but can also put the brakes on action 
and are therefore both drivers and controls.  
 
109 In this regard, ‘personality’ refers to the individual characteristics and personal make-up of 
the relevant individual, in this case mostly the powerful Governor, and ‘prestige’ to the desire for 
and need to achieve and ensure respect and acclaim. It is in particular the person and 
personality of the Governor that matters, because of their unusual and important role. 
 
110 The answer, as discussed above, is not ‘clear regulatory goals’. The answer also does not lie 
in ‘clear regulatory responsibility’. There are no express regulatory objectives and the mandate 
is informal. There are also no clear government controls. 
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excel domestically and internationally. Seeking prestige and excellence would 
include the desire of the RBA’s officials and the organisation to obtain 
favourable peer review and admiration, and to satisfy political and electorate 
expectations. It would also involve the avoidance of sanction and disgrace, and 
therefore will be discussed as an accountability mechanism in the next chapter. 
Some key drivers and controls of the RBA as financial stability regulator may 
be behavioural factors. The consequence is that principles of good 
governance, democracy, legitimacy of regulatory institutions in Australia and 
the rule of law will be undermined. 
 
2 The Personality and Person of the Governor 
 
The personality of the Governor as the leader of the RBA (encompassing for 
purposes of this discussion especially their personal characteristics and 
abilities) is generally important but becomes even more significant in light of a 
weak hard law framework. 111  Personality relates not only to worldview, 
background, political persuasion and philosophical beliefs, but also to the 
manner in which the individual is able to deal with (and use) power, peer 
pressure and persuasion. The potential for personality in this sense to play a 
very significant role is increased in the face of lesser hard law regulatory forces. 
Personality (and power) play a measurable role in the making of risk 
decisions112 and policymaking.113 
 
 
111 The focus in this discussion is specifically on the Governor, but it is acknowledged that the 
role of the Deputy Governor and other senior RBA officials can also be very influential. 
 
112 See for example G J Davies, G Kendall, E Soane, J Li, F Charnley and S J T Pollard, 
‘Regulators as ‘Agents’: Power and Personality in Risk Regulation and a Role for Agent-Based 
Simulation’ (2010) 13(8) Journal of Risk Research 961; See also the modelling of the influence 
of personality: G J Davies, G Kendall, E Soane, J Li, S A Rocks, S R Jude and S J T Pollard, 
‘Regulators as Agents: Modelling Personality and Power as Evidence is Brokered to Support 
Decisions on Environmental Risk’ (2014) 466-467 (January) Science of the Total Environment 
74. 
 
113 James Basham and Aanor Roland, ‘Policy-Making of the European Central Bank during the 
Crisis: Do Personalities Matter?’ (Working Paper No 38/2014, Institute for International Political 
Economy Berlin, 2014) <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/101312/1/790611287.pdf>. 
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The personality and personal characteristics of central bank governors are 
important considerations. Central bank governors may even be selected for 
their even-keel rationalist and moderate approaches to life, as generally central 
bank governors project an image of rational and dispassionate care.114 That 
view is not held universally though. It has for example been said that: 115 
[t]he problem with both independent courts and independent banks can be 
stated very simply: they may run amok. Constitutional scholars and central 
bankers not infrequently belong to extreme, sectarian and ideological schools 
of thought.  
 
While there may be no evidence that any governor of the RBA fell into any of 
these extreme sectarian or ideological schools, the risk exists. In fact, recent 
political events in the world have demonstrated the extent to which populist 
views for example can succeed politically.116 
 
Importantly, though, ‘the literature has shown that the identity of central bank 
council members [including governors] has an important bearing on economic 
outcomes’.117 Markets react to changes in central bank governor.118 There is 
 
114 Former RBA Governor Glenn Stevens was described by the then Treasurer, Wayne Swan, 
as a ‘somewhat dour character, albeit with a wry sense of humour’, and with ‘a complex and 
interesting personality’ evidenced by him being both ‘quite a good jazz guitarist’ and ‘a pillar of 
his church’: See Jessica Irvine, Vanda Carson and Ellie Harvey, ‘Treat for Elite as Reserve 
Bank Celebrates’, Sydney Morning Herald (online, 9 February 2010) 
<https://www.smh.com.au/business/treat-for-elite-as-reserve-bank-celebrates-20100208-
nnc5.html>. See also Annelise Riles, ‘The Secret Lives of Central Bankers’, The New York 
Times (online, 20 October 2018) <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/20/opinion/sunday/fed-
central-banks.html>. She notes that central bank governors are often aloof and rational, and as 
a group is not very diverse. 
 
115 See Jon Elster, ‘Constitutional Courts and Central Banks: Suicide Prevention or Suicide 
Pact?’ (1994) 3(3 – 4) East European Constitutional Review 66. 
 
116 The election of Donald Trump as President in the US is a prime example. See John H Farrar 
and Louise Parsons, ‘Financial Stability After the Global Financial Crisis: Globalisation, 
Nationalism and the Potential Demise of a Rules-Based Order’ in John H Farrar, Bee Chen Goh 
and Vai Io Lo (eds), Scholarship, Practice and Education in Comparative Law: A Festschrift in 
Honour of Mary Hiscock (Springer, forthcoming). 
 
117 Christoph Moser and Axel Dreher, ‘Do Markets Care about Central Bank Governor 
Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets’ (2010) 42(8) Journal of Money, Credit and 





also evidence that governments can undermine central bank independence by 
‘filling lead positions at central banks with individuals that are favourably 
predisposed towards the policies put forward by the Government’. 119  The 
personality and personal qualities of the Governor therefore matter. 120 
Although governors are not the only policy-makers in central banks, they are 
the most important individuals. Central bank governors are also ‘among the 
most important non-elected policy makers in modern democracies’. 121 
Governors often have ‘considerable freedom of maneuver (sic)’122 because of 
central bank independence from government. Accordingly, ‘the appointment of 
responsive governors and the removal of “hostile” ones becomes the main 
source of influence that elected officials can exert over monetary policy’.123 In 
the case of the RBA, the role and responsibilities of the Governor are, as shown 
above, extensive and highly influential. 
 
The biographies of central bankers matter as the views and economics 
background of the governor can affect decision-making in the institution.124 For 
example, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, 
acknowledged the fundamental influence of discussions he had as a child with 
his grandmother about the Great Depression on his role as Chair of the Federal 
Reserve.125 A recent study concluded that biographical elements of central 
 
119 See Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik, ‘Party Politics and the Survival of Central Bank Governors’ 
(2014) 53(3) European Journal of Political Research 500. 
 
120 See also Perry Mehrling, Laurence S Moss, Jocelyn Pixley and George S Tavlas, ‘What If 
the Leader of the Central Bank Told Hilarious Jokes and Did Card Tricks? A Panel of Experts’ 
(2007) 66(5) American Journal of Economics and Sociology 863. 
 






124 See Frédéric Lebaron and Aukiz Dogan, ‘Do Central Bankers’ Biographies Matter?’ (2016) 
10(2) Sociologica 1. 
 
125 Ibid. See also John Simon, ‘Ten Years of Research – What Have We Learnt Since the 
Financial Crisis?’ (Speech, Economic Society of Australia (QLD) and Griffith University 
Symposium, 7 March 2019) <https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2019/sp-so-2019-03-07.html>. 
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bank council members including governors ‘help to better understand, or at 
least suggest refined interpretations about the dynamics of position-takings 
inside councils, and consequently monetary and financial policies of the central 
banks’.126 The biographies – and personal characteristics – of central bank 
officials and governors ‘allow to analyze (sic) from a more concrete basis what 
is really at stake in this very particular multidimensional élite group, which is 
evolving over time’.127 The broad political persuasion of the governor also 
matters and can affect their professional role.128  
 
It is not just the extent to which personal characteristics may influence a 
Governor’s policy-related decisions that matter. Personal characteristics such 
as the ability to negotiate, and use and/or resist the use of power, peer pressure 
and persuasion, will affect the way in which policy may be determined. The 
manner in which a Governor is able to interact with other important 
stakeholders, and in particular other important personalities on boards, 
committees and councils, may be determinative. This is particularly important 
in Australia, where the mandate for financial stability is decentralised. The 
personalities of others role players such as the Minister of Finance, Treasurer, 
and head of APRA are also important.129  
 
One of the most significant tools in financial stability that the RBA has  is 
persuasion. The Governor, and the RBA, may, for example, have to persuade 
APRA to take certain steps, if the RBA deems those steps necessary.130 The 
 




128 An empirical analysis has for example shown that ‘a governor’s ties to a political party in 
Government or opposition have a statistically significant and substantively important impact on 
their odds of surviving in office’: Ennser-Jedenastik (n 119) 515. 
 
129 The personalities and their effects on the roles of central bank governors are evident from 
their biographies. See for example the description of Mervyn King: Dan Conaghan, The Bank: 
Inside the Bank of England (Biteback Publishing, 2012) 1, 63-99; See also Ben Bernanke, The 
Courage to Act: A Memoir on a Crisis and its Aftermath (Norton, 2015). 
 
130 Ellis refers to the RBA’s use of a metaphorical microphone and a megaphone. The role of 
the person in communication is however important. See Luci Ellis, ‘Why Financial Stability 
Policy Matters, and What We Can Do About It’ (Address, University of Adelaide, 4 June 2014) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2014/sp-so-fs-040614.html>. 
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RBA has to persuade the banks or the markets, to engage in practices that will 
benefit financial stability. In debates at the CFR, the personal power of the 
Governor may also play a role. Personality clashes could for example have an 
important impact, as can personal agendas, and where there are no guiding 
legal principles, it may come down to personalities and personal agendas. The 
Governor may use their personal power to influence decisions; or may 
succumb to powerplay by others at the CFR or on the RBA Board.  
 
The role of personality in procuring the compliance by the RBA with the needs 
of government is important. It has been determined that ‘the best way to ensure 
compliance with regulatory regimes is by appealing to self-interest, defined as 
rational calculation of the magnitude of liability discounted by the probability of 
enforcement’.131  
 
Although it has been demonstrated at the level of regulation of regulatees such 
as banks and financial institutions, that ‘hard law (required behaviors (sic), 
processes, or disclosure) is effective to induce compliance, but only up to the 
point where resistance and a defensive culture ensues’132 the same is not 
necessarily true at the level of a regulator which is a government agent. 
 
The key issue is, however, that where there is considerable fundamental fluidity 
in the legal framework of the RBA in relation to ‘who does what and how’, then 
the personality of the Governor may have a disproportionately significant role to 
play, and may even amount to one of the key tools of control and influence of the 




131 Rupp and Williams (n 19) 583. 
 
132 It has nevertheless also been pointed out that soft law has ‘the potential to engage a broader 
range of human motivations, needs, emotions, and moral reasoning, and thus might more 
effectively encourage behaviors that optimize society's regulatory goals than do approaches 
that rely only on appeal to the instrumental considerations or self-interest of the regulated 
entity’: Ibid 585.  
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The issue is whether these should play a significant regulatory or governing role 
in the behaviour of a government regulatory agent, and what effect that may have 




This chapter has demonstrated that the range of governance mechanisms that 
control and drive the RBA’s financial stability function are not optimal. The fact 
that the RBA has an informal and decentralised mandate for financial stability 
lies at the heart of the issue, as the mandates and powers of a regulatory 
agency when acting as an agent of government are important. The RBA is 
further governed by its relationship with the government, notably through its 
design as an independent central bank. As summarised in Appendix 3, the 
governance mechanisms, together with the transparency and accountability 
mechanisms discussed in Chapter 7, ultimately form a long list of controls on 
and drivers of the RBA, but these are not truly effective as controls or drivers 
of the RBA’s financial stability responsibilities. In light of predominantly soft law 
governance mechanisms, there is the possibility that behavioural factors, such 
as the role of personality, may play a disproportionately important role in the 
governance of the RBA, at the expense of legitimacy and general principles of 
democracy and the rule of law. The transparency and accountability 






CHAPTER 7  
 
Accountability of the RBA as Financial Stability Regulator 
 
 
… [A]ccountability. It is the very bedrock of central bank independence in a 
democratic society.1 
 
[A] central bank cannot be accountable for everything.2 
 
I  Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the accountability framework of the RBA in its financial 
stability responsibility. Part II considers the role of transparency mechanisms 
as controls and drivers of the RBA’s actions, and concludes that few are 
significant as controls and drivers in the financial stability responsibility. It also 
demonstrates how the search for prestige is a further behavioural influence on 
the RBA. Part III considers how the need to justify its actions, and the possibility 
of sanction, could drive and control the RBA in its financial stability 
responsibility. It considers accountability through Parliamentary control (Part III 
A), control by the Executive (Part III B), and the possibility for control by the 
Judiciary (Part III C).  
 
This chapter however concludes that the existing governance and 
accountability mechanisms, which feature a preponderance of soft law 
 
1 Guy Debelle, ‘Central Bank Independence in Retrospect’ (Speech, Bank of England 
Independence: 20 Years On Conference, 28 September 2017) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2017/pdf/sp-dg-2017-09-28.pdf>.  
 
2 Ian J Macfarlane, ‘Monetary Policy and Financial Stability’ (Speech, CEDA Annual Dinner, 16 
November 2004) <https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2004/dec/pdf/bu-1204-1.pdf>. 
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mechanisms, are assessed as being ineffective governance and accountability 
mechanisms of the RBA, in light of its informal, decentralised and shared 
mandate for financial stability. The transparency and accountability 
mechanisms are also summarised in Appendix 3. 
 
II Transparency Mechanisms 
 
As described in Chapter 6, this thesis considers governance, transparency and 
accountability to be on a regulatory continuum. Transparency mechanisms are 
primarily accountability mechanisms, because of the ‘fear of disclosure’, or the 
‘fear’ of the ‘disinfectant effect of sunlight’. 3  Prestige-seeking behaviour is 
therefore also a factor in relation to transparency and accountability. 
Transparency mechanisms can provide both contemporaneous visibility to 
actions of regulators (continuous or real time disclosure), and can also be 
provided after the fact (ex post facto), by reporting past actions or behaviours. 
Some disclosure could be for the purpose of justification, and potentially 
sanction. Some transparency mechanisms are statutory, although arguably 
some of the most powerful transparency mechanisms may come through 
involuntary press and public disclosures. 
 
A The Role of Disclosure in the Accountability of a Government 
Regulatory Agency  
 
Disclosure forms part of how a government regulatory agency gives account of 
its activities. Disclosure plays many different roles. The anticipation of 
disclosure through accountability mechanisms4 that also require transparency 
 
3 See Luc Juillet and Éric Phélippeau, ‘Sunshine is said to be the best of disinfectants: 
Transparency as a Tool of Ethics Regulation in Canada and France’ (Conference Paper, 
International Research Society for Public Management, 14 April 2016) 
<https://irspm2016.exordo.com/files/papers/604/final_draft/IRSPM_Conflict_of_Interest_Juillet_
Paper.pdf>. On its limitations, see however, Amitai Etzioni, ‘Is Transparency the Best 
Disinfectant?’ (2010) 18(4) The Journal of Political Philosophy 389. 
 
4 The ’usual set of accountability questions’ have been described as being ‘who, to whom, how, 
for what, in accordance with what standards, and with what effects’: Julia Black, ‘Constructing 
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can influence the behaviour of the RBA as a regulator: that is the regulatory 
purpose of transparency and accountability regimes.5 Measures imposed to 
hold an organisation or person accountable can amount to measures of 
control, 6  because actions, rights and expectations of the accountor 7  can 
influence the behaviour, decisions and actions of the accountee8 (in this case 
the RBA). Being accountable performs a regulatory or controlling function for 
independent regulatory agencies. The three principles – control, accountability 
and independence – are inextricably related in the case of a central bank such 
as the RBA.9 In view of central banks’ important roles and redistributive effects, 
accountability by central banks is of key importance,10 and transparency and 
accountability therefore accompany central bank independence. The fact that 
a central bank will be accountable supports its legitimacy and credibility, and 
justifies its independence:11  
It is then in the continuing life of that entity that accountability becomes 
necessary to ensure legitimacy. An accountable central bank must give 
 
and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2(2) 
Regulation & Governance 137, 138 (‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and 
Accountability’). 
 
5 See for example Chapters 12 and 13 on compliance and enforcement and sanction as 
methods of regulation: Arie Freiberg, Regulation in Australia (Federation Press, 2017). See also 
the section on accountability: at 84-99.  
 
6 ‘To be accountable is to agree to subject oneself to relationships of external scrutiny which 
can have consequences’: Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability’ (n 
4) 150.  
 
7 The accountor is the entity to whom the account must be made. 
 
8 The accountee is the entity accounting for its actions. 
 
9 For a discussion of issues relating to accountability, including the involvement of the accountor 
and the cooperation by the accountee, see Julia Black, ‘Calling Regulators to Account: 
Challenges, Capacities and Prospects’ (Working Paper No 15/2012, London School of 
Economics and Political Science Law Department, 11 October 2012) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2160220> (‘Calling Regulators to 
Account’). 
 
10 Charles Goodhart and Rosa Maria Lastra, Central Bank Accountability and Judicial Review 






account, explain and justify the actions or decisions taken, against criteria of 
some kind, and take responsibility for any fault or damage. 
 
Central bank accountability is accordingly not simply an ‘ex post’ factor of 
central bank governance, but rather inextricably linked to independence. It is 
not simply ‘an “add-on” to justify independence’.12 Rather, central banks are 
‘accountably independent’,13 and14  
[a]ccountability – ex ante and ex post – is a constitutive part of the design of 
an independent agency in a democratic system, whose aim is to bring back 
the central bank to the system of checks and balances, (trias politica) (sic).  
 
Transparency is a first step in accountability, 15  as accountability inevitably 
involves a measure of disclosure. Transparency allows for actions to be 
observed; accountability per se requires explanation or justification, and often 
also the taking of responsibility for actions and/or suffering punitive 
measures.16 
 
To be ‘accountable’ therefore includes the provision of an explanation and 
justification for actions taken. 17  It could also include the imposition of 
consequences if explanations and justifications do not satisfy the requirements 
of the accountor. In the case of the RBA, the Australian government and 






14 Ibid (emphasis unaltered). 
 
15 It can be seen as the first step – the giving of account (ie making actions transparent). See 




17 See Black, ‘Calling Regulators to Account’ (n 9); See Bird (n 19). 
 
18 Black adds the ‘consequences’ component: Black, ‘Calling Regulators to Account’ (n 9).  
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Accountability accordingly has three components:19 
1. Disclosure (or transparency) - the accounting entity merely discloses 
facts/acts/decisions or makes them transparent; 
 
2. Justification - the accounting entity explains and justifies 
facts/acts/decisions etc; and 
 
3. Sanction (or consequences) - the accounting entity accepts 
responsibility and/or is made to suffer sanctions or punitive 
consequences in the event that it has failed to comply with its 
obligations. 
 
Accountability measures can also be categorised according to their different 
strengths:20 
• Weak accountability measures relate to explanations and justification 
(the consequence of which may be negative publicity and some 
recommendations); and  
• Strong accountability measures require the regulator to respond, for 
example by changing or reversing a decision, or to suffer the imposition 
of a penalty, such as removal from office, or a civil or criminal sanction. 
 
Sanctions have both punitive and deterrent effects, and are therefore strong 





19 This classification reflects the approaches of Goodhart, Lastra, Bird and Black. See: Goodhart 
and Lastra (n 10); See also Joanna Bird, ‘Regulating the Regulators: Accountability of 
Australian Regulators’ (2011) 35(3) Melbourne University Law Review 739. 
 






Transparency has been described as a ‘soft’ form of accountability. 21 
Disclosure is an important component of accountability, and in particular the 
fear of disclosure has an impact on the behaviour chosen by an institution. In 
fact,22  
[t]ransparency is seen as a key element of accountability in an era of central 
bank independence. As central banks have become more independent and 
freer to choose their tactics, transparency has come to be seen as a 
mechanism enabling the public to assess whether the actions of central 
bankers are consistent with their mandate.  
 
The pressure for transparency has been described as being ‘more intense’ as 
the mandate of central banks ‘extends beyond the pursuit of easily quantifiable, 
independently verifiable targets like the rate of inflation to encompass 
emergency lending, securities market intervention, and related financial 
operations’.23 Financial stability could also be added to that list. Transparency 
involves the disclosure of actions and practices of the agency, and will ideally 
reflect that the agency is acting in accordance with requirements. Accordingly, 
transparency is a means by which central banks not only enhance their policy 
credibility but retain flexibility.24 
 
 
21 See Frans Van Dijk, ‘Independence and Autonomy: The Parallel Worlds of Courts and Public 
Agencies’, Blog of the Montaigne Centre for Rule of Law and Administration of Justice (Blog 
Post, 11 December 2018) <http://blog.montaignecentre.com/index.php/1265/independence-
and-autonomy-the-parallel-worlds-of-courts-and-public-agencies/>. In this regard, transparency 
has been likened to dialogue. 
 
22 N Nergiz Dincer and Barry Eichengreen, ‘Central Bank Transparency and Independence: 
Updates and New Measures’ (Working Paper No 2013-21, 4 September 2013) 2 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2579544>. 
 
23 Ibid 3.  
 
24 Ibid 3. 
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Various indices of central bank transparency have been created, the details of 
which are beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is worth noting that economic, 
political, operational, procedural and policy transparency elements play a role 
in these indices.25 This thesis focusses on concrete transparency requirements 
that affect or may affect the behaviour of the RBA, and that can act as controls 
or drivers of the RBA in its financial stability role. 
 
C Overview of Transparency Requirements and Mechanisms 
 
The RBA is subject to many transparency requirements. 
 
1 General Transparency Mechanisms 
 
There is large number of mechanisms that require the RBA to be transparent 
and to disclosure its operations. These have diverse origins, but do not 
specifically support the financial stability mandate. It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to discuss all transparency mechanisms in detail (see also Appendix 3 
for a summary of the governance, transparency and accountability 
mechanisms of the RBA in table form). 
 
(a) Regular/routine disclosures 
 
The RBA makes a number of routine/regular but nevertheless important 
disclosures. Some of these reports are in response to statutory requirements; 
 
25 See Dincer and Eichengreen (n 22); In relation to central bank transparency, see also, for 
example, Christopher W Crowe and Ellen E Meade, ‘Central Bank Independence and 
Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness’ (Working Paper No 08/119, International Monetary 
Fund, 1 May 2008) <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Central-Bank-
Independence-and-Transparency-Evolution-and-Effectiveness-21903>; See B Laurens, M 
Arnone and J Segalotto (eds), Central Bank Independence, Accountability, and Transparency : 
A Global Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); See further Rania Al-Mashat, Ales Bulir and 
N Nergiz Dinçer, An Index for Transparency for Inflation-Targeting Central Banks: Application to 
the Czech National Bank (International Monetary Fund, 2018). 
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others are self-imposed/voluntary disclosures and communications. As 
transparency is a way in which to enhance and enforce governance, the extent 
of transparency adopted by the RBA should be noted (see also Appendix 3): 
 
1. RBA publications/reports include the Reserve Bank of Australia Annual 
Report, the Quarterly Bulletin, Financial Stability Report, Quarterly 
Statement on Monetary Policy, and the Payments System Board Annual 
Report. The Reserve Bank of Australia Annual Report is tabled before 
the Standing Committee on Economics in Parliament. Of particular 
importance is also the publication of minutes of the monetary policy 
committee meetings of the Reserve Bank Board;26 
 
2. Oral/written statements: Speeches by governors are delivered in public 
and published on the RBA website; other oral/written statements include 
the RBA’s Governor’s address to Parliament in accordance with 
undertakings in the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy, and 
Interest Rate Decisions (published) 27  as well as Statements on 
Monetary Policy28;  
 
3. Discussions that involve transparency include those at the CFR, in 




4. Statutory transparency requirements include reports under legislation 
such as the PGPA Act, and Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-
Terrorism Financing legislation; 
 
26 These minutes are published after the meeting on the first Tuesday of every month excluding 
January. The minutes have been publicly available since 3 October 2006. See ‘Minutes’, 
Reserve Bank of Australia (Web Page, 2018) <https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/rba-
board-minutes/2018>. 
 
27 See ‘Interest Rate Decisions 1990’, Reserve Bank of Australia (Web Page, 1990) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/int-rate-decisions/1990/>. 
 




5. Audit reports: Auditing is important because although the audited entity 
submits to the process, it does not create the audit report. The level of 
objectivity in this form of transparency is therefore higher. The fact that 
the RBA is required by statute to have an audit committee29 further 
contributes to governance, because failures in governance mechanisms 
often have financial repercussions, and audit reports typically include 
potential legal exposures including existing and pending legal 
proceedings; 
 
6. Annual financial statements provided to the Auditor-General: under 
s 7A(8) of the RBA Act and in accordance with s 42(1)(b) PGPA Act, the 
RBA is required to provide annual financial statements to the Auditor-
General after approval by the Reserve Bank Board; and 
 
7. Miscellaneous disclosures which include the RBA’s Corporate plan, 
research publications, conference publications, and workshop notes.30 
 
Of the various routine publications of the RBA, the financial stability review is 
the most relevant publication for the financial stability mandate. The RBA 
commenced publication of the financial stability review without any statutory or 
other compulsion, at a time when financial stability became an important topic 
in central banking circles.  
 
(b) Ad hoc disclosures 
 
The RBA also makes a number of ad hoc or specific disclosures. Some 
disclosures may be required in specific circumstances and unlike those listed 
 
29 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 7A(9). 
 




above, are not routine acts by the RBA. Some of these disclosures are 
voluntary, or partly voluntary. These include submissions to law reform 
commissions and commissions of inquiry,31 and information to the IMF and/or 
FSB in relation to country peer reviews.32 Some information may be provided 
to international fora and meetings, such as for example the Basel Committee 
and BIS. In certain circumstances, the RBA may also engage with the 
press/media,33 make press statements or answer questions in public forms 
such as at conferences.  
 
Transparency is however sometimes imposed on the RBA. Apart from 
unavoidable scrutiny by the press, there is also general public commentary and 
academic scrutiny.34 Although it is not a reflection of work performed by the 
RBA itself, the so-called RBA Shadow Board at the Australian National 
University’s Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis  provides valuable 
critique and commentary.35 FOI requests also fall into this category.36 Unless 
the RBA can legally resist FOI requests, responses are compulsory. Further, 
questioning of the Governor by Parliament can also serve as an involuntary 
imposition of transparency. All of these disclosures can affect the standing or 





32 Such as for example, Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority, Macroprudential Analysis and Policy in the Australian Financial Stability Framework 
(Report, September 2012) <https://www.rba.gov.au/fin-stability/resources/2012-09-map-aus-
fsf/pdf/2012-09-map-aus-fsf.pdf>. 
 
33 See ‘Latest Media Releases’, Reserve Bank of Australia (Web Page, 2019) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/>. 
 
34 The BIS also critiques central banks. See John Mauldin, ‘The Bank Of Central Banks Reveals 




35 ‘CAMA RBA Shadow Board’, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis (Web Page, 31 
August 2017) <https://cama.crawford.anu.edu.au/rba-shadow-board>. 
 




2  The Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 
(Cth) and Related Obligations 
 
The RBA is required to comply with a host of financial, corporate or procedural 
governance requirements.37 The key statutory governance mechanism that 
could have a controlling effect on the policy actions of the RBA is the PGPA 
Act. Although many of these can be categorised as governance requirements, 
they are dealt with in this chapter because of the significant reporting 
requirements under the PGPA Act. It is not always possible to strictly delineate 
between governance and transparency requirements and this is one such 
example. The PGPA Act and its effect on the RBA also demonstrate that it is 
not always possible to draw a clear line between governance, transparency 
and accountability on the continuum discussed in Chapter 6. 
The RBA Act in s 7A38 confirms the application of the PGPA Act  to the RBA 
(subject to certain exceptions),39 and regulates the interaction between the 
RBA Act and the PGPA Act in terms of the relationship between the disclosure 
obligations under the RBA Act and those under the PGPA Act. The details of 
these are not relevant for purposes of this thesis.  
The obligations of the RBA under the PGPA Act are however important 
supplements to the RBA Act. The Governor is the accountable authority for the 
RBA under the PGPA Act.40 As this is an individual role, the way in which the 
role is fulfilled will reflect the subjective characteristics of the incumbent. 
 
37 These include governance requirements stemming for example from anti-money laundering 
and counter-terrorism financing obligations. See also Appendix 2. 
 
38  Under the RBA Act s 7A, the RBA is subject to the Public Governance, Performance and 
Accountability Act 2013 (Cth), with the Governor as the accountable authority (s 7A(1)).  
 
39 The exceptions that the RBA is not required to comply with, are listed in Reserve Bank Act 
1959 (Cth) s 7A(2), and board members of both the RBA Board and the Payments System 
Board (with the exception of the Governor, Deputy Governor and RBA staff members) are not 
considered to be officials under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 
2013 (Cth) (see Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 7A(3) and (4)). 
 
40 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 7A(1). 
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The key relevant obligations of the Governor as the ‘accountable authority’ 
under the PGPA Act are: 
• To govern the RBA ‘so as to promote proper use of public resources, 
achieve the purposes of the entity and promote the financial 
sustainability of the entity’ (s 15(1)); 
• To ‘establish appropriate systems of risk and control, including oversight 
in the agency, and an appropriate internal system of control’ (s 16); 
• To ‘encourage officials to cooperate with others’ (s 17);41  
• To ‘manage the risk of imposing requirements on others’ (s 17); and 
• To ‘keep the relevant minister and Minister of Finance informed’ (s 18) 
to the extent that the information is consistent with the enabling 
legislation of the RBA (s 17(4A)), and subject to confidentiality 
provisions’. 
 
All officials (including the Governor, Deputy Governor and other employees of 
the RBA) are also required to perform their duties in accordance with the PGPA 
Act. In particular, officers have a duty of due care and diligence,42 with the 
relevant standard being that of a reasonable person in the same position.43 
Officials are to act in good faith, for a proper purpose,44 and may not improperly 
use their position.45  Officials may not use information obtained during the 
course of their employment improperly and/or for their own advantage or to 
cause detriment to the Commonwealth of Australia,46 and all potential conflicts 
of interest must be disclosed.47 
 
41 It is not clear whether this cooperation is limited to other RBA employees, or also the other 
regulatory agencies such as APRA and ASIC. 
 
42 Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth) s 25. 
 
43 Ibid s 25(1)(a) and (b). 
 
44 Ibid s 26. 
 
45 Ibid s 27. 
 
46 Ibid s 28. 
 




The RBA as a body corporate also has to comply with other requirements of 
the PGPA Act, which relate to good corporate governance, including 
budgeting, 48  record-keeping, 49  performance measurement, 50  and financial 
reporting.51 It is evident that the PGPA Act imposes a significant number of 
governance and reporting (transparency) obligations on the RBA.  
 
In addition to the impositions from the PGPA Act, the Department of Finance 
treats the RBA as a ‘material entity’ and a ‘public financial corporation’, and 
makes the RBA subject to Commonwealth Procurement Rules.52 The RBA’s 
employees are however not engaged under the Public Service Act.53  
 
The public character of the RBA is therefore evident from the externally 
imposed transparency requirements. All of these requirements are however 
general in nature, and they do not specifically govern the RBA in its core policy 




What is evident from the discussion on transparency above, is that none of the 
measures of transparency specifically controls or directs the financial stability 
function. However, the mere fact that communication or disclosure is made – 
or will be made – serves as a form of control and regulation. In principle, it 
 
48 Ibid s 36. 
 
49 Ibid s 37. 
 
50 Ibid s 38. 
 
51 Ibid Part 2 Division 4. Please note that this list is not a complete list of all the obligations 
under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth). 
 
52 See ‘Flipchart of PGPA Act Commonwealth Entities and Companies (186)’, Australian 






influences behaviours and decisions before they are taken, and also influences 
behaviour after the communication or disclosure has elicited some response.  
 
The transparency mechanisms discussed above are however assessed by this 
thesis as having on the whole low effectiveness as controls and drivers of the 
financial stability responsibility (see also Appendix 3).54 They are mostly not 
specifically linked to the financial stability responsibility and do not compel or 
direct any actions in relation to financial stability.  
 
It may be that the fear or anticipation of disclosure – whether that disclosure 
arises voluntarily or involuntarily, formally or informally, through routine 
transparency measures or imposed accountability obligations – has a more 
important ‘governing’ effect. The mere anticipation of disclosure has been 
identified as an important governing mechanism,55 and without the anticipation 
of disclosure, some governing mechanisms would likely not be effective. 
Accordingly, to the extent that in some cases the RBA’s behaviour may be 
influenced because of transparency requirements and it could affect the 
prestige in which the institution is held by peers, markets, the regulatees, the 
State and the public, transparency mechanisms have moderate effectiveness 
also on the financial stability responsibility. The behavioural factor of prestige-
seeking behaviour may however be the real control and driver of the RBA’s 
financial stability actions.  
 
 
54 The assessment of the effectiveness of regulatory mechanisms was done on the basis of how 
likely and how reliably that mechanisms would control and drive the RBA to perform its financial 
stability tasks. It was an overall contextual assessment. That accords broadly with the 
evaluation criteria of effectiveness described by Freiberg, namely whether the objective has 
been achieved. See also Freiberg (n 5) 479. 
 
55 The anxiety of discovery has been described as a powerful regulatory force. See Andrew 
Schmulow, ‘Constructively Tough? Neither Side Has Committed to Fully Adopting Perhaps the 
Most Important Recommendation of the Banking Royal Commission’, The Conversation (online, 
18 April 2018) (for URL see Bibliography). 
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D Governance by Prestige? The Potential Role of Prestige-seeking 
Behaviour 
 
The second behavioural factor that can play a disproportionate role in 
controlling and influencing the actions of the RBA is the search for prestige. As 
noted above, in this context the search for prestige is synonymous with an 
endeavour to achieve comparative excellence. Central banks covet respect 
and admiration because of the need for credibility in order to exert influence. 
Commanding the respect of the markets, those they supervise (the regulatees), 
those who have appointed them (politicians and indirectly the electorate), and 
those who are affected by their decisions (the general public/electorate), is a 
critical factor in the effective functioning of a central bank,56 and contributes to 
credibility. Professional prestige is therefore sought domestically and 
internationally.57  
 
There is also an important element of personal prestige involved for those at 
the helm of central banks. Considering the traditionally comparatively low 
remuneration packages of central bankers, it has been said that ‘central 
bankers are paid almost entirely in prestige’.58 
 
56 Prestige is a key factor in moral suasion. It is the combination of power and prestige that 
enables central banks to use moral suasion in the markets: See Joseph Lucia, ‘Moral Suasion – 
An Obscure Tool’ (1976) 126(600) Banker 141. For a detailed discussion of the history of the 
search for prestige in central banking, see Claudio Borio and Gianni Toniolo, ‘One Hundred and 
Thirty Years of Central Bank Cooperation: A BIS perspective’ (Working Paper No 197, Bank for 
International Settlements Monetary and Economic Department, February 2006) 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/work197.pdf>. The search for prestige has also been viewed 
negatively as being contrary to an endeavour to honestly serve the public interest, but this view 
has not been accepted without criticism: See Eugenia Toma and Mark Toma, Central Bankers, 
Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy (Kluwer, 1986); See also Myles S Wallace, ‘Book 
Review: Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy’ (1989) 55(3) Southern 
Economic Journal 806. 
 
57 Central bank salaries are traditionally below that of the central bankers’ peers in the market, 
and the salary of the Governor of the RBA is very modest by market standards. Accordingly, the 
role of the Governor is emphasized as a role of personal service and personal esteem, rather 
than personal financial advancement: See for example Karen Maley, ‘RBA Governor Glenn 




58 See Matthew O’Brien, ‘How much is a good central banker worth?’ The Atlantic (online, 19 
April 2012) <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/04/how-much-is-a-good-
central-banker-worth/256089/>: ‘Ben Bernanke is making just $199,700 this year. That's not to 
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In the absence of a strong legal framework that directs and guides the 
operations of the RBA for financial stability, the RBA may, for example, engage 
in certain activities because these appear to be best practice internationally. In 
this regard, the actions of the RBA may be quite fundamentally influenced by 
how the RBA is reflected in analysis by the media, academics and politicians.59  
 
‘Prestige’ and the search for prestige is an important regulatory tool. It is a way 
for the RBA to create and enhance its own credibility and legitimacy.60  
 
III Accountability to the Australian State 
 
The importance of accountability of central banks to both the political process 
and the general public is of critical importance.61 A central bank has to be 
accountable ‘to the politicians and the population at large’. 62  Central bank 
independence depends on accountability. 63  In order to be able to ‘take 
independent decisions about the appropriate stance of monetary policy, a 
central bank has to appropriately justify them’. 64  In fact, ‘[a]n accountable 
 
say that we need to pay central bankers more to attract the best ones. We don't. Economists 
really care about prestige’. 
 
59 After the GFC, the BOE in the UK was essentially motivated by blame-avoidance: See Harpal 
Hungin and Scott James, ‘Central Bank Reform and the Politics of Blame Avoidance in the UK’ 
(2019) 24(3) New Political Economy 334. 
 
60 See Black, ‘Calling Regulators to Account’ (n 9) 146-7. Regulators can work on constructing 
their own legitimacy. The form that the strategy will take can vary and will depend on the type of 
legitimacy sought, including cognitive and normative legitimacy: at 147. The importance of the 
‘legitimacy community’ is also emphasised. Legitimacy is ‘a critical element in motivating 
behavioral responses’: at 148 
 
61 Debelle (n 1). See also Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability’ (n 
4) 137. She notes that accountability is ‘a critical element in the construction and contestation of 
legitimacy claims by both regulators and legitimacy communities, as they are the means by 









central bank should be judged for the reasonableness of its actions, by 
Parliament, the executive, the competent courts of justice and the public.65  
 
Accountability in relation to financial stability objectives is however complex, 
not just because of the nature of financial stability, but also in light of the fact 
that the financial stability responsibility in Australia is both informal and shared. 
Nevertheless, accountability in relation to financial stability objectives needs to 
be clear, and Goodhart and Lastra for example suggest that the criteria against 
which the central bank must account, should be set.66  
 
Some of the ways in which the RBA is held accountable for its operations, acts 
and decisions through disclosure are already inherent in the different ways in 
which transparency of the RBA’s actions is provided because some justification 
may already be included in the disclosure itself.  
 
Additional accountability measures that fall into the categories of justification 
and sanction are discussed below. The structure of the analysis below broadly 
reflects the separation of powers principles in Australian constitutional law, 
focussing on parliamentary, executive and judicial control. These are also 
typical of accountability regimes in constitutional/liberal democratic states 
(parliamentary oversight, executive control and forms of judicial review).67 
 
A Accountability to Parliament and Parliamentary Control 
 
There are no direct sanctions or punitive measures that Parliament can take 
against the RBA as an institution, but by its powers to issue amendment 
legislation, Parliament holds the ultimate control over its statutory creations. 
 
65 Rosa María Lastra, ‘Accountability in the Context of EMU & EBU: Judicial Review of the ECB 
by the CJEU’ (EBI Brexit Seminar, Brussels, 10 January 2018). 
 
66 Goodhart and Lastra (n 10).  
 
67 See Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability’ (n 4) 138. 
 
 266 
Parliament can legislate to change or revoke the RBA’s independence. There 
is no legal reason why Parliament may not take whatever legislative steps it 
sees fit in order to introduce measures which would have the effect of 
sanctions. It can even dissolve or nationalise the RBA as an institution. 
However, as central banking as an economic model is virtually universally 
adopted in all nations in the world, it is rather unthinkable that a developed 
Western democracy such as Australia would resort to such as step. Parliament 
would likely be strongly influenced by international opinion and the practical 
need for a central bank in order for Australia to continue to participate in the 
international financial sphere. 
 
It is however doubtful whether the prospect of legislative change removing 
central bank independence, or drastically changing the organisational structure 
and/or reporting lines of the RBA, or even dissolving the RBA as an 
organisation, would act as an effective control measure for the acts, decisions 
and policy choices of the RBA on a daily basis. In addition, legislative change 
of such a fundamental nature will probably only be implemented if significant 
damage had already been done,68 and will likely not have a significant deterrent 
effect.69 The potential for intervention by Parliament may therefore not directly 
assist with the regulation of the regulator and its conduct when it really matters 
and parliamentary control therefore has been assessed as having very limited 




68 It is likely that for example a complete abolition of the RBA or restructuring of the RBA as 
government department will be an extreme measure, a step that will only likely be taken if the 
status quo in relation to the RBA has become politically intolerable. It would however be a case 
of shutting the gate after the horse had bolted. 
 
69 The role of Parliament has been described as being ‘largely confined to post hoc scrutineer’: 
Julia Black, ‘The Credit Crisis and the Constitution’ in Dawn Oliver, Tony Prosser and Richard 
Rawlings (eds), The Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications (Oxford University Press, 
2010) 92, 118. 
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B Accountability to the Executive and Executive Control 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the Australian government has the power to 
override policy decisions by the RBA,70 and in what could be construed to be a 
personal punitive measure, the Treasurer may terminate the employment of 
the Governor and/or Deputy Governor. 71  Executive control is therefore 
personal – the policy of the RBA may be overridden by government, which may 
diminish the professional standing of the Governor (and/or the RBA)), and the 
Governor and/or Deputy Governor may lose their jobs if they do not exhibit 
‘good behaviour’, which will also reflect poorly on the Governor and/or Deputy 
Governor. These powers have never been used in Australia, and the 
government has not overridden policy or terminated the services of a Governor 
or Deputy Governor. It should be noted that this type of action can enliven both 
the behavioural factors of control – personality and prestige – as well. 
 
The possibility of executive control may however have some deterrent effect. 
The actions and decisions of the Governor and/or Deputy Governor may 
however still be taken in the knowledge that the government may take actions 
that could personally and publicly discredit the Governor, Deputy Governor 
and/or the RBA. The protection of the reputation of both the institution and the 
relevant individuals may have an important governing effect. In this instance, 
personal prestige is an important factor.72  Executive control therefore has 
some or limited benefit as a proactive regulatory tool, as the threat of a personal 
loss of income, reputation, status, respect and power in the event of a 
termination of employment, may control and regulate the behaviour of the RBA 
through the decisions and influence of the Governor.  
 
 
70 RBA Act s 11. 
 
71 Ibid s24(1)(c) – the Governor and Deputy-Governor holds office subject to ‘good behaviour’. 
 
72 For more on this point see the discussion of prestige above. 
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C Judicial Control and Sanction 
 
Judicial control is effectively regulation through imposed liability. The extent of 
judicial control over the RBA in its central banking capacities, and in particular 
in the performance of the financial stability function, is however likely limited. 
(Judicial control in cases where the RBA acts as employer or a commercial 
contracting party is not relevant to this thesis and are disregarded for purposes 
of this discussion.) 
 
1 Civil Liability: Actions Brought by Individuals  
 
A compelling argument can be made that regulatory agencies may be legally 
liable (or should be legally liable) to those affected by the manner in which they 
perform (or fail to perform) their regulatory and supervisory tasks, and that they 
should be capable of being held liable in contract or tort. 73  However, the 
position in Australia is not finally settled.74 Although the tort of misfeasance in 
public office exists in Australia and can (at least theoretically) be used to launch 
an action against a financial regulator, it has not yet been successfully argued 
by persons not directly supervised or regulated by the particular regulator 
against whom such a claim can be made.75 Further, the scope of cases that 
 
73 Giesen argues that supervisors are ‘just not that special...’: Ivo Giesen, ‘Regulating 
Regulators Through Liability: The Case for Applying Normal Tort Rules to Supervisors’ (2006) 
2(1) Utrecht Law Review 8, 31. They do not deserve special consideration, especially in light of 
the fact that ‘[s]upervision and supervisory (or: regulatory) authorities are becoming increasingly 
important as a means of regulating all kinds of public and private enterprises and markets, 
including the market for (other) services’: at 8. Giesen refers to instances where Dutch courts 
held a supervisor liable for supervisory negligence. See also (as cited by Giesen) M Tison, ‘Do 
Not Attack the Watchdog! Banking Supervisor’s Liability After Peter Paul’ (2005) 42(3) Common 
Market Law Review 639. Central banks may also be vulnerable to suit by foreign governments 
or entities: See Harvard Law Review, ‘Notes: Too Sovereign To be Sued’ (2010) 124(2) Harvard 
Law Review 550. 
 
74 An example of a case brought by individuals against a regulator in Australia on the basis of 
misfeasance in office or alleged negligence because of allegedly poor supervision, is Lock v 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) (2016) 248 FCR 547. The action for 
misfeasance in office brought by investors against ASIC failed.  
 
75 See Lock v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) (2016) 248 FCR 547; 
See also Chapel Road Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) (No 
10) (2014) 307 ALR 428. Cases involving claims by regulated entities, for example banks, 
against the regulator, are not relevant to the issue at hand. At issue is whether third parties – ie 
 269 
may lead to legal relief may be limited, as in Australia the High Court confirmed 
that the key issue is the state of mind of the official.76 
 
In the UK, in the case of Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company 
of the Bank of England,77 the tort of misfeasance in public office was accepted 
as the basis for a claim against the BOE. The claim was brought by the Three 
Rivers District Council on the basis of a breach of EU law, alternatively on the 
basis of misfeasance in public office.78 Although the matter was struck out and 
the case did not succeed, misfeasance in public office was acknowledged as 
a ground for an action against a regulator, in that case the BOE. In England, 
as in Australia, the tort requires proof of more than negligence:79 
The main concern in Three Rivers was to confine reasonable foreseeability or 
objective fault to negligence actions, and to insist that at the very least, 
misfeasance required that its defendants knew they were running the risk that 
their actions were illegal and harmful but recklessly went ahead anyway.  
 
The Three Rivers case confirmed that although it may be hard to prove 
misfeasance in public office, because more than mere negligence is required, 
it is possible to bring such a claim against a central bank/supervisory 
authority.80 The Australian position will likely be similar. 
 
the clients of regulated entities, or the public at large – can successfully bring an action against 
a regulator on the basis of misfeasance in public office. Aronson, points out that liability for 
misfeasance in public office can fail even if officers of the relevant institutions had acted beyond 
their powers, provided that their actions were still done in good faith: See Mark Aronson, 
'Misfeasance in Public Office: A Very Peculiar Tort' (2011) 35(1) Melbourne University Law 
Review 1. 
 
76 See Northern Territory of Australia v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307 and Sanders v Snell (1998) 
196 CLR 329. 
 
77 See Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 2) 
[1996] 2 All ER 363 and Three Rivers District Council v. Governor and Company of the Bank of 
England (No. 3) [2000] 3 All ER 558. There were a number of cases of which these are the 
most relevant. 
 
78 See Johann J de Jager, ‘Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank 
of England: A Red Flag or a Red Herring for Bank Supervisors in South Africa’ (2001) 13(4) 
South African Mercantile Law Journal 531. 
 
79 Aronson (n 75) 5 (emphasis added). 
 
80 In the Three Rivers case, the plaintiff could not prove that the BOE had dishonestly granted 
authority to the bank to operate, and had not dishonestly failed to revoke the authorisation to 
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In the Netherlands, the nature and quality of the supervision by the Dutch 
Central Bank formed the basis of a successful action against the Dutch Central 
Bank in 2006, when the Dutch District Court ruled that the Financial 
Supervisory Authority (part of the Central Bank) had acted negligently.81 Cases 
against other financial regulators/supervisors have for example been brought 
in France 82  and Italy. 83  It should be noted that some jurisdictions have 
indemnities that protect their regulators.  
 
Although financial supervisory authorities have sometimes been held liable in 
other jurisdictions, 84  and an action against the RBA on the basis of 
misfeasance in public office or negligence cannot be entirely ruled out, issues 
such as standing and the high threshold that must be proven, will pose 
significant challenges. The value of judicial control in this regard will not be an 





operate: See De Jager (n 78) 539. See also R Dijkstra, ‘Essays on Financial Supervisory 
Liability’ (PhD Thesis, Tilburg University, 2015).  
 
81 See the case against the Insurance Supervisory Authority for a supervisory failure when Vie 
d’Or became bankrupt: See Vie d’Or (Supreme Court of Netherlands, LJN AW2077, 
C04/279HR, 13 October 2006); See Dijkstra (n 80); See also Giesen (n 73); See also Mads 
Andenas and Gudula Deipenbrock (eds), Regulating and Supervising European Financial 
Markets: More Risks than Achievements (Springer, 2016). 
 
82 In the case of Kechichian, the court initially held the regulator/State of France liable on the 
basis of the regular standards of negligence, although on appeal it was determined that a higher 
standard, that of gross negligence, had to be satisfied in order to establish liability: See Cour 
Administrative d’Appel [French Administrative Court of Appeal], 25 January 2000, Kechichian 
(unreported) and Conseil d’État [French Administrative Court], 30 November 2001 reported in 
Rec Lebon (Conseil d’Etat [French Administrative Court], 30 November 2001 reported in 2002 
Juris-Classeur Periodique (the appeal case); See Dijkstra (n 80); See also Andenas and 
Deipenbrock (n 80); See further Giesen (n 73). 
 
83 See the judgement by the Italian Supreme Court against Consob, the public authority 
responsible for the regulation of the Italian securities market. The case was brought on the 
basis of the negligent vetting of a prospectus: See Corte di Cassazione [Supreme Court of 
Italy], 3132 of 2001, 3 March 2001: See also Dijkstra (n 80); See also Giesen (n 73). 
 
84 See Dijkstra (n 80). 
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2 Civil Liability: Class Action Most Likely on the Basis of Negligence 
 
Although class actions are possible in Australia, it seems unlikely that a class 
action on a civil basis, for example on the basis of negligence, against the RBA 
or any of its officers in the course of performing their duties in relation to 
financial stability, will succeed.85 The main legal hurdles will be whether the 
RBA owes a duty to individuals, what the content and standard of that duty is 
(especially in light of the fact that there is no express statutory mandate for 
financial stability), and the case would have to satisfy the ‘necessary condition’ 
test of causation if brought in negligence. 86  In any event, the RBA could 
potentially avoid or reduce liability through joinder of APRA, or even the 
government, because the financial stability mandate is decentralised. A further 
difficulty may lie in creating the requisite ‘class’ of plaintiffs.87 
 
3 Indemnity of the RBA and Indemnities for Officers 
 
Although some jurisdictions have provided their supervisory authorities and/or 
central banks with legal indemnity, 88  the RBA does not have a statutory 
indemnity. Technically, therefore, the RBA could be held liable and be required 
 
85 In Ireland the High Court considered a challenge to the validity of an exercise of a statutory 
power by the Central Bank of Ireland. Although the challenge failed, and the Central Bank’s 
actions were validated, this case is an example of legal and factual circumstances that lead to a 
central bank’s actions being judicially reviewed and/or litigated. See Purcell v Central Bank of 
Ireland & Ors [2016] IEHC 514 (29 July 2016). 
 
86 The various state Civil Liability acts all impose a ‘necessary condition’ requirement for 
causation in tort. 
 
87 This was for example a problem when attempting to mount a class action against commercial 
financial institutions in Australia after the Hayne Commission. See Duncan Hughes, ‘Major 




88 See Ashraf Khan, ‘Legal Protection: Liability and Immunity Arrangements of Central Banks 






to pay any amounts it may be ordered to pay by a court, or perform such action 
as it is ordered by a court to perform.  
 
All board members of the RBA Board and the Payments System Board have 
however been personally indemnified by the RBA ‘against liabilities incurred by 
reason of their appointment to the relevant board or by virtue of holding and 
discharging such office’.89 These indemnities are in substance similar to s 27M 
of the now repealed Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997(Cth) 
(CAC Act). Directors are however not indemnified from the legal consequences 
of actions not taken in good faith.90 As long as the officers therefore act in good 
faith, it is unlikely that they will be personally liable for any losses suffered. 
 
In any event, although persons in ‘public office’ can be held liable for certain 
legal breaches,91 there is no standard test, and no clear defences federally.92 
The problem is that in these cases a very high standard is applied, and actual 
knowledge of, for example a lack of power, is required to establish liability.93 It 
is therefore likely that even in the absence of a formal statutory indemnity, the 
actions of the decision-makers in the RBA may not be guided by the wish to 
avoid legal action. In this sense, too, the extent to which judicial control of this 
nature can have an impact on the way in which the RBA acts, is assessed to 
be limited. 
 
89 See Reserve Bank of Australia, Reserve Bank of Australia: Annual Report 2018 (Report, 27 
August 2018) <https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/annual-reports/rba/2018/pdf/2018-
report.pdf>. Various indemnities had been provided to members in terms of the relevant 
legislation, including (as applicable) s 27M of the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies 
Act 1997 (CAC Act), depending on the relevant time of appointment. Senior RBA staff have 
been indemnified from personal liability that may be incurred in the conduct of their duties at the 
RBA, depending on when the events occurred. The RBA has a policy on assistance to staff for 
legal proceedings.  
 
90 See s 27M of the now repealed CAC Act providing an indemnity for liability. 
 
91 For example, some fiduciary breaches. See Tina Cockburn, ‘Personal Liability of Government 
Officers in Tort and Equity’ in Bryan Horrigan (ed), Government Law and Policy: Commercial 
Aspects (Federation Press, 1998) 374, 374-389. 
 
92 See Alan Robertson, ‘Liability of Public Officers’ (2002) 34 Australian Institute of 
Administrative Law Forum 25. 
 




4 Justiciability of Central Bank Actions 
 
The general justiciability of central bank actions should also be considered, and 
whether actions by central banks – in particular when exercising a financial 
stability function – are justiciable, and whether in particular they can be the 
subject of judicial review. Notwithstanding the possibility of legal action against 
the RBA (or RBA officials) in tort or otherwise in the performance of its financial 
stability mandate, it is unlikely that the relevant actions in relation to financial 
stability of which a plaintiff may complain would constitute justiciable actions. 
In fact, the nature of the pursuit of financial stability may not give rise to a 
justiciable action at all. If that is the case – as will be argued below – it places 
the conduct of the RBA in relation to financial stability beyond the constraints 
of judicial power.  
 
(a) Other Jurisdictions: Justiciability of Central Bank Acts/Omissions 
 
In other jurisdictions, some actions of central banks related to their actions as 
supervisors or monetary policy authorities have been the subject of judicial 
review, notably after the GFC.94  
 
One such example is the review of measures taken by the ECB during the GFC 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 2015 in the decision 
in Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag, Judgment of the Court 
(Grand Chamber) of 16 June 2015.95 The ECB’s powers inter alia to ‘deploy 
unconventional monetary policy measures’ were challenged in the German 
 
94 “Up until the global financial crisis, courts dealt sparsely with central banking actions and 
decisions’: Lastra (n 65).   
 
95 See Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag (Court of Justice of the European Union, C-62/14, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, 16 June 2015).  
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court, and then also referred to the CJEU.96 The CJEU however has express 
power to do so under art 35 of the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks, and what has been described as ‘a fairly consistent standard of judicial 
review’97 has developed. 
 
The 2015 Gauweiler decision by the CJEU, although it also involved issues of 
the supremacy of EU law, essentially considered the powers of the ECB,98 and 
it is therefore relevant to this thesis. The Court held that the Outright Monetary 
Transactions programme adopted by the ECB was in fact compatible with the 
ECB monetary policy mandate. 99  The review of the Gauweiler decision 
involved ‘a close scrutiny of the purposes of a mandate or competence, a check 
whether the instruments deployed serve the mandate, and an analysis whether 
the effects are proportionate to the objectives’.100 At the heart of the matter 
were the legal powers of the ECB. On 10 December 2018 the CJEU held that 
the ECB’s public sector purchase programme was legal and did not breach the 
German Constitution.101 In its considerations of the manner in which the ECB 
acted, the CJEU placed significant emphasis on the ECB’s express mandate. 
 
96 Ursula Knapp and Balazs Koranyi, ‘Germany’s Top Court Rejects Fresh Challenge to ECB 
Powers’, Reuters (online, 18 October 2017) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-ecb-
court/germanys-top-court-rejects-fresh-challenge-to-ecb-powers-idUSKBN1CN0TH>. 
 
97 Lastra (n 65). 
 
98 See Federico Fabbrini, ‘The European Court of Justice, the European Central Bank, and the 
Supremacy of EU Law’ (2016) 23(1) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 3. 
 
99 For a brief discussion, see Goodhart and Lastra (n 10) 6.  
 
100 See Lastra (n 65); See also M Goldmann, ‘Adjudicating Economics? Central Bank 
Independence and the Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review’ (2014) 15(2) German Law 
Journal 265. The Pringle and Gauweiler decisions on the powers of the ECB are controversial 
decisions of the CJEU, and the CJEU has been criticised for making law: See Paul P Craig and 
Menelaos Markakis, ‘Gauweiler and the Legality of Outright Monetary Transactions’ (2016) 
41(1) European Law Review 4; See also Lastra (n 65).   
 
101 Weiss and Others (Court of Justice of the European Union, C‐493/17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000, 11 December 2018); See also Central Banking Newsdesk, ‘ECB 
Secondary Bond Purchases are Legal, European Court of Justice Says’, Central Banking 
(online, 11 December 2018) <https://www.centralbanking.com/central-banks/monetary-
policy/3905671/ecb-secondary-bond-purchases-are-legal-european-court-of-justice-says>; See 
also Beatriz Rios, ‘EU Top Court Rules in Favor of Draghi’s Bond-Buying Programme’ (sic), 




The decision of the CJEU is therefore also important for this argument, 
especially in light of the fact that the RBA does not have an express mandate 
for financial stability. 
 
The position in the United States is different to the position in the EU. In the US 
there is no mechanism for judicial review of the Federal Reserve’s monetary 
policy decisions in court. 102  However, ‘the Fed’s actions and decisions 
concerning supervision, financial stability and payment systems are subject to 
judicial review’.103 In 2015, for example, AIG won its case against the United 
States Government on the basis that the Federal Reserve Bank New York 
(FRBNY) had exceed its mandate, and that it had also not treated AIG fairly 
during the GFC in providing LOLR assistance.104 ‘[T]he Court of Federal Claims 
held that the Federal Reserve Act did not authorize the FRBNY to acquire 
equity in AIG, and that the FRBNY’s doing so effected an illegal exaction’.105 In 
this case the Court closely examined the mandate of the FRBNY, and this case 
is therefore also pertinent to this discussion. 
 
The approach to judicial review in the United Kingdom has been described as 
one in which issues are found to be justiciable, but that the degree and intensity 
of review is the main concern.106 In the UK, the decisions of the BOE have in 
 
102 See Goodhart and Lastra (n 10); See Lastra (n 65). 
 
103 See Goodhart and Lastra (n 10). 
 
104 Starr International sued the Federal Reserve Bank of New York claiming that federal officials 
acted illegally when making a loan of $US85 billion to AIG (of which it was the largest 
shareholder), at an interest rate of 14 per cent and in exchange for an equity stake in Starr 
International of 80 per cent. The court held that the actions of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York had exceeded its mandate.  Nevertheless, as without the government intervention AIG 
would likely have had to file for bankruptcy in any event, no damages were awarded: Starr 
International Co v United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428 (2015); See also Harvard Law Review, ‘Fifth 
Amendment – Illegal Exaction – Court of Federal Claims Holds that Government Acquisition of 
Equity Share in AIG Effected an Illegal Exaction – Starr International Co. v United States, 121 
Fed. Cl. 428 (2015)’ (2016) 129(3) Harvard Law Review 859.  
 
105 The Court of Federal Claims held that the Government acquisition of an equity share in AIG 
amounted to an illegal exaction. Harvard Law Review (n 104).  
 
106 See Dominic McGoldrick, ‘The Boundaries of Justiciability’ (2010) 59(4) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 981. 
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recent times been reviewed in court, for example in relation to the experiences 
with Northern Rock Bank at the onset of the GFC. The depositors at Northern 
Rock Bank who were not entirely covered by the £2000 deposit guarantee, 
orchestrated a ‘run’ on the bank after hearing rumours that the bank was failing 
and had requested emergency liquidity assistance from the BOE.107 In the case 
of SRM Global Master Fund LP v The Commissioners of HM Treasury [2009] 
EWCA Civ 788, shareholders of the failed Northern Rock Bank sought 
compensation on the basis of failures by the BOE. The court was requested to 
examine the policy grounds on which LOLR assistance was rendered by the 
BOE. The claim was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on the basis that the 
assumptions adopted by the BOE were not ‘manifestly without reasonable 
foundation’. 108  The argument also failed on causation and because some 
matters were of a policy nature.109 The fact that the assumptions on which the 
LOLR regime was based, were matters of policy rather than fact, meant that 
they did not need to be subject to challenge in the valuation procedure itself.110 
Ultimately, the decision of the court focussed on process and legality, rather 
than the merits of the compensation, but it can still be said to have been a form 
of judicial review of the LOLR regime.111 
 
The Supreme Court of India recently decided that a circular issued by the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was ultra vires.112 Action was commenced by 
corporations mostly in the power sector against the validity of a circular issued 
 
107 Jon Cunliffe, ‘Ten Years On: Lessons from Northern Rock’ (Speech, Single Resolution Board 
Annual Conference, 29 September 2017) <https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2017/ten-
years-on-lessons-from-northern-rock-speech-by-jon-cunliffe >. 
 
108 SRM Global Master Fund Lp v Her Majesty’s Treasury [2009] EWCA Civ 788. See 
paragraphs 51 – 71 dealing with the ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’ test.  
 
109 See Lastra (n 65).  
 
110 SRM Global Master Fund Lp v Her Majesty’s Treasury [2009] EWCA Civ 788. 
 
111 Lastra (n 65). 
 
112 See ‘Box A Risks in Non-bank Lending Sector in India’ (Web Page, Reserve Bank of 
Australia, Financial Stability Review, April 2019) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/fsr/2019/apr/box-a.html> 
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by the RBI which tightened rules regarding stressed assets.113 The Supreme 
Court reportedly held that the circular in question had overreached the RBI’s 
mandate, in what has been described in the media as ‘a serious blow to the 
bank’s officials’.114 
 
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an overview of all 
jurisdictions, the examples cited above demonstrate that decisions of central 
banks may be reviewable in some jurisdictions, and that in those they may 
relate to the scope of the powers or mandate of the institutions. International 
approaches may inform Australian jurisprudence or be examples of what may 
happen in Australia. 
 
(b) Judicial Review of the RBA115 
 
Central bank experts Goodhart and Lastra have no doubt that the central 
bank’s actions and decisions should be the subject of judicial review of 
administrative actions.116 Judicial review considers the process of decision-
 
113 The issue appears to be whether the actions were in conflict with statutory powers of the 
Reserve Bank of India, and it was anticipated that the court would not interfere with policy: FE 
Bureau, ‘Supreme Court Hearing on RBI Circular Next Week, Experts Say Scrapping of Central 
Bank Diktat May Kill IBC’, Financial Express (online, 10 November 2018) 
<https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/supreme-court-hearing-on-rbi-circular-next-week-
experts-say-scrapping-of-central-bank-diktat-may-kill-ibc/1377573/>; See also Reserve Bank of 




114 Andy Mukherjee, ‘India’s Crony Capitalism Claims Another Victim’ Bloomberg Opinion, 
(online, 3 April 2019) <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-03/india-s-crony-
capitalism-claims-another-victim>. 
 
115 See Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms —
Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws (Report No 129, 2 March 2016) 
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/freedoms-alrc129> in particular Chapter 15 Judicial 
Review and Chapter 16 on immunity from liability for administrative action. 
 
116 Goodhart and Lastra consider that it is something that is ‘beyond question’: Goodhart and 
Lastra (n 10). See also Alon Harel, Why Law Matters (Oxford University Press, 2014) Chapter 
6. Harel develops a rationale for judicial review based on the right to a hearing. Harel notes that 
‘… the value of judicial review is grounded in the adjudicative process and not in the institutions 
of courts or the professional background of judges’: at 224.  
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making, ie the legality of the decision-making, and not the merits of the 
decision.117 
  
In Australia, the High Court (under s 75(v) of the Constitution) and the Federal 
Court (under s 39B(1) and (1A) Judiciary Act)118 have broad powers of judicial 
review, but require an ‘error of law’.119 In Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth 
(2003),120 in relation to matters ‘in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or 
an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth’, Gleeson CJ 
affirmed that this provision ‘secures a basic element of the rule of law’:121  
The jurisdiction of the Court to require officers of the Commonwealth to act within the 
law cannot be taken away by Parliament. Within the limits of its legislative capacity, 
which are themselves set by the Constitution, Parliament may enact the law to which 
officers of the Commonwealth must conform. If the law imposes a duty, mandamus 
may issue to compel performance of that duty. If the law confers power or jurisdiction, 
prohibition may issue to prevent excess of power or jurisdiction. An injunction may 
issue to restrain unlawful behaviour. Parliament may create, and define, the duty, or 
the power, or the jurisdiction, and determine the content of the law to be obeyed. But 




117 See Robin Creyke, Matthew Groves, John McMillan and Mark Smyth, Control of Government 
Action: Text, Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2018), Chapter 16. 
Judicial review is about the validity or legality of a decision. See also Paul Hughes, Justin liver 
and Rachel Trindade, ‘The Role of Courts and Tribunals in Providing Guidance to Regulators’ 
(Conference Paper, ACCC Regulatory Conference, 24-25 July 2008), 4 and 5. The only 
considerations are ‘whether the decision has been made for an improper purpose, whether the 
decision is one which no reasonable person would reach, whether there has been a denial of 
natural justice, or whether the decision maker has made an error of law or gone beyond power’: 
at 5.  
 
118 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). 
 
119 Garry Downes, ‘Judicial Review’ (Speech, Seminar for the College of Law Government & 




120 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476. 
 
121 Ibid [5] (per Gleeson CJ). See Australian Law Reform Commission, (n 115) 418 and Chapter 
15 Judicial Review. 
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There have been two cases involving judicial review of the actions of the RBA 
in Australia relating to the exercise of the RBA’s powers in relation to payment 
systems. In the case of Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank 
of Australia (2003)122 (consolidated with a similar application by MasterCard), 
the Federal Court dismissed the application that credit cards did not fall within 
the ambit of payment systems and could not be designated as such by the 
RBA. Similarly, in Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia 
(2005), 123  the Federal Court dismissed the application that the EFTPOS 
system could not be designated by the RBA under s 18 of the Payment 
Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 (Cth) and that an access regime under s 12 
could not be imposed. Both those cases recognise that judicial review of some 
actions of the RBA is possible.  
 
However, judicial review is limited to essentially a process question. 
Tambarlin J in the Visa and Mastercard challenge to the powers of the RBA 
summarised the role and powers of the courts in relation to judicial review as 
follows:124 
On judicial review the Court does not reconsider the merits of the RBA 
decisions, but is confined to examining decisions sought to be challenged in 
order to determine whether the decision-maker complied with the required 
legal process for decision-making. That is to say that it is not for the Court to 
perform the function assigned to the RBA by the legislation. The Court on 
 
122 Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2003) 131 FCR 300. 
This case was consolidated with an application by MasterCard International Incorporated. The 
issue was described as follows by Tambarlin, J at [1]: ‘Both applications are brought against the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (“RBA”) to set aside five decisions of the Payment Systems Board 
(“the PSB”) of the RBA made under the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 (Cth) (“the 
PSR Act”). The decisions are part of a regulatory regime imposed by the RBA on what are 
known as four-party credit card schemes in Australia. The schemes, the subject of the 
regulations, include issuers (which are financial institutions such as banks that issue credit 
cards and extend credit to their customers), cardholders (who are purchasers of goods and 
services from merchants and customers of the issuers), merchants (who accept credit cards 
and claim on issuers for payment and satisfaction for transactions between merchants and 
customers, for example, stores, utilities and airlines) and acquirers (financial institutions such as 
banks that “acquire” merchants’ claims against issuers) which agree to pay the merchant under 
the credit card schemes’.  
 
123 Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2005) 148 FCR 446.  
 
124 Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2003) 131 FCR 300, 8. 
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review must not substitute its own conclusion for that of the decision-maker 
simply because it would have been minded to reach a different conclusion in 
circumstances where it was reasonably open to the decision-maker to reach 
that conclusion. 
 
The Court confirmed that its focus ‘is directed to the legality of the decision-
making process taken by the RBA and that must be distinguished from a re-
examination of the merits of the decisions made’.125 
 
Further, the cases relating to the validity of a designation of a payment system 
under the relevant legislation were essentially about a question of the legal 
interpretation of an express power under the statute. Section 11(1) of the 
Payment Systems Regulations Act (1998) (Cth) expressly grants the RBA the 
power to designate a payment system, and what will constitute a payment 
system is defined under s 8. Similarly, what ‘designation’ entails is also 
described under the Act, for example in Divisions 2, 3 and 4, detailing access 
requirements and standards.126  
 
Absent express financial stability powers in the RBA Act, the situation in 
relation to the RBA’s financial stability functions will be different, and it is likely 
that judicial review will not be possible. 
 
5 A Fundamental Question: Is Judicial Review Restricted to Process, or 
is Policy Also Justiciable? 
 
What the judicial reviews in the different jurisdictions above appear to have in 
common is that the review was in relation to whether the central bank acted 
within its powers. That’s ultimately a review of process – not policy: 127  
 
125 Ibid 10. 
 
126 Payment Systems Regulations Act (1998) (Cth), Divisions 2, 3 and 4. 
 
127 Goodhart and Lastra (n 10).  
 
 281 
Judicial review does not extend to the ‘content of the decision’ (the aim of the 
Court is not to supplant or replace the decision taken), but it does extend to 
the parameters and legal framework that surround such decision in order to 
determine whether or not the central bank mandate has been exceeded. 128 
The issue is whether the matter under review is one of procedural justice or 
redistributive justice:129 
… common law judiciaries avoid judicially reviewing Government functions 
with high-stakes macroeconomic consequences and tend to focus on issues 
of procedural justice or fairness rather than redistributive justice. 
 
The international tendencies sketched above seem to be that although courts 
will mostly focus on process and legitimacy, it may be inevitable that matters 
of policy (political policy) may be presented for review. An exercise of public 
power is in principle justiciable,130 although policymaking would not be. Just 
having a public power is not enough.131 
 
What is ‘justiciable’, is however not always clear, but the term generally 
signifies an issue that is appropriate or fit for judicial determination,132 and 
would normally exclude political questions.133 In the case of the RBA, its broad 
 
128 These comments are made specifically in relation to the national central banks in the EU, but 
the same principles apply to the RBA. For example, it is unlikely that an Australian court will 
second-guess a discretionary decision in relation to the amount of LOLR assistance provided, 




130 ‘If it is an exercise of public power, then, subject to satisfaction of the subject matter 
principle, the exercise of power is likely to be justiciable’: See Amanda Sapienza, ‘Justiciability 
of Non-Statutory Executive Action: A Message for Immigration Policy Makers’ (2015) 79 




131 ‘Of course, the power being public power will not alone render an exercise of non-statutory 
executive power justiciable’: Sapienza (n 130) 78.  
 
132 Anthony Mason, ‘The High Court as Gatekeeper’ (2000) 24(3) Melbourne University Law 





financial stability responsibility is essentially about the making of policy, and 
may therefore not be justiciable: 134 
Central bank discretion is the freedom to act within a legal framework. Judicial 
review does not extend to the ‘content of the decision’ (the aim of the Court is 
not to supplant or replace the decision taken), but it does extend to the 
parameters and legal framework that surround such decision in order to 
determine whether or not the central bank mandate has been exceeded. 
 
Although the HCA has not considered matters in relation to policy decisions 
taken by the RBA, there are six possible instances when matters may not be 
justiciable:135 
 
1. typically policy matters that are debated and made by governments are 
not justiciable,136 because of their political nature;137  
 
2. matters that are not justiciable are matters for which there is ‘a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it’,138 or 
 
3. where there is an ‘impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion’, 139 or 
 
 
134 See Lastra (n 65); See Sapienza (n 130) who describes the justiciability of an issue as 
follows: ‘[A] crucial question for its justiciability is whether the subject matter of the dispute is 
one that is resolvable by an application of judicial power. That is, can the dispute be resolved by 
courts declaring the law and applying legal criteria? Was the exercise of power attended by 
“standards capable of being assessed legally”? If the answer to these questions is “no”, then the 
exercise of non-statutory public power will not be justiciable’: at 78. 
 
135 Mason considers there to be seven instances. He lists the following: Express textual or 
implied commitment to a non-judicial agency, the absence of legal criteria and standards, the 
need for initial policy determination, a resolution that involves a lack of respect because of the 
involvement of other branches of government, an unusual need for an unquestioning adherence 
to a political decision already made, and the potential embarrassment because of multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on the one question: See Mason (n 132) 789-94.  
 






139 Ibid 792. 
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4. where it would be impossible for a court to undertake an independent 
resolution of the matter without ‘expressing a lack of respect due’ to 
other branches of government;140 or 
 
5. where there is an ‘unusual need for [an] unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made’;141 or 
 
6. where there is a possibility of ‘embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question’. 142 
 
Some actions of the RBA may be justiciable, others not. Generally, the courts 
cannot review policy or policy implementation. In addition, central banks use 
discretion in the performance of their monetary policy and also financial stability 
obligations. It is practically impossible for a central bank to follow mechanically 
an algebraic formula that describes the policy rule.143 Therefore, some of the 
financial stability actions (and monetary policy decisions) of the RBA may be 
non-justiciable because it involves discretion, much like decisions on 
international relations or national security, which are typically non-justiciable.144 
Similarly, there is an absence of legal criteria and standards.145 Perhaps the 
critical argument against judicial review of policy actions by the RBA would be 
the fact that doing so would involve a measure of disrespect for other branches 
of government.146 Under the RBA Act, there is provision for the government to 
intervene in RBA policy, as noted above.  
 
 
140 Ibid 789. 
 




143 See John B Taylor, ‘Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice’ (1993) 39 Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 195.  
 




146 Ibid 793-4, Item E.  
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Another complication is that in the event that actions of the RBA were to be 
subject to judicial review, the court would have to take into consideration the 
principles, objectives and considerations in the statute which the RBA as 
regulator was required to consider.147 In the case of the RBA, considerations 
include ‘the stability of the currency of Australia, the maintenance of full 
employment in Australia and the economic prosperity and welfare of the people 
of Australia’.148 How an act by the RBA that could be both in furtherance of 
prosperity and welfare in some respects, but contrary to prosperity and welfare 
in others, can be the subject of judicial review, is not clear. Although the 
decisions taken by the RBA in relation to payments systems issues may be 
similar to the issues in Re Michael,149 issues in relation to monetary policy and 
financial stability may be different. The meaning of economic terms poses 
additional hurdles to justiciability.150 
 
On the other hand, some actions of the RBA and even some policy issues may 
be justiciable. 151 The hurdle in relation to financial stability, though, is the 
absence of a clear financial stability mandate. 
 
The reason why justiciability of aspects of the financial stability responsibility is 
important, is because of the important links between justiciability and the rule 
of law:152 
[J]usticiability is one of the moral principles that determine the ideal content of 
the rule of law. 
 
 
147 Justin Gleeson, ‘Administrative Law Meets the Regulatory Agencies’ (2005) 46 Australian 
Institute of Administrative Law Forum 28, 32. 
 
148 Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) s 10(2). 
 
149 Gleeson (n 147) 32. 
 
150 Ibid 34.  
 
151 Mason (n 135) 792, Item D. 
 




If the actions of the RBA are not justiciable, it means that the role of an agent 
of the Australian government, which in this instance is also a non-
democratically elected agency, is not subject to the normal controls. If there is 
to be a lack of judicial control,  compensation should be made in some manner, 
and it has been suggested that increased accountability by the RBA may be 
required.153 However, where actions of the RBA may be justiciable and subject 
to judicial review, the courts may exercise restraint if the RBA has a robust 
system of parliamentary or other accountability. 154 
 
6 A Final Brief Cautionary Note  
 
On a cautionary note, restraint should be exercised. One of the potential issues 
with judicial review of the acts of a central bank, is ‘[t]he risk of “supplanting the 
Bank”’ which ‘justifies the “degree of caution” that should characterize the 
intensity of judicial review’. 155  It has been noted that ‘[j]udges should not 
overstep the limits of their competences in order to enforce the limits of other 
actors’ competences’.156 These decisions should only be made by judges with 
the necessary experience and technical expertise,157 and understanding of 
regulatory policy.158 
 
153 Goodhart and Lastra (n 10). 
 
154 Ibid. Goodhart and Lastra are of the view that ‘judicial restraint is justifiable in the presence 
of other strong mechanisms of accountability, notably parliamentary scrutiny’.  
 




157 Ibid. Lastra notes: ’However, the deference to the ECB’s ‘broad discretion’ on the basis of 
the latter’s experience and technical expertise strengthens the case for expertise and adequate 
preparation of the judges that will assess those complex issues. This happens in other areas of 
economic regulation. Judicial activism has become the norm in the field of EU competition 
policy’.  
 
158 Ibid: ‘Given the specificity and complexity of monetary policy and other central banking 
functions (and the added difficulty in the EU context of determining whether a measure is of 
monetary policy – an exclusive competence of the Union – or economic policy) and considering 
that only the CJEU can judge the ECB (Article 35 ESCB Statute), the need for competence and 
expertise in the exercise of judicial review could be served by the establishment of a specialised 
chamber within the CJEU to deal with these issues. Having dedicated specialised judges with 
expertise in financial and monetary matters when adjudicating cases related to the ECB would 
enhance the legal framework of ECB accountability in light of the significantly expanded 
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In conclusion, the role of judicial review in Australia on the actions of the RBA 
in relation to financial stability will likely be limited, due in large measure to the 
lack of clarity in both what the RBA is required to do and empowered to do. It 
is both hampered by a lack of a statutory mandate for financial stability, and 
also a motivation for the inclusion of a statutory mandate for financial stability. 
This point will be returned to later. 
 
D Deficiencies in Accountability Mechanisms: Regulatory Impact 
 
The aforementioned gaps in the regulatory framework are caused by an 
imbalance between hard law and soft law elements in the regulatory 
framework: there is a preponderance of soft law regulatory mechanisms and 
insufficient hard law regulatory mechanisms in the regulatory framework of the 
RBA including in governance and accountability. 
 
The governance and accountability of the RBA for its financial stability mandate 
is limited or negatively affected in a number of ways.  
 
1 Absence of Statutory (Hard Law) Controls 
 
The deficiencies in accountability mechanisms in regulating the conduct of the 
RBA in financial stability arise from a number of areas. Firstly, there is limited 
to no statutory compulsion on the RBA to take any actions directly in relation 
to financial stability generally, no statutory requirement to publish any 
communications/reports on financial stability, and no compulsion to report on 
financial stability, except to the extent that the Governor has given such an 
undertaking captured in soft law in the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary 
 
mandate of the ECB’. Lastra further notes: ‘The need for specific expertise when it comes to the 
adjudication of complex financial and monetary matters is a relevant issue not only for the CJEU 
but also, for example, for the UK Supreme Court. If judicial restraint in monetary matters is 
advocated on the basis of [limited] technical expertise and qualifications of the judges 
adjudicating such matters, the counter-argument to not ‘being equipped’ is to actually equip 
judges’. See also Goodhart and Lastra (n 10).  
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Policy and it is customary for central banks to do so. This statement has low 
regulatory effectiveness as it has no permanence, and is amended and signed 
each time a new government comes into power. There is no compulsion on the 
RBA to agree to or sign the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy. In 
any event, a failure by the RBA to comply with the obligations undertaken in 
the Statement has no clear consequences. There is however a possibility that 
the Governor’s appointment could be terminated by the Treasurer. 
 
2 Government Involvement Reduces RBA Accountability  
 
Even if the RBA were to be found to be responsible/accountable/liable for an 
act or omission in relation to its financial stability role, the involvement of the 
Australian government reduces any possible accountability of the RBA. The 
RBA could rely on the involvement of the government (eg the Treasurer) to 
defend the RBA from any allegation that it has not fulfilled its mandate. Not only 
is the Australian government involved in the operations of the RBA through its 
role in the appointment of the key RBA officials and the RBA Board, but also 
through its role in the RBA’s determination of policy, and its presence at the 
CFR. 159  Government’s ultimate control over policy through statutory 
mechanisms that the government can exercise, could also be used to shield 
the RBA from accountability. Having such a shield from accountability may 
undermine the actual performance of the mandated responsibilities. There is a 
risk however that the RBA will suffer a loss of prestige and credibility, which as 








3 The Shared Nature of the Financial Stability Responsibility Reduces 
RBA Accountability 
 
The division of roles and responsibilities between the RBA, government and 
other regulators together with limited tools and instruments in the hands of the 
RBA to protect financial stability, dilute the RBA’s responsibility for financial 
stability. The RBA’s financial stability responsibility is shared with others, 
particularly APRA and the CFR. 160  APRA as the prudential regulator has 
control over most of the tools in the financial stability toolkit (with the exception 
of the LOLR function as the most important central bank tool). In some 
instances, therefore, the RBA would be unable to actively prevent instances of 
financial instability as it itself does not have the tools to do so. As a minimum, 
the RBA could blame the prudential regulator for financial instability. A loss of 
prestige and credibility may follow. 
 
4 Limited Legal Remedies Available against the RBA and its Officers 
Provide Poor Incentives for the Proper Conduct of Financial Stability 
Policy  
 
As private law remedies are unlikely to succeed against the RBA and its 
officers, the low prospects of legal action would likely not incentivise the RBA 
to fulfil its mandate in respect of financial stability. It is relatively unlikely that 
any private law remedies will be available to members of the public and the 
chances of a successful action against the RBA for losses suffered by 
members of the public as a result of the failure of the RBA to secure financial 
stability, are probably remote. The tort of misfeasance in office on the basis 
that the RBA misguided policy is not only hard to make out, but unlikely to be 
successful.161 In addition, not all actions by the RBA are justiciable, and cannot 
 
160 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
161 See Mark Aronson, 'Misfeasance in Public Office: A Very Peculiar Tort' (2011) 35(1) 
Melbourne University Law Review 1, 51. Aronson notes that ‘if misfeasance vindicates ‘rights’, 
they are rights in only the loosest sense of the term — the political right to be free of deliberate 
abuse of public power’. See also De Jager (n 78); See further Jim Davis, ‘Misfeasance in Public 
Office, Exemplary Damages and Vicarious Liability’ (2010) 64 Australian Institute of 
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form the basis of judicial review, as they fall in the category of policy decisions. 
Although a court can, for example, review the procedural aspects of 
designating a credit card payment network as a designated payment system, 
monetary policy decisions, and/or statements relating to the RBA’s opinion on 
financial stability conditions are not judicially reviewable. Legal action instituted 
against the RBA could however damage the institution’s prestige and 
credibility. 
 
5 Sanctions are Less Effective than the Search for Prestige 
 
The Australian government may override some decisions of the RBA, although 
in the context of financial stability it is hard to image which type of decision 
would come into question. That is because some key financial stability tools 
are in the hands of APRA. Similarly, the sanction of removal from office of the 
Governor and/or Deputy Governor has limited use except through deterrence 
for future Governors and Deputy Governors. That makes the form of control 
over the actions of the RBA ultimately personal. The sanction of removal from 
office of the Governor and/or Deputy Governor by the Treasurer is very 
personal and would also negatively affect the prestige in which the Governor 
and/or Deputy Governor is held. 
 
The accountability measures imposed through the parliamentary report 
presented by the Governor also ultimately has a personal impact. There is the 
possibility that Parliament as a public forum may serve the purpose of publicly 
scrutinising and exposing acts and decisions of the RBA. This too is ultimately 
personal and the personal loss of prestige and respect through negative 
publicity would be a significant sanction for a person such as the Governor. 
The loss of reputation and credibility are therefore perhaps the most important 
consequences that can flow from the requirements that the RBA account for its 
actions – including actions in relation to financial stability – both internationally 
 
Administrative Law Forum 59. On the manner in which the law of torts could affect regulators, 
see also Giesen (n 73). 
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and nationally, and therefore perhaps the strongest ultimate drivers of RBA 
actions.  
 
The overall architectural design dominated by soft law regulatory mechanisms 
then results in the situation where the combined effect of behavioural factors – 
personality and prestige in particular – may have the highest regulatory 
significance. This architectural design does not adequately support legitimacy 
and credibility of the regulator as well as democratic and rule of law principles. 
 
Further, it should also be noted that these consequences of accountability for 
deficient policies or policy implementation are however hardly remedial in 
nature, and in the big scheme of things, have limited punitive and corrective 
effect to the institution of the RBA as a whole, even though the relevant 




This chapter has set out the existing governance and accountability 
arrangements of the RBA, the vast extent of ‘controls’ and ‘influences’ on the 
activities of the RBA along the continuum of governance, transparency, and 
accountability (see also Appendix 3), and how these ‘controls’ and ‘influences’ 
may still leave the RBA open to behavioural factors as key sources of control. 
It concluded that the paucity of hard law mechanisms for the regulation of 
financial stability leaves certain gaps in the RBA’s governance and 
accountability frameworks and allows for a disproportionate role in the control 
and influence of the RBA by behavioural factors.  
 
Despite the large number of internal and external controls and influences on 
the RBA, its responsibility for financial stability is not strongly controlled. The 
existing forces of control, including governance (as discussed in Chapter 6) 
and accountability (discussed in this chapter), are extensive, but in view of the 
fundamental lacunae in the financial stability regulatory framework, the control 
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of the RBA’s role in financial stability regulation is unsatisfactory, and soft law 
is predominant. This situation is the consequence of the informal and 
shared/decentralised nature of the RBA’s financial stability responsibility. It is 
further the consequence of the difficulties in defining the concept of financial 
stability, and the complexities that arise when a monetary authority is made 
responsible for financial stability. 
 
When asked what ultimately drives or controls what the RBA does in relation to 
financial stability, the answers may be: ‘because that’s what the Governor has 
directed’ and/or because ‘that will best increase the RBA’s prestige nationally and 
internationally’. Behavioural factors may dominate, reflecting an architectural 
design that does not best support the principles of legality, democracy and the 







CHAPTER 8  
 
Considerations for Redesigning the Regulatory Framework of 
the RBA’s Financial Stability Responsibility  
 
 
Fuzziness of the regulatory framework in place invites gaming, shirking, and 
blaming — the characteristic deficiencies associated with overly complex but 




This chapter considers the need and justification for changes to the regulatory 
framework of the RBA as financial stability regulator. It builds on the analysis in 
the preceding chapters, which have demonstrated that firstly, the existing 
regulatory framework of the RBA’s financial stability mandate has an informal, 
shared and decentralised nature. The complexities of a financial stability role are 
also exacerbated by potential tensions with other central bank responsibilities 
and the inherent ambiguities of the concept financial stability itself. Secondly, 
despite the fact that the RBA is subject to a large number of governance and 
accountability controls and drivers, there are gaps and inefficiencies in the 
controls over the RBA that allow a disproportionate role for behavioural factors in 
the governance and accountability framework. Thirdly, there is a preponderance 
of soft law mechanisms on which the RBA’s financial stability responsibility is 
based, giving rise to concerns about governance and accountability. This chapter 









In this chapter, Part II makes the case for change to the RBA’s regulatory 
framework. Part II A considers practical reasons for change, including difficulties 
that can arise if the RBA as regulator is scrutinised in its execution of the financial 
stability role. The potential external threats to financial stability further contribute 
to the need to improve the RBA’s financial stability regulatory framework. In 
Part II B, theoretical imperatives for change are examined. These include general 
principles of legitimacy, the rule of law, principles of democracy, and legislating 
as a government obligation to act in the public interest. Part II C acknowledges 
the limits of law in regulation. 
 
In order to redesign aspects of the RBA’s regulatory framework for financial 
stability, Part III provides an overview of international best practice in the 
regulatory framework for financial stability in the G20 countries. Part IV provides 
a different regulatory lens through which to consider the redesign of the 
regulatory framework of the RBA, namely Paul Tucker’s design precepts for 
central banks as independent and unelected powers. The RBA’s regulatory 
framework is compared both to best international practice and Tucker’s precepts. 
Part V introduces the concept of the ‘fourth branch of government’ as a potential 
method to regulate the regulator. It highlights recent recommendations in that 
vein by the Murray Inquiry and Hayne Commission, and evaluates the usefulness 
of the ‘fourth branch’ as a ‘regulator of regulators’ for the RBA’s financial stability 
function.  
 
This chapter and the following chapter will conclude that parliamentary action is 
needed in order to improve the governance and accountability issues that arise 
as a consequence of the gaps in the RBA’s regulatory framework for financial 
stability. While this chapter considers the rationale behind these 
recommendations and considers emerging international best practice and legal 
and philosophical issues, Chapter 9 will provide concrete recommendations for 
the way forward.  
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II. The Case for Changing the RBA’s Regulatory Framework 
 
As will be discussed further in Chapter 9, legislative change is required to improve 
the financial stability regulatory framework of the RBA. The reasons are set out 
below. 
 
A Practical imperatives  
 
1 Justification of Policy Actions 
 
The current political and social climate is characterised by an increased emphasis 
on transparency and scrutiny. In the banking sector in Australia, the level of 
scrutiny of regulators dramatically increased with the Murray Inquiry and the 
Hayne Commission.2 Although it was not the target of either of those inquiries, 
the RBA may also be subjected to scrutiny. This is not to suggest that the RBA 
has in any way acted in any improper way or has in any way not performed its 
obligations in an exemplary manner. However, if Australia were to suffer an 
instance of financial instability, and a commission of inquiry were to investigate 
the role of the regulators, the RBA will be required to publicly defend its actions. 
The benefit of hard law in such a scenario is that it provides a neutral and clear 
base from which to judge the acts of a regulator.3 The recommendations for 
improvements to the regulatory framework of the RBA for financial stability as set 
out in Chapter 9 will assist the RBA by creating clarity and stability. 
 
 
2 Contemporary society is demonstrating a heightened need for disclosure, transparency and 
scrutiny, from the demand for transparency about the origin of ingredients and employment 
practices in manufacturing, to scrutiny and accountability in movements such as #metoo, and of 
government and regulatory action.  
 
3 See Gregory C Shaffer and Mark A Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, 
and Antagonists in International Governance’ (2010) 94(3) Minnesota Law Review 706. 
Although soft law has many benefits in international governance, national systems depend more 
on hard law. 
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Whenever a regulator is challenged, government is also open to critique. In 
particular, the electorate may judge whether government has adequately and 
appropriately provided for the regulation of threats to the Australian economy and 
people. The current legal framework, which includes gaps, may also leave the 
Australian government open to criticism. The recommendations in Chapter 9 will 
also assist in this regard. 
 
2 Responsiveness to External Threats to Financial Stability 
 
The need to ensure that the regulatory framework for financial stability is optimal 
is also important because of future threats to financial stability. Even before the 
GFC the importance of the role of law in the economy was acknowledged;4 it is 
even more important now. It is commonly accepted that episodes of financial 
stability are inevitable even though the exact nature, timing and extent cannot be 
predicted with certainty. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to create a 
full list of potential threats to financial stability in Australia, the list below is 
reflective of significant and reasonably likely threats that may impact Australia’s 
financial stability and justify revisiting the current regulatory framework.  
 
The following future threats to financial stability can be identified:5 
 
1. Technological developments creating regulatory challenges (including 
fintech, cryptocurrencies, big data, artificial intelligence);6 
 
 
4 Douglas W Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth, and the Role of Law (Cambridge, 
2007) 1. Law is important for financial stability, financial market development, and ultimately 
economic growth: at 2. 
 
5 See Agustín Carstens, ‘The Nature of Evolving Risks to Financial Stability’ (Speech, SEACEN 
Governors' Conference/High-level Seminar and Meeting of the SEACEN Board of Governors, 
15 December 2017) <https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp180214.htm>. 
 
6 See Jason Healey, Patricia Mosser, Katheryn Rosen and Adriana Tache, The Future of 




2. Market and/or economic changes in the banking and financial sectors 
(including open banking, democratization, credit growth, institutional 
failures); and  
 
3. Political challenges that impact geopolitics as well as national economies 
and financial systems (including trade wars, protectionism, war, political 
uncertainty through geopolitical shifts, changes to regional and customs 
unions, migration, political and religious radicalism, climate change, and 
populism. For example, the particular brand of populism in the Trump era 
has brought about many changes to the status quo and poses threats to 
international stability, including financial stability).7 
 
In light of such potential threats, the regulatory framework of the RBA’s financial 
stability responsibility should be improved on a proactive basis to ensure that the 
result of any scrutiny of the government’s regulatory design and the RBA’s 
execution of its mandate is positive. Any deficiencies identified will reflect 
negatively on both the Australian government and the RBA, and the reputational 
damage can have serious and long-term repercussions for Australia. Inertia and 
inactivity in this area is not defensible as there are real and potential 
consequences to not implementing the changes recommended in this thesis. 
  
 
7 President Trump has at times hoped to influence monetary policy, and expected some help 
from the Federal Reserve: See Kevin Carmichael, ‘In the Age of Trump, Central Banks Are Only 
One Populist Uprising Away from Losing Cherished Independence’, Financial Post (online, 22 
August 2018) <https://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/central-banks-wise-to-court-
public-in-an-era-of-populism>; See John H Farrar and Louise Parsons, ‘Financial Stability After 
the Global Financial Crisis: ‘Financial Stability After the Global Financial Crisis: Globalisation, 
Nationalism and the Potential Demise of a Rules-Based Order’ in John H Farrar, Bee Chen Goh 
and Vai Io Lo (eds), ‘Scholarship, Practice and Education in Comparative Law: A Festschrift in 
Honour of Mary Hiscock’ (Springer, forthcoming); See also Richard Berner, ‘Globalization and 






3 Justification of Practical and Operational Decisions by the Regulator 
 
The statutory objectives of a regulator also have practical importance for the day 
to day governance of the regulator. A regulator’s practical decisions for example 
in relation to resource allocation or staffing will be informed by its statutory 
obligations. Spelling out the regulator’s obligations will ensure that internal 
management of the regulator and its governance are enhanced.8 
 
B Theoretical imperatives 
 
Apart from practical considerations, regulatory frameworks also have to satisfy 
legal and theoretical considerations that attach to the very nature of law. 
Regulatory frameworks should not be judged purely pragmatically on their real-
world deliverables. A regulatory framework forms part of the broader fabric of law 
in a society and should fit into and reflect the underlying principles of that legal 
system.9 That also applies to the financial stability framework of the RBA. The 
theoretical concerns that underpin the proposed recommendations for changes 
to the regulatory framework include the legitimacy of the RBA and the regulatory 
framework, the importance of the law and the rule of law, and the use of 
legislation to secure public policy objectives. These are discussed below. 
 
1 Regulator and Regulatory Legitimacy in a Democracy 
 
The legitimacy of the RBA as a regulator is important, and a lack of legitimacy 
will have negative consequences for the RBA as a central bank.10 If something is 
 
8 As noted earlier, formal mandates can affect the practical operation on the RBA for example 
decisions about resource allocation. See Chapter 4.  
 
9 The principles of the rule of law also include legal cohesion. See Chief Justice Allsop, ‘The 
Rule of Law is not a Law of Rules’ (Speech, Annual Quayside Oration, 1 November 2018). 
 
10 Legitimacy is at heart a normative question: ‘When should an actor or a constellation of actors 
be regarded as legitimate?’: Julia Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and 
Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2(2) Regulation & Governance 137, 
 299 
not legitimate, it is arbitrary.11 To be effective as a regulator, the RBA cannot be 
seen to be arbitrary or act in an arbitrary manner. Although central banks derive 
legitimacy from their expertise, 12  a good legal framework also matters for 
regulatory and institutional legitimacy.13 Credibility and legitimacy of the regulator 
is also linked to whether or not a regulator acts ultra vires – such actions would 
at common law be void.14 
 
Both formal and societal legitimacy are important for a central bank:15 
There is ‘formal’ legitimacy (in a democracy the creation of an independent 
central bank must be the fruit of a democratic act: statute, constitutional decision 
or treaty provision) and there is also ‘societal’ legitimacy, determined by the public 
acceptance of or loyalty to the system... When societal legitimacy weakens or is 
no longer present a change in the law is bound to happen. 
 
The legitimacy of the decisions of agents such as the RBA acting for the 
Australian government will be increased if the roles of the agents have been 
formalised through a democratic process in Parliament. The real value of 
 
144. She notes: ‘In a governance or regulatory context, a statement that a regulator is 
“legitimate” means that it is perceived as having a right to govern both by those it seeks to 
govern and those on behalf of whom it purports to govern’: ibid. 
 
11 See Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘Courts and the Rule of Law’, (Speech, Rule of Law 
Series, 7 November 2001) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-
justices/gleesoncj/cj_ruleoflaw.htm>. 
 
12 Central banks fall into the category of regulatory agencies that get their legitimacy from being 
insulated from day-to-day politics and technical experts: See Martino Maggetti, ‘Legitimacy and 
Accountability of Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Critical Review’, Living Reviews in 




13 ‘Legitimacy pre-exists and is a requisite of accountability’: Charles Goodhart and Rosa Maria 
Lastra, Central Bank Accountability and Judicial Review (Policy Note No 32, May 2018) 1 
<https://www.suerf.org/policynotes/2585/central-bank-accountability-and-judicial-review/html>. 
 
14 See Frank Decker and Sheelagh McCracken, ‘Central Banking in Australia and New Zealand: 
Historical Foundations and Modern Legislative Frameworks’ in Peter Conti-Brown and Rosa 
María Lastra (eds), Research Handbook on Central Banking (Edward Elgar, 2018) 245, 266.  
 
15 Rosa María Lastra, ‘Accountability in the Context of EMU & EBU: Judicial Review of the ECB 
by the CJEU’ (EBI Brexit Seminar, Brussels, 10 January 2018). 
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legislation (hard law) lies not just in its certainty and durability, but also in the fact 
that it is the fruit of a democratic process. 
 
2 The Inherent Importance of the Content of the Law (What the Law Says 
and Does Not Say, Matters) 
 
As Australia has not recently experienced a period of significant financial 
instability under its existing regulatory framework for financial stability, it may be 
argued that the regulatory framework does not have to be changed. Change may 
seem unnecessary if there are no financial stability problems in Australia.16 As 
the regulatory framework per se does not ensure financial stability, changes may 
seem redundant.  
 
These arguments should however be rejected. The regulatory framework for 
financial stability has clear deficiencies (see Chapters 4–7), and the Australian 
government may be criticised if it does not implement effective proactive 
legislative measures in the interest of Australia’s economic future as proposed in 
this thesis.  
 
The inherent importance of the law in the regulation of public regulatory agencies 
should also be fully recognised. Firstly, law is an enduring way of organising 
society17 – including organising regulatory agencies. Law creates stability and 
order in social life. Law is also the ‘go-to tool’ for governments in situations where 
a remedy is sought, or some forceful measure of protection is required.18 In that 
way, law matters. Law has been used as a system of enforcement to back up a 
 
16 One could argue that it is a question of ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’. 
 
17 See Joe Harman, The Rule of Law: Law as an Instrument of Justice and a Tool of Oppression 






18 A typical governmental response to a crisis is often legislation, whether it is for example gun 
control after a mass shooting, public protection because of needles in strawberries, or the 
prohibition of naked shorting of securities in crisis times. 
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market system,19  and as a formal framework of norms that support societal 
structures that may have evolved over time.20 
 
In light of potential future threats and challenges that Australia and the RBA as 
financial stability regulator may face, a strong regulatory framework will be 
beneficial. Regulatory disasters in the past have highlighted some of the 
problems that can arise and that should be guarded against.21 The design of a 
regulatory regime matters. For example, poor regulation can lead to disasters.22 
Some of the problems in a regulatory regime that could have negative 
consequences include: fragmentation in the legal framework, 23  deficient 
mandates and powers, 24  ineffective organisational dynamics, 25  complexity, 26 
informality,27 and ‘weakness, ambiguities and contradictions in the regulatory 
strategies’.28 These are all evident in the current financial stability framework of 
the RBA. The use of more ‘hard law’ legal tools in the regulatory framework for 
 
19 The phrase ‘law matters’ is not used here in the sense of the so-called ‘law matters’ thesis 
used in corporate governance studies. There it refers to ‘the quality of investor protection in 
different jurisdictions. [The authors of this theory] conclude that, in part through a difference in 
the degree of investor protection, legal origin influences ownership structures’: John H Farrar 
and Pamela Hanrahan, Corporate Governance (Lexis Nexis, 1st ed, 2017) 31. 
 
20 See Jack Knight, ‘The Bases of Cooperation: Social Norms and the Rule of Law’ (1998) 
154(4) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift Für Die Gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft 754. Law (and institutions), when viewed in an interdisciplinary context do 
make a difference at the end of the day: Joseph J Norton, ‘The Fall of ‘71 and the Old Quad: A 
Personal Tribute to Professor John H Jackson’ (2016) 19(2) Journal of International Economic 
Law, 407, 410. 
 
21 See Julia Black, ‘Learning from Regulatory Disasters’ (Sir Frank Holmes Memorial Lecture) 








25 Ibid 4. 
 
26 Ibid 8. 
 
27 Ibid 6: ‘In the case of Deepwater Horizon, the overlapping jurisdictions of the MMS and the 
United States Coastguard led to a requirement to continually renegotiate informal inter-agency 
agreements over an extended period and in effect expand the MMS’s jurisdiction, contributing to 





financial stability in Australia will realign the balance between hard law and soft 
law tools in the regulation of the RBA’s responsibility for financial stability.29 Hard 
law tools of regulation ultimately promote democratic principles. 
 
3 The Inherent Importance of Law and the Rule of Law 
 
The regulatory framework of the RBA for financial stability, including the 
measures for governance and accountability, should satisfy the requirements of 
the rule of law principles that underpin the Australian legal system. According to 
Dicey’s characterisation of the ‘rule of law’, it entails firstly an ‘absence of an 
arbitrary or discretionary power on the part of government’.30 Secondly, under the 
rule of law, every person is ‘subject to the ordinary law of the land administered 
by ordinary and usual tribunals’.31 Thirdly, ‘the general principles of law, the 
common law rules of the constitution, in contradistinction to the civil law countries 
of Europe, are the consequences of rights of the subject, not their source’. 32 The 
rule of law also provides an ‘essential framework for economic activity’.33 
 
Avoiding an ‘arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of discretionary authority’34 is 
important, and part of the rationale behind the judicial review of government 
administrative actions.35 It is ‘an important element of the rule of law’.36 The 
 
29 Legal tools can and should be used to organise society: See Simon Deakin, Katharina Pistor 
and Michael I. Sovern (eds), Legal Origin Theory (Edward Elgar, 2012).  
 
30  A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Liberty Fund, 1982) 
Foreword, xx. 
 




33 Douglas W Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth, and the Role of Law (Cambridge, 
2007) 124. It has been suggested that the best way to develop a state that maximises the 
market is to create a state that implements and supports the rule of law: ibid. 
 
34 Goodhart and Lastra (n 13) 1. A solid legal framework also protects against populism: See 
Francis Fukuyama, ‘Opinion: How to Tame the Populists’, Financial Review (online, 6 February 
2018) <https://www.afr.com/news/economy/how-to-tame-the-populists-20180129-h0ppg2>. 
 





enabling legislation and legal framework of the RBA are therefore important. In 
other jurisdictions where actions were commenced against central banks, the 
legal mandates and general legal frameworks of the central banks were 
particularly relevant and were scrutinised (see the examples in Chapter 7). That 
approach reflects a general ‘rule of law’ approach. For example, the High Court 
in the UK in Fingleton v Central Bank of Ireland & Ors, considered the statutory 
powers of the Bank of Ireland and confirmed that it did indeed have the power to 
‘commence an inquiry into suspected breaches of regulatory obligations by 
regulated entities’.37 The relevant legislation was the starting point. Currently a 
court would not be able to pinpoint the financial stability mandate of the RBA, and 
even if an implied or de facto mandate is held to exist legally, its scope and 
content are unclear. 
 
The law (particularly hard law) is also important in a democracy. Goodhart and 
Lastra are of the view that38 
whether central banks have abrogated to themselves powers which are not in the 
mandate, and the legal interpretation of whether a central bank is abiding by the 
mandate or exceeding its powers, are fundamental issues in a democratic 
system. 
 
‘Hard law’ or parliament-made law reflects democratic principles. Central banks 
as government agencies (but unelected powers) should not be able to allocate to 
themselves powers and roles that have not been assigned to them through the 
democratic parliamentary process. 
 
 
37 See Fingleton v The Central Bank of Ireland [2016] IEHC 1 (Ireland) and Purcell v Central 
Bank of Ireland & Ors [2016] IEHC 514 (29 July 2016); See also Dario Dagostino and Brendan 
Hayes, ‘Court Affirms Central Bank’s Powers to Conduct Inquiries’, A&L Goodbody (Web Page, 
13 September 2016) <https://www.algoodbody.com/insights-publications/court-affirms-central-
banks-powers-to-conduct-inquiries>. 
 
38 Goodhart and Lastra (n 13). 
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In addition, law has always been an important component of economics and the 
market:39 
Markets are crucially underpinned both by a legal system (property law, contract 
law, bankruptcy law, and so on) and by a monetary system. If either of these key 
elements of market infrastructure were missing it is hard to see how mankind 
could have ever progressed far beyond barter (the simultaneous exchange of 
goods of roughly equal perceived value). Indeed, without a rule of law, the 
physically weaker of the two parties might even fear that, after an agreed barter 
exchange, the stronger party might try to seize back the good previously handed 
over. 
 
4 The Act of Legislating as a Means for Government to Meet Public 
Expectations 
 
The Australian public expects Parliament (and government) to act in its best 
interest. A failure to do so will likely result in a change of government through 
democratic means.40 Parliament can legislate as a way of communicating to the 
electorate that Parliament is ‘listening’ to the Australian people and acting for the 
benefit of the Australian public. Conversely, a failure to legislate, or to properly 
legislate, will lead to criticism by the Australian electorate. Legislating is a political 
statement, and a means to address societal problems. 41  By improving the 
regulatory framework of the RBA for financial stability, Parliament will give effect 
to the interests of the Australian people and will demonstrate that financial 
stability is in fact a high priority. Even though the RBA has implied and de facto 
financial stability roles, these should be clarified, in accordance with the OECD’s 
 
39 Charles Goodhart and Ellen Meade, ‘Central Banks and Supreme Courts’ (Special Paper No 
153, London School of Economics, September 2003) 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/assets/documents/papers/special-papers/SP153.pdf>. 
 
40 Less attractive alternatives are demonstrations, strikes, social unrest, and even social 
uprisings.  
 
41 The ‘mischief’ model is still to some extent used in statutory interpretation. 
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guidelines for regulator governance. These specifically emphasised the need for 
role clarity for the benefit of the citizens.42 
 
C Limits of the Law 
 
Hard law sources are not the only sources of the role and functions of the RBA. 
Not all central banks have a comprehensive underlying legal structure. For 
example, the Federal Reserve also does not have a comprehensive legal 
structure underpinning all aspects of its operations. It has been pointed out that 
the Federal Reserve Act43 does not actually say what people think it says, and 
that the powers that people seem to think derive from that Act, do not in fact 
derive from that Act,44 but are the consequences of history and practice.45 Conti-
Brown notes that ‘[t]he assumption that law is the exclusive source of Fed  
independence is wrong. But the opposite assumption, that law is irrelevant, is 
also incorrect’.46 Conti-Brown concludes that it’s not about the law as written, but 
the law as applied in practice.47 He correctly points out that it is not possible or 
desirable to put everything into hard law. The absence of hard law does not 
necessarily equate to a less effective regulator. Black also points out that legal 
validity is not necessarily always a relevant or productive way of identifying the 
 
42 The principles of best practice adopted by the OECD for the regulation of regulators are: (1) 
Role clarity; (2) Preventing undue influence and maintaining trust; (3) Decision-making and 
governing body structure for independent regulators; (4) Accountability and transparency; (5) 
Engagement; (6) Funding; and (7) Performance evaluation: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Principles for the Governance of Regulators (Public Consultation 
Draft, 21 June 2013) 7.  
 
43 Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 12 USC. 
 
44 Peter Conti-Brown, ‘The Institutions of Federal Reserve Independence’ (2015) 32(2) Yale 




46 Ibid, 308. Conti-Brown continues: ‘The Federal Reserve Act matters, …. But the institutions of 
Federal Reserve independence also include the role of personalities, including the relationship 
between the Fed Chair and the President. And the institutions include changes in historical 
practice, …’. 
 
47 In essence, it’s about the practice of law, or the law as ‘lived’. 
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legitimacy of governance regimes. 48  The RBA’s regulatory framework also 
reflects the reality that hard law is only part of its foundation, and that its roles 
have evolved partly through a political process of passing legislation, and partly 
through a process of history and practice in society.49 The regulatory framework 
of the RBA consists partly of hard law, but also many soft law sources (as set out 
above in Chapters 4 – 7).  
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the imbalance between hard law and soft law 
(and non-legal) sources in the regulatory framework of the RBA for financial 
stability, leads to the conclusion that the RBA’s framework does not support 
governance and accountability as well as it could and should. A legislated 
framework that provides for the main aspects of the financial stability mandate 
will provide important legal anchor points that are not subject to discretion, and 
less affected by interpretation and other influences such as the behavioural 
factors discussed above. 50 
 
Stability and resistance to change – some of the key advantages of hard law in 
particular – are nevertheless potentially also some key disadvantages in the area 
of financial stability, where there are significant knowledge gaps and where the 
economic modelling of financial stability is still relatively young. Economic theory 
may not have progressed far enough for the creation of meaningful statutory 
mandates for financial stability.51 Extra-statutory methods of regulation therefore 
 
48 Julia Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric 
Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2(2) Regulation & Governance 137, 144-5. ‘Legitimacy thus lies as 
much in the values, interests, expectations, and cognitive frames of those who are perceiving or 
accepting the regime as they do in the regime itself’: at 145. 
 
49 In this regard, although not in relation to the RBA, see Kutsal Yesilkagit and Jørgen G. 
Christensen, ‘Institutional Design and Formal Autonomy: Political versus Historical and Cultural 
Explanations’ (2010) 20(1) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 53.  
 
50 See Chapters 6 and 7. ‘The argument is not that law is irrelevant, that all is politics. It is that 
law is incomplete’: Conti-Brown, (n 44) 308-9.  
 
51 The modelling of financial stability is still evolving: See F Caccioli, P Barucca and T 
Kobayashi, ‘Network Models of Financial Systemic Risk: A Review’ (2018) 1(1) Journal of 
Computational Social Science 81. 
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have their advantages especially in light of new knowledge. 52  Also, extra-
statutory devices have the advantage that they can, if necessary, be changed, 
without the onerous and long parliamentary processes. They are ultimately more 
flexible mechanisms. 
 
One of the fundamental limitations of creating a hard law framework for financial 
stability lies in the elusive nature of the concept of financial stability. Even if a 
statutory explicit mandate for financial stability were to be included in the enabling 
legislation of the RBA, it would still be limited by the uncertainties and elusive 
nature of the concept of financial stability itself. 
 
The benefits and needs of improvements to the regulatory framework of the RBA 
however outweigh the negative consequences. The balance of this chapter will 
now discuss considerations for adjustments to the RBA’s regulatory framework. 
International perspectives and best practice will first be discussed, followed by 
Tucker’s design precepts and the possibility of control by the ‘fourth branch’ of 
government.  
III. International Perspectives: Best Practice in the G20 
Countries53 
 
This part examines international perspectives on a national regulatory framework 
for financial stability regulators and determines an emerging best practice. It does 
so by extracting the relevant views and recommendations of significant 
international bodies and international experts, and actual practice in the G20 
countries. This blueprint of best practice in financial stability regulation provides 
guidance as to a way forward for the Australian regulatory framework, which is 
 
52 Bank for International Settlements, Central Bank Governance and Financial Stability (Report, 
May 2011) 30 <http://www.bis.org/publ/othp14.pdf> (‘Ingves Report’). It is possible to explicitly 
refer to extra-statutory devices in legislation, such as the inflation-target arrangements in New 
Zealand and the UK. 
 
53 This part draws extensively on work published during this PhD candidacy, namely Louise 
Parsons, ‘Domestic Regulatory Architecture for the Protection of Financial Stability after the 
GFC: Global Order or Disorder’, in Leon Wolff and Danielle Ireland-Piper (eds), Global 
Governance and Regulation: Order and Disorder in the 21st Century (Routledge, 2018) 147.  
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not in line with emerging international best practice. These also reflect the post-
GFC lessons for the regulation of financial stability discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
International practices and perspectives are important because despite national 
differences, central banks (and other financial stability regulators) share many 
characteristics. Further, commensurable practices internationally are important54 
because of the interconnectedness of global finance.55 For example, the FSB 
conducts country peer reviews and thematic reviews of its members with a view 
to international commensurability. The key sources of benchmarks for 
international best practice are the G20, IMF, FSB, BIS, and OECD. These are 
supplemented by the work of international experts such as Charles Goodhart, 
Rosa María Lastra and David Mayes. 
 
In order to gauge what constitutes emerging best practice, the practices of the 
G20 countries were considered. They are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the 
United States and the European Union. For purposes of this study the EU was 
excluded as its central banking structure is not a good comparator for a national 
central bank, and Spain has been included in the analysis, because although not 
officially a G20 member, it attends all meetings. 
 
Five relevant key characteristics of best practice in regulatory regime have been 
identified. These are: 
 
 
54 This investigation and analysis incorporated some of the comparative law methodology set 
out in Chapter 1. 
 
55 Luis Garicano and Rosa M Lastra, Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven 
Principles’ (2010) 13(3) Journal of International Economic Law 597 598-9. They point out that 
most advanced economies suffered in the GFC despite their regulatory architecture: ‘While to 
some extent that may mean that the architecture does not matter, since it was not a cause of 
the crisis, we do believe, however, that the institutional design is important for the resolution of 
the crisis and for the establishment of a more effective framework of supervision, systemic risk 
control and crisis management’ (emphasis added). 
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1. The regulatory architecture demonstrates a clear focus on financial 
stability at a high level; 
 
2. At the highest level, a single regulator is responsible for financial stability; 
 
3. The central bank plays a central role in financial stability; 
 
4. The responsible regulator has been provided with a clear statutory/ 
legislated mandate for financial stability; and 
 
5. The regulatory framework includes a focus on macroprudential regulation 
and supervision. 
 
The regulatory framework of the RBA will be compared to these characteristics. 
The five characteristics will now be discussed individually. 
 
A The Regulatory Architecture Demonstrates a Clear Focus on Financial 
Stability at a High Level56  
 
An important lesson after the GFC was that a more dedicated focus on financial 
stability per se was required, and that there needed to be a broader responsibility 
for and oversight of financial stability at domestic and international level.57 This 
was confirmed in the G20’s 2010 Seoul Summit, echoing the earlier views of  the 
IMF. 58  After the GFC, ‘achieving and preserving financial stability has now 
 
56 See Parsons (n 53). 
 
57 G20, G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration 2010 (Seoul, 12 November 2010)  
<https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/documents/statement/wcms_146479.pdf>;  See also Parsons (n 53). 
 
58 International Monetary Fund, ‘Lessons of the Financial Crisis for Future Regulation of 
Financial Institutions and Markets and for Liquidity Management’ (Policy Paper, 4 February 
2009) <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Lessons-of-the-
Financial-Crisis-for-Future-Regulation-of-Financial-Institutions-and-Markets-PP4316> (‘Lessons 
of the Financial Crisis’); See also Parsons (n 53). 
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become a key policy objective in our societies’.59 Financial stability is ‘not only a 
national but an international public good’.60 
 
The importance of financial stability as a public good should therefore be reflected 
in the importance given to and the actual design of the regulatory framework for 
financial stability in domestic jurisdictions. 61  The structure, role and 
administration of the government-mandated regulators and their institutional 
underpinnings are important. 62  A government should demonstrate the 
importance of financial stability, and should ensure that the importance of 
financial stability is also reflected in the regulatory framework designed by the 
government.63 
 
There should be a clear identification of the regulatory authority that is primarily 
responsible for financial stability,64 and it should be ‘vested with a clear mandate 
and commensurate powers, so that it can be held accountable for achieving its 
objectives’.65  
 
The Australian government has not fully reflected the significance of financial 
stability in the design of the regulatory framework for financial stability. No 
 
59 Peter Praet, ‘The (Changing) Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability Policies’ (Speech, 
Annual Internal Banking Conference, 10 November 2011); See also Parsons (n 53). 
 
60 Charles B Blankart and Erik R Fasten, ‘Financial Crisis Resolution – The State as a Lender of 
Last Resort?’ (2009) 29(3) Economic Affairs 47, 50; See also Parsons (n 53); See also Joseph 
J Norton, ‘NIFA-II or ‘Bretton Woods-II’?: The G-20 (Leaders) Summit Process on Managing 
Global Financial Markets and the World Economy – Quo Vadis?’ (2010) 11(4) Journal of 
Banking Regulation 26. 
 
61 See also Parsons (n 53). 
 
62 Ibid; See Erland W Nier, Jacek Osiński, Luis I Jácome and Pamela Madrid, ‘Institutional 
Models for Macroprudential Policy’ (Staff Discussion Note No 11/18, International Monetary 
Fund, 1 November 2011) <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1118.pdf>. 
 




65 International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Navigating Monetary Policy 
Challenges and Managing Risks (Report, April 2015) 
<http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2015/01/index.htm> (‘Global report April 2015’). 
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changes to the relevant regulatory framework of the financial stability regulators 
have been made in the past 10 years following the GFC. A reference to the RBA’s 
mandate for financial stability has been included for the first time in the 2010 
Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy, 66  which by its nature, is an 
instrument of soft law with little or no legal significance. This step cannot be seen 
to be one that truly strengthens the regulatory framework. The current regulatory 
framework in Australia therefore does not reflect the political or economic 
importance of financial stability. 
 
B At the Highest Level, a Single Regulator is Responsible for Financial 
Stability 
 
Financial stability can be promoted by the designation of a single high-level 
regulator tasked with the broad, overarching oversight of financial stability.67 The 
ideal regulator is a centralised, national, government-mandated regulator or body 
that is unambiguously responsible for financial stability overall.68 The role of such 
an ‘umbrella’ domestic regulator69 would be wide oversight and coordination at a 
high level, with the ability to gather information and coordinate responses to 
domestic and international financial stability challenges. It would also be able to 
identify uncoordinated responses and fragmentation in regulation. In the interest 
of identifying potential systemic risk, centralising access to the relevant data and 
information is ideal. As a minimum, one institution should have access to such 
data and information,70 including information from microprudential supervisors, 
macroprudential policy-makers, market and competition supervisors, fiscal 
 
66 The Treasurer and the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Statement on the Conduct of Monetary 
Policy (Statement, 30 September 2010) <http://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-
policy/framework/stmt-conduct-mp-5-30092010.html>. 
 






70 Nier et al (n 62). 
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decision-makers, and monetary policy.71 This structure reflects the reality that 
financial stability is affected by a range of policies.72 
 
It has also been recommended that the regulator with the greatest expertise to 
assess systemic risk should be allocated the lead role in financial stability.73 
There is therefore a strong view that this function should be performed by the 
central bank.74 That is also the case in all the G20 countries, where the central 
bank is responsible for financial stability either on its own, or with other 
regulators/bodies. 75  Central banks are not only well-appointed to determine 
systemic risk because of their role as LOLR. Acting to reduce the systemic impact 
of a possible or actual failed institution(s) through the LOLR function has the 
effect that pursuing financial stability lies at the heart of central banking.76 In 
addition, central banks have over the past 20 to 25 years also studied financial 
stability, and have communicated their findings through financial stability reviews. 
This has happened irrespective of whether the individual central banks have been 
officially mandated to pursue financial stability.77  
 
The Australian regulatory framework falls short of this benchmark. In Australia, 
the financial stability responsibility is shared. Although impliedly the RBA is finally 
or overarchingly responsible for financial stability, it’s not clear what that really 
 
71 International Monetary Fund, Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy (Policy Paper, 10 June 




73 See Nier et al (n 62); See also Parsons (n 53). 
 
74 See Charles A E Goodhart, The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar, 
2009). 
 
75 See Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 below. See the analysis of the G20 countries’ response to the 
‘best practice’ guidelines after the GFC in Parsons (n 53). 
 
76 See also Parsons (n 53). For a discussion as to why central banks should be responsible for 
financial stability, see Louise Parsons, ‘Developments in Central Banking after the GFC: Central 
Banks, the State, Globalisation and the GFC’ in John H Farrar and David G Mayes (eds), 
Globalisation, the Global Financial Crisis, and the State (Edward Elgar, 2013) 218 
(‘Developments in central banking’). 
 
77 See the analysis of the G20 countries’ response to the ‘best practice’ guidelines after the 
GFC in Parsons (n 53). 
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means. The RBA may have overall oversight, but it relies heavily on APRA for 
information and the CFR for coordination. Although it is a vehicle for coordination, 
the CFR does not fulfil the role of an ‘umbrella’ regulator because of its informal 
nature. It simply provides a forum and cannot take any actions of its own accord. 
Although the CFR provides for the opportunity for the RBA to have access to the 
relevant information, nothing compels any of the regulators to share information, 
cooperate and collaborate. The RBA as lead regulator is however the regulator 
best placed to evaluate systemic risk. There is however currently no 
unambiguously responsible entity in Australia. 
 
Alternatively, if the financial stability mandate is to be shared, it would be best 
practice that information-sharing between multiple regulators is regulated clearly. 
Where multiple regulators are involved, there should be a clear process for the 
sharing of information. In cases where there is not a single financial stability 
regulator, or where the macroprudential and microprudential supervision 
responsibilities are split, information-sharing between regulators becomes very 
important. For example, in the UK, problems arose when AIG experienced 
liquidity and solvency problems and these were not elevated to the right level of 
regulatory oversight at an appropriate time. AIG was at the relevant time 
regulated by a regulator that was not sufficiently equipped to deal with the 
problems it caused.78 This incident ultimately resulted in legislative change in the 
UK and the incorporation of the financial stability function formally into the BOE. 
 
Garicano and Lastra suggest the following framework for ensuring optimal 
communication between regulators:79 
We propose three ways to facilitate information sharing. First, the communication 
advantages of single organizations can be obtained through the use of 
centralized and common databases (common codes) together with horizontal 
(rather than hierarchical) communication. Second, organizations, even if 
separate, should be housed in close proximity to facilitate the creation of bonds 
 
78 See Garicano and Lastra (n 55). 
 
79 Ibid 614-615 (emphasis added). 
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that facilitate informal sharing. This should be complemented with encouraging 
an ‘esprit de corps’ and identification with the ultimate aim. Third, while explicit 
monetary incentives are unlikely to be used, agents should be rewarded as a 
function of the ‘impact’ that their recommendations have on final decisions.  
 
The Australian framework falls short in this regard too. In Australia, information-
sharing between regulators occur generally through the operation of soft law, in 
particular the MOUs that regulate interagency collaboration at the CFR. These 
processes have been set out above. Information sharing depends on soft law 
instruments and ultimately organisational culture and behaviour. This could lead 
to difficulties.80 
 
C The Central Bank Plays a Central Role in Financial Stability 
 
After the GFC, the need for the central bank to take the lead in financial stability 
and to have a financial stability mandate was voiced.81 Before the GFC, the main 
focus of central banking was monetary policy and in particular the combatting of 
inflation (see Chapter 3 above).82  
 
Central banks are well-placed to be responsible for financial stability as they have 
a unique expertise in risk assessment, 83  and as lender of last resort, are 
‘motivated to take timely action to reduce the buildup (sic) of risks’.84 Further, a 
strong role for the central bank in financial stability can coordinate well with the 
 
80 Garicanos and Lastra point to the possibility of turf wars between agencies: See Garicano 
and Lastra (n 55). In Australia, difficulties in relation to confidentiality have however been 
addressed and confidential information is generally protected (including through statute). 
 
81 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Ingves Report’ (n 52) 1, 12; See International Monetary 
Fund (‘Global report April 2015’ (n 65); See also Parsons (n 53); See Parsons ‘Developments in 
central banking’ (n 76). 
 
82 See also Parsons (n 53); See Parsons ‘Developments in central banking’ (n 76). 
 
83 International Monetary Fund (‘Global report April 2015’ (n 65). 
 
84 Ibid; See also Parsons (n 53). 
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monetary policy role, which ‘sets the overall conditions that affect the demand for 
and the supply of credit’.85 Central bank prestige and independence are also 
valuable for enforcement actions and enhance the ability of the central bank to 
‘recruit and retain the best staff’.86  
 
Table 8.1 below reflects which regulator is responsible for financial stability in the 
G20 countries (excluding the European Union and including Spain). 
 
Table 8.1 Regulator responsible for financial stability in G20 countries87 
 
 Country Which regulator is ultimately responsible for 
financial stability?  
1 Argentina Central Bank of the Argentine Republic 
2 Australia Reserve Bank of Australia, the RBA, together with 
APRA  
3 Brazil Central Bank of Brazil 
4 Canada Bank of Canada 
5 China People’s Bank of China 
6 France Bank of France (Banque de France) 
7 Germany Deutsche Bundesbank 
8 India Reserve Bank of India (shared) 
9 Indonesia Bank Indonesia 
10 Italy Bank of Italy (Banca d’Italia) 
11 Japan Bank of Japan 
12 South Korea Bank of Korea and the Financial Supervisory 
Commission  
13 Mexico Bank of Mexico (Banco de Mexico) 
14 Russia Central Bank of the Russian Federation 
(also known as Bank of Russia) 
15 Saudi Arabia The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (which is both 
central bank and bank supervisor) 
16 South Africa South African Reserve Bank 
17 Turkey Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (shared)   
18 United Kingdom Bank of England, incorporating the Financial Policy 
Committee  
 
85 Ibid. See also Chapter 3 above. 
 
86 Garicano and Lastra (n 55) 610. 
 
87 Table from Parsons (n 53) 153 (updated). 
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19 United States The Financial Stability Oversight Council, part of the 
Federal Reserve System (The Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors is the central bank) 
20 Spain Bank of Spain (Banco de España) 
 
Australian practice aligns with general international practice, in that the central 
bank is responsible for financial stability, but it is one of a minority in which the 
responsibility is shared between the central bank and another regulator, which is 
not in some way institutionally part of the central bank.  
 
D The Responsible Regulator has been Provided with a Clear Statutory 
Mandate for Financial Stability 
 
Best practice would be to provide a clear mandate for financial stability to the 
responsible regulatory (typically the central bank). That is the case in most G20 
countries, where the central bank has an express mandate for financial stability, 
with Australia being one of a few clear exceptions.88 Whether there is an express 
statutory financial stability obligation is not part of the framework of the IMF/FSB 
country peer review assessment framework. However, that does not mean that 
an express and clear mandate is not important.89 
 
The Basel Core Principles for banking supervisors and the IAIS Core Principles 
emphasise the need for clear mandates.90 In 2010 the FSB again emphasised 
the need for clarity in mandates, and suggested that these principles should be 
expanded ‘on what is meant by “clear” when describing an authority’s 
responsibilities and objectives’.91 
 
 
88 See Parsons (n 53). 
 
89 Ibid.  
 
90 Ibid. The Basel Core Principles are known as BCP1. 
 
91 Ibid 154, citing Financial Stability Board, Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision: 




The vast majority of the G20 countries as identified for purposes of this thesis 
have provided an express mandate for financial stability, but in the others the 
mandate is either de facto or implied.92 See Table 8.2 below.  
 
Table 8.2 – Type of financial stability mandate in G20 countries93 
 
 Country Is the mandate for financial stability express or 
implied? 
1 Argentina Express 
2 Australia Effectively implied or de facto. The express mandate of the 
central bank is very limited in ambit and scope. 
3 Brazil Express 
4 Canada Express 
5 China Express 
6 France Express 
7 Germany Express 
8 India Not express 
9 Indonesia Express 
10 Italy Express 
11 Japan Express 
12 South Korea No express mandate but the Bank of South Korea has a 
statutory obligation to publish a financial stability review 
13 Mexico Not express  
14 Russia Express 
15 Saudi Arabia Implied 
16 South Africa Express 
17 Turkey Implied 
18 United Kingdom Express 
19 United States Express 
20 Spain Express 
 
The need for a clear mandate has also been recognised by scholars, such as De 
Haan and Oosterloo.94 
 
92 See Parsons (n 53). 
 
93 Ibid 155. 
 
94 Jakob De Haan and Sander Oosterloo, ‘Transparency and Accountability of Central Banks in 
their Role of Financial Stability Supervisor in OECD Countries’ (2006) 22(3) European Journal 
of Law and Economics 255, 260. 
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The informal nature of the RBA’s mandate for financial stability has been 
discussed in Chapter 4. The fact that the RBA does not have a formal statutory 
mandate for overall financial stability has not necessarily detracted from the 
performance of the RBA as regulator. However, a formal mandate for the official 
financial stability regulator is nevertheless important.95 The Australian regulatory 
framework clearly falls short in this respect. 
 
E The Regulatory Framework Includes a Focus on Macroprudential 
Regulation and Supervision  
 
The increased focus on financial stability during and after the GFC also led to an 
increased interest by financial regulators in macroprudential policy and 
regulation.96 
 
The influential Core Principles on Effective Banking Supervision issued by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision advocate a system-wide approach, 
emphasising that97  
the prevailing macroeconomic environment, business trends, and the build-up 
and concentration of risk across the banking sector and, indeed, outside of it, 
inevitably impact the risk exposure of individual banks. Bank-specific supervision 
should therefore consider this macro perspective.  
 
95 See Parsons (n 53). 
 
96 Macroprudential policy and regulation have been defined and described in Chapter 3. 
Macroprudential policies ‘use primarily prudential tools to limit systemic or system-wide financial 
risks’: Nier et al (n 62). A systemic approach is now sometimes considered to be 
‘macroprudential policy’: Luiz A Pereira da Silva, Adriana Soares Sales and Wagner Piazza 
Gaglianone, ‘Financial Stability in Brazil’ (Working Paper Series No 289, Banco Central do 
Brasil, August 2012) 4 <https://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps289.pdf>. See also Parsons (n 
53); See Stijn Claessens, ‘An Overview of Macroprudential Policy Tools’ (Working Paper No 
14/214, International Monetary Fund, December 2014) 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp14214.pdf>; See also International Monetary 
Fund, Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy (Policy Paper, 10 June 2013) 6 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013b.pdf> (‘Key Aspects of Macroprudential 
Policy’).  
 
97 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
(Report, September 2012) 6 <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf>  (‘Core principles’); See 
Parsons (n 53). 
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As this ‘broad financial system perspective’ is deeply ingrained in many of the 
Core Principles, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision does not include 
a specific stand-alone Core Principle on macroprudential issues. 98  The 
importance of macroprudential policy was however emphasised in the GFC (as 
set out in Chapter 3 above).99 
 
The events of the GFC proved that ensuring regulatory compliance by individual 
institutions did not result in the stability of the entire financial system. 100 
Macroprudential issues were not sufficiently attended to before the GFC.101 In 
2009 the IMF recommended that a macroprudential approach to regulation 
should be adopted as a correction to the overly narrow scope of prudential 
regulation before the GFC.102 The IMF further emphasized that macroprudential 
policy was needed ‘to achieve the stability of the system as a whole’.103 The FSB 
also affirmed the need for a well-developed macroprudential surveillance 
approach by all supervisory authorities,104 and that such an approach should be 
‘designed to identify trends and developments that might negatively impact the 
risk profile of its firms’.105 
 
The effectiveness of macroprudential policy and regulation depends on a clear 
mandate for taking the lead in monitoring systemic risk. This responsibility should 




99 See Parsons (n 53). 
 
100 Pereira da Silva et al (n 96) 4. 
 
101 IMF ‘Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy’ (n 96) 6. 
 
102 International Monetary Fund ‘Lessons of the Financial Crisis’ (n 58) 8; See Parsons (n 53). 
 
103 International Monetary Fund ‘Lessons of the Financial Crisis’ (n 58) 5. 
 
104 Financial Stability Board, Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision: Recommendations 





106 Parsons (n 53) 156; International Monetary Fund ‘Lessons of the Financial Crisis’ (n 58) 9; 
See also Nier et al (n 62). 
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appropriate regulator for macroprudential policy should first be identified. In 
Australia, macroprudential policy has not been expressly assigned to the RBA or 
APRA. Rather, in Australia a ‘macroprudential approach’ is adopted both by the 
RBA and APRA, rather than the pursuit of a defined macroprudential policy.107 
There is however no legal/legislative certainty as to where any macroprudential 
responsibility may lie.  
 
However, by assigning the macroprudential mandate ‘to someone, a body or a 
committee’, the ‘willingness to act’ will be strengthened.108 Some are of the view 
that macroprudential supervision should be the express responsibility of a 
separate supervisor activity, and should be separate from microprudential 
supervision.109 The macroprudential supervisor should then be clearly mandated 
and identified, and equipped with sufficient powers, including ‘the use of 
prudential tools to address systemic risk’.110 Without a clear mandate, ‘collective 
action problems lead to underinvestment in systemic risk identification and 
mitigation across agencies and reduce accountability, since in the end no one is 
fully responsible for the crisis outcome’.111  
 
It has been recommended that ‘[t]he central bank should play an important role 
in macroprudential policymaking’.112 The central bank would be well-placed to 
perform the role of macroprudential authority, as the specific roles of the central 
 
 
107 See Luci Ellis, ‘Financial Stability and the Banking Sector’ (Speech, Sydney Banking and 
Financial Stability Conference, 12 July 2016) <https://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2016/sp-so-
2016-07-12.html>. 
 
108 IMF ‘Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy’ (n 96) 29; See Parsons (n 53). 
 
109 Donato Masciandaro, Rosaria Vega-Pansini and Marc Quintyn, ‘The Economic Crisis: A 
Story of Supervisory Failure and Ideas for the Way Forward’ in Morten Balling, Frank Lierman, 
Freddy Van Spiegel, Rym Ayadi and David T Llewellyn (eds), New Paradigms in Banking, 
Financial Markets and Regulation? (Larcier, 2012) 19. 
 
110 Nier et al (n 62). 
 
111 IMF ‘Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy’ (n 96) 29 (emphasis unaltered). 
 
112 Nier et al (n 62); See also Masciandaro et al (n 109); IMF ‘Key Aspects of Macroprudential 
Policy’ (n 96) 29. 
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bank can ‘support effective coordination of macroprudential policy with monetary 
as well as microprudential policy’, 113  thereby harnessing the 'institutional 
incentives and expertise available at the central bank’.114 This would benefit the 
‘coordination with other central bank functions, including monetary policy, 
provision of liquidity, and payment systems oversight’.115 Garicano and Lastra 
emphasise that ‘[s]ystemic supervision must be under the purview of the central 
bank’,116 as ‘a central bank has a responsibility for financial stability, because of 
its lender-of-last-resort role’,117 and ‘those in charge of monetary policy need to 
know the amount of risk and instability in the system.’118 Garicano and Lastra 
however suggest that the central bank’s role should be limited to macroprudential 
supervision, and not all macroprudential tasks.119 
 
A country needs a strong and flexible LOLR to prevent systemic problems if 
financially significant organisations face liquidity problems.120 It is therefore not 
surprising that in the G20 countries where the role of a macroprudential regulator 
has been identified or formalised, this task falls either on the central bank or a 
committee comprising a number of regulators, but generally including the central 
bank.121  
 
Although the tendency in G20 countries is to allocate financial stability 
responsibility to the central bank, there is significant divergence in the G20 
 




115 Nier et al (n 62); See Parsons (n 53). 
 




118 Ibid 610. 
 
119 Ibid 612. 
 
120 International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Navigating Monetary Policy 
Challenges and Managing Risks (Report, April 2015) 
<http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2015/01/index.htm>.  
 
121 See Parsons (n 53) 158-9.  
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countries as to the macroprudential responsibility. The IMF has identified three 
different models describing the involvement of the central bank in 
macroprudential policy, some of which are evident in the G20 countries:122  
 
1. Model 1: The macroprudential mandate is assigned to the central bank, 
with macroprudential decisions ultimately made by its Board (as in the 
Czech Republic); 
 
2. Model 2: The macroprudential mandate is assigned to a dedicated 
committee within the central bank structure (as in the UK); and  
 
3. Model 3: The macroprudential mandate is assigned to a committee outside 
the central bank, with the central bank participating on the macroprudential 
committee (as in France and the US).123 
 
The institutional models for the macroprudential regulator fall into different 
categories: those with a single responsible authority,124 such as an independent 
statutory body, an independent non-statutory body, or a statutory body that is not 
independent.125 In other countries, the macroprudential function is shared among 
multiple regulators and bodies. 126  The responsibility can be provided either 
expressly or impliedly.127 Some countries have not allocated the macroprudential 
policy and supervision to a specific regulator or body at all.128 
 
 
122 International Monetary Fund ‘Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy’ (n 96) 30. 
 
123 Although the IMF include Australia among the countries that have adopted Model 3, this may 
not be entirely accurate. 
 











The different regulatory models based on this categorisation and the G20 
countries that have adopted that model are reflected in Table 8.3 below. The table 
also reflects which institution or body is responsible for macroprudential policy.129 
Some countries have allocated macroprudential responsibilities to more 
informally structured bodies/institutions. In Australia, for example, the CFR, a 
non-statutory body with no independent powers, is involved with macroprudential 
responsibilities, and both the RBA and APRA have a macroprudential approach. 
The informality of such structures in Australia could be of concern (as discussed 
above) but collaborative bodies seem to be well-placed to take on such 
responsibilities. Macroprudential matters include the work of different regulators 
and/or supervisors, and collaborative, informal meetings or committees may be 
more effective in arranging cooperation between regulators. 130  The obvious 
disadvantage of informality include the potential difficulties faced by a ‘body’ that 
does not have the powers that a formal regulator would have had to take the 
necessary steps, or ensure that others do so.131 There is however no general 
established international practice in the regulatory architecture for 











Table 8.3 - Regulatory authority responsible for macroprudential policy in 
G20 countries132 
 
 Different models: 
Regulatory 




policy and supervision 
Countries  
A single authority 
 Independent statutory 
body 
• Germany – Financial Stability 
Committee 
• Argentina – Central Bank of Republic 
of Argentina has a financial stability 
mandate which is equated to a 
macroprudential policy mandate by 
Argentina and the FSB 
• Indonesia – Bank of Indonesia 
• Canada – Financial Institutions 
Supervisory Committee 
• France – Haut Conseil de stabilité 
financière (HCSF - High Council for 
Financial Stability), is acknowledged to 
be the macroprudential authority, 
installed in June 2014. 
• Russia – Central Bank of Russia 
• Spain – the Bank of Spain has 
financial stability and macroprudential 
mandate. 
 Not independent but 
statutory body 
• UK – Financial Policy Committee 
under the central bank 
• US – Financial Stability Oversight 
Council 
• Brazil – Financial Stability Committee 
under the Central Bank of Brazil 
• China – the People’s Bank of China 
and Joint Ministerial Conference on 
Financial Regulatory Coordination (led 
by the People’s Bank of China) 
 
132 Ibid, 158-9 (updated). 
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• Saudi Arabia – Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency with a Financial 
Stability Committee 
• Turkey – Financial Stability 
Committee, chaired by and 
incorporating government (Treasury) 
and the central bank of Turkey 
 Independent non-
statutory body 
• Many countries have a financial 
stability council, or a body aimed at 
encouraging cooperation between 
regulators, such as the Australian 
Council of Financial Regulators, with 
the main responsibilities falling under 
the key or mandated regulators. 
 Not independent and 
non-statutory body 
• India - Joint Ministerial Conference on 
Financial Regulatory Coordination – all 
the regulatory agencies are part of this 
committee, and it is chaired by a 
government representative, although 
some functions are executed by the 
Bank of India. 
A split authority for macroprudential policy and supervision 
 Multiple regulators 
share the responsibility 
for macroprudential 
policy and supervision 
expressly 
• Japan – Bank of Japan and Financial 
Services Authority. Council for 
Cooperation on Financing Stability 
perform a coordinating function. 
 Multiple regulators 
share the responsibility 
for macroprudential 
policy and supervision 
not expressly but 
implicitly/de facto. 
• Australia (APRA and RBA) 
• Italy – the Banca d’Italia, IVASS, and 
Consob share a financial stability 
mandate which has to some extent 
been equated with a macroprudential 
policy mandate. 
 





• Korea (the Bank of Korea and the 
Financial Services Commission each 
have statutory powers for 




In Australia, the macroprudential framework is a lot less formal than in some other 
jurisdictions.133 The Australian position has been described as follows.134 
The Australian framework includes: a shared responsibility for financial stability 
across regulatory agencies with effective coordination arrangements; clear 
mechanisms for identifying and monitoring systemic risk; and a number of policy 
tools available to contain systemic risk, including supervisory tools. In particular, 
the Australian authorities have taken a holistic approach, seeing macroprudential 
policy as being subsumed within a broad and comprehensive financial stability 
policy framework that is backed by inter-agency cooperation and coordination. 
 
The fact that Australia has no specific designated macroprudential regulatory 
authority however makes it somewhat unique. The financial stability responsibility 
is shared between the RBA, APRA, the CFR and Treasury.135 These roles have 
been discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Both APRA and the RBA adopt systemic 
perspectives in their regulatory work. The approach of APRA has been described 
as ‘bottom-up’, whereas the RBA has been developing a ‘top-down’ approach.136 
The RBA and APRA see macroprudential policy as inseparable from 
microprudential policy. 137  The RBA has noted: ‘In essence, effective policy 
measures to mitigate financial stability risks are seen as ensuring ongoing good 
microprudential supervision as much as macroprudential policy’. 138  APRA's 
toolkit includes the right to impose countercyclical capital buffers139 and liquidity 
coverage ratio capital buffers for domestic systemically important banks,140 the 
 
133 David Orsmond and Fiona Price, ‘Macroprudential Policy Frameworks and Tools’ [2016] 




135 For a summary of the roles of the Australian regulators, see Orsmond and Price (n 133) 82. 
 






139 Ibid. Using countercyclical capital buffers has been described as a tool having an ‘explicit 





right to set regulations that direct behaviour of supervised entities, 141 as well as 
communications and directive powers.142 The RBA’s toolkit includes the LOLR 
function, the provision of liquidity to the financial system, research, 
communication and monetary policy, and macroeconomic policies that are 
informed by financial stability developments. 143  The RBA also disseminates 
information through its various publications that have an important role in financial 
stability. Discussions about the Financial Stability Review with other regulators at 
the CFR are also of assistance. 144  A recent example of collaborative (and 
successful) macroprudential policy in action was the ‘approach taken by the 
Australian regulators in late 2014 to reinforce residential housing lending 
practices’.145 
 
The informal and shared allocation of macroprudential policy responsibilities in 
Australia however exposes the regulators to the same weaknesses/problems as 
the informal and shared allocation of a financial stability mandate.  
 
Furthermore, in Australia there is no clear delineation between the RBA’s 
responsibility for monetary policy and its financial stability obligations. If the 
financial stability obligations slot in seamlessly into its other responsibilities, the 
consequence is that its financial stability responsibility will be given effect to within 
its broad independence. As financial stability does not have a limiting framework 
comparable to the inflation-targeting model in monetary policy, the RBA as a 
central bank may have very wide policy-making powers. Garicano and Lastra are 
of the view that the macroprudential supervisor should not have the same level 










145 Ibid, 83. 
 
146 Garicano and Lastra (n 55) 616. 
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government has a statutory right to intervene in the event that it does not agree 
with the RBA’s policies, that right has never been used, and it is submitted that it 
will take significant political will for a government to invoke those statutory 
provisions.147  
 
On the whole, the Australian regulatory framework does not reflect international 
best practice, and may be improved on the basis thereof. 
IV. Perspectives on Delegating Responsibilities to Unelected 
Independent Agencies: Tucker’s Delegation Criteria and Design 
Precepts148 
 
Perspectives on best practice when delegating authority to unelected 
independent agencies also provide a useful lens and some guidance as to a way 
forward for the Australian framework. The recent work of Paul Tucker is of 
particular relevance. Tucker’s perspectives on the regulating of regulators draw 
on his practical background as former Deputy Governor of the BOE, and as 
current Chair of the Systemic Risk Council of the Federal Reserve in the US.149 
He is also engaged as a fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School. In a recent 
extensive examination of the manner in which central banks are tasked with 
responsibilities – including financial stability responsibilities – Tucker focusses on 
the fact that central banks are both ‘unelected powers’, and ‘independent 
agencies’.150 As mentioned earlier, Tucker characterises the role of central banks 
as similar to that of ‘trustees’.151  
 
147 See Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
148 Paul Tucker, Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the 
Regulatory State (Princeton University Press, 2018) 569-572. 
 
149 For his biography, see ‘Resources’, Paul Tucker (Web Page) 
<http://paultucker.me/resources/>. 
 
150 Tucker notes: ‘By “independent agency” (IA) I mean, broadly, a public agency that is free to 
set and deploy its instruments in pursuit of a public policy goal (or goals) insulated from short-
term political considerations, influence, or direction. This means insulation from the day-to-day 
politics of both the executive branch and the legislature. Such policy agencies are trustees’: 






Tucker identifies five ‘design precepts’ for delegating responsibilities to central 
banks as ‘trustee-like’ independent agencies. 152  These design precepts are 
therefore particularly relevant to this thesis and for its recommendations. 
 
A The Regulatory Regime should include a Statement of its Purpose, 
Objective and Powers, and a Delineation of its Boundaries (the 
‘Purposes – Powers’ Precept)153 
 
According to this design precept, the regime should include a ‘statement of its 
purposes, objectives, and powers and a delineation of its boundaries’.154 This 
recommendation accords well with the international best practice principles set 
out above, and also reflects the reasons why regulatory change in Australia 
should be considered. The analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrated the lack 
of delineation of the RBA’s purpose, objectives, powers and boundaries in its 
financial stability mandate. This is a problem for an unelected power in a 
democratic country. Accordingly, the RBA’s purpose, objective, powers and 
scope of mandate in relation to financial stability by not having been clarified 
appropriately, falls short. 
 
B Prescriptions should be provided of Who should Exercise the 
Delegated Powers and the Procedures to be Employed (the 
‘Procedures’ Precept)155 
 
The regulatory framework should include ‘[p]rescriptions of who should exercise 
the delegated powers and the procedures to be employed’.156 Similarly, this 
 











recommendation reflects the concerns expressed at the conclusion of the 
analysis in Chapter 5 above and the resulting problems in relation to 
accountability for the RBA (see also Chapters 6 and 7). As the financial stability 
responsibility in Australia is shared among regulators in an informal fashion, it is 
not clear who should exercise which powers, and which procedures are to be 
used. The presence of the Australian government representatives in the process, 
and the controls and drivers that to some extent influence the behaviour of the 
RBA in its financial stability responsibility, do not give effect to this design precept 
because of a lack of clarity. In this regard too, the RBA’s regulatory framework 
falls short. 
 
C Principles for How the Agency Will Conduct Policy within its 
Boundaries should be Stated (the ‘Operating Principles’ Precept)157 
 
The regulatory framework should include ‘[p]rinciples for how the agency will 
conduct policy within its boundaries'. 158  The analysis in this thesis has 
demonstrated the extent to which there is an absence of guidance on how the 
RBA is to conduct financial stability policy. In this respect too the Australian 
regulatory framework falls short. 
 
D Sufficient Transparency should be Provided to Enable the Delegated 
Policy Maker and the Regime Itself to be Monitored and Held to 
Account by Elected Representatives (the ‘Transparency-
Accountability’ Precept)159 
 
‘Sufficient transparency [is required] to enable the delegated policy maker, and, 
very important, the regime itself to be monitored and held to account by elected 










promote transparency and accountability for the RBA. None of these are however 
particularly focussed on the financial stability objective. In this respect the 
Australian regulatory framework also does not match the design precepts. 
 
E Provisions for Exceeding Regulatory Boundaries should be Stipulated 
(the ‘Emergencies’ Precept)161 
 
‘Provisions determining what happens when the boundaries of the regime are 
reached during a crisis [should be included], including how democratic 
accountability works then’.162 Tucker advocates for laying down ‘a process for 
decision-making in unenvisaged, emergency contingencies. It would in effect be 
a “pause” or “regime shift” button that could be pressed when the boundaries of 
an agency’s powers are reached’.163 Even though a specific memorandum of 
understanding exists between the relevant Australian regulators for dealing with 
emergency situations,164 it does not meet this level of detail. In this regard too, 
the Australian framework can be improved. 
 
F Assessment of the RBA against the Principles Identified by Tucker 
 
When assessing the RBA and its financial stability responsibility against the 
principles identified and promoted by Tucker, it is evident that the RBA’s 








163 Ibid 120. 
 
164 Memorandum of Understanding on Financial Distress Management between the Members of 





Table 8.4 Comparison of the RBA’s financial stability regulatory 
framework against Tucker’s design precepts 
 
The RBA’s legislative framework has been assessed as follows: 
 
 Tucker’s regulatory design 
precept (extracted)165 
Assessment of the RBA’s 
regulatory framework 
1 ‘Elected legislators should provide a 
statement of purposes, objectives 
and powers, and a delineation of the 
regime’s boundaries. (Purposes-
Powers)’ 166  Standards are capable 
of being monitored, and understood  
Not met 
2 Clear indications to be given as to 
who exercises which powers167 
Not met 
3 Publication of operating principles168 Not met 
4 Transparency for stewardship of 
delegated policy, and ability to 
monitor the regime. 169 
Mostly met. 
5. Processes for emergencies when 




In relation to independent agencies with multiple missions – such as the RBA – 
Tucker argues that an independent agency should only be given multiple 
mandates if those are ‘(a) intrinsically connected, (b) each faces a problem of 
credible commitment and meets the other Delegation Criteria (as defined by 
Tucker), and (c) it is judged that combining them under one roof will deliver 
materially better results’.171 In the case of the RBA, monetary policy and oversight 
 
165 Tucker (n 148) 570-2. 
 










171 Ibid 572. 
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over the payment systems can both be seen as roles that complement the 
financial stability role, but also compete with it.172 The regulatory framework of 
the RBA however currently does not include the objectives and constraints of 
each of the missions (mandates),173 and there is not a distinct policy body for 
each of the missions (mandates) in the RBA.174 
 
In conclusion, the regulatory framework of the RBA for financial stability falls short 
of the proposed design precepts of Tucker. Both international best practice and 
Tucker’s principles provide guidance for adjustments to the RBA’s regulatory 
framework. These will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. The adjustments 
to the regulatory framework essentially will call for parliamentary action. It is 
therefore first necessary to consider the benefits of ‘hard law’ and legislative 
control for a financial stability regulator. 
V. The Potential of Regulatory Control by a ‘Fourth Branch’ 
of Government 
 
Control of regulators by a ‘fourth branch’ of government is also a consideration 
for a proposed new regulatory framework for financial stability in Australia, and 
this idea has been gaining support in Australia. The two most recent government-
commissioned inquiries into the Australian financial system, the Murray Inquiry 
and the Hayne Commission, both recommended that there should be more 
oversight over regulators by a ‘regulator of regulators’. This type of ‘oversight of 
regulators’ approach accords well with the developing notion of a ‘fourth branch’ 
of government – the so-called ‘integrity’ branch – but there are also some 
important differences. Whereas the main focus of an ‘integrity branch’ would be 
to prevent corrupt practices, a ‘regulator of regulators’ would be more concerned 
with the appropriate fulfilment of a regulatory mandate. These types of ‘oversight’ 
 
172 See Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
173 See Tucker’s recommendation: Tucker (n 148) 572. 
 
174 Ibid 572. 
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bodies outside Parliament, the Executive and the Judiciary, are nevertheless 
similar enough to be grouped together. They will now be discussed in turn. 
A The ‘Integrity Branch’ 
 
The ‘fourth’ branch of government, or the so-called ‘integrity branch’ is a relatively 
new suggestion in relation to the separation of powers model,175 pioneered by 
American constitutional scholar Bruce Ackerman.176 It is an idea that has also 
gained support among Australian legal scholars. Former NSW Chief Justice, Jim 
Spigelman, for example, described it as follows:177 
The primary basis for the recognition of an integrity branch as a distinct functional 
specialisation, required in all governmental structures, is the fundamental 
necessity to ensure that corruption, in a broad sense of that term, is eliminated 
from government. … The role of the integrity branch is to ensure that that concept 
is realised …  not merely in the narrow sense that officials do not take bribes, but 
in the broader sense of observing proper practice. … A short definition is that the 
integrity branch or function of government is concerned to ensure that each 
governmental institution exercises the powers conferred on it in the manner in 
which it is expected and required to do so and for the purposes of which the 
powers were conferred, and for no other purpose. 
 
Existing institutions such as the Auditor-General, Ombudsman and Electoral 
Commissioner have been considered as part of this branch.178 A ‘regulator of 
regulators’ could also fit within the integrity branch (See Part V B below). 
 
 
175 The original idea of the three branches of government come from John Locke, in the 18th 
century, and was developed by Montesquieu. 
 
176 Robin Creyke, Matthew Groves, John McMillan and Mark Smyth, Control of Government 
Action: Text, Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2018) 37. See also 
Bruce Ackerman, ‘The New Separation of Powers’ (2000) 113(3) Harvard Law Review 633. 
 
177 Creyke et al (n 176) 37, citing Chief Justice Jim Spigelman; See Jim Spigelman, ‘The 
Integrity Branch of Government’ (Lecture, Australian Institute of Administrative Law National 
Lecture on Administrative Law No 2, Sydney, 2004). 
 
178 Creyke et al (n 176) 37. 
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The adoption of the ‘four branches of government’ model is supported on the 
basis that the three-branch theory of government does not reflect the evolution of 
modern government.179 According to McMillan, 180  
[t]he inescapable reality is that the doctrine of the separation of powers no longer 
provides an accurate picture of how scrutiny and accountability of government 
action occurs. 
 
He notes: 181 
The oversight bodies are different to executive departments, in terms of their role 
and statutory independence. They chiefly examine the legality and propriety of 
executive actions, not implement government policy or administer government 
programs. 
 
In order for a ‘regulator of financial regulators’ to effectively function in a role that 
can be classified as part of the ‘integrity’ branch of government, it would have to 
overcome one of Chief Justice Martin’s concerns, namely clarity of the position 
of such agencies in relation to government and other agencies. He questions 
whether these institutions in the ‘integrity branch’ would ‘disrupt the long-
established systems of checks and balances between the existing branches of 
government’.182  
 
There appears to be some political will in Australia at the moment for increasing 
the fourth or integrity branch. For example, the government announced on 
13 December 2018 that it intended to create a Corruption Commission. 183 
 
179 Ibid 38.  
 
180 Ibid.  
 
181 Ibid.  
 
182 Ibid. 
183 Commonwealth, A Commonwealth Integrity Commission — Proposed Reforms (Paper, 
December 2018) <https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/commonwealth-integrity-
commission/cic-consultation-paper.pdf>. Recently, also the Law Council of Australia called for 
the creation of a body to handle complaints against the judiciary: Michael Pelly, ‘Law Council 
‘Very Troubled’ by Circuit Court Judge’s Rulings’, Financial Review (online, 26 February 2018 
3). The Law Council however expressed the view that the judiciary should not be subject to the 
proposed Commonwealth Integrity Commission because of the importance of the principle of 
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Further, the government’s Statements of Expectations issued to regulators such 
as ASIC and APRA and the RBA’s Payments System Board now include policy 
requirements for regulators.184 A further such example would be the now defunct 
Financial Sector Advisory Council (FSAC).185  
 
The exact role of any ‘overseer’ of financial regulators would be hard to 
characterise. It would further be difficult for such an entity to exclude matters of 
policy and limit itself to matters of process thereby limiting the potential 
effectiveness of a ‘regulator of regulators’ in that regard.  
 
B Regulator of Regulators 
1 Recommendations by the Murray Inquiry  
 
In its final report, the Murray Inquiry recommended that a Financial Regulator 
Assessment Board should be created ‘to advise Government annually on how 
financial regulators have implemented their mandates’.186  
 
The proposed Financial Regulator Assessment Board would provide a formal 
mechanisms through which the Australian government would ‘receive annual 
independent advice on regulator performance’, 187  thereby strengthening ‘the 
accountability framework governing Australia’s financial sector regulators’. 188 
This board would only operate in respect of ASIC, APRA and the RBA payments 
 
the separation of powers: See Law Council of Australia, Submission No 24 to Attorney-
General’s Department, Commonwealth Integrity Commission (31 January 2019). 
184 See for example the most recent statements of expectations issued in 2018. 
 
185 See Chapter 7. 
 
186 Recommendation 27. Financial System Inquiry (Final Report, November 2014) Financial 
System Inquiry Final Report 
<http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final_Report_Consolidated20141210.pdf> (The Murray 







Systems Board. Although the regulatory framework for financial stability in 
Australia was characterised by the Murray Inquiry as ‘informal’ and 
‘decentralised’,189 the Inquiry nevertheless did not ‘see a strong case for change 
in this area’.190 A key issue for the Inquiry was that although there were no 
recommendations for major changes to the roles of the financial regulators, there 
were ‘some weaknesses in how financial regulation is implemented’,191 notably 
because the government lacked ‘a process for holding regulators accountable for 
their overall performance’.192  
 
In the Final Report, the Murray Inquiry detailed that the proposed Financial 
Regulator Assessment Board should replace the Financial Sector Advisory 
Council (FSAC). 193  The Australian government, however, did not create a 
Financial Regulator Assessment Board but formally reconstituted the FSAC in 
November 2016 with a new charter. It did not incorporate the breadth of 
recommendations of the Murray Inquiry194 and focussed mostly on APRA and 
ASIC.195 Although the value of the FSAC is not disputed, its focus is probably not 
what the Murray Inquiry had in mind. The Murray Inquiry envisaged ‘[a] more 
 
189 See Chapter 5, Commonwealth, Financial System Inquiry (Final Report, November 2014) 
<http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final_Report_Consolidated20141210.pdf> (The Murray 








193 The Federal Government created the Financial Sector Advisory Council: Kelly O’Dwyer, 
‘Financial Sector Advisory Council’ (Media Release, The Treasury, 6 May 2016) 
<http://kmo.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/067-2016/>. 
 
194 The Government described the Financial Sector Advisory Council as a body to provide 
‘advice to the Government on policies that will maintain an efficient, competitive and dynamic 
financial sector to support growth in the economy’, and to advise on ‘the performance of the 
financial system regulators [and] …. regulatory reform which could improve the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the financial sector …’: Ibid. 
 
195 In the Minutes of the FSAC released under FOI obligations, the FSAC expressly noted that 
at the end of November 2017 it had not really considered the PSB but rather focused on APRA 
and ASIC: For the FOI documents see Financial Sector Advisory Council, Minutes of the 
Meeting of the Financial Sector Advisory Council (Minutes, 20 March 2017) 
<https://static.treasury.gov.au/uploads/sites/1/2018/11/FOI-2315-Documents-v2.pdf> (‘FSAC 
Minutes 20 March 2017’). 
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effective review mechanism that provides Government with regular formal advice 
on the overall performance of regulators [that] will improve regulator 
accountability’. 196  The FSAC does not fulfil these expectations. Its charter 
requires the FSAC ‘to provide industry views on the performance of the financial 
regulators’.197 The minutes of the FSAC demonstrate that the overall flavour of 
those meetings were considerations of how regulation could be better 
implemented in the interest of the regulated industry itself (eg through discussion 
of the removal of red-tape etc at the meetings with ASIC).198 The work of the 
FSAC was suspended in light of the 2018 Hayne Commission.199  
 
The Murray Inquiry Final Report also recommended more clarity in the 
interpretation of the mandates of regulators, through ‘Statements of 
Expectations’.200 More clarity was needed on ‘the strategic direction that the 
government expected the regulators to take, as well as a ‘broad outline’ of the 
measure of tolerance for ‘financial sector risk’.201 
 
The Murray Inquiry considered, but did not recommend, an Inspector-General of 
Regulation. The reasons were that it would ‘involve creating a new agency’,202 
and that the Inspector-General model would ‘place considerable reliance on a 
 
196 The Murray Inquiry Final Report (n 186), Chapter 5. 
 
197 ‘Overview’, Australian Government The Treasury (Web Page, 25 September 2017) 
<https://consult.treasury.gov.au/small-business-and-consumer-division/copy-of-financial-
services-advisory-council-views/> (emphasis added). The members of the Financial Sector 
Advisory Council (FSAC) are appointed by the Treasurer from the private sector, and consist of 
‘a range of financial market participants’: ‘Financial Sector Advisory Council’, Directory (Web 
Page) <https://www.directory.gov.au/portfolios/treasury/financial-sector-advisory-council>. 
 
198 It is evident that the focus of these meetings reflected the interests of the members – ie the 
financial industry – and not those of Government: FSAC Minutes 20 March 2017 (n 195) 
(emphasis added).  
 
199 Disgraced Ex-AMP chairman Craig Meller was a member of the FSAC: Eryk Bagshaw, ‘Ex-
AMP CEO Craig Meller Resigns as a Turnbull Government Adviser’, Sydney Morning Herald 
(online, 30 April 2018) <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/ex-amp-ceo-craig-meller-
resigns-as-a-turnbull-government-adviser-20180430-p4zcf6.html>. 
 







single person, while the [proposed] Assessment Board can include members with 
expertise across the regulators’. 203  It should be noted that the idea of an 
Inspector-General is not new, and the Uhrig Enquiry of 2003 in fact 
recommended the establishment of an Inspector-General of Regulation ‘to 
review, independently, a regulatory authority’s systems and procedures for the 
administration of legislation’.204  
 
In view of the comments by the Hayne Commission Interim Report, and what 
appears to be the growing importance of the fourth branch of government, some 
form of ‘Inspector-general of Regulation’ may be a thought worth reconsidering. 
What may be needed is in fact what the Murray Inquiry rejected – ‘more detailed 
assessments of administrative processes of the type currently performed by the 
[Australian National Audit Office] and the Inspector-General of Taxation (in 
relation to the ATO)’. 205 
 
In response to the Murray Inquiry Recommendation, the government rejected the 
notion of a Financial Regulator Assessment Board, 206 choosing to rely rather on 
the PGPA Act, the reconstituted Financial Sector Advisory Council, 207 and the 
amended Statements of Expectations of the various regulators. 208  The 




204 Commonwealth, Review of Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office 
Holders (Report, 27 June 2003) 9 <http://www.finance.gov.au/sites/default/files/Uhrig-
Report.pdf> (Uhrig Report). The ‘Uhrig Commission’, chaired by John Uhrig, was tasked with 
reviewing ‘structures for good governance, including relationships between statutory authorities 
and the responsible Minister, the Parliament and the public, including business’: at 1.  
 
205 The Murray Inquiry Final Report (n 186) Chapter 5. 
 
206 Commonwealth, Improving Australia’s Financial System: Government Response to the 








were addressed as matters of ‘resilience’, with the Government’s focus being on 
prudential regulation of financial institutions.209 
 
2 Recommendations by the Hayne Commission 
 
The Hayne Commission did not spare the regulators in its report. Although the 
issues for consideration by the Hayne Commission were not directly related to 
financial stability, the conclusions about the role of the regulators are relevant for 
this thesis. In particular, Commissioner Hayne,210 in relation to the accountability 
of the regulators, raised the issue as to whether there should be ‘annual reviews 
of the regulators’ performance against their mandates’.211 In the final report, a 
recommendation for a new oversight authority was included,212 specifically for 
APRA and ASIC. This authority was recommended to be statutory, and 
independent of government,213 with the objective of assessing ‘the effectiveness 
of each regulator in discharging its functions and meeting its statutory objects’, 
and reporting to the Ministers biennially.214 Hayne specifically agreed with the 
recommendation of the Murray Inquiry, noting that ‘a permanent oversight body 
is now required’.215  
 
Although the recommendation is only in relation to the oversight of APRA and 
ASIC, it is significant from the perspective of the RBA as well. What this 
recommendation demonstrates, is the need for a type of ‘integrity branch’ or 
 
209 Ibid, Summary.  
 
210 In the interim report. 
 
211 Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry (Final Report Volume 1, 1 February 2019) 299 
<https://financialservices.royalcommission.gov.au/Pages/reports.aspx#final> (‘Hayne 
Commission Final Report’). 
 
212 Ibid, 41, 476. 
 




215 Ibid 476. 
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‘regulator of regulators’. There is no reason theoretically why the RBA in some of 
its functions could not also be subject to this type of oversight. 
 
Commissioner Hayne did not make any recommendations as to the manner in 
which regulators should be regulated, but it is evident from the concerns 
expressed that the Commission was of the view that the oversight of the 
regulators was not satisfactory. At the start of this chapter it was pointed out that 
there is an increased concern with transparency and that it may also affect the 
way that the RBA is allowed to function. The Hayne Commission’s 
recommendation is a good and recent example of the identification of the need 
for oversight over regulators. The relevance of the ‘fourth branch’ of government 
to the RBA is discussed below. 
C Limited Relevance of the ‘Fourth Branch’ for the RBA 
 
Although possible entities in the ‘fourth’ or ‘integrity branch’ may justifiably have 
oversight over the Payment System Board and over the RBA in its more classic 
‘regulator’ mode in relation to the payments system, the same cannot be said of 
the RBA in respect of its other functions.  
 
There are two main reasons for this conclusion: 
 
1. The independence of the RBA in respect of the monetary policy function 
would be threatened; and 
 
2. Some of the RBA’s actions involve policy and discretion, that are not the 
type of decisions and actions that are capable of review in the same way 
that the implementation of policies and procedures, and performance 
against a given mandate, can be monitored by a regulator of regulators. 
 
The ‘integrity branch’ is predominantly involved with ensuring that processes are 
followed, and mandates complied with, and is concerned primarily with ensuring 
due process, and in the main avoiding corruption. The conduct of monetary policy 
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and financial stability policy seem to fall outside such constraints. What would fall 
within such oversight is the cooperation and interrelationship between the 
different agencies.  
VI. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated the extent to which the RBA’s regulatory 
framework for financial stability can be improved so as to align better with 
international best practice, and also with very recent recommendations for the 
governance frameworks of regulators that are ‘unelected powers’. This chapter 
commenced this analysis with a consideration as to why a change should be 
made, and pointed to both practical and theoretical (jurisprudential) reasons as 
to why the RBA’s regulatory framework should be changed. As considerations for 
regulatory amendments, this chapter has provided guidance from international 
best practice as well as the design precepts for regulatory agencies such as the 
RBA developed by Paul Tucker. It has also considered the need for a separate 
‘regulator of regulators’ in the ‘fourth branch’ of government. The specific 
recommendations for improving the regulatory framework of the RBA will be dealt 




CHAPTER 9  
 
The Way Forward: Recommendations and Conclusion  
 
The rule of law is not enforced by an army. It depends upon public confidence in 




The previous chapter discussed the need and justification for changes in the 
RBA’s regulatory framework for financial stability. It highlighted the absence of a 
formal mandate, the fact that the mandate is shared and decentralised, and that 
there is a preponderance of soft law instruments that drive and control the actions 
of the RBA in respect of financial stability including through governance and 
accountability mechanisms. Chapter 8 justified regulatory change on the basis of 
practical and theoretical imperatives, and considered international best practice 
and the design precepts for central bank mandates by Paul Tucker as bases for 
legislative change. It also introduced and considered the potential relevance of 
the ‘fourth branch’ of government for purposes of redesigning the regulatory 
framework of the RBA for financial stability. 
 
Against this background, this chapter proposes specific changes to the regulatory 
framework of the RBA’s financial stability responsibility in the form of three key 
recommendations (Parts II A, B and C). It also provides a suggestion for further 
changes based on additional research that falls outside of the scope of this thesis 
 
1 Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘Courts and the Rule of Law’, (Speech, Rule of Law Series, 7 
November 2001) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-
justices/gleesoncj/cj_ruleoflaw.htm>. Gleeson noted: ‘As an idea about government, the 
essence of the rule of law is that all authority is subject to, and constrained by, law. The 
opposing idea is of a state of affairs in which the will of an individual, or a group, (such as a 
Party), is the governing force in a society. The contrasting concepts are legitimacy and 
arbitrariness. … The word "legitimacy" implies an external legal rule or principle by reference to 
which authority is constituted, identified, and controlled’ (footnotes omitted). 
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(Part II D). Part III defends the need for legislative change in principle. Part IV 




Legislative action should be taken to address the problems of the RBA’s financial 
stability mandate. It is only through legislative action by Parliament that the 
regulatory framework can be improved so as to provide a suitable governance 
and accountability framework for the RBA as financial stability regulator. 
 
This thesis makes three key recommendations for strengthening the RBA’s 
regulatory framework for financial stability, based on the assumption that the 
current role-division between the RBA and other role-players in financial stability 
will be retained: 
 
1. Recommendation 1: The financial stability mandate of the RBA should be 
encapsulated in legislation;  
 
2. Recommendation 2: The relationship between the RBA and APRA in respect 
of their roles in financial stability should be clarified and regulated in legislation; 
and 
 
3. Recommendation 3: The CFR should be formalised as a statutory IAC under 
the auspices of the RBA and the internal governance structures of the RBA and 
the role of the Governor should be adjusted accordingly. 
 
These recommendations will enhance the role of the RBA as agent of 
government in financial stability.  
 
The particular areas in which the RBA’s governance falls short of international 
best practice and the design precepts of Tucker have been discussed in Chapter 
8. In brief, the current regulatory framework does not reflect the importance of 
 345 
financial stability regulation, particularly its political importance, does not clearly 
make the central bank overarchingly responsible for financial stability, and does 
not provide for a strong mandated framework that leads to the proper governance 
and accountability of the RBA (and other regulators). 
 
A Recommendation 1: Introduce a Statutory Mandate of Financial 
Stability for the RBA in the RBA Act 
 
The recommendation that the financial stability mandate should be codified is the 
most critical change recommended and will have the biggest impact on the 
regulatory framework. 
 
1 Proposed Change 
 
It is recommended that the RBA Act should include an express mandate for 
financial stability for the RBA.  
 
The statutory mandate of the RBA for financial stability should: 
• be clear; 
• actively provide the financial stability mandate, and state the purpose 
of the mandate; 
• provide the scope or parameters of the mandate by using appropriate 
verbs that accurately describe the role of the RBA; and 
• provide a definition or description as to what financial stability entails 
for regulatory purposes. 
 
Further, although clarity is important, this mandate should be a broad enabling 




As examples, the statutory mandates of the SARB and the BOE, which were both 
incorporated into the relevant legislation after the GFC, can be considered.2 The 
financial stability function has been incorporated into the SARB with effect from 
1 April 2018 through broad regulatory changes accompanying the introduction of 
a Twin Peaks regulatory system in South Africa. The prudential regulatory 
component of the Twin Peaks system has been established as part of the SARB. 
Under the new legislation, the SARB is also directly mandated with financial 
stability as follows:3 
Section 11: Responsibility for financial stability  
(1) The Reserve Bank is responsible 
(a) for protecting and enhancing financial stability; and 
(b) if a systemic event has occurred or is imminent, for restoring or maintaining 
financial stability.  
(2) When fulfilling its responsibility in terms of subsection (1), the Reserve 
Bank— 
(a) must act within a policy framework agreed between the Minister and the 
Governor; 
(b) may utilise any power vested in it as the Republic’s central bank or 
conferred on it in terms of this Act or any other legislation; and  
(c) must have regard to, amongst other matters, the roles and functions of other 
organs of state exercising powers that affect aspects of the economy.  
Specific financial stability obligations are listed in the Financial Sector Regulation 
Act4 including obligations to monitor risks, take steps to mitigate risks and advise 
others of steps to take, and to publish a financial stability review. 5 
 
2 These examples are not proposed as legal transplants: See generally Mathias Siems, 
Comparative Law (Cambridge, 2018) Chapter 8. 
 








The BOE also has a statutory financial stability responsibility:6 
 
Section 2A Financial Stability Objective 
(1) An objective of the Bank shall be to protect and enhance the stability of the 
financial system of the United Kingdom (the “Financial Stability Objective”). 
(2) In pursuing the Financial Stability Objective the Bank shall aim to work with 
other relevant bodies (including the Treasury and the Financial Conduct 
Authority). 
 
The obligations of the BOE and in particular the Financial Stability Committee, 
which is a committee of the BOE, are set out in Part 1A, Financial Stability, ss 9A 
– 9ZA of the Bank of England Act 1998 (UK). These include obligations regarding 
financial stability strategy.  
 
The RBA Act could be amended by the insertion of the words ‘financial stability’ 
into section 8A(2), to read as follows (for purposes of clarity it should be noted 
that in the RBA Act, the RBA is referred to as ‘Bank’ and that terminology has 
been retained in the proposals below; the proposed insertion into the legislation 
has been underlined): 
 
 
Proposed insertion s8A(2): 
 
The Reserve Bank Board is responsible for the Bank’s 
monetary, banking and financial stability policy, and the 
Bank’s policy on all other matters, except for its payments 





6 Bank of England Act 1998 (UK). 
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It is suggested that this formulation is the minimum that is required. It would 
however not provide a strong mandate to the RBA, and a redraft of the RBA Act 
to include clearer mandates would be preferable. Clearer mandates for both 
monetary policy and financial stability could be provided in s 8 of the RBA Act, 
which should be amended to provide for both the RBA’s mandates and powers, 





Section 8 Mandates and powers 
 
(1) The Bank is responsible for conducting monetary 
policy … 
(2) The Bank is responsible for protecting and 
enhancing financial stability … 
(3) The Bank is responsible for payment system stability 
and regulation …. 
(4) In the furtherance of its mandates, the Bank has such 
powers as are necessary for the purposes of this Act and 
any other Act conferring functions on the Bank and, in 
particular, and in addition to any other powers conferred 
on it by this Act and such other Acts, has power to ….’ 
 
In light of the fact that the RBA’s mandate is shared and decentralised, and that 
the RBA does not currently have access to all financial stability tools, the most 
appropriate descriptive verbs that will encapsulate the scope of the RBA’s 
mandate for financial stability would be ‘protect and enhance’. It would be 
impossible for the RBA to ‘ensure’ financial stability.7  
 
7 Verbs such as ‘contribute to’ or ‘promote’ are often used: Jakob de Haan and Sander 
Oosterloo, ‘Transparency and Accountability of Central Banks in their Role of Financial Stability 
Supervisor in OECD Countries’ (2006) 22(3) European Journal of Law and Economics 255, 
261, 268). See also Louise Parsons, ‘Developments in Central Banking after the GFC: Central 
Banks, the State, Globalisation and the GFC’ in John H Farrar and David G Mayes (eds), 





The importance of a clear, if simple, express financial stability mandate, cannot 
be overemphasised. The importance of a clear mandate was confirmed by former 
Governor Ian MacFarlane when he stated that ‘the central bank must be able to 
be judged on whether or not it has achieved its agreed objective’.8 This view 
accords well with the views of Paul Tucker, and international best practice. The 
importance of a clear financial stability mandate has also been emphasised by 
the BIS: 9 
Clarity about financial stability responsibilities is needed to reduce the risk of a 
mismatch between what the public expects and what the central bank can deliver, 
as well as to promote accountability. Institutions should not be held accountable 
for tasks they are not clearly charged with pursuing nor equipped to achieve. 
Even though it is difficult to define and operationalise financial stability concepts, 
it is important for the central bank to have a formal mandate. Where that mandate 
gives central banks broad financial stability responsibilities, the group see 
potential merit in the public announcement of a financial stability strategy that 
clarifies the central banks’ intentions. A similar approach is sometimes used for 
monetary policy, where the legislative framework sets out overarching objectives 
and the central bank formulates and publishes its strategy. 
 
A statutory mandate satisfies the need for certainty and clarity, and as hard law 
provides durability and longevity. It aligns with best international practice, by 
demonstrating the importance of financial stability for government, placing the 
responsibility with a senior regulator, involving the central bank and making the 
mandate clear. It also satisfies the design precepts of Tucker. It further also 
addresses some of the issues that arise from the current informal and 
decentralised nature of the RBA’s financial stability responsibility. Black has 
 
 
8 Ian J Macfarlane, ‘Monetary Policy and Financial Stability’ (Speech, CEDA Annual Dinner, 16 
November 2004) <https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2004/dec/pdf/bu-1204-1.pdf>. 
 
9 Bank for International Settlements, Central Bank Governance and Financial Stability (Report, 
May 2011) <http://www.bis.org/publ/othp14.pdf> (‘Ingves Report’).  
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identified four challenges that arise in decentred or polycentric regulatory regimes 
such as that of financial stability in Australia. They are: functional, systemic, 
democratic and normative. 10  Functional challenges relate to problems of 
coordination, and the inability to determine a centre of authority. 11  Systemic 
challenges are posed when it is not clear which norms amount to law, which are 
soft law, and what the internal hierarchy for law is.12 Democratic challenges 
centre around who should be involved in decision-making, and to whom they are 
accountable.13 Normative challenges arise when it is not clear what the goal is 
that should be pursued.14 These challenges can be overcome with an appropriate 
mandate for the RBA. 
 
Unless there is a clear and express mandate for financial stability in the RBA Act, 
the RBA cannot truly be judged on whether it has achieved the objective of 
financial stability. Including a statutory definition along with an indicative definition 
of financial stability in the RBA Act will alleviate some of these challenges. 
 
There are two further important advantages of a statutory mandate. Firstly, a 
statutory mandate will better allow for scrutiny and accountability of the RBA as 
financial stability regulator.15 Although a statutory mandate will not necessarily 
create legal rights that can be enforced judicially, a statutory mandate promotes 
 
10 Julia Black, Legitimacy and the Competition for Regulatory Share (Working Paper No 
14/2009, LSE Law, Society and Economy, 2009) 7-8 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1424654>. 
 
11 Ibid. ‘There may not be a body whose role it is to act as the lead interpreter of the regime’s 
rules or principles, for example, or to otherwise steer or coordinate the activities of the multiple 
participants in such a way that the regime moves towards the resolution of the problem which it 
defines and also by which it is defined’: at 8.  
 






15 For example, jurisdictions should clearly identify the leading regulatory authority primarily 
responsible for financial stability and, further, ‘vest [it] with a clear mandate and commensurate 
powers, so that it can be held accountable for achieving its objectives’: Luis I Jácome and 




judicial review and accountability either to Parliament and the public or the fourth 
branch of government (if a regulatory oversight body were to be created).  
 
Secondly, a statutory mandate aligns with the democratic principles adopted in 
Australia, and ensures that the RBA as a regulatory agency, and agent of 
government, is tasked with its responsibilities in a legally appropriate manner. 
The current extra-statutory instruments do not adequately fulfil the function of 
mandating the RBA with financial stability. It is suggested that without 
establishing a mandate for financial stability there has been no proper delegation 
of authority to the RBA for financial stability. 
 
This recommendation may sound ‘ridiculously banal’,16 but it’s important. 
 
Although it would be preferable to provide a definition of financial stability in 
legislation as well (Allen and Wood are of the view that concepts should be clearly 
defined, and that concepts and definitions should be directly measurable and 
correlated with measures17), a statutory definition may also be restrictive. No 
definition is provided for the BOE’s financial stability objective. Financial stability 
is however defined as follows in relation to the SARB’s objectives and can serve 
as an example:18 
4. (1) For the purposes of this Act, ‘‘financial stability’’ means that 
(a) financial institutions generally provide financial products and financial 
services, and market infrastructures generally perform their functions and duties 
in terms of financial sector laws, without interruption;  
 
16 Tucker uses this phrase when advocating for more legal legitimacy for central banks. He 
notes: ‘If that sounds ridiculously banal, remember that the Federal Reserve does not have an 
overall statutory objective to help preserve the stability of the financial system but only 
objectives tied to specific powers: for example, safety and soundness for the generality of banks 
and, since Dodd Frank, stability for its powers over ‘systemically important financial institutions’. 
In the UK, only since 2012 has the Bank of England had macro-prudential and micro-regulatory 
functions framed in terms of an objective of stability’. See Paul Tucker, ‘How can Central Banks 
Deliver Credible Commitment and be “Emergency Institutions”?’ (Speech, Hoover Institution 
Conference, 21 May 2015). 
 
17 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Ingves Report’ (n 9) 1. 
 
18 Section 4 Financial Sector Regulation Act No 9 of 2017 (South Africa). 
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(b) financial institutions are capable of continuing to provide financial products 
and financial services, and market infrastructures are capable of continuing to 
perform their functions and duties in terms of financial sector laws, without 
interruption despite changes in economic circumstances; and  
(c) there is general confidence in the ability of financial institutions to continue to  
provide financial products and financial services, and the ability of market 
infrastructures to continue to perform their functions and duties in terms of 
financial sector laws, without interruption despite changes in economic 
circumstances.  
(2) A reference in this Act to maintaining financial stability includes, where 
financial stability has been adversely affected, a reference to restoring financial 
stability.  
 
The description provided in s 7 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act No 9 of 
2017 in South Africa is an example of a plain language description of the object 
of financial stability. The approach to defining financial stability is to include both 
narrow and broad conceptions of financial stability in the definition, and rather 
than describing a permanent and stable state, it provides an objective or 
purpose:19 
Object of Act 
7. (1) The object of this Act is to achieve a stable financial system that works in 
the interests of financial customers and that supports balanced and sustainable 
economic growth in the Republic, by establishing, in conjunction with the specific 
financial sector laws, a regulatory and supervisory framework that promotes —  
(a) financial stability; 
(b) the safety and soundness of financial institutions; 
(c) the fair treatment and protection of financial customers; 
(d) the efficiency and integrity of the financial system;  
(e) the prevention of financial crime; 
(f) financial inclusion; 
(g) transformation of the financial sector; and 
(h) confidence in the financial system.  
 
 
19 Financial Sector Regulation Act 2017 (South Africa) s 7. 
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The definition currently provided by the RBA on its website20 covers the same 
essential components as those of the SARB’s definition and it is proposed that it 
would be a useful and suitable definition on which to base the definition in the 




Proposed addition to s 5: 
 
‘financial stability means that the financial system is 
stable, that financial intermediaries, markets and market 
infrastructure facilitate the smooth flow of funds between 
savers and investors and help promote growth in 
economic activity. A stable financial system is resilient 
with effective crisis management arrangements that 
ensure that distressed financial institutions are managed 
in such a way that public confidence in the financial 
system is not undermined. 
 
 
Putting the financial stability mandate into legislation does not mean that the 
process of safeguarding financial stability will necessarily be any better, but it 
means that the duty and entitlement to do so will be safeguarded.  
 
This recommendation is the most important of the three recommendations and 
will have the most impact. It also requires the least change. The difficulties with 
the RBA’s legal framework arise from the fact that it is (1) informal, (2) shared 
and decentralised, and (3) without directly supportive or supplementary 
governance and accountability mechanisms. 
 
 
20 See Chapter 2. 
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By changing the first of these characteristics – ie the informality – the impact of 
the second characteristic is diminished, and the impact of the third characteristic 
virtually avoided. 
 
Once the financial stability responsibility is formalised, the role clarification 
between the RBA and APRA will already have been somewhat improved, and 
the negative impact of a decentralised mandate will have been ameliorated. 
Similarly, a formalised mandate will also impact the existing governance and 
accountability mechanisms positively, and existing compulsory disclosure and 
reporting requirements of the RBA will also have to take into consideration the 
statutory financial stability obligations. 
 
A regulatory authority without a formal mandate may run into a range of 
difficulties. A clear mandate is not only enabling for the regulator – and therefore 
conducive to financial stability – it is also an important tool of accountability. 
Difficulties may include an inability to enforce its decisions, and uncertainty in 
determining whether or not the regulator has complied with its tasks, and/or acted 
within its authority. Moreover, a clear statutory mandate reaffirms the 
commitment of government to the role of the regulator in financial stability, and 
constitutes a political statement embodied in legislation about the importance of 
financial stability. 
 
B Recommendation 2:  Clarify and Regulate the Relationship between the 
RBA and APRA in Relation to the Financial Stability Objectives in 
Legislation 
 
The recommendation that the relationship between the RBA and APRA in relation 
to financial stability mandate should be codified is based on the assumption that 




1 Proposed Change 
 
Information sharing obligations between the RBA and APRA should be codified. 
In particular, APRA should be provided with an obligation to provide such 
information to the RBA as is necessary for the RBA to perform its financial stability 
function. In parallel to the provisions for Trans-Tasman cooperation, the 
relationship between APRA and the RBA for purposes of financial stability should 
be stipulated. The following is suggested: 
 
 
Proposed change to the APRA Act: 
 
Section 8B Cooperation with the Reserve Bank for 
financial stability 
(1) In performing and exercising its functions and powers, 
APRA must: 
(a) support the Reserve Bank in meeting its statutory 
responsibilities relating to financial stability, including 
through the provision of relevant information in a timely 
manner to the RBA, the appropriate use of APRA’s role as 
prudential regulator, and cooperation with the RBA on 
matters of financial stability; and 
(b) to the extent reasonably practicable, avoid any action 
that is likely to have a reasonably detrimental effect on the 
Reserve Bank’s financial stability responsibilities. 
 
 
Minimum practical requirements for cooperation and collaboration could also be 
included in the APRA Act, but these are beyond the scope of this thesis and no 
specific suggestion will be made in that regard. The existing statutory protections 
for confidentiality of information in information-sharing between APRA and the 





By addressing the information-sharing and cooperation requirements between 
APRA and the RBA for financial stability in legislation, the same benefits will be 
provided as those listed in respect of Recommendation 1, the express statutory 
mandate of the RBA for financial stability.21  
 
C Recommendation 3:  Formalise the CFR as a Statutory IAC in the RBA 
and Adjust the Internal Governance Structures of the RBA and the Role 
of the Governor 
 
The CFR fulfils the role of an inter agency financial stability committee, but 
functions informally through the operation of MOUs. It is chaired by the RBA 
Governor. It is recommended that the CFR be recreated as a formal IAC inside 
the RBA. This recommendation is made on the assumption that the current roles 
of regulators in financial stability remain unchanged. The importance of 
collaboration and cooperation between the financial stability regulators have 
been emphasised in Chapters 5 and 7.  
 
1 Proposed Change 
 
In order to incorporate this proposed change, the RBA Act will require substantial 
redrafting. Accordingly, no specific sections for inclusion in the RBA Act (or 
section numbers) are proposed.  
 
The RBA Act should expressly establish a Financial Stability Council and the 
manner in which the Financial Stability Council is to be constituted should be 
 
21 For example, Luci Ellis pointed to the limits of persuasion – when one regulator is not 
persuaded by another regulator with whom it is required to cooperate. Luci Ellis, 
‘Macroprudential Policy: What Have We Learned?’ (Presentation, Bank of England Roundtable 
for Heads of Financial Stability) 16 <https://www.rba.gov.au/information/foi/disclosure-
log/pdf/131413.pdf>. She noted that cooperation and maintaining relationships with her peers in 
APRA formed part of her job KPIs in the RBA.  
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contained in the RBA Act. The Financial Stability Council should include the 
current members of the CFR (representatives of APRA, ASIC and Treasury) as 
members of the Financial Stability Board. It should be given the power to 
determine the financial stability policy of the RBA, and the RBA Act should state 
that the Financial Stability Committee has the power to take whatever action is 
necessary to ensure that the RBA gives effect to the policy it determines, subject 
to the balance of the RBA Act.  
 
The RBA Act should further stipulate that it is the duty of the Financial Stability 
Council to ensure that, within the limits of its powers, the financial stability policy 
is directed to the greatest advantage of the people of Australia, and that the use 
of its powers will best contribute to controlling risk in the financial system, promote 
the efficiency of the financial system and promote financial stability. Similar 
wording would mirror the existing wording in the RBA Act in relation to the 
Payments System Board. 
 
The word ‘Council’ has been deliberately selected and it is suggested that the 
internal governance structures of the RBA should be further amended to both 
better reflect the four key roles of the RBA (monetary policy, financial stability, 
payment systems and general central banking), and to improve the internal 
governance mechanisms of the RBA. Some aspects of the suggested change to 
the internal governance structures may however only be indirectly relevant to the 
scope of this research but are included because they address problems that have 
been identified, and are earmarked for future research. 
 
It is proposed that the hierarchy of the internal governance structures of the RBA 




Figure 9.1 Proposed internal governance structure of the RBA 




A general Reserve Bank Board should be created that oversees all the work of 
the RBA. The following boards, committees and councils would in the proposed 
framework report to the Reserve Bank Board:  
 
1. Monetary Policy Council; 
 
2. Financial Stability Council; 
 
3. Payment Systems Council; 
 
4. Management and Central Banking Committee; 
 
5. Audit Committee; and 
 
6. Remuneration Committee. 
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Financial stability policy should be determined separately from monetary policy,22 





By formalising the role of the CFR as an IAC inside the RBA, a number of 
regulatory objectives will be met. The benefits attaching to legislation as a tool of 
regulation set out in respect of Recommendation 1 above apply here as well. 
 
There are however some additional benefits that attach firstly to the formalisation 
of the CFR and its incorporation into the RBA. The CFR as the Financial Stability 
Council can have formal statutory decision-making powers, and will be subject to 
more governance and accountability mechanisms than at present. Thereby the 
entire regulatory framework for the governance of financial stability will be 
significantly improved and effect can be given to more of the considerations 
discussed in Chapter 8. In additional, cooperation and collaboration between 
different regulators can be protected in statute, and the suggestions of Garicano 
and Lastra in relation to geographical proximity, physical sharing of databases 
and staff cooperation incentives23 can be accommodated. It is likely that the 
macroprudential focus of the regulators will be facilitated. 
 
As noted by the OECD,24  
 
22 Financial stability policy should not be part of monetary policy: Loretta J Mester, ‘Five Points 
About Monetary Policy and Financial Stability’ (Conference Paper, Sveriges Riksbank 
Conference on Rethinking the Central Bank’s Mandate, 4 June 2016). 
 
23 See Luis Garicano and Rosa María Lastra, ‘Towards a New Architecture for Financial 
Stability: Seven Principles’ (2010) 13(3) Journal of International Economic Law 597. See further 
below. 
 
24 OECD Best Practice Principles on the Governance of Regulators’, Organisation for Economic 




[t]o reduce overlap and regulatory burden, all regulators should be explicitly 
empowered and required to cooperate with other bodies (non-government and 
other levels of government) where this will assist in meeting their common 
objectives. 
 
The relationships and the duties of collaboration, cooperation and consultation 
between different regulators should be formalised, and as far as possible 
governed in legislation.  
 
Although having legislation does not necessarily ensure compliance, and having 
a legislated obligation to consult, or to collaborate, will not necessarily result in 
consultation or collaboration, the existence of a legislative provision will enhance 
accountability in the event that individuals or organisations/agencies resist. The 
governance structures of regulators matter for their overall performance.25 
 
Legislation should ensure that the RBA has access to the necessary information 
in order to perform its functions. For example, the BIS recommends that a central 
bank that is responsible for financial stability should also ‘have the power to obtain 
information directly from financial firms, through the legal authority to call for 
reports and to conduct onsite inspections if judged necessary’. 26  Legislation 
should include mechanisms to ensure that consultation between agencies will not 
be perfunctory.27  
 
3 Changes to the Role of the Governor  
 
The role of the Governor in the current internal governance structures of the RBA 
is of concern. It is however not unusual, and it has been pointed out that ‘[i]n 
 
25 Graeme S Cooper, Michael Dirkis, Jennifer G Hill, John G H Stumbles, Greg Tolhurst, 
Richard J Vann and Sheelagh McCracken, Regulation and Reforms to Enhance Financial 
Stability in the Post-GFC Era (CIFR Paper No 036/2014, Centre for International Finance and 
Regulation, 11 August 2014) 14-8. 
 





central banking, the governor is traditionally both chief executive and chairman 
of the board’.28  
 
The main concern, as set out in Chapter 7, is that the Governor wields significant 
power, rivalling and at times even exceeding that of a government minister, 
despite the fact that the Governor is not a democratically elected official. The 
governance model of the RBA around the Governor is akin to the US presidential 
model and does not reflect modern corporate governance practices. 29  The 
Governor has a disproportionately large role both in policy governance and 
institutional governance, with only some measure of Parliamentary control. 
Modern corporate governance practice favours the so-called CEO/Chairperson 
duality, 30  where the CEO and the chairperson are not one and the same 
individual.  
 
Concerns about the role of the Governor and about the manner in which the 
financial stability responsibility of the RBA is regulated, are not simply of 
academic importance. It is a principle of the rule of law that it is the law that should 
be the governing principle, not an individual. The current role of the Governor 
allows an individual to have disproportionate sway, and this could lead to 
arbitrariness, and a lack of legitimacy for the institution. 
 
The role of the Governor at present does not allow for sufficient discipline that will 
control the Governor’s authority. When the Governor is the only person who can 
exercise their powers, then the Governor’s powers should be subject to robust 
 
28 John Mendzela, ‘Improving Institutional Governance in Central Banks’ (2009) 20(1) Central 
Banking 62, 62 (‘Improving institutional governance’). See also John Mendzela, ‘Governing the 
Governors’ (2012) 23(2) Central Banking 74.  
 
29 It has been suggested that modern corporate governance principles can also be effectively 
applied to regulators with a view to regulating the regulator: See Hadar Yoana Jabotinsky and 
Mathias Siems, How to Regulate the Regulators: Applying Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance to Financial Regulatory Institutions (Working Paper No 354/2017, European 
Corporate Governance Institute, 2 June 2017) <https://ecgi.global/working-paper/how-regulate-
regulators-applying-principles-good-corporate-governance-financial>. 
 
30 See Stephen Bainbridge, Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 104. 
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conditions that are provided by the Australian people through Parliament. It is 
accordingly suggested that the role of the Governor be moderated. In the 
governance structures proposed above, the Governor could chair the three 
councils, but should not chair the three committees. The Reserve Bank Board 
should also be a board reflective of the ‘supervised model’ of governance.31 The 
Reserve Bank Board could be an ‘accountability’ board and should comprise 
some political appointees. Voting should be regulated so that the Governor does 
not have a casting vote. The RBA will however be accountable to this board. That 
means that the Governor’s role in policy matters will be enhanced (as chair of the 
three councils), but their influence overall reduced.  
 
Recommendation 3 however does not address concerns about the lack of a 
CEO/chairperson duality. It would be contrary to the role of the RBA itself if the 
chairperson of the RBA board were able to override policy determined in, for 
example, the proposed Monetary Policy Council, and it is possibly inevitable that 
the Governor should still chair both. This suggestion therefore does not provide 
true duality. The success of this model will depend on appropriate legislated 
mandates, the appropriate board composition, and accountability.32 
 
Further, the possibility for the Governor to be effective in their job should be 
carefully evaluated. Recent changes at the BOE in including financial stability and 
prudential supervision under the auspices of the BOE have brought about severe 
challenges for the BOE Governor. Concern has been expressed that ‘the role of 
governor has become an impossible job’:33  
The current arrangements place too many competing and complex demands on 
one person’s time. There is a real risk that valuable time spent reflecting on 
events, debating with colleagues or refining the Bank’s medium-term strategy will 
be crowded out by the day-to-day demands of keeping the show on the road … 
 
 
31 See Mendzela, ‘Improving institutional governance’ (n 28) 65. 
 
32 Ibid 67. 
 
33 Richard Barwell, ‘A New Vision of the Old Lady’ (2014) 24(3) Central Banking 47, 51. 
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A final benefit of this revised structure is however that although behavioural 
factors will still be controls and drivers of RBA action, the changes in 
recommendations 1 and 2 will already significantly moderate those, and under 
the revised internal governance model, behavioural factors in governance will 
also have reduced importance. 
 
D Issues for Consideration for Future Research: Reincorporation of the 
Prudential Supervision Function into the RBA 
 
Recommendations 1 - 3 of codifying the financial stability mandate and APRA’s 
duty to collaborate and cooperate, as well as incorporating the CFR into the RBA 
are necessary for improving the regulatory framework of the RBA for financial 
stability. The proposed changes to the internal governance of the RBA may be 
less essential, but nevertheless address issues related to the key 
recommendations, and address the possibility for the unjustified significance of 
behavioural factors as controls and drivers of the RBA’s actions. 
 
In this part, suggestions for further regulatory changes are discussed that are 
related to the research conducted for this thesis, but require further research 
(which falls beyond the scope of this thesis). It is suggested that consideration 
should be given to reincorporating the prudential supervision function of APRA 
into the corporate structure of the RBA, and that further concomitant changes 
should be effected to the internal governance structures (the boards and the role 
of the Governor).34 
 
 
34 For a concise summary of the background to the separation of the prudential supervision 
function from the RBA, see Cooper et al (n 25) 6. The UK has incorporated the Financial 
Services Authority into the BOE, thereby making the BOE also responsible for prudential 
supervision. This decision was based on the experience of the GFC, in which it was evident that 
the previous tripartite system (the FSA, BOE and HM Treasury) was flawed. See HM Treasury, 





Incorporation of the prudential supervision function into the RBA may be a 
controversial topic, and it is introduced in this thesis cautiously, for the following 
two reasons. Firstly, where the responsibility for prudential supervision lies, 
relates to the topic of this thesis indirectly – the RBA is not currently responsible 
for prudential supervision, but prudential supervision is an important component 
of financial stability regulation. The importance of information-sharing and 
collaboration in the promotion of financial stability however cannot be 
overemphasised. It has even been suggested by Garicano and Lastra that staff 
should be personally rewarded for the impact that their work and 
recommendations have, and that physical geographical proximity between the 
prudential and financial stability regulators is important.35 In many countries the 
financial stability regulator is also the prudential regulator.36  Incorporating the 
CFR into the RBA only partly addresses these issues. 
 
Secondly, the problems associated with the significance of the role of the 
Governor of the RBA in financial stability matters relate to other aspects of the 
RBA’s responsibilities, and directly relates to this thesis. The difficulties arising 
from the existing internal governance structures (the twin board structure without 
an overarching board), impact the financial stability function directly as well as 
other central bank functions. A change to the organisation structure of the RBA 
will also result in a change to the internal governance structures and would 
require a reconsideration of the role of the Governor. 
 
The reason that APRA was created subsequent to the Wallis Inquiry was to 
remove an expectation on the part of supervised entities that the RBA as bank 
supervisor and LOLR would always provide emergency liquidity assistance. It 
was a move that sought to strengthen the avoidance of moral hazard. That may 
no longer be necessary, as the attractiveness of obtaining LOLR assistance from 
the central bank has diminished. 37  The microprudential supervisor could be 
 
35 See Garicano and Lastra (n 23). 
 
36 See Chapter 7. 
 
37 As demonstrated by the experience of Northern Rock Bank in the UK. 
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reincorporated into the RBA as a department of the RBA (similar to the approach 
taken in the UK with the adoption of a model with three committees in the BOE: 
the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy Committee and the 
Prudential Regulation Committee, and in the SARB where the Prudential 
Authority functions as a department of the SARB). This suggestion would return 
Australia to some extent to a pre-Wallis Inquiry position, but with some significant 
differences related to express financial stability objectives. 
 
APRA’s exercise of control over certain key financial stability tools also support a 
very close working relationship with the RBA. Further, as the regulatory agency 
ultimately responsible for financial stability, the RBA should have access to policy 
instruments to effectively pursue and protect financial stability. If the prudential 
regulator forms part of the organisational structure of the RBA, it will allow for 
optimisation with the RBA’s role as LOLR and its ability to use its balance sheet 
to manage liquidity – the RBA’s key tool in promoting financial stability. 38 
Monetary policy will still be conducted separately but greater coordination with 
financial stability will be possible, 39  and monetary policy will still be able to 
contribute to financial stability, a view predicated on the assumption that a stable 
inflation rate and a stable and strong value of the currency would also lead to 
financial stability.40  
 
Currently, some of the financial stability instruments that have been considered 
to be among the most critical in the pursuit of financial stability, lie solely in the 
hands of APRA, who as prudential regulator can ‘influence and respond to banks’ 
risk taking without the use of prescriptive rules’,41 and can set and control both 
‘structural’ prudential instruments aimed at promoting a generally robust financial 
 
38 See Malcolm Edey, ‘The Financial Stability Role of Central Banks’ (Speech, Thomson 
Reuters' Australian Regulatory Summit, 1 May 2013). 
 
39 See generally Nier et al (n 15) 6. 
 
40 One of the lessons of the GFC was in fact that it was a false assumption that stable and low 
inflation and interest rates would create financial stability. 
 
41 Edey (n 38). 
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system’42 such as the setting of capital and liquidity standards. It is of some 
concern that the RBA does not control the responsibility for supervision; it is 
further of concern that the Australian government has hardly clarified the 
relationship of the RBA with APRA.43 Concerns about the effects of a similar 
division of responsibilities between the BOE and the Financial Services Authority 
were fundamental to the recent changes in the UK that resulted in the 
reincorporation of the function of the supervision of financial institutions into the 
BOE as the central bank.44 It is submitted that these are considerations that could 
be taken into account by the Australian government. There is currently an in-
depth review of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand underway, including whether 
it should have a financial stability objective (and if so, whether it should be 
construed narrowly or broadly), whether it should also be the prudential 
supervisor, and how it should be governed.45 Australia may follow a similar path. 
 
III The Need for Legislative Intervention: A Legal Approach to a 
Legal Problem 
 
A Legislative Intervention: Benefits and Advantages  
 
Parliamentary action is needed to improve the regulatory framework of the RBA 




43 The key formal structure for bilateral cooperation between the RBA and the APRA is the 
Coordination Committee that meets roughly every six weeks to discuss market developments 
and issues relating to any regulated institution. 
 
44 See Charles A E Goodhart and Dimitrios P Tsomocos, ‘Analysis of Financial Stability’ 
(Special Paper No 173, London School of Economics Financial Markets Group, May 2007) 16 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/assets/documents/papers/special-papers/SP173.pdf>. 
 
45 Consultations are still underway in Phase 2; Phase 1 dealing with Monetary Policy has been 
completed. See ‘Information Release: Phase 2 Reviewing the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 





purpose and powers of the RBA as financial stability regulator46 as well as its 
procedures and requirements47 should be set out in legislation. This view accords 
with those of Tucker. Tucker points out that the legislature should choose ‘the 
high-level goals [of regulatory agencies], not the agency heads who, as unelected 
technocrats, are not free to impose their sense of the public interest’.48 Tucker 
advocates for legislative guidelines in the interest of ‘clarity, fairness and … 
procedural justice’. 49  Tucker however does not advocate for legislating 
everything, and considers it appropriate for the regulatory agency to set its own 
operating principles.50 
 
The Australian Federal Parliament retains the ultimate legislative control over the 
RBA. An important characteristic of parliamentary regulation is that it’s part and 
parcel of the democratic process, and ‘[a]ny democratic regime can alter the 
mandate of the central bank following the required normative procedure (a statute 
for example can always be replaced by another statute …)’.51 In a democracy a 
change in the law may be necessary ‘if the mandate [of the central bank] gets 
overstretched’.52  
 
The reasons why the Australian government should take action are set out below. 
 
 
46 Paul Tucker, Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the 
Regulatory State (Princeton University Press, 2018) 111 (‘Unelected Power’). 
 
47 Ibid 114.  
  
48 Ibid 111-2.  
 
49 Tucker is also of the view that this design precept requires ‘mandatory procedures for 
consulting on rule-making, due process for the exercise of adjudicatory powers, and, more 
generally, giving reasons for decisions’: Ibid 114.  
 
50 Ibid 115.  
 
51 See Charles Goodhart and Rosa Maria Lastra, Central Bank Accountability and Judicial 






B Importance of Financial Stability and Government’s Obligation to Act 
(and Legislate) in the Public Interest 
 
The Australian government recognises the importance of finance and the 
financial system for Australia. For example, at the start to the government’s recent 
response to the Murray Inquiry, the government noted:53 
The financial system touches the life of every individual, family and business. … 
Our largest lifetime undertakings — including purchasing a home, providing for 
our retirement or starting a business venture — are all supported by the financial 
system. A competitive, innovative and efficient financial system supports the 
operation of the whole economy.  
 
The importance of the financial system and financial stability for the Australian 
government has not always been reflected in legislation. 
 
As a liberal democracy, Australia adopts the principle of the separation of powers, 
and respects the rule of law.54 The role of government under the Constitution is 
to metaphorically ‘steer the ship’, not just through the executive, but also through 
the legislature. Government has the prerogative to create legislation and should 
legislate for good governance, 55  and in the interest of the electorate. That 
includes creating a regulatory framework that best supports financial stability. 
Government has a duty to organise society in the best interest of the electorate, 
using the best selection of the tools at its disposal, including legislation through 
Parliament, and the creation of regulatory agencies. 
 
53 Commonwealth, Improving Australia’s Financial System: Government Response to the 
Financial System Inquiry (Response, 20 October 2015) 3 
<https://treasury.gov.au/publication/government-response-to-the-financial-system-inquiry/>. 
 
54 See A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Liberty Fund, 1982). 
The Rule of Law involves an acknowledgement that regular law is supreme and that there can 
be no influence of arbitrary power, not allowed for in law. Punishment can only be made for a 
breach of law. Further, there is equality before the law and no-one, including officials, is above 
the law or exempt from its operation. The rule of law principles are also embodied in clause 5 of 
the Preamble to the Australian Constitution: ‘This Act, and all laws made by parliament of the 
Commonwealth under the Constitution, shall be binding on the courts, judges, and people of 
ever state and of every part of the Commonwealth’: Australian Constitution.  
 
55 Australian Constitution s 51. 
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The choice of effective tools for the regulation of the RBA (and other regulators) 
is important considering the importance of financial stability in Australia. It would 
be reasonable to expect that the Australian government would use the most 
effective regulatory tools that it has at its disposal for the benefit of the Australian 
people, and that it should deal appropriately with the effectiveness and 
accountability of the institution (or institutions) that is responsible for the 
protection of financial stability. 
 
Government to some extent assumes the role of both protector of and provider 
for the citizens. Accordingly, the Australian government should ensure that the 
regulatory framework it creates, or allows to develop, for a matter of national 
importance, is optimal, reflects good principles of regulation, and maximises the 
principles of the rule of law.56 This is particularly important in an area such as that 
of financial stability, where it is unlikely that regulation by the market alone would 
provide the desired welfare outcomes. The regulation of the financial stability 
regulators should reflect the significance of their task and the impact it may have 
on the Australian people.  
 
C Benefits of Legal Clarity and Certainty 
 
Legal and regulatory clarity is important, and legislation and/or other hard law 
assist with providing clarity and good governance and accountability. Clarity does 
not only come from legislation,57 however, but ‘[w]hen the legislation does not 
 
56 Government can be judged for a failure to properly regulate matters of public importance, as 
was the case after the collapse of HIH Insurance. ‘The Australian community had an 
expectation that corporate regulation, audit and good corporate governance should have 
triggered early warnings of any looming crisis. Public confidence has been shaken’: Brendan 
Bailey, Report of the Royal Commission into HIH Insurance (Research Note No 32, 




57 Clarity and certainty were for example introduced in relation to monetary policy by the 
introduction of inflation targeting, which did not form part of the RBA Act. Ian MacFarlane, then 
Governor of the RBA, noted that ‘[t]he reason for inflation targeting was in order for there to be 
proper accountability’: Ian J Macfarlane, ‘Monetary Policy and Financial Stability’ (Speech, 
CEDA Annual Dinner, Melbourne, 16 November 2004) 
<https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2004/dec/pdf/bu-1204-1.pdf>. 
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have clarity, different people will have different ideas’.58 It is perhaps inevitable 
that different central bank governors and boards will have different approaches 
to interpreting their mandate.59 Although it may not be possible to clearly legislate 
all aspects of financial stability, in alignment with Tucker’s design precepts, at 
least the fundamentals should be clear.  
 
The Australian government can give effect to its obligations to the Australian 
electorate in the regulation of the RBA for financial stability by creating a 
reasonable measure of clarity and certainty, and it could enhance the clarity and 
certainty about the roles and functions of the RBA as a well-governed and 
accountable regulatory agency. The Australian government should ensure that 
its agents act at a standard similar to (or better than) that of government. 
 
D Legal Formalism and Positivism or only a Legal Solution? 
 
This thesis argues that the regulatory framework of the RBA for its financial 
stability responsibility should be improved to not only reflect emerging best 
practice in the regulation of financial stability, but also to improve the legitimacy 
and credibility of the RBA as financial stability regulator, and give effect to the 
rule of law approach adopted in Australia. Tucker argues that what is de facto 
should also be recognised de iure.60 
 
Consideration should however be given to a possible fundamental question as to 
whether it matters if the regulatory framework of the RBA for financial stability is 
‘legally’ inadequate. Does it matter if the regulatory framework of the RBA for 
 
 
58 Ibid.  
 
59 Ibid: Macfarlane emphasized that the board in his time did not adopt a narrow interpretation.  
 
60 ‘Since unelected power needs framing carefully in democracies, the de facto position I have 
outlined should be recognized de jure’: Tucker (n 16). ‘ 
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financial stability is not ideal, or not optimal, if there have been no known negative 
practical consequences?  
 
From a pragmatic perspective, the RBA has performed its responsibilities 
adequately, and as there is no economic or financial evidence that the RBA’s 
framework should be amended, it may be argued that there is no need to do so. 
From a legal realist perspective, an express legal mandate and express legal 
‘checks and balances’ are not required in order to properly regulate the functions 
(including the powers and obligations) of the RBA in respect of financial stability. 
Not all regulation is the result of codification and legislation,61 and formal law does 
not necessarily best govern behaviour. ‘Law’ is not always necessary to reach 
the desired outcomes; other forces can have bigger or more effective regulatory 
power and effect. Legislation is also not enough for legitimacy.62  
 
However, from a public and regulatory perspective, the lessons of the GFC 
should not be ignored. The public expects that the government will take 
reasonable steps to guard against wide-scale economic distress, and in light of 
such potential crises, there is a positive duty on governments to use their 
regulatory tools appropriately.63 An overemphasis of legal formalism and formal 
legislation may however amount to a legal positivist approach. That is not the 
general approach adopted in Australia; instead, a more flexible approach of 
enabling legislation is preferred. It is also not the intention of this thesis and its 
recommendations to further a position of legal positivism. 
 
Good regulation however supports the rule of law, a fundamental tenet of 
Australian law. Good legislation and formal legal regulation are part of organised 
and civilised society, and supports democracy and the separation of powers 
principle. The absence of problems in the past offers no guarantee that future 
problems may not arise. Good law is a way that the present can take steps 
 
61 See Arie Freiberg, Regulation in Australia (Federation Press, 2017) 1, 11. 
 
62 See Tucker, ‘Unelected Power’ (n 46). 
 
63 ‘The state is designed to provide in the most efficient way public goods such as security’: Alon 
Harel, Why Law Matters (Oxford University Press, 2014) 3.  
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against future aberrations and mischievous or wayward individuals. The legal 
framework still matters for governance and accountability reasons. These are 
important as ‘[t]he Australian constitutional system of government is premised on 
a principle of accountability’. 64  ‘Government should not be arbitrary and 
uncontrolled, but act in the public interest and according to the rule of law’. 65 
Important accountability mechanisms established in the Constitution include 
elections, Parliamentary processes, and judicial oversight.66 
 
The present regulatory arrangements leave the RBA and the Australian 
government exposed. The RBA, if subjected to regulatory scrutiny, may be 
criticised for its interpretation of and approach to a vague (legally non-existent) 
mandate for financial stability. Similarly, the Australian government, in the event 
of a financial crisis where there are concerns about the performance by the RBA 
(or any of the other financial stability regulatory agencies), may be criticised for 
not using more effective and clear regulatory tools to regulate a matter that is of 
national interest to Australia.67 In finance, trust is important, and the credibility of 
the Australian financial system is the bedrock of the Australian economy, and by 
implication, the welfare of the Australian people. Financial stability is of the utmost 




64 John McMillan. ‘Commonwealth Oversight Arrangements: Re-Thinking the Separation of 








67 Governments have been judged by their responses to crises and the use of the legal tools 
they have available: See Julia Mahoney, ‘Takings, Legitimacy, and Emergency Action: Lessons 
from the Financial Crisis of 2008’ (2016) 23(2) George Mason Law Review 299. 
 
68 See David Gruen, ‘Towards an Efficient and Stable Financial System’ (Speech, CEDA State 




IV Summary of the Argument of the Thesis: Overview per 
Chapter 
 
The arguments presented through this thesis are now summarised with reference 
to the different chapters. 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the regulatory framework of the RBA for 
financial stability lacks essential hard law components that will increase the 
quality of the legal framework, especially in light of the governance and 
accountability of the RBA for its financial stability responsibilities.  
 
This thesis forms part of the academic conversation envisaged by Dr Guy 
Debelle, current Deputy Governor of the RBA, around financial stability regulatory 
frameworks of central banks. He effectively invited academic investigation, noting 
that the financial stability responsibility of central banks was a ‘hot topic’.69 Of 
particular relevance are questions of how and by whom the goal of financial 
stability had to be defined, and the independence of the central bank in 
determining the goals of financial stability.  
 
This thesis considers these issues to some extent and focusses on the 
fundamental legal issue of the responsibility of the RBA for financial stability, and 
the overall regulatory framework for financial stability. 
 
The contribution to knowledge that this thesis makes in particular is in the 
detailed critical analysis of the regulatory framework of the RBA’s financial 
stability responsibility. It demonstrates how the regulatory framework of the RBA 
for financial stability is deficient, and why, and it suggests the areas in which the 
framework can be improved, and why. To do so, this thesis has considered the 
 
69 Guy Debelle, ‘Central Bank Independence in Retrospect’ (Speech, Bank of England 
Independence: 20 Years On Conference, 28 September 2017) 




statutory and extra-statutory framework within which the RBA finds its mandate 
for financial stability and the factors that complicates this regulatory framework. 
 
Chapter 2 dealt with the concept of financial stability and concluded that it is an 
elusive concept. Requiring a regulatory agency to pursue financial stability 
involves a significant degree of interpretation and financial stability may mean 
different things at different times. The fact that the economics discipline lacks 
conclusive research in this area makes the creation of a statutory mandate for 
financial stability even more complex. In many instances, it is more pragmatic to 
avoid instability, rather than to strive for stability. From a regulatory perspective, 
the elusiveness of the concept creates difficulties. 
 
Chapter 3 dealt with the nature of a central bank as a regulator of financial 
stability. Not only is financial stability a complex, undefined concept, but a central 
bank is a unique type of institution, for whom a financial stability mandate may be 
challenging or problematic. Central banks are sui generis institutions. They are 
unique in their structures and roles, and in particular in relation to their 
independence, notwithstanding the performance of a highly important public 
policy function. The independence of central banks in the monetary policy arena 
(specifically for purposes of the effective conduct of monetary policy), as well as 
the potential for conflict and competition between the mandates for monetary 
policy and financial stability, make the governance of and accountability for the 
financial stability function more complex. The role of a central bank in financial 
stability is, despite the complications, also ideal, and it presents the best vehicle 
for the protection of financial stability, given the expertise and research 
capabilities of the central bank, and its system-wide focus. In fact, during and 
after the GFC, the importance of the financial stability mandate for central banks 
was emphasised by international authorities such as the FSB, BIS and IMF, and 
international political powerhouses such as the G20. Chapters 2 and 3 frame the 
nature of the RBA as a regulator and financial stability as the object of regulation 
and provide context to the rest of the investigation. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 analysed the financial stability responsibility of the RBA – a 
mandate that is both informal, and decentralised and shared. Chapter 4 dealt 
with the extent to which the RBA’s mandate for financial stability is informal. It 
demonstrated that the RBA has a limited express statutory responsibility for 
financial stability in the payments system area. Notwithstanding some references 
to ‘financial stability’ and ‘financial system stability’ in the relevant legislation, 
there is no concrete, clear, overarching mandate for financial stability in the RBA’s 
enabling legislation (hard law). The financial stability mandate can at best be 
implied generally from the enabling legislation, but the most important sources of 
the mandate – or confirmations of the mandate – come from informal documents 
and statements (soft law), and the mandate is implied and/or de facto.  
 
Chapter 5 dealt with the financial stability mandate of the RBA as a shared and 
decentralised mandate. The financial stability functions are shared between the 
RBA, APRA and the CFR (in the main, although other regulators like ASIC also 
play minor roles). Coordination, cooperation and collaboration between 
regulators are therefore of the utmost importance, and the CFR has been created 
to fulfil that need, as well as the need to enhance communication between the 
regulators. However, the CFR itself is an informal arrangement, relying on MOUs 
for its operation. The informality of the decentralised and shared aspect of the 
RBA’s responsibility was also emphasised. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 dealt with the manner in which the regulatory framework for 
financial stability does not create an optimal framework for control over the 
regulator’s actions, and leaves important gaps. Some of the governance and 
accountability measures of the RBA are general in nature, and are not exclusive 
to the financial stability function. These chapters described the various 
governance and accountability mechanisms of the RBA in its financial stability 
mandate. These are also summarised in Appendix 3. Chapters 6 and 7 concluded 
that notwithstanding the vast number of ‘controls and influences’, the paucity of 
hard law mechanisms for the regulation of financial stability left certain gaps in 
the governance and accountability frameworks, including for the possibility that 
behavioural factors (personality and prestige) could play a disproportionate role 
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in the control and influence of the RBA. The deficiencies are both in the mandate 
and in the additional governance and accountability mechanisms. 
 
Chapters 8 and 9 dealt with how these gaps in the regulatory framework, and in 
particular the arrangements for governance and accountability, may be 
addressed. Chapter 8 provided important considerations for adjusting the 
regulatory framework of the RBA. It stipulated the practical and theoretical 
imperatives for regulatory change. The need for an improvement to the regulatory 
framework for financial stability of the RBA does not just stem from the existence 
of threats to future financial stability, but also from the importance and likelihood 
of regulatory scrutiny. A further important consideration is the legitimacy of the 
RBA in its role as financial stability regulator, as well as conformity to the broad 
underlying principles of law in Australia, where legal frameworks should reflect 
the rule of law principles and regulatory agents should be appointed and 
mandated in accordance with democratic values. This chapter provided three 
practical lenses appropriate to the RBA as an institution, through which to 
consider possible amendments to the regulatory framework of the RBA. The first 
is emerging international best practice in the area of financial stability regulators. 
The benchmarks of emerging best practice in this field comprised 
recommendations by experts in relation to financial stability regulatory 
framework, recommendations by significant international institutions in the field, 
and also the actual regulatory frameworks implemented in the G20 countries. The 
regulatory framework of the RBA was shown to fall short. The second are the 
design precepts proposed by Paul Tucker for regulating central banks 
government agencies that are unelected powers. The regulatory framework in 
Australia also does not meet these precepts. Thirdly this chapter considered the 
possibility of the fourth branch of government imposing an accountability 
mechanism, but concluded that it may be ineffective because of the difficulty in 
overseeing policy, not just process.  
 
The only arm of government that would likely have any significant influence over 
or impact on the regulatory framework of the RBA for financial stability, is the 
legislative arm. It is suggested that Parliament should step in to improve the 
 377 
regulatory framework of the RBA for financial stability not just because of the 
existence of threats to future financial stability, but also because of the 
importance of regulatory scrutiny. Chapter 9 provided three key 
recommendations for legislative reform. These three recommendations will put 
the Australian legal framework on par with international best practice and will also 
satisfy the design precepts of Tucker. These are that the financial stability 
mandate should be formalised in legislation, that APRA’s obligations to cooperate 
with the RBA be codified, and that the CFR be incorporated as a separate council 
inside the RBA, resulting in a reorganisation of the corporate governance 
structures of the RBA, and reducing the role of the Governor. Chapters 8 and 9 
also provided rationales for the changes, including the need for legislative 
change, and Chapter 9 alluded to further possible changes that will require further 
research. The key legislative change involves the introduction of a legislative 
mandate for financial stability for the RBA as a minimum. Such a step will mitigate 
the problems associated with the informality but also the decentralised and 
shared nature of the mandate. It will also allow the currently inefficient 
governance, transparency and accountability mechanisms to be more efficient as 
governance tools. It will also improve the legal character of the financial stability 
role and support the legitimacy of the RBA as regulator and align with rule of law 
and democratic values. 
 
In conclusion, legislative action is needed to improve the regulatory framework. 
The balance between hard law and soft law mechanisms in the regulatory 
framework should be adjusted, in particular, by providing the RBA with an explicit 
statutory mandate for financial stability, clarifying the role between the RBA and 
the microprudential regulator in legislation, and through the formalisation of the 
role of the CFR inside the RBA.  
 
V Final Remarks 
 
The RBA currently has an uneasy mandate for financial stability. Although it may 
be well-established in practice, the financial stability mandate’s informality 
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together with its decentralised and shared nature, present a fundamental 
question: if there is no legal compulsion to pursue financial stability as an 
objective, or pursue it in a certain way, what drives the RBA to do so, and how 
can the Australian government can be assured that the RBA is pursuing financial 
stability in the desired manner? Governance and accountability issues arise 
because of gaps in the foundations of the financial stability responsibility and the 
hard law framework. The potential importance of behavioural factors that 
potentially fill the gaps – mainly personality and prestige (but also including power 
and peer pressure)– run contrary to the fundamental principles of Australian law, 
and should be curtailed. The choice of effective tools to regulate the regulator is 
important in consideration of the vital role of financial stability in Australia. It would 
be reasonable to expect that the Australian government in making its architectural 
choices for this public policy regime would use the most effective regulatory tools 
that it has at its disposal for the benefit of the Australian people, and should deal 
appropriately with the effectiveness and accountability of the institution (or 
institutions) that is responsible for the protection of financial stability. By doing so 
it will further legitimacy of the regulator, democratic principles and the rule of law. 
 
Jeremy Bentham noted that ‘uncertainty is of the very essence of every particle 
of law’.70 In areas of law that relate to matters of national interest and significant 
public importance, legal uncertainty, whilst it can never be completely avoided, 
should be rationalised and diminished. That is the task for Parliament to consider 




70 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Jonathan 
Bennett, 2017) 159 <https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/bentham1780.pdf>. The 
quotation that is widely attributed to Jeremy Bentham is that ‘[t]he power of the lawyer is in the 
uncertainty of the law’: See for example Alice C Linsley, ‘A Thumbnail Sketch of Jeremy 
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Appendix 1: RBA Hard Law Framework: Table of Legislation 
that Regulates the RBA and has an Impact on the Roles and 
Functions of the RBA in Relation to Financial Stability  
 
 
Legislation Importance/effect of the legislation and 
potential relevance to a financial stability 
mandate 
Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) This is the founding legislation of the RBA. It 
establishes the RBA and contains the RBA’s 
charter in s 10(2). It is the main source of the roles 
and responsibilities, powers and obligations of the 
RBA. It also creates the two boards of the RBA 
that are responsible overall for the RBA’s 
operations, namely the RBA Board and the PSB. 
 
This Act contains three references to financial 
stability in largely synonymous phrases, but this 
Act does not express an overarching mandate for 
financial stability for the RBA. All the references to 
financial stability considerations occur in relation 
to the duties of the PSB. The three references are 
in s 10B3(b)(iii), s 10B3(c) and s 25M. Sections 
10B3(b)(iii) and 10B3(c) refer to ‘stability of the 
financial system’ in relation to the functions of the 
PSB, whereas s 25M contains a broader 
reference to ‘Australia’s financial stability’ but it is 
still a reference limited to the functions of the 
PSB.  
Payment Systems (Regulation) 
Act 1998 (Cth) 
 
This Act gives regulatory powers to the RBA in 
connection with the payments system and 
payments system services providers.  The phrase 
‘financial stability’ appears in s 8 where it is 
described as a matter of ‘public interest’.1 
However, s 12 allows the RBA to determine its 
own obligations and/or actions with the use of the 
 
1 Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 s 8. Section 8 defines what ‘public interest’ means. In 
essence, something (in this instance, a payment system) would be ‘in the public interest’ if it is 
financially safe for use by the participants, and also efficient and competitive.  It should further 
not materially cause or contribute to risk in the system. In addition, the RBA is empowered to 
consider other matter – which presumably could include a range of financial stability issues – if 
it is relevant – but the RBA is not required to do so. 
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phrase ‘any other matters that the RBA thinks 
relevant’.2  
Payment Systems and Netting 
Act 1998 (Cth) 
 
 
This Act grants powers to the RBA with regard to 
the payments system. These are general powers 
that relate to the regulation of entities over which 
the PSB has regulatory authority, eg the power to 
approve netting arrangements.  
Although this Act does not refer to financial 
stability, it envisages that the RBA will be 
concerned about potential systemic risk and 
systemic disruption.3 Systemic risk has generally 
been considered a matter of importance because 
it can lead to financial instability. 
Financial Services Reform Act 
2001 (Cth) 
This Act provides the RBA with obligations and 
powers in relation to persons who hold a financial 
services licence. The RBA may determine 
‘financial stability standards’ in relation to 
providers of financial services, in terms of s 827D 
of the Corporation Act4. 
 
2 See s 12.  
 
3 The Act refers to ‘systemic risk’ or systemic disruptions in s 9 (emphasis added): 
“9 Reserve Bank may approve payment system  
(1) The Reserve Bank may, by legislative instrument, approve the system if it is satisfied that:  
(a)  systemic disruption in the financial system could result if a participant went into external 
administration and the system were not approved under this section;” 
“12 Reserve Bank may approve netting arrangement  
(1) The Reserve Bank may approve the arrangement if it is satisfied that:  
(a)  systemic disruption in the financial system could result if a participant went into external 
administration and the arrangement were not approved under this section; and  …” 
“15 Declaration that section 14 does not apply  
(1) The Reserve Bank may declare in writing that section 14 does not apply to a close-out 
netting contract if it is satisfied that systemic disruption in the financial system could result if a 
party to the contract went into external administration.” 
 
4 Financial Services Reform Act 2001 s 827D. It states: 
‘827D Reserve Bank may determine financial stability standards  
(1)  The Reserve Bank of Australia (the Reserve Bank) may, in writing, determine standards for 
the purposes of ensuring that CS facility licensees conduct their affairs in a way that causes or 
promotes overall stability in the Australian financial system.’ 
 
This legislation also added s 25M to the RBA Act. 
“25M Payments System Board’s report to the Minister  
(1) The Payments System Board must, as soon as practicable after 30 June in each year, 
prepare and give to the Minister a report that:  
(a) describes the standards determined under section 827D of the Corporations Act 2001 during 
the financial year ending on that 30 June; and  
(b)  describes any variations made to standards determined under that section that were in 
force during the financial year ending on that 30 June; and   
(c)  describes any revocations of standards determined under that section that were in force for 
part of the financial year ending on that 30 June; and  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Payment Systems (Regulation) 
Act 2006 (Cth) 
 
 
This piece of legislation contains no specific 
provision in relation to financial stability. 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) grants the RBA 
power to set standards for financial stability in 
s827D, effectively mirroring the provision in the 
Financial Services Reform Act 2001. 
 
The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) further includes 
as an objective ‘the reduction of systemic risk and 
the provision of fair and effective services by 
clearing and settlement facilities’.5 ‘To support this 
objective, the Act sets various obligations for 
providers of clearing and settlement facilities, and 
gives the RBA the power to set financial stability 
standards. It gives both the RBA and ASIC 
various powers relating to licensing, standard-
setting and direction over a provider of such 
facilities.’6  
Cheques Act 1986 (Cth) 
 
This Act contains no specific provision in relation 
to financial stability and places no specific 
obligation on the RBA in relation to financial 
stability. 
Public Governance, 
Performance and Accountability 
Act 2013 (Cth) 
 
This Act, which took effect on 1 July 2014, makes 
no mention of financial stability or any 
synonymous term, and does not place any unique 
obligations on the RBA. It also does not include 
any obligation to account for the exercise of a 
financial stability mandate. It replaces the 
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 
1997 which applied to the RBA previously. This 
Act applies to the RBA as a Commonwealth 
 
(d)  discusses developments in the clearing and settlement industry during the financial year 
ending on that 30 June that are relevant to Australia’s financial stability.”   
  
What is interesting is that financial services licensees should not threaten ‘overall stability in the 
Australian financial system’ and it is the task of the RBA to oversee that. It is interesting to 
consider what exactly financial stability means in that context. In this context it likely has to do 
with consumer issues. It is further interesting that in this regard consultation has been 
legislated.  
 
5 Reference legislation and also the APRA-RBA 2012 doc. 
 
6 Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Macroprudential 
Analysis and Policy in the Australian Financial Stability Framework (Report, September 2012) 
3<https://www.rba.gov.au/fin-stability/resources/2012-09-map-aus-fsf/pdf/2012-09-map-aus-
fsf.pdf> (emphasis added). 
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entity, and requires accountability from the RBA in 
respect of the use and management of public 
resources. 
Electronic Transactions Act 
1999 (Cth) 
This Act contains no specific provision in relation 
to financial stability. 
Banking Act 1959 (Cth) The Banking Act 1959 (Cth) is referred to in 
s 26(c) of the RBA Act, in the context of the RBA 
acting as a central bank. The Banking Act 1959 
(Cth)does not include any mandate for financial 
stability for the RBA.  
 
Under the Banking Act 1959 (Cth), APRA is 
authorised to revoke a corporation’s authority to 
conduct banking business if the corporation poses 
a risk to financial system stability in Australia 
s 9A(2)(ba). Section 11AB provides a similar 
authority in relation to NOHCs. Similarly, 
s 11CA(1)(k) authorises APRA to give directions 
to support financial system stability. Further the 
APRA is obliged to protect depositors and to 
promote financial system stability in Australia 
(s 12(1)). There are various related obligations in 
the Banking Act relating mostly to the preservation 
of financial stability in the event of the failure or 
potential failure of an institution under the 
supervision of the APRA.  
Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) 
 
This Act is referred to in the RBA Act, but the 
Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) has as its object the 
establishment of an apolitical and efficient public 
service, and focuses predominantly on 
employment issues in the public service. It does 







Appendix 2: Communication and Disclosure by the RBA as 
Sources of Control and Influence  
 
Table A Communication and disclosure by the RBA -
Summary of some key sources of control and influence 
through transparency 
 
This table summarises and groups together the different 








































• Minutes of 
the MPC 
 























Table B Ways in which the RBA’s actions are made 
transparent to the Australian public  
 
This table sets out the ways in which the RBA’s actions are made visible, and 
provides the vehicle through which the Australian public has access to that 
information. 
 
Vehicle through which the RBA’s 
actions are made transparent to the 
public 
 
Parliament Appearances and statements in 
Parliament 
 
Indirectly through accounting to, and 
providing information to Treasurer 
Press/media Reports by media ad hoc  










Appendix 3: Analytical Overview of Governance and Accountability Mechanisms and their 
Effectiveness as Controls and Drivers of the RBA’s Financial Stability Function 
 
This analysis categorises the controls and drivers of the RBA’s actions according to their key characteristics: 
• Whether they fall within the broad category of governance mechanisms and are therefore predominantly proactive in 
nature, or whether they fall into the category of accountability mechanisms, which includes transparency as part of 
accountability, and are therefore more ‘reactive’ in nature; 
• Whether their origin is in hard law or soft law, or non-legal. In this regard, hard law is taken to mean legislation and 
regulations that have binding legal effect, and soft law is considered to be quasi-legal instruments that either have no 
legally binding force but carries some other compulsion or have weaker legally binding effect. Non-legal origins have 
no direct connection with the law at all;  
• Whether their origin is public or private, and national or international; 
• Whether they have been assessed in the course of this research as being effective or not as regulatory mechanisms 
in the overall regulatory design. The regulatory driver will be considered to be ‘effective’ if it is a compelling driver in 
ensuring the RBA properly pursues financial stability as a regulator. 
 
The table below provides a list of the key controls and drivers of the RBA’s actions in relation to financial stability. This list 
demonstrates the extensive number of controls and drivers on the RBA but also that only a very small number of the formal 
hard law controls and drivers are actually directed at the financial stability function. There is a preponderance of soft law and 


















































RBA Act – BUT only an 
implied and de facto 
mandate 
 



















Governance Soft law Low 
 
There is no 
express financial 
stability mandate. 
In addition, the 
listed powers of 
the RBA do not 
include specific 
powers that relate 
directly to financial 
stability. 
 
Second reading speech of 





Governance Soft law Low 
 
The confirmation 
of an existing 
mandate of the 
RBA in a second 
reading speech of 
the legislation of a 
different regulator 
has little legal 
relevance and has 
been rated as low. 
The fact that the 
RBA attaches 
some significance 
to this document 
may however 



















Governance Hard law Low 
 
The RBA Board 
has no express 
financial stability 
mandate or role. 























power given to the 
position of the 
Governor in the 
RBA Act paves the 




in the RBA’s 
financial stability 
role, the Governor 

































Statements on the 











Soft law Low → Moderate 
 
The Statement on 






the RBA and since 
2010 a financial 
stability mandate 
was included. The 
effectiveness of 
this document is 
nevertheless 
ranked as 































Hard law Low 
 
These controls are 
general in nature 
and aimed more at 
internal 
governance of the 
RBA as a statutory 
corporation. 
Management practices in 


















Statement of Expectations 







Governance Soft law Low 
 
This statement is 
general in nature 







Legislation relation to 
cheques, banks, 
insurance, employment, 
tax, AML-CTF, etc 
 
The RBA is subject to a 
very long list of statutory 
obligations – it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to 
list them all. What is 
emphasized here is that 
notwithstanding an 
extensive statutory 
framework, a statutory 
framework for financial 











Hard law Low 
 
Largely irrelevant 









G20 meetings;  
BIS All Governor’s 
Meeting; 
Financial Stability Board 
(including Committee of 
Central Banks and 
Treasurers);  
Basel committee on Bank 
Supervision (with APRA);  
Other committees at BIS 
and Basel 



















constitute soft law, 
are not binding, 
and depend on 
voluntary adoption 






Various statutes (eg Tax, 
AML-CTF, Health and 
Safety, etc) 
 
The RBA is subject to a 
very long list of statutory 
obligations – it is beyond 







Transparency Hard law Low 
 
Largely irrelevant 




list them all. What is 
emphasized here is that 
notwithstanding an 
extensive statutory 
framework, a statutory 
framework for financial 
stability is lacking. 
 
























Statement on the Conduct 









Soft law Low 
 
Disclosure may be 
a deterrent, and it 
could possibly 
















Soft law Low 
 
These documents 
do not clearly 
address 
responsibilities in 
relation to financial 
stability. 
CFR – structure and 
cooperation, including the 









Soft law Low → moderate 
 
Although the CFR 
de facto is the 
main coordinating 
body for financial 
stability, as a 








Commissions of Inquiry; 




Transparency Hard law Low 
 
Both the actual 
report and the 




















they could also 
involve public 
censure. 
Financial Sector Advisory 
Council (not currently in 
operation) 






The nature of this 








The ANU Shadow 
Board’s comments 
can be construed 
as a form of 
criticism if it differs 
from the decisions 
of the RBA, but the 
effectiveness is 
low as the focus is 
monetary policy. 
Academic analysis and 
critique 







can involve a form 
of censure but on 
its own has a low 
driving effect as it 
has no legal basis. 
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Hard law Low 
 
The effectiveness 
is low because the 
legal framework is 
not express in 
imposing legal 
obligations, and to 
make out the 
elements of the 
tort of misfeasance 
in public office 
involves a high 
threshold. There is 
no possibility of a 
statutory breach as 
there are no 
express statutory 
obligations. 












Hard law Low 
 
Although actions of 
the RBA are open 
to judicial review, 
the acts in relation 
to financial stability 
would not be 
reviewable in 




issues or policy 
matters. The 
decisions of the 
RBA are outside of 
the purview of the 
courts in that 
respect. 
 
